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THE "MIDDLE" EAST

كذلك جعلناكم أمة وسطا

In English usage the term 'Middle East' is a convenient description for an area of the world which lies between the Far East and ourselves. Like the 'Middle West' on the American continent, as seen from the Atlantic States, the term originates only in geography. To Muslims, however, the whole area of Islam is a 'middle' or central 'nation' standing mid-way between the East and the West. There is a passage in Surah ii (v. 143 seq.) which comments on the perplexity of those who asked why the *Qiblah,* or direction of prayer, was changed from Jerusalem to Mecca, by declaring that "unto God belong the East and the West." It continues: "Thus We have made you a middle nation" adding as a reason, — "that ye may be witnesses unto mankind and that the apostle may be a witness unto you."

Numbers of recent Muslim writers have appealed frequently to this verse to sustain their interpretation of Islam today as mediating between the conflicts of the West and the East, and as bringing together in its society the true values of both the Communist and the capitalist worlds, while avoiding the excesses of both. The conception of an Islamic bloc as it presents itself to the thinkers and spokesmen of Muslim peoples lying between farther Asia and Europe is much more than a mere reaction to geography. It is an interpretation of how they see Islam in the spiritual tensions of a divided world.

Commentators on the passage down the centuries have varied considerably. To Al-Baiḍāwī the sense is moral rather than territorial. Muslims are balanced in mind and fair in action and do not run to extremes. Religious practice is, in the main, tempered by sanity and fanaticism is avoided. Such moderateness is characteristic of much of Muslim ethical theory, with its admiration for the Aristotelian notion of the 'mean' as identifying virtue.

It may, of course, be that the verse should be understood as calling attention to the disconnection of Islam. The change of *Qiblah,* as the rest of the passage indicates, was a test of the leadership of Muḥammad. He was to be followed whatever disquiet the abandonment of Jerusalem and the choice of Mecca, while still idolatrous, might occasion in Muslim hearts. Whether or not—which has been disputed—the original direction of prayer towards Jerusalem had meant an attitude of positive expectancy towards Jewry, its termination certainly marked

an increasing independence and self-sufficiency in Islam, and an assertive feeling of difference. Islam was poised for a future all its own of which Mecca, not Jerusalem, would be the religious centre and symbol.

But whatever the precise exegesis, this persuasion of Muslim distinctiveness, of moderateness and of detachment from the faults —Western and Communist—of the rest of the world, is strong and formative in Islam today. The Christian Church is called to minister to Muslims everywhere in all these attitudes of mind. What then is the essence of its witness to those who conceive themselves as 'a community in the middle'? If 'the Middle East' is thus far a concept, as well as a place, what has a universal Church to say to it?

Deep in the Christian understanding of men and human society is a faith as to solidarity—the solidarity of humanity in its waywardness and its need of redemption. The New Testament proclaimed that men were in a common predicament of selfishness, however varied might be the range and degree of their particular evils. The claim that "in Christ there is neither Jew nor Greek, neither bond nor free" was held to be true for diagnosis as well as for redemption. Salvation is never a territorial concept, whether our 'territory' be a Ruritania of our dreams, an ideal 'America' beyond the reach of evil-ridden Europe, or a staked-out preserve on some planet yet to be colonised. The evil that, in the last analysis, plagues the world of men, is not a regional thing: it is not finally social, or economic or political, but personal. The good society hinges on the transformation of man in himself. This truth is an act, not of criticism, but of witness. Indeed there are many in the Muslim world, who realise, as the years of new independence begin to lengthen, that salvation does not come simply with the long, and rightly, desired political change. Rather the very recession of 'Imperialism' gives occasion for the deeper discovery and ministry of the Christian truth that our 'astrayness' is our own and that salvation is more than political. In the final diagnosis there is no East and West, there is only 'Man.'

This leads on to the Christian's witness in love about the possibilities of Divine grace which take us beyond the Greek 'mean.' Some virtues, it is true, are identified by being moderate. But as many Muslim seers have understood, the love of God and man is not among them. The Early Church was not a community of moderates. The good life proclaimed in the New Testament is not the product of law or philosophy, since our need is for more than wisdom. It is the gift of God through redemption, received in obedience to His ever-present Holy Spirit.

Holding, as we must, these truths in the trust of love, how apposite to our duty is this Quranic reminder that a people who would witness must be 'in the midst.' How far we often stay from the centre of the fears, the hopes, the yearnings and the thoughts of men.

CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING AND ACTION IN THE NEAR EAST

It is always easier to point out problems than to indicate their solution. When a critic of the College comes into my office I have long since learned that the surest way to end his criticism is to say: "Well, Sir, what do you think we should do about it?" If suggesting cures is far more difficult than outlining ills that is something in the nature of the case. The more one knows of any situation the less ready one is to give answers. Moreover, any attempt to state a program of understanding and action in the Near East must be conditioned by the connections and capacities of the people in question. The members of a Mission Board having activities in the area, Point Four Personnel going out to work in Egypt or Iran, a Rotary Club in a Middle West town with no visible relationship to the Near East,—each of these would call for different treatment. Detailed and comprehensive answers, then, can only be given by differentiating between the various capacities of the readers involved.

In what follows five such different points of view will be taken up in turn. Let us first assume merely the interests of a number of American citizens, having no Church connections and not concerned about any Christian message, but only for American relationships in the area. If that is too political at least it can be got out of the way first. In the world of today, however, international affairs are the backdrop against which the drama of human life is being played out. Any small slip, either accidental or intentional, on the part of men in authority, may plunge us all into a condition of affairs where everything we call normal human life in the world would be upset. So there need be no apology for taking the political aspect first.

The question commonly asked—and that not only by strangers and foreigners—is not, Why is American policy in the Near East what it is? but rather the question, Is there any policy? Our policy should be more conscious, more continuous and more consistent. Many a young man in the Near East would be happy to support American policy if he knew what it was. In this field there is a more important point. It is that such policy as we do have should be firmly supported at home in America. There have been glaring examples of Senators and others pronouncing upon matters connected with Near Eastern countries and situations with entirely inadequate information and understanding of the local realities. Either they have failed to find access to reliable information or the State Department has failed to make it available for them.

American representatives abroad are on the whole good men, and the policy they can suggest is good policy, but the constitutional set-up is weak. The Constitution of the United States was framed in a period

when there were no foreign relations to speak of. The conduct of foreign affairs was put in the hands of the President as one of his minor and incidental duties. There has grown up a State Department to advise the President but whose authority turns upon the President's willingness to take its advice.

Related to this aspect of the problem is the lack of fundamental education in foreign affairs in the American public. The ignorance of the American people in view of their responsibilities in the world is truly alarming. Despite our impression that we are well informed, we do not think as the rest of the world thinks or see the rest of mankind as clearly as we should. If we are amateurs in the conduct of our international relations, it is the fault of the people rather than the experts. The United Nations Organisation is in need of more consistent American support. Too often, as in the case of the proposed Internationalisation of Jerusalem, American reluctance or refusal to take strong leadership has impeded progress. Similarly our major role in feeding the Arab refugees through the United Nations has not been sustained by vigorous political initiative towards an overall solution. Thus when the day inevitably comes and that feeding has to cease, all possible credit and gratitude for what has been generously done will be lost in the accusation that we are using starvation to coerce the Arabs. These are only examples of the intricate problems involved in foreign relations. A far more consistent policy is needed, more intelligent public support and far better co-ordination between the public, the Congress, the State Department and the White House.

But our theme has bearing beyond the duty of American citizenship. It must be set within the context of a world society. One day I met a Turk employed as an interpreter in the American Military Mission in Ankara. I asked him what kind of Americans were being sent abroad and what impression the Turks had of them. After paying all the compliments one could expect, he added that there was one thing more. "When an American goes abroad" he said, "he never remembers which is the foreigner." To the mind that is awakened beyond its immediate citizenship, the problems of the world are tremendous, and often seem insoluble. The American people constitute but seven per cent of the world's population yet they annually consume 46 % of the world's goods and services. At the other end of the scale, 38 % of the population of the world divide only three per cent of the annual productivity of the earth. A third of the world goes to bed hungry every night, and another third undernourished. There is a growing mal-adjustment of the things of this world, and what is more it is an accelerating process.

A century ago, Karl Marx, sitting among the files of the British Museum, worked out his theory based on his observations in Europe and Britain, that because of the Industrial Revolution, the poor would get progressively poorer and the rich progressively richer, until the

inevitable class war allowed the numerical superiority of the poor to prevail. He had reason to predict as he did. The process he described was under way. But Christian conscience and its works, social legislation, graded income tax, intervened. In England now there is no such poverty—and no such wealth—as there was in Marx's day. Marx has proved a bad prophet, at least in relation to England. There is a similar pattern disproving the inevitability of class war in America and many other countries. But in the world as a whole, the process Marx discerned is still going on. 1953 is said to have seen a rise of four per cent in the American standard of living, measured in terms of per capita income. But on the other side of the world, despite more industry and better government, the standard of living is going down. The average per capita income in one of the better governed Asiatic countries is 20 % below what it was twenty years ago. Increase in population is in part responsible for this general drop in living standards, though the same factor in America has not this effect. The British *Raj* in India was always burdened by the dilemma that improved public health standards and productively also brought increased population. Relative to America the countries on the other side of the world are getting steadily poorer. Is Karl Marx to be disproved only in England and vindicated in the Asian world? The same forces which prevailed to belie him in the former, should be active and vigorous in the whole world. Point Four and all such programs are a partial recognition of the disparity between America and most of the world. But are we willing to go further and deliberately lower the American standard of living?

Take, for example, Egypt's population problem. In that country there are twelve hundred people on every arable square mile. If the population of the United States were to be similarly compressed, every American in the United States would be living in North and South Carolina. In India every time the sun rises there are six thousand more Indians than the day before. China and Japan have similar problems. And the solution is not simply giving away goods. For in the last analysis the wealth of the United States is not the things that are moveable. In terms of moveable wealth which it would be worth while for a conqueror to carry away—since it would remain wealth—the country most worth invading is not America, but India. American wealth lies in skill and resources. Much of our duty lies in sharing the former. As responsible members of the human family we must think and live in the spirit of S. R. Lysaght's poem.

> "If love should count you worthy and should deign
> One day to seek your door and be your guest,
> Pause! ere you draw the bolt and bid him rest,
> If in your old content you would remain:
> For not alone he enters: in his train
> Are angels of the mist, the lonely guest,

Dreams of the unfulfilled and unpossessed,
And sorrow, and Life's immemorial pain.
He wakes desires you never may forget,
He shows you stars you never saw before,
He makes you share with him for evermore,
The burden of the world's divine regret.
How wise you were to open not! And yet,
How poor if you should turn him from the door." [1]

Perhaps we are already in the third category, that of membership in a Christian fellowship that is worldwide. Christianity has been defined as the fellowship of those who care. The Christian has the duty to seek facts, to extend consideration everywhere and to remember the bearing of his conduct upon all men. How are we represented abroad by books and films and tourists? What are our relations with foreign students among us, and how do we treat our own minorities? What control do we exercise on an irresponsible press?

A fourth category from which to consider the problems in the Near East is that which takes us into actual or potential leadership of organised Christian action within the general obligations of the Christian conscience. There are three duties which lie upon us in that organised capacity. The first is the duty to do our utmost in building a consciousness of the universal fellowship of Christian people. Call it the Church Universal, or call it the Ecumenical mind, the universal outreach in space and time of the Christian community. We claim membership in the Holy Catholic Church, neither denying the claim to others, nor allowing ourselves to be denied it. It is our duty to strengthen the World Council of Churches and kindred bodies. We must work for comity arrangements everywhere to halt shameful overlapping of denominational activities. The various types of Christian activity must be brought into harmony, or at least a reasonable degree of cooperation. Let us never assume that there is an iron curtain between us and any other Christian. We must work for fellowship across all lines, however strange, exacting or arduous it may be.

Secondly, if we are working members of the Christian organisation in the world we must fill the words "Mission" and "missionary" with new meaning or else change the terms. There is a certain feeling abroad that a "missionary" is necessarily some strange person. I have noticed that though I always insist that I am a missionary of the American Board, first, and in that capacity a College President, second, my Chairmen and hosts generally drop the missionary and introduce only the President! There is some significance in this attitude. It may well be a fair question whether being a missionary is a separate profession any more. Being a teacher in Egypt or a pastor in India

[1] Quoted from B. H. Streeter, Reality, London, 1926, p. 57.

is in many respects not now different from being a teacher in Ohio or a pastor in New Orleans. The term missionary should be interpreted afresh to the younger generation. We should certainly drop the distinction between home and foreign when we speak about missionary work, and bring all our terminology into closer relationship to the thinking of the churches and the problems of the world today.

This leads into a third duty, which is an enlargement of the concept of Christian work. Our aims in mission work must be as varied as the situations with which we have to deal. Our thinking must be in concrete terms. Each man's question must be met and to each man's situation we must speak. Wise as serpents, but harmless as doves, we must be all things to all men. There are at least five levels on which mission work must proceed in the Near East. There is the facing of common needs—the lowest common denominator of human life. I remember the phrase of an East German Pastor who led a group of refugees through the bitter years, 1945-46-47. "All we had in common then was the distress of being human." In the presence of calamity and catastrophe we do not ask the color, religion or ethics of the man we must help.

At the second level there is a great deal to be done in cooperation with those of faiths other than our own with whom we share certain common principles and purposes, in contrast to the secular world outside. There is much that we have in common with a conscientious Muslim, or Buddhist or Confucian. We may well serve with such to work against social vice in any city of the East that organises a committee for the purpose, without any implication of criticism of his religion or conspiracy for ours. We work together as believers in one God and as holding in common basic ethical principles. But we cannot stop there. We do not imply any incipient Bahaism or suggest that all religions are equally worthy or that controversy between them has no meaning.

Our third duty is the cultivation of Christian ideals in those who are receptive to them. There are a surprising number of such persons everywhere in the world. Teaching ethics classes in Aleppo College, I have been amazed at the appeal of what are historically Christian ethical ideas, so long as they are not clothed in ecclesiastical form. Many over the world are hungry for the things of the spirit and we should be glad for that searching, whatever labels it may bear. When the average man of another faith is relaxed and not self-defensive, or under criticism, he is surprisingly willing to admit that he wishes he had more than his own clergy can give him. There is anti-clericalism East as well as West. There is much turning to dervish orders or to other sects to try to find the answer to the inward search beyond what is wanting in the conventional forms of religion. This is less a mark of poverty in organised religion than an evidence of the vitality of individual spiritual life everywhere. In this sense we may be all things

to all men and encourage every man to seek the best that is in his own heart.

There is the level beyond this—that of definite fellowship among Christians and also among those who are interested in Christian things. The term "Christian" can be so readily misunderstood in the Near East so as to amount to an unthinkable proposition for a Muslim. But what may be called "lovers of Jesus" is a different thing. We should be ready to recognise all that impedes membership in the Church Universal as well as all that, sometimes disconcertingly, leads towards it. Then there is the fifth level—the traditionally 'missionary' work:—the task of gathering converts into little communities, building up churches and establishing them in larger groups until you have at last a self-supporting, self-governing and self-propagating Church. We need large-mindedness here too, recognising the Orthodox Church, and being anxious to comprehend also the Roman Catholic in the definition, as well as making room for those "lovers of Jesus" who may not fit into our terminology or organise themselves in ways familiar to us. Let us deny to none the right to believe that the Spirit of God is at work in their hearts, as in ours. As leaders in the Christian enterprise we must rise above the notion that everything must fit into tidy categories, that conditions will always be stable, that everything is either black or white, right or wrong. If we are involved in constant uncertainties that is life itself. Life, not least in the Church and the Near East, is like a raft. Your feet may be always wet, but you do not sink. The Christian Church today has to be willing to think in such terms as "post Christian Europe." There is the possibility that we are yet living in the "pre-Christian world." Let us not ask for categories that are too fixed. Let us be ever receptive to new ideas.

These are our five levels of action. There remains the fifth category in the analysis of capacities with which we began. What of those who are committed to full time Christian service and are able to influence others to the like commitment? There is a constant need for men and women to live out the whole area of understanding, everywhere in the world. We may differ in how our motives are defined, whether we go because we are 'called of God' or whether we go 'to share.' Terms vary, but there is ever the need of human life to serve as a bridge between one culture or one civilization and another. It is important that Point Four personnel, and staffs of independent Colleges and Universities shall be competent men and women of Christian background. And the world-wide work of the Church through its own mission Boards is ever dependent upon a supply of the right kind of people. Far more depends upon the kind of people who go than upon the amount of money the Churches may give to send them. There are vacancies in important spheres all over the world for lack of people ready to fill them. There is no substitute for personal contact. Just as water comes in rain from the clouds drop by drop and flows through

many channels, but does not fulfill its purpose until again, drop by drop, it reaches the roots of plants and trees that are thirsty for it, so Christian work begins with the individual conscience and no matter what the channels of Churches, Boards or institutions may be, it has to reach the other side of the world in personal contact with individuals one by one. There are perhaps three qualities in particular worthy of mention which must be found in those who would serve the world mission. They are, beyond the obvious need of great Christian conviction, good health and an understanding of the spirit as well as the letter of Christian teaching. Dr. Paul Harrison, of Arabia fame and one of the greatest missionaries of the generation now passing, once said that the first essential of the good missionary is that he have such a measure of the grace of God as to be comfortable to live with. That means adaptability. In the second place there must be a liking for people. It is no use saying in the words of Ednan St. Vincent Millet: "I love humanity but I hate people." It is easy to say you love those whom you have never seen. But to like them when among them is another thing and demands understanding and knowledge. Thirdly, any one who thinks to serve the cause of Christ in any capacity abroad must be competent in his own field. No ill-prepared half-measures will suffice in the modern world. Thorough and adequate preparations are alone sufficient, and even that with a willingness to learn and to go on learning.

Whatever the category of our interest or the area of our competence, it is clear that the problems of the Near East cannot be solved without a new approach to the problems of the world as a whole. Neither will be solved until thought and work, understanding and devotion are spent upon them by individual Christians. In the ultimate analysis, what works is the single, personal contribution of thought, effort, imagination and devotion. The Near East and the whole world are in desperate need of such devotion as Horatius Bonar has described:

"O turn me, mould me, mellow me for use!
Pervade my being with Thy vital force,
That this else inexpressive life of mine
May become eloquent and full of power,
Impregnated with life and strength divine...
I cannot raise the dead, nor from this soil
Pluck precious dust, nor bid the sleepers wake,
Nor still the storm, nor bind the lightning back,
Nor muffle up the thunder,
Nor bind the evil One, nor bid the chain
Fall from creation's long-enfettered limbs:
But I can live a life that tells on other lives, and makes
This world less full of evil and of pain—
A life which like a pebble dropped at sea
Sends its wide circles to a hundred shores.

Let such be mine, Creator of true life!
Thyself the life Thou givest, give Thyself,
That Thou mayest dwell in me, and I in Thee." [2]

Aleppo College, Syria ALFORD CARLETON

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[2] Quoted from R. E. Speer, Five Minutes a Day, The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1943, p. 53.

A TURKISH ACCOUNT OF ORIENTALISM

The following corrections should be made in the article appearing in October, 1953, Vol. xliii, No. 4, pp. 260-282, under the above title. It will be remembered that Professors Niyazi Berkes and Howard A. Reed, of the Institute of Islamic Studies in Montreal, presented a translation of Dr. A. Adnan-Adïvar's Introduction to the Turkish *Encyclopaedia of Islam.* The Editor accepts responsibility for those alterations which are not later changes.

Encyclopaedia (not: *Encyclopedia*) is the spelling followed by the original publication of which the Turkish edition was largely a translation.

p. 260, line 23; read Matbaası for Matbassï.
p. 261, line 9; delete square brackets and contents.
p. 265, line 9; read ambassador for embassy.
p. 268, line 2; read Istanbul for Istabul.
p. 272, line 7; read Mehmed for Mehemed
p. 273, line 4; read Litteratur for Literatur.
line 14; read M. Th. Houtsma for M. R. Houtsma.
p. 278, line 2 from foot; read Dictionary of Proper Names for Dictionary of Great Names.
p. 278, last line; read 1888 for 1899.

THE RURAL FACTOR

A PAPER PRESENTED TO THE COLLOQUIUM ON ISLAMIC CULTURE

The Muslim world covers extensive areas of the globe which we commonly refer to as the East. The millions of human beings who live in this vast region are predominantly rural folk and nomadic life as well as the various types of settled agricultural pursuits constitute their chief occupations. Thus in seeking to comprehend Islamic culture in its relation to the contemporary world, one must have some understanding of its major component—the rural community. As we go deeper into this matter, we need to understand that tremendous progress made by all branches of science in recent years is the result of fundamental knowledge enjoyed by Eastern scholars centuries ago. These facts are too well known to require repetition but in this instance they provide an appropriate introduction to the discussion that follows.

If in this the second half of the 20th century, the West is in a position to send to the Muslim world the latest scientific techniques for preventing and curing human disease, controlling farm pests, increasing food production (to mention but three examples), it is only a partial repayment on a debt of long standing. Exchange of information is a two-way proposition. Nor is this movement limited to one direction during a given era with the flow of knowledge reversed in another generation. There is in reality a constant interchange of ideas. But the pressure today is mainly from the West to the East. The resulting social revolution appears to be causing the greatest stir among the long-neglected rural people with noticeable repercussions in many parts of the world.

Throughout most Islamic areas the two societies—the rural and the urban—are quite separate and distinct. Of the two the largest and most extensive is the rural. In every Eastern State those who till the soil and tend the flocks make up the majority of the population with the proportion ranging from 75 to 95 per cent. The economy of whole nations in this section of the world is based in large part on the efforts of these producers. This fact is sometimes overlooked when considering national and international problems.

We hear much these days about the relation of oil to the economy of the new Middle East. There is no doubt of the increasing importance of this commodity for all concerned with its extraction from the earth, its processing, its distribution and its use both for war and for peaceful pursuits. Nevertheless not as much of the revenue from this product seeps down to the general population as one might assume. Thus when a nation like Iran was expected to suffer immediate economic collapse from the loss of its valuable petroleum exports, the calamity did not occur with the speed that had been predicted; and

the world was surprised. The backbone of Iran is still the peasant group who constitute a high percentage of the population and whose combined efforts contribute largely to the basic economy of the country. To view the matter from another angle one can readily see how advantageous it is to improve the economic health of the rural community as a means of raising the standard of living throughout the whole society. This, in fact, should be a major objective in all effort to improve conditions in regions that are presently underdeveloped.

In the cities there is poverty, of course, and often of a sort that is more appalling than anything to be found in the rural districts. But in every country the amenities of civilization tend to become concentrated in the main centers of population. Here we find most of the schools, hospitals, libraries, cultural centers, recreation and entertainment both wholesome and bad. Moreover, it has usually been the practice, at least until recently, to focus on the urban areas the various manifestations of Western philanthropy from medical assistance to educational effort. A totally different way of life—of living, thinking and acting—develops in the city even among those who are too poor to avail themselves of any of the opportunities just listed. There is in general a lack of understanding of the rural point of view and philosophy of life and a lack of appreciation of the hardships which the peasant faces, his wonderful ability to survive with limited resources, his native wisdom and intelligence notwithstanding his high rate of illiteracy.

Some of the reasons for these sharp distinctions between two major segments of the same society are fairly obvious. Collectively it is a matter of simple economics. Through centuries of use the natural fertility of the land became exhausted, forested mountain sides were denuded and the unprotected soil eroded into the rivers. Eventually the moving silt was deposited again to transform productive fields into swamps. Mosquitoes bred, malaria developed among the inhabitants of the region and a people who were already poor and undernourished found themselves with less vitality than ever for the battle to survive.

The cumulative effect of this tragic cycle is to deplete slowly but surely the total resources of the nation. More and more the dwindling capital remains in or is diverted to the cities. The lack of a sound national economy based on rural prosperity, is reflected in the absence of good roads, transportation facilities and modern systems of communication. This handicaps still further the free movement of people and the exchange of information and leaves the farming communities more isolated than ever.

Other related factors of a sociological and psychological nature contribute to the gap between rural and urban life and share in retarding the reconstruction of a handicapped country. In areas of poverty competition for existence is keen and class distinctions develop. Extending

educational opportunities does not always help to lessen this problem especially when the emphasis is on higher education before broadening the base. After all, it was just a few years ago when only those who had the means with which to purchase this commodity could secure any schooling. With education becoming more universal there remains for a time a tendency to view formal training of any kind as a means of attaining a higher social status, of getting away from manual labor and social service as well. Related to all of this is the fact that those who have enjoyed a good education generally insist on applying their knowledge and skills in an urban environment instead of going out to the isolated regions where the need is greatest.

There is a similarity between the situation as it exists today in many parts of the East and that of America fifty or sixty years ago. In those days there were no radios and few good highways, automobiles, or telephones to break down the barriers between town and country. The farmer was easily identified in the city while the townsman in a farming community was the object of joking remarks. But America had the advantage of expanding frontiers and vast unexploited resources. It paid to work hard, to be thrifty; and so it came about that it was considered proper to be known for these qualities. The benefits of the rich heritage in America began to be felt just as science reached a high point in its development offering many material things to mankind whenever there was money to pay for them. Roads, automobiles, telephones, radio and now television have molded town and country into one to the equal advantage of both groups.

While this fortunate combination of circumstances is lacking today in many parts of the East there are factors in the situation which may well result in improving rural conditions much more rapidly than was the case in America. For example, the application of the science developed to such a high point in the well financed laboratories of the West may be capable of reviving and renewing some of the dwindling resources of the East and so help to return many of these areas to the levels of prosperity which they enjoyed centuries ago.

There are other hopeful aspects. New ideas, when they are workable and sound, spread rapidly from family to family among people who live in closely knit settlements rather than on scattered farmsteads as in this country. There is also the common bond of a predominating religion with its pastoral flavor and its emphasis on helping the needy. Many years devoted to problems of rural reconstruction in the Near and Middle East have convinced the writer that not only is it possible today to bring about tremendous improvement in areas that have long been neglected but that this can be accomplished at a fairly rapid rate. Improved farm practices that are basically sound and adapted to local conditions are readily accepted by the conservative peasant. This fact has been demonstrated many times in the writer's experience. When the cautious, hard-working peasant discovers, fre-

quently to his surprise, that community leaders are sympathetic, understanding and practical, his response is enthusiastic. With the prevailing situation, whatever it may be, as the point of departure and the initial support of the few who develop faith in the improvements recommended, results soon appear and gather momentum. It is not among the aims of this paper to attempt to list the procedures involved in raising the level of life of underdeveloped areas of the world, but rather to suggest a few of the points which we consider especially important. These are intended primarily for leaders who undertake the challenge of revitalizing their own rural society in order that the whole nation may prosper and thus assume a more important place in the affairs of this modern world.

I. PROVIDE FOR THE RURAL POPULATION AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF EXTENSION EDUCATION

A number of countries claiming to have such a service are actually maintaining only regulatory activities. There are laws on the statute books which are intended to control irrigation, the spread of plant and animal disease, the disposition of certain kinds of crop seeds. All of this is important for the protection and development of farming but it does not take the place of an educational program.

In the United States where the ratio of farmers to the total population is now not more than 16 per cent, it is considered essential to maintain a sound agricultural industry as one means of protecting the economic health of the nation. To this end a bureau is operated to provide farmers and their families with the latest and most up-to-date information pertaining to their daily needs. This, in fact, is considered one of the responsibilities of a modern state. A service of this kind would appear to be particularly essential in territory that is economically underdeveloped and where agricultural pursuits constitute the chief activity of a predominantly rural population.

In late 1949, a demonstration in rural community improvement was launched in the little village Qabr-al-Sitt located about fifteen kilometers from Damascus. Qabr-al-Sitt is a typical farming community of the area with about 800 fellaḥīn struggling for an existence. Although in a rather isolated spot entirely off the main highways, this little community has a special significance for a large part of the Muslim world. Here at the edge of the village is the tomb of Sitt Zaynab, niece of the prophet Muḥammed. Shī-ᶜite Muslims by the thousands make pilgrimages to this holy spot from all over the Islamic world. The quarters inside the enclosure can accommodate only a few dozen persons and so in certain seasons the pilgrims overflow into the orchards and fields of the surrounding countryside, sleeping in the open, under trees and along the irrigation streams.

A community-minded, agriculturally trained young Arab by the

name of Fu'ād Faraj went to live in Qabr-al-Sitt. Until he could find permanent quarters in the village, the religious leader in charge of the shrine gave Fu'ād the use of one of the rooms usually reserved for pilgrims. By the spring of 1950 a modest program began to emerge. Faraj looked for improvements, to be introduced among the farmers, which were simple, easy to apply and adapted to local conditions. He knew from previous experience in the Lebanon that a number of these innovations combined could be made to have a tremendous beneficial effect on the economy of the whole village. It is unnecessary in this paper to explain what these recommendations were, how they were introduced or in what order. It is sufficient to state that in 1952, after only two years and three cropping seasons of effort, the improved practices which were applied to just two of the traditional farm enterprises of this community increased the total income by L.S. 103,000. Translated into American currency at the rather low free market rate this is equivalent to $ 28,600 which is a great deal of money for a community like Qabr-al-Sitt.

Increased production and higher income were immediately translated into better living in a number of ways. With the active cooperation of the people the village has been completely DDTed to eliminate flies and mosquitoes, the streets have been drained, a young men's club organized, evening classes in reading and writing for illiterate adults conducted, a cooperative formed. The villagers contributed land, labor and cash in the amount of L.S. $ 3,000 to construct a new building for the cooperative society which operated during its first year or so in an old shed. The new structure includes living quarters and an office for their greatly beloved extension leader.

Last year with their economy and their health already greatly improved as a result of the efforts of this practical leader, the men of this man's world began to think of the needs of their womenfolk. This was just what Fu'ad Faraj had been waiting for. The suggestion was referred to the home welfare department of the organization responsible for this work and a program for women and children was launched. It operates from quarters which the village provides rent free. The project described is one segment of a demonstration reaching 62 villages with a total population of 26,000. It is typical of scores of other equally effective efforts which could be presented. Rural people almost everywhere react promptly and aggressively and effectively in improving their own conditions when there is someone with intelligence and good common sense to lead them.

II. LEADERSHIP AND IMPROVEMENTS SUITED TO LOCAL CONDITIONS

Any practice suggested for increasing production—whether a farm implement, a new crop, or a fertilizer—must not only be suitable for the soil, climate and other environmental conditions but economically

feasible as well. A certain piece of machinery may increase the harvest but if the cost of the implement is beyond the means of the peasant and especially if the resulting increase in yield is not sufficient to pay for this investment, then the recommendation is entirely unsound however good it may seem to be to the leader. A corollary of this principle might be to avoid accepting, without careful appraisal, either methods or procedures used in the Western world.

A detail of this kind may appear to be rather inappropriate or quite unnecessary for this discussion since it can be assumed that we are directing our remarks primarily to Eastern leaders who are well informed on local conditions. But even they are liable to recommend for the East the same procedures and practices that are followed in America. Perhaps they have gone to a Western university for their advanced training and come away admiring the things they have seen. Possibly they studied agriculture or home economics in one of their own schools or colleges where the professors were Western trained or the text books were imported from outside. Whatever the reasons, —and they are numerous,—suggestions are often made which the peasant himself knows are wholly impractical or, if he is not at first aware of this fact, he soon finds it out to his sorrow. And the next time he is more sceptical than ever of a new idea even if it happens to be sound.

This business of adapting improvements to local conditions, even when they are basically sound, presents unexpected problems. Certain agricultural leaders in Iran decided recently it was important to develop an inexpensive steel plough that could be drawn by oxen and which would do a better job than the old wooden stick. Many months were devoted to this seemingly simple project. Hundreds of different types of small steel ploughs were studied and tested and discarded. The angle of the beam had to be just right, the mouldboard of the proper size and curvature, the hitch had to be suitable for oxen and the tool one which could easily be duplicated in the local market and inexpensive enough for the peasant to buy. Finally all of these refinements were incorporated and a rather efficient implement for turning the soil was produced.

It was then that it was discovered there was still another hurdle to be cleared—training the oxen to pull a steel plough. It had never occurred to me that the wooden plough makes no furrow but merely scratches the soil. It is really a form of harrow and does a fairly good job when the field is gone over a number of times. But the steel plough makes a furrow and one partner of the ox team must always walk in this depression. It takes time and patience but the animals can be taught to do this. Once the art is mastered it is equally difficult for an ox to unlearn his newly acquired skill.

One day I attended a demonstration which aimed to show the superiority of the new steel plough over the old wooden stick. Un-

fortunately the extension leader neglected to prepare himself with two yokes of oxen. The farmer went around the field several times with the mouldboard plough and did a good job. He then switched to the old-fashioned tool to show the difference. But the situation was made ludricrous by the fact that the oxen insisted on wandering all over the field in spite of every attempt to keep them on a straight line. They had lately been taught to follow the furrow and there was no furrow to be found. As a consequence the poor beasts were utterly lost. What was intended as a serious demonstration turned out to be good comedy.

How to provide the kind of leadership that is capable of dealing with rural problems in this manner is too extensive a subject for this paper [1]. It is sufficient to state that the farming community itself is the source of much of the wisdom and intelligence which are necessary in both planning and executing aggressive programs of improvement. It is also the chief source of the leadership which is essential in conducting activities of this kind. Such leaders are developed largely through intensive, systematic programs of in-service training.

III. RAISE EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS GRADUALLY

It is my observation that Easterners who are educated, aggressive and anxious to see their country get ahead frequently want to jump a number of hurdles at one time instead of moving forward step by step. It is important to keep in mind, however, that a certain amount of evolution cannot be avoided (in fact, is essential) even though it may be greatly speeded up. This applies with particular force to the field of education.

It was only fifty or sixty years ago in America (in fact much less than that in certain parts of the country) when a young man who had finished the one-room one-teacher country school of seven or eight grades could return the next year as instructor. The chief requirement for the position was that he be husky enough to lick the biggest boys in the school; to be able, in other words, to maintain what was considered to be proper discipline. Many of these pioneer schoolmasters through constant study, frequent refresher courses and by passing periodic examinations, not only continued in the work for a lifetime but rose high in the profession.

Gradually, as schools were established throughout the country, the requirements for teaching were raised without seriously handicapping the spread of education. In a comparatively short time two years of high school training beyond the elementary grades were required to qualify for a teaching position; then graduation from high school;

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[1] Those who are interested in pursuing this subject further are referred to *Rural reconstruction in Action,* by H. B. Allen, Cornell University Press, 1953. Chapter X.

still later two years of normal training beyond the secondary grades. Today it is necessary, in most states, to complete four years of college and hold at least a bachelor's degree to qualify for teaching in a rural school. To raise the requirements to the present level at the very beginning not only would have been quite illogical but would have hampered the whole national development in providing schools for the people.

The same evolutionary process is appropriate for many parts of the world today. But it is more difficult perhaps to hold to such a procedure when scholars everywhere are well acquainted with the so-called modern, progressive methods of education including those related to the preparation of teachers and extension leaders. As a matter of fact, some of this is not necessarily "progressive" for every place in the world. It might be more accurate to say that it represents a good adaptation to a particular situation although if we were inclined to be less charitable to ourselves, we might explain that some of these "standards" are tinged with extravagance even for a country with ample resources.

An excellent example of this evolutionary process currently operating is found in Iran. In 1946 a fairly typical area of 35 villages was selected for a demonstration in rural improvement in that country. Since there were only two schools in the area and the adult population was almost 100 per cent illiterate, it was decided that elementary grades for the children and evening classes for illiterate adults must be included as a part of the comprehensive approach to the over-all problem. When it came to the question of teachers, it was found that the graduates of the Faculty of Education at the University of Tehran would not go out into these primitive villages to teach. A few who attempted to do this were quite unsuccessful and very unhappy. This was true also of the graduates of the normal training school. In fact, with plenty of opportunities in the cities and larger towns of the country a university or normal school graduate did not need to go into the remote areas to ensure himself of a position.

Numerous conferences with the Minister of Education finally resulted in an agreement making it possible to engage as schoolmasters village boys whose chief qualification was that they had somewhere learned the three Rs. Assigned to newly established schools around the district they were brought together every Thursday, before the Muslim Sabbath, to be given intensive instruction both in methods of teaching and in the subject matter itself of which they possessed but limited knowledge. They were also taught a few basic principles of agriculture and sanitation. Their progress was rapid and they soon became skilled teachers and good community leaders. Soon the Ministry of Education requested the organization which was promoting this work in cooperation with the government to train teachers in this setting in order that other schools in various parts of the country might be more

rapidly established. Accordingly village boys with six grades of education were given one year of special preparation for teaching. Thus the program moved from on-the-job, in-service training for the first workers to very elementary pre-service instruction in the same rural setting. Today, only five years after the start of this project, over 200 young men have been turned out as village schoolmasters and all of them have positions. Some have moved on up to become principals of multiple-teacher schools while others have gone out as community extension leaders; a few are supervisors of villages under the Shah's land reform program. The school was recently enlarged to take care of an annual enrollment of 200. Eventually as village teachers are supplied through this and similar training centers scattered over the country educational standards will be raised. In this manner Iran is improving rural life much more rapidly and more effectively than if she had attempted to duplicate Western educational standards of today.

IV. PROPER POLICIES OF STUDY ABROAD

One of the post-war developments which has caused me increasing concern is that of sending young people from Eastern countries to America for undergraduate study. In my opinion this represents a most unfortunate trend. It would seem to me that leaders in the Islamic world should be quick to see this and take steps to hold this practice to reasonable proportions. Adolescents who have not completed basic education available in their own country nor engaged seriously in any vocational or professional activity are quite unable to interpret properly their own cultural heritage. Moreover, it is difficult for a person to appraise and assimilate the best of a foreign society if he is too young and too inexperienced to know thoroughly the environment from which he himself came. Lack of professional experience makes it difficult, if not impossible, for one to be discriminating in his studies, to seek out and then concentrate on those subjects which have a particular application in his own country.

Students who lack this background are quite naturally influenced, as they should be, by all of the good things which they see. If their studies are in a technical field such as agriculture or extension education, they are undoubtedly impressed with the application of these methods and the results that are secured. With these favorable observations they return home (if they have not decided in the meantime to remain in the West) to carry out those procedures which they have seen so effectively applied. Unfortunately, the results are often disastrous and, to make matters worse, these graduates of a good Western university are quite unable to understand why their "modern" ideas fail to work. They cannot perceive why their friends and associates are not as enthusiastic about some of their schemes as they are. In the end they become frustrated and lost to their own country as far as useful service is concerned.

On the other hand there are many examples of how a mature, experienced person with the education that is available in his own country derives tremendous benefit from foreign study. He serves effectively as an ambassador of his own nation, culturally and professionally. He is anxious to gain new ideas, to improve his knowledge, skills and techniques, to do more effectively, more efficiently the work he had been doing before. He approaches his studies with the desire and the ability to derive the utmost out of them. He quickly eliminates those subjects which have little or no application in his own environment. Having secured the latest information in his professional field, he is anxious to return home to apply what he has learned.

Among the many illustrations of this important point that come quickly to mind is that of a young man who recently returned to Iran after a year of study in agricultural engineering at the University of California. He had been engaged in agricultural work of an engineering nature for five or six years before coming to America. His formal education was barely the equivalent of four years of college work but his maturity, general knowledge and experience resulted in his classification as a graduate student and enabled him to secure his Master's degree in one year of study.

When this Iranian student was given the laboratory assignment of testing the strength of certain varieties of wood for construction purposes, he pointed out that the samples provided were not commonly found in Iran and that this experiment would have no particular value for him or his country. His professors saw the point and agreed that he should secure specimens common to Iran. With the aid of good friends and modern air transportation he was soon testing in the laboratory the strength of wood samples imported from Iran. The result is that from this original research important contributions have been made to scientific knowledge in America and information secured which will prove increasingly valuable to Iran.

The rural community is an exceedingly important element in every Eastern society. For this reason, apart from all others, it must be made healthy, virile and productive. Only when this is achieved, as it can be with the means that are available today, is it possible for Islamic culture to make its maximum contribution to the contemporary world.

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TURKISH ISLAM

To the sympathetic westerner who attempts to describe the status and role of religion in the modern Turkish Republic, Turkish Islam presents a paradox. On the one hand the population of the country is more than 98 per cent Muslim: on the other hand the prevalent tenor of thought and action among almost all upper-class Turks is strikingly secular and western. Even among the uneducated, lower classes of Turkey many features characteristic of the life of other, and numerically less completely Muslim lands are lacking.

The sympathetic non-Turkish Muslim who investigates Turkish Islam is likely to be even more perplexed. He may come away with the conviction that Turkey no longer deserves to be called a Muslim land, but is simply heathen. To him, Turkish protestations that "we, as individuals, are devout and good Muslims" may ring entirely false, because in Turkey he will miss so many of the values which he regards as basic to any Muslim society.

Insight into the seemingly anomalous status and role of Islam in today's Turkey must begin with a recapitulation of what happened to religion in that country in the 1920's. That decade, for the educated upper-class Turk, was a period of turmoil and of violent, revolutionary change. The Ottoman Empire had finally been lost. Rightly or wrongly, the loss was in large measure attributed to the formal Muslim institutions which had so long clustered around the Sultan-Caliph's throne—the entire edifice of the Ottoman *ʿUlamāʾ* under the Shaikh-ul-Islam. Although since 1800 the westernizing Sultans had done much, and the less visible but more potent influences of the west as they worked on upper-class individuals had done far more, to shake the formal Ottoman-Muslim institutions, those institutions had persisted and had continued to be of importance in education, in law, and in other aspects of life. Now, under Ataturk's strong leadership, the totality of those formal Ottoman-Muslim institutions was speedily discarded, and this aspect of Islam became, in official ideology, the chains of the dead past with which the Turks had too long bound themselves. Not only were the *ʿUlamāʾ* deprived of power, prestige, and money, no provision for the education of future *ʿUlamāʾ* was made. As a result, Turkey today possesses no sizable group of educated, upperclass Muslim clergy.

With one exception, correspondingly violent measures were not taken against the religious institutions of the uneducated, lower-class majority of Turkey's Muslim population. That exception was the treatment given the wide-spread dervish orders. Theoretically outlawed, they in fact suffered the destruction of their nation-wide institutional framework, were deprived of their property, deprived of their higher-level (and more prosperous) leaders, but were left alive as local, village units. Over these and over all village clergy, the state

exercised close supervision, and in no instance was religiously led or motivated "reaction" against Ataturk's measures allowed to reach dangerous dimensions.

Few indeed of the educated, progressive, westernized citizens of Ataturk's generation in their hearts wholly applauded all that was done to Turkey's religious institutions during the period of Ataturk's reforms. But the program succeeded more and more as year by year upperclass individuals young enough to know no other way of life came first to maturity and eventually to political power.

After Ataturk's death there was, of course, a measure of relaxation. With Turkey's post-World War II espousal of a much wider practice of democratic procedures, which for the first time entailed giving the lower-class (and still more traditionally Muslim) citizen a secret and unintimidated vote, religion became if not a political issue at least an issue intimately connected with politics. This fact, however, has served only to strengthen the upper class's resolution to keep Turkey a secular republic.

Many upper class Turks voice regret that values which they recognize in religion are so frequently lacking in their children's lives. They seek to inculcate those values, often by appealing to Islam as a "personal" religion which they practise within a lay state. But in many cases they also fear Islam in its institutional aspect, because here they equate "religion" and "political reaction." This determination to keep Turkey a lay, democratic state does not rule out spirituality from the lives of those who are so determined. But it does mean that they are resolved to continue to control institutional and political aspects of Islam rigidly throughout all levels of Turkish society.

In Ankara University, a newly established Faculty of Theology, designed to produce an educated, westernized, upper-class new Turkish Muslim clergy who will have knowledge of science and of comparative religions and western languages and who will be loyal to the concept of the lay democratic state, is now in operation. That this Faculty, the first legal attempt to train a higher clergy since Ataturk's reforms, will succeed in producing *ʿUlamāʾ* acceptable to the Turks who are still traditionally minded in religion seems entirely unlikely. That its graduates will have an acceptable message for the westernized Turk who seeks to preserve Islam as a personal religion in a lay state remains to be proved.

The Department for Religious Affairs, technically a subdivision of the Prime Minister's office, retains rigid control over all recognized clergy and places of worship. With the re-emergence of religion as an issue affecting politics, the post of Director of the Department for Religious Affairs has become more important and more hazardous, and the hazards are increased by the constant activity of several influential daily newspapers which constantly "expose" instances of "illegal" (i.e. traditional) religious activity among lower-class people

and in backward regions of the country. Contact with western practice, especially under the conditions of joint service in Korea, has led to the institution of a Chaplains' Corps in the Turkish Army, another reversal of the Ataturk pattern and another innovation which is carefully controlled. Religious holidays and secular holidays are everywhere celebrated. Among the upper class as among the lower, covert discrimination against the non-Muslim holder of a Turkish passport is common: religion here remains the final touchstone of complete acceptance as citizen and patriot. Many upperclass people seldom take part in public worship, others do. Popular subscription has erected several mosques since the end of World War II. Those upper-class people who never otherwise attend mosques always employ the full Muslim service for the conduct of funerals. Only Ataturk's funeral, being an affair of state, was almost wholly a secular ceremony. And the same upper-class people who shun mosque services may, in private homes, enjoy the traditional Ottoman-Muslim *Mevlud*. This latter is frequently rationalized as a matter of sentiment, tradition, and esthetic pleasure not wholly or essentially religious in nature.

These considerations, and they are only a few of many, serve to explain why the status and role of Islam in Turkey today strike the sympathetic western observer as paradoxical and anomalous, and the sympathetic non-Turkish Muslim as unheard-of and even scandalous.

There is no doubt that the lower-class citizen has, since Turkey turned more fully to democratic practice, gained several points in his desire for a more traditional treatment of Islam. Hatib-schools have been established in provincial centers. Designed as secondary schools which would produce a lower clergy, in places their attendance has surpassed that of the local, secular schools. For all who have the opportunity for public schooling, upper and lower class alike, voluntary religious instruction is now available—another innovation largely produced by popular concern that children are not given, in Turkey's lay state, the ethical undergirding which only religious instruction can provide. Yet the upper class, despite sharp political differences on many other points, seems generally to be firmly united in the conviction that the basic Ataturk reforms must not be imperiled by lower-class religious "reaction."

Particularly criticized and punished by the full force of the law are the very few upper-class individuals who attempt to make personal profit from lower-class religious sentiment, whether that personal profit take the shape of amassing political support or of collecting money from the faithful. Proposals that Turkey revert to the (in lower-class eyes still) "sacred" Arabic script or that, whether in her law codes or her governmental forms, she revive traditional Muslim forms, awaken no enthusiasm among any important section of the upper class. Such proposals, indeed are ordinarily held to endanger the state and are lumped with Communism as treasonable.

On the basis of the above description the reader might perhaps conclude that Turkish society faces the imminent development of an unbridgeable rift between a westernized, secular-minded, dominant minority and an uneducated, traditionally-minded and even reactionary lower-class majority. Neither the sympathetic western observer nor the sympathetic non-Turkish Muslim observer who has examined Turkish society on the spot, however, is likely to reach so extreme a judgment. The burden of the education which the state provides is wholly in support of the Ataturk reforms, and that education yearly reaches more deeply into the social pyramid. Turkey's phenomenal economic development since 1945, particularly its road-building and mechanizing phases, reaches farther and farther into villages which until recently were truly isolated. The result for the lower-class, uneducated citizen, whether in terms of personal economic opportunity or in mobility and the new sophistication which comes with travel, is impossible to exaggerate and impossible to predict. For every class of citizen, most of the coveted rewards which Turkish society provides for success —tangible rewards and intangible rewards alike—come basically from success in a life which is lived by the secular, westernizing new Turkish patterns of conduct. So long as Turkey continues to be able to keep open reasonably attractive horizons of opportunity for ability and ambition, there seems little prospect that Muslim "reaction" will either disturb Turkey's dynamic development or alter her lay form of government.

In what other Muslim country—not to say what other country whose population is actually more than 98 percent Muslim—could the most influential independent daily, in an editorial, blandly remark "But since we have abandoned the Persico-Arab Ottoman-Muslim tradition and adopted the Graeco-Roman European tradition..." without creating a furore? Yet such argumentation passes as normal in new Turkey's thought today. It is not, of course, wholly true that Turkey has abandoned her tradition, however much the non-Turkish Muslim observer may feel that she has, at least in her upper class. It also is by no means true that upper-class Turkish individuals have wholly espoused the western tradition. That tradition is not only Greek, Roman, and western: it is also Christian. How far can one read in western literature without encountering allusions and assertions wholly Christian in their import? How far can the individual Turk, cooperating whole-heartedly in a western philanthropic venture, proceed without confronting basically Christian elements in the motivation of that enterprise?

These points, however, do not mean that the western tradition is here necessarily unpalatable or repugnant to the new Turk. They simply mean that since he will always remain a Muslim it always will be in some respects not his tradition. But only in some respects. For the most part, the new garment tends to fit him with increasing ease. Almost nowhere, in the length and breadth of Turkey, among young

or old, will you encounter an educated individual who, when arguing any debatable point, will inject into the argument, let alone attempt to settle the argument by, a quotation from Qur'ān or Ḥadīth. Few educated Turks, except the very oldest, could so quote if they wished.

To put the matter in western terms, for most Turks—except the uneducated and backward-looking, and the future of Turkey is not in the hands of such as these—the authoritative writings of Islam have lost their authority except in the spheres of "personal morality and faith." To put that same matter into traditional Muslim terms is, of course, impossible, for Islam has not elsewhere recognized that such a circumscribing of its status and role is possible.

In this new limitation of Islam's status and role, Turkey gives one more proof of her basic modern alienation from the rest of the Muslim world. Suppositions that Turkey's international or supra-national course, on any level of human activity, will be seriously influenced, let alone governed, by the circumstance that Turkey is a Muslim country, are not to be taken seriously. Pan-Islam has no effective appeal. Instead, the educated Turk tends to feel impatience, at times ill-disguised, for his non-Turkish fellow-Muslims who, he thinks, are tarrying inexcusably in medieval times and had best rapidly rouse themselves and follow the Turks into modernism and self-fulfilment. In international political groupings, the concept of a Muslim bloc has no appeal to Turkey *qua* Muslim bloc, but only as a perhaps feasible regional grouping based solely on grounds of geographical location. Nor does an idea flourish in modern Turkey because it is labelled a "Muslim idea." Indeed, the label would probably be a hindrance. Islam retains little sanction over new Turkish speculative thought. Even on the lower educational levels of Turkish life, Islam, however deeply cherished, is felt basically to be the local, Anatolian, and—in most cases—Turkish faith rather than a religion which is distinctively and inevitably Arab. Turkey's feeble, "reactionary" (i.e. traditional) religious leaders are at times accused of connections with the Arab world, but on investigation such tenuous connections as exist all appear to be of trivial importance and effect.

Granting that Islam in Turkey today represents no "threat" to that country's continued existence as a secular, westernizing, evolving, democratic state does not, of course, imply that Turkish Islam among the educated classes has no future. It plainly does have a future, but the shape of that future has not yet begun to appear. One can only say that the truly new Turks, evolved from a historic background so sharply different from that of all other Muslim peoples, represent a potentially fertile seed-bed for the growth of as yet undiscernible new phenomena within Turkish Islam. And one must add that, should such growth really take place, its manifestations would, in all likelihood, be repugnant to the rest of the Muslim world, if only because of the sharp difference which separates the Turks from the rest of Islam today.

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MUSLIMS: DECADENCE AND RENAISSANCE

ADAPTATION OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE TO MODERN SOCIAL NEEDS

The development of communications among the various countries of the world has shortened distances and strengthened dealings among nations and peoples. This has resulted, among other things, in an exchange of influences between East and West and the fusion of different cultures into a sort of universal culture. Thus the study of Islamic culture no more concerns Muslims alone but others as well.

Indeed, the study of Islamic culture has today acquired special importance. The world at present is divided into two great contesting camps. One advocates chiefly fundamental freedom, even at the expense of inequality; and the other proclaims social equality and justice, sacrificing, if need be, individual freedom and human dignity. In this contest, Islam takes a middle position. It recognizes individual freedom, but at the same time gives priority to public rather than private interest; and although it believes in social equality and justice, it acknowledges the principle of individual rights. To Islam, man's dignity, his personal freedom and freedom of belief and ownership are all sacred, but, nevertheless, limited by the principle of equality among people and the necessity of taking into account the right of society.

For all these considerations, the study of Islam, its culture, its jurisprudence, and its institutions in the light of our modern age is of great importance. Such a study has long been the concern of Western orientalists and many a Muslim scholar. No doubt, some orientalists were not unbiased, perhaps under the influence of politics or environment, or for lack of adequate knowledge of Arabic and original references. The majority of them, however, succeeded in publishing Arabic and Islamic manuscripts and in composing useful Islamic studies. Their efforts are generally commendable, and their endeavors conducive to mutual scientific understanding.

Muslim scholars, on the other hand, fell into two groups. The conservative group adhered strictly to traditions and customs and without second thought or reconsideration interpreted the principles of Islam in accordance with the views expressed by ancient and recent jurists. It advocated the application of such interpretations on both the religious and civil life of all Muslims. The modernist group believed in the necessity of discussing the conditions of Muslims and the reasons for their backwardness, as well as in studying ways and means of liberating Islamic thought from ignorance, blind imitation, and stagnation.

Whereas reformers and modernists of all nations have striven to achieve their aims by discarding the old and replacing the things of the past by those of the present, the Muslim reformers and modernists,

on the contrary, called for the return to the past or the restoration of the teachings of the "Puritan Loyal School" (Madhhab al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ). They have been right in that; for the earlier past of Islam represents its basic principles, true essence and immortal teachings. The new which followed had brought in its wake, as a result of imitation and ignorance, formalism, superstitions, details and interpretations incompatible with the spirit of Islamic jurisprudence and its original bases. Reform, in the opinion of modernist scholars, could therefore be achieved by exploring the old early substance and purifying it of the many innovations and traditions which, through periods of ignorance, have accumulated, to hide from Muslims the meaning of true Islam.

This, then, is what prompts us to study the reasons for the backwardness suffered by Muslims, and the ways and means of rectification. We have, here, to limit ourselves to a brief outline of the most important among them, namely the following:

I. Closing the door of *Ijtihād* in Islamic jurisprudence and neglect of education.

II. Adherence to doubtful texts.

III. Adherence to formalism and accessories.

IV. Sectarianism.

V. Neglect of looking into the effective causes of laws.

VI. Association of religion with ways of daily life.

Other reasons influencing the relapse of the Muslims, along with Arab and Oriental nations, such as colonialism and foreign influence, wars, moral degeneration, poverty, and the like, will not be discussed here. Consideration will be limited to the factors mentioned earlier, because they pertain to the study of Islamic thought and its influence on the life of Muslims.

I. CLOSING THE DOOR OF IJTIHĀD AND NEGLECT OF EDUCATION

Islamic Jurisprudence dealt with questions of religion and acts of worship, and with legal transactions, along with all provisions, rules, and particulars derived from them. That is why jurists in Islam were at once men of religion and jurisprudence. They were called "scholars" (*ᶜulamāᵓ*) because their field of study included all departments of ancient knowledge. As a result, Islamic jurisprudence played such a significant role in the history of Islamic thought as well as in all aspects of Muslim life.

It is known that Islamic jurisprudence is based on various sources; some religious, the Qurᵓān and the Sunnat, and some secondary accepted by the majority of the jurists; *Ijmāᶜ* (consensus of opinion) and *Qiyās* (analogy). There are other sources acknowledged by some schools but refuted by others. These are based on necessity, custom and

equity; such as *Istiḥsān* (appropriateness) in Al-Ḥanafī school, *Al-Maṣāliḥ al-Mursalat* (excepted interests) in Al-Mālikī school, and the like.

The jurists took up all these sources, known as evidence (adillat) of law, in a special branch of knowledge called *ʿIlm al-ʿUṣūl* (science of basic sources). They began to work at discovering legal solutions from such sources and evidences. This sort of activity was referred to as *Ijtihād* (endeavor or interpretation). It was a cause for expanding legal provisions to comprise new cases, as well as a strong factor in the development of Islamic law according to the needs of different countries and the conditions of changing times. Thus, *Ijtihād* had led to the flourishing of Islamic jurisprudence, especially at the early stage of the ʿAbbāsid period.

When Baghdad fell in the middle of the 7th century A.H. intellectual activities diminished and Arab civilization began to decline. This took place after the Sunnite jurists unanimously agreed to close the door of *Ijtihād* and to be contented with the four known Sunnite schools: the Ḥanafite, the Mālikite, the Shāfiʿite, and the Ḥanbalite. The result was that Islamic thought met a dead end, and imitation and stagnation in jurisprudence and other Arabic and Islamic learning became predominant.

The Shiʿite scholars of Islam were right in their refusal to close the door to *Ijtihād*. So were some of the ancient Sunnite scholars, like Taqī al-Dīn ibn Taimiyyat and Ibn Qaiyim al-Jawziyyat in his book *Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn ʿan Rabb-il-ʿālamīn*. They were followed in recent times by certain modernist jurists like Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd-al-Wahhāb, Jamāl-al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Shaykh Muḥammad ʿAbduh. All these jurists and their like, particularly Al-Imām al-Shawkānī in his treatise *Al-Qawl al-Mufīd fī Adillat al-Ijtihād wa-l-Taqlīd*, have proved by conclusive legal arguments from the Qurʾān, the Sunnat, *Ijmāʿ* and *Qiyās*, that *Ijtihād* is not only open, but also is a duty incumbent upon the qualified. May God have mercy on Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal when he said "Don't imitate me, nor Mālik, nor Al-Shāfiʿī, nor Al-Thawrī; but take from where they have taken."

This obvious matter, for ignorance of which a great blunder befell Islamic jurisprudence, had, in the words of Ibn Qaiyim al-Jawziyyat, caused "such difficulties, hardships, and unsupportable demands which it is evident that a jurisprudence at the highest order of good does not prescribe." (*Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn*, volume 3, p. 1).

In fact, the closure of *Ijtihād* violates the provisions and concepts of Islamic jurisprudence and condemns all Muslims to permanent stagnation and exclusion from the application of the laws of evolution. It imposes upon them to maintain the same conditions prevailing at the time of ancient jurists, and to follow the pattern they had set for themselves and for the Muslims of their days and the days that will follow until eternity.

No doubt, the remedy lies in opening what the ancients had closed or attempted to close. The door of *Ijtihād* should be thrown wide open for anyone juristically qualified. The error, all the error, lies in blind imitation and restraint of thought. What is right is to allow freedom of interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence, and to liberate thought and make it capable of true scientific creativeness.

But *Ijtihād* is limited by certain qualifications required of all those willing to take it up. These have been explained by authors on the sources of law, and there is no room here to enumerate them all. However, a word regarding learning is desirable because learning is necessary for *Ijtihād,* as well as for freedom of thought and life itself.

Learning is one of the Muslim's basic duties. It is stated in the Qurʾān "And say: O my Lord, Give me more knowledge" (Surah xx, 114); and in the Ḥadīth: "Wisdom is the aim of the Believer; and wherever he shall find it, he shall have the right to it. Seek knowledge even in China. To seek knowledge is an obligation on every Muslim, man or woman."

But despite these obvious authoritative texts, the majority of Muslims neglected this sacred duty. As a result ignorance and, consequently disease, poverty, and degeneration set in. If Muslims now desire to rid themselves of these evils, they should resort to knowledge and fulfill their duty with regard to learning. No other means can awaken them from their slumber and lift their lives to a standard worthy of their human dignity. This would be in realization of the Quranic verse: "God will uplift those of you who believe, and those endowed with knowledge to high ranks." (Surah lviii, 11).

The Qurʾān associates knowledge with faith; for faith stands on the three pillars of belief, thinking and conviction. These can exist only through knowledge, true knowledge.

The Muslim cannot be a true believer, nor a true Muslim unless he meets the obligation of learning, and consequently the obligation to think, to reason, to accomplish, and to produce intellectually, spiritually, and scientifically. By so doing, the Muslim puts an end to blind imitation and ignorance, along with all their ugly evils.

II. ADHERENCE TO DOUBTFUL TEXTS

The basic source of Islamic jurisprudence is the Text in its two parts, namely the Qurʾān and the Sunnat. The former was written down at the time of the Prophet by an order from Him; then it was compiled during the days of the first Caliph, Abū Bakr al-Ṣaddīq. It was not until the days of the third Caliph, ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān, that the Qurʾān was compiled in one single book and written in one version. In this there has been no disagreement whatever among the various Muslim sects and religious schools.

The second part of the Juridical Text, namely the Sunnat, contains

the rules deduced from the sayings and deeds of the Prophet, as well as from his silence and implicit approval of actions taken with his knowledge. In regard to this juridical source, disagreement arose among jurists as to the authenticity of some of the Prophet's sayings and the extent of their reliability. The disagreement first began between the Sunnites and the Shi'ites, but later spread among the Sunnite schools dividing them into two groups: *Ahl al-Ra'ī* (followers of opinion), and *Ahl al-Ḥadīth* (followers of tradition). Each of these two groups accepted traditions rejected by the other.

What brought about disagreement is the fact that the Prophet did not order the writing of the *Sunnat* as he did regarding the Qur'ān. On the contrary, he prohibited such an action by saying: "Don't write down from me, and whoever wrote down from me other than the Qur'ān should have it destroyed. There is no harm in relating from me." (*Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim,* Vol. 8, pp. 229). This made 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb refuse to compile the traditions. He was afraid lest the people would take them up and leave the Qur'ān.

However, despite such discouragement, traditions were forged in great number during certain periods of Islamic history. This was done to serve and support certain policies or factions, or to popularize story-telling or to achieve other purposes. Consequently, the traditions became impossibly numerous. Many unreliable and absurd traditions could not possibly stand in logic and reason.

Faced with this situation, Muslim jurists began to study and examine them. They laid down a set of scientific rules by which to judge and determine their authenticity. These rules came to constitute a special science called the Science of Traditional Method (*Muṣṭalaḥ al-Ḥadīth*). In addition, many were prompted to write, warning their readers of false traditions. As a result, there was agreement among jurists regarding some traditions and disagreement regarding others. As an example of fabricated traditions, one may cite the following: "The sea is of hell." "The mouse is Jewish." "Eggplant is the cure of all sickness."

Modernist jurists, such as Ibn Taimiyyat and Muḥammad 'Abduh, also revolted against this deplorable situation. They began to examine traditions in the light of the principles of jurisprudence and reason. They even refuted some of the traditions accepted by Al-Bukhārī and Muslim (*Al-Manār* magazine, 1347, pp. 507-516. Also *Kitāb Yusr al-Islām wa 'Uṣūl al-Tashrī' al-'Āmm* by Rashīd Riḍā, Egypt, 1928).

Take for instance this tradition: "Whoever ate for breakfast seven dates, no poison or magic during that day could do him any harm." (*Sharḥ al-'Aynī,* Vol. 21, pp. 71). This saying cannot be authentic, because it is contrary to practical experience and scientific principles. It was so pointed out by recent scholars, (Dr. Aḥmad Amīn, *al-Wā'ī* magazine, Cairo, 1952, No. 2, p. 3).

There are thousands of traditions like the above, added to the Sunnat

through forgery and fabrication, as well as by error and neglect. They were adhered to by the bulk of Muslims and by some of the earlier jurists. Thus they were incorporated in their religion and jurisprudence, thereby contributing to their decline and degeneration.

The remedy of this evil is obvious and within reach. All forged traditions without exception should be discarded. Nothing should remain except those authentic traditions on which agreement by jurists of the known schools had been unanimous. Acceptance of other traditions should be subject to the judgement of reason and the conditions laid down by the Science of Basic Sources (*ʿIlm al-ʿUṣūl*). This criterion had been adopted by many a Muslim jurist, such as Taqī-al-Dīn ibn Taimiyyat who declared: "The truly traditional in Muslim jurisprudence is always consistent with the truly rational." (*Al-Islām wa-l-Naṣrāniyyat maʿ-al-ʿIlm wa-l-Madaniyyat,* by Shaykh Muḥammad ʿAbduh, 1350, p. 56). It is, no doubt, a sound and trustworthy criterion, adequate enough to eradicate this evil which the Prophet predicted when he said: "There will later be among my people some who will relate what neither you nor your fathers have heard. Beware of them." (*Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim,* Vol. 1, p. 9).

In compliance with this warning, Muslim reformists should liberate themselves from the remnants of error, forgery, falsehood and fabrication. They must discard made-up traditions which are incompatible with legal texts and principles, or with the rules laid down by the Science of the Sources of Law (*ʿUṣūl al-Fiqh*), or by logic and reason, on which all provisions of Islamic jurisprudence are based.

III. ADHERENCE TO FORMALISM AND PARTICULARS

The provisions of Islamic jurisprudence are based less on the texts than on interpretations of the jurists. The texts form the bases of the principles and universal rules; whereas most details and particulars are based on the interpretation of jurists by way of unanimity, *Ijmāʿ*, analogy *Qiyās,* or other legal sources. These details and particulars fill huge volumes of legal work, so that research regarding them requires a long time and considerable effort.

Furthermore, this great body of particulars often dominated the general principles, and, with repeated imitation, took a rigid and formalistic taint alien to the original substance. Some jurists of late adhered to them and through blind imitation transmitted them as basic obligatory provisions, without any discrimination or examination in the light of the original principles and texts and without the criterion of reason and thought. Thus, details dominated the basis and the form overshadowed the substance. Such a state of things was one of the causes which led to the decline and stagnation of Islamic culture.

An example of this is the question of intention in contracts. The original view is that "consideration in contracts is given to the intention and meaning rather than to the words and sentences." (Ar-

ticle III, *Majallat al-Aḥkām al-ᶜAdliyyat,* (Ottoman Civil Code), p. 325). This is a universal principle based on the following Ḥadīth of the Prophet: "Actions are judged by intentions. Every one gets what he intends." In explanation, Ibn Qaiyim al-Jawziyyat states: "Consideration in contracts and actions is given to their real meanings and intended purposes rather than to the outward forms of their words and verbs... Intention is the spirit of the contract, and the measure of its validity and invalidity. The consideration of intentions in contracts is prior to the consideration of words. For words are intended to other than themselves, whereas intentions embodied in contracts are what are sought for themselves." (*Iᶜlām al-Muwaqqiᶜīn,* Vol. 3, pp. 82 & 83).

Nevertheless, despite this clear fundamental principle, the jurists took upon themselves a detailed study of words and their various forms. They formulated for words certain regulations and defined what words should be used to denote relating intentions and purposes. Consequently, such details came to be considered as the basis itself, whereby the reality of the original principle mentioned above was distorted.

Similar to this example is another one regarding conditions in contracts. Originally, the principle is one of contractual freedom. That is to say, the basis in acts and conditions is permission, until conclusive evidence establishes prohibition. Thus, the contracting parties have the right to set forth in their contracts any conditions they wish, subject to no limitations except what is categorically prohibited by the law. This was accepted by reliable jurists in clear and obvious statements. Among them was Ibn Qaiyim al-Jawziyyat who also said in this connection: "Contracts and terms are held to be valid unless avoided or prohibited by the legislator." (*Iᶜlām al-Muwaqqiᶜīn,* Vol. I, p. 299: Also the writer's "General Theory of Obligations and Contracts in Islamic Jurisprudence. Vol. II, pp. 82, 208).

In spite of this, jurists of the various schools in Islam, particularly the Ḥanafite, composed lengthy chapters on the detailed rules governing covenants and conditions, the contracts which can rightly be attached to a condition or precedent or associated with a restrictive covenant, and the definition of the valid or invalid conditions or covenants in a contract. They, moreover, went too far in enumerating the causes of invalidity of conditions, as if the basis in contracts were prohibition and invalidity rather than freedom and validity.

Thus some of the jurists clung to the accessories and formalisms of the law, thereby wasting their time in discussing such trivial matters and losing sight of the original principle of contractual freedom. As a result, so many contracts were condemned as invalid, whereas, in accordance with the general principle, they were certainly valid.

Another example that explains the evil of adhering to accessories and formalisms rather than to basic principles and real motives, is

the question relating to purification as a condition of prayer. The basic principle governing this question is stated in the Quranic verse which says: "O, faithful, when you rise up in prayer wash your faces and hands up to the elbows and clean your heads and also your feet up to the ankles... God does not want to bring trouble upon you, but He wants to purify you and fulfill His grace upon you." (Surah v, 6). The reason then for purification before praying, as indicated by the text, is purity, cleanliness and offering to God in worship. The meaning of all this is comprehended by reason, experience and practice. Suffice it on this point to quote Ibn Rushd: "...For that which a human being refuses to drink ought not to be used in offering to God in Prayer." (*Bidāyat al-Mujtahid,* Vol. i, p. 20).

But the jurists were not content with that. They took up this subject with detail and analysis, consigning to it a whole book at the forepart of the provisions on acts of worship. They delved into the study of definitions regarding water which is purifying, pure and impure; and regarding things which are pure and impure. Hundreds of pages were written, and divergence of opinion arose. Their interest in this subject was such that its contents became incomprehensible, and its reading tedious and fruitless. The reader came to think as though these accessories and particulars were the basis of religion and worship. In addition, most of its stuff was inconsistent with reason and logic and too far removed from the original purpose, namely cleanliness and purity.

If that original purpose had been taken as a basis, and then reason and science left to deduct from it the particulars, this would have been more proper. Muslims today live in an age wherein time is gold, and modern scientific knowledge is one of the necessities of survival and success. Therefore, it is absurd that they should spend most of their lives in comprehending, if at all, the details and technicalities in the manner described for them by earlier jurists.

The conclusion that we may draw from all these and similar instances is that adherence to accessories and particulars and formalism led to rigidity of thinking, difficulty in studying a great part of Islamic teachings, and to a distortion of some of these teachings. All this had a bearing on Muslims, as one of the factors contributing to their decline.

In order to remedy such a situation, a return to the basic texts and original principles is imperative. Every legal decision, statement, opinion and whim that has overshadowed those texts and principles should be discarded, together with all the formalism of lengthy interpretations. Thus the light of Islamic doctrine will brightly shine again, as it did in the beginning and as it should be and endure.

IV. SECTARIAN PREJUDICES

One result of freedom of opinion and interpretation in Islamic juris-

prudence was the coming into being of different doctrinal systems or schools. This first sprang from the divergence of opinion between the Sunnites and the Shiᶜites. The former were those who supported, after the Prophet's death, the succession of Abū Bakr, then ᶜUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, then ᶜUthmān ibn ᶜAffān. The latter were those who advocated that ᶜAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib had more right to the Caliphate than any of those three. They, therefore, took up his cause and were thus called partisans or *Shīᶜat* of Al-Imām ᶜAlī. The fundamental cause of the dispute between these two groups was in the main political.

Later, the Sunnites became divided into two groups: one in Iraq under the name *Ahl al-Raʾī* (Followers of Opinion) who were led by Abū Ḥanīfa al-Naᶜmān and who accepted only a few of the traditions, referring most judicial matters to the arbitration of reason and judgement; and the other in Hijāz, under the name of *Ahl al-Ḥadīth* (Followers of Traditions), who were led by Mālik ibn Anas and who were known for their adherence to the Sunnat, having aversion to the employment of judgement and interpretation.

As time went by, the two camps became themselves divided into various systems or schools. Of the Sunnites, four schools became famous: the Ḥanafite, the Mālikite, the Shāfiᶜite and the Ḥanbalite; and of the Shiᶜites three: the Imāmite, the Zaydite, and the Ismāᶜīlite. We shall not concern ourselves with details regarding these schools at the present. Disagreement among the jurists, together with the various doctrinal schools, can be attributed to the following main reasons.

(1) **Disagreement on the interpretation of some Quranic verses.** For example, take the following verse: "Their (meaning wives) due is equal to what they owe, in a friendly manner." (Surah II, 228). This verse was taken by Ibn Ḥazm and the other followers of the Ẓāhirite School as an argument in support of their view that a wealthy wife is bound to pay alimony to her needy husband (*Al-Muḥallā*, Vol. X, No. 1930). But other schools did not accept this interpretation. They absolutely refused to agree that any alimony should be paid by the wife to her husband.

Another example relates to the *negotiorum gestor* (unauthorized agent) who pays another's debt. The two jurists, Mālik and Ibn Ḥanbal, gave him the right to refer to the debtor for claiming what he paid in his behalf. They based their opinion on the Quranic verse: "What other than goodness is the reward of goodness" (Surah LV, 60). But Abū Ḥanīfa and Al-Shāfiᶜī did not agree. In their opinion the *negotiorum gestor* is considered a volunteer in such a case; hence he has no right to demand of the debtor the repayment of what he paid for him (See my: *General Theory on Obligations and Contracts*, Vol. I, pp. 84-85).

(2) **Disagreement among jurists concerning acceptance of certain traditions.** For example, the Sunnites prohibited the making

of a will in favor of an heir, basing this prohibition on the Prophet's saying: "No will in favor of an heir unless approved by the other heirs." But the Shiᶜites did not accept the authenticity of this tradition, and thus considered such a will as legal.

(3) **Disagreement among jurists concerning the interpretation of certain traditions.** Example: If one sold something to another, and they both accepted, has anyone of them the right to change his mind before parting? In this connection, there is a tradition: "Parties to a sale are entitled to retract until they separate." But the jurists could not agree on its interpretation. Some, like Al-Shāfiᶜī and Ibn Ḥanbal and Al-Awzāᶜī, were of the opinion that the parting intended here is the physical parting. Therefore any party to a sale has the right to revoke the contract after acceptance prior to the end of the meeting over the sale. On the other hand, Abū Ḥanīfa and Mālik had another interpretation. They thought that what was meant by parting in this case is only parting by word. Hence they did not permit any party to a sale contract to change his mind after acceptance, even if both parties were still at the place of contract. So the disagreement on the interpretation of this tradition gave rise to disagreement on the legal solution of this question. (*General Theory of Obligations and Contracts,* by the writer, Vol. 2, pp. 43).

(4) **Difference of opinion with respect to the acceptance of some legal sources.** This difference of opinion first began on the subject *Qiyās* (analogy). Some schools rejected it while others insisted on its acceptance. Later, more differences arose regarding acceptance or rejection of other sources. Example: the Mālikite School agreed to consider acts by the inhabitants of Madina and *Al-Maṣāliḥ al-Mursalah* as two sources of jurisprudence. The Ḥanafite School accepted equity (*al-Istiḥsān*); and the Shāfiᶜites and the Imāmites applied the principles of *Istiṣḥāb al-ḥāl* as legal sources.

Thus jurists of the Ḥanafite School upheld the validity of sale with option of redemption (Baiᶜ al-Wafa) for the need people have for it. They prohibited *damnum sine injuria* when it is enormous (abus des droits), and enlarged upon a considerable number of provisions for reasons of necessity and hardship. All of this was done in contradiction to the principles of analogy and in accordance with the principle of equity—a legal source peculiar to this school. (See my: *Philosophy of Jurisprudence in Islam,* 2nd Edition, p. 129).

(5) **Jurists of the same school often disagreed on legal decisions regarding certain practical cases.** Abū Ḥanīfa, for instance, did not legalize placing a prodigal under restraint (interdiction), because in his opinion "interdiction constitutes a restraint on personal freedom, whereas such freedom is more important than property." (*Al-Baḍāᵓiᶜ,* Vol. VII, p. 170. Also *Al-Mabsūṭ,* Vol. XXIV, p. 157). But his two disciples, Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan, legalized

interdiction in agreement with the general position taken by other jurists and on the basis of various legal arguments (*General Theory*, Vol. II, p. 121).

In general, disagreements among schools were not on the whole disagreements on basic principles and doctrines, but rather on details as a result of diversity of interpretations and differences of views in applying principles to practical cases.

The existence of diversity of opinions was a reason for flexibility in Islamic jurisprudence, as well as a cause of relief to the people. Thus it was said: "Disagreement among jurists is the nation's bliss." This is supported by the fact that the Ottoman Empire which adopted the Ḥanafite School in law and religion borrowed from other schools many legal provisions, particularly in its Family Code. This code adopted the Mālikite principle permitting divorce between husband and wife in case of dispute and discord. Furthermore, it adopted the Shāfiᶜite view regarding the invalidity of repudiation under the influence of drunkenness or duress. Egypt today is following the same practice. It has adopted many provisions chosen from different Muslim schools, incorporating them in the new codes on personal status, especially in questions of inheritance, wills and trusts (*Waqf*).

However, alongside those advantages of diversity of schools there were disadvantages too, most important of which was sectarianism, with all its outcome of discord, animosity and hatred. Followers of each school were often so by inheritance and tradition rather than by reason and conviction. They displayed strong fanaticism towards their own school and its leaders and attacked other schools and leaders with flagrant bitterness. There were days when strife became intense between the Shiᶜites and the Sunnites as well as among the different schools and sects within these two groups. Such a strife was one of the causes leading to disunity and backwardness among Muslims.

To cure this evil, struggle must be waged against sectarian partisanship. Efforts must be made to reconcile all hearts and unite the various schools. This, in my opinion, can be achieved by a return to the same and only original sources of law. Such a return should take into consideration the following bases:

I. To adopt the provisions of the Qurᵓān as the first basis for Islamic teachings and jurisprudence; to distinguish in this respect between compulsory and voluntary or directive provisions on the lines already attempted by interpreters of the Qurᵓān and scholars of the Science of Legal Sources; and then to apply these provisions in accordance with their respective significance.

II. To adopt the Sunnat in all obligatory religious provisions, provided that this Sunnat is authentic and acceptable in the various Muslim schools and that it is not inconsistent with the text of the Qurᵓān.

III. To adopt the rest of the Sunnat, that is to say the traditional

teachings and precepts whose authenticity had been disputed by reliable leaders of the schools, provided they are consistent with reason and acceptable to jurists and scholars of the Science of Legal Sources (*ʿIlm al-Uṣūl*) on the basis of the principle mentioned above, namely that the truly traditional is always consistent with the truly rational.

IV. To choose from the legal rules based on interpretations of jurists those which are most suitable to the needs of modern society, public interest and principles of justice and equity.

Such are the practical fundamental lines which will lead to the unification of Muslim schools—a unification that has become at the present time an urgent necessity. This is, by no means, a new idea. The call for unification had also been advocated by pious reformist leaders, who realized in their own words that "a Muslim nation can never bear the burden of imitating... the imitators of one school; or make their marriage, family and financial interests dependent on their comprehension of books containing the doctrines of one school with all their hardship and toil." (*Al-Manār* Magazine, 1345 A.H., p. 158).

Moreover, the idea of unifying the various schools is consistent with the spirit of Islamic jurisprudence and its teachings. For, "Islam is a religion of unification, unity, brotherhood and tolerance. It does not recognize discord among people, nor does it approve of religious partisanship prohibited in the Qurʾān" (*Philosophy of Jurisprudence*, p. 27), "Those who are discordant in their religion and separated into parties, do not belong to you." (Surah vi, 159).

If Islam prohibits religious fanaticism and demands brotherhood and tolerance between Muslims and the rest of the world, for better reason it does not allow sectarianism among Muslims themselves.

V. FAILURE TO STUDY THE EFFECTIVE CAUSES OF LEGAL RULES

Scholars of the Science of legal sources, including the Shāfiʿite ʿIzz-al-Dīn ibn ʿAbd-al-Salām, the Ḥanbalite ʿIbn Qaiyim al-Jawziyyat and the Mālikite Abū Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī, were agreed that legal rules are based on causes and purposes "all of which are founded on the interests of human beings in this life and the life here-after."

Consequently, all rules, even those based on legal texts, should cease to apply when the effective causes on which they are based and which provide their raison d'être, no more exist. This is in accordance with the original principle that "a legal rule based on an effective cause depends for its existence on the existence of its effective cause."

As a logical consequence of this principle, legal rules change with the change of their effective causes and purposes—a principle on the basis of which jurists have laid down the general rule that it is undeniable that laws change according to changes in times, places and conditions.

An example regarding this general rule is Caliph ᶜUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb's abolition of the share of alms alloted by the Prophet to those whom he wanted to win for Islam. By giving them a share of alms, he sought to strengthen their faith, or repel their evil, or profit by their great reputation among their people. This was in accordance with the Quranic verse: "Alms belong to the poor and the needy; to those who collect them, and those whose hearts are to be reconciled..." (Surah IX, 60). ᶜUmar based his action on the cessation of the effective cause that constituted the raison d'être of the Quranic text, namely the need to promote Islam at its beginning. But in the days of ᶜUmar this effective cause ceased to be relevant due to the fact that Islam had become powerful.

Another example is what it was told of Abū Yūsuf, Chief Justice of Baghdad, regarding his decision that barley and wheat should be considered among the commodities measurable by weight. He took this decision in compliance with the usual custom in his days and in violation of the Prophet's saying which considered barley and wheat as commodities to be dealt with by measures of capacity, in accordance with the custom that was prevalent during the time of the Prophet.

From these and similar examples, we find that legal opinions have changed according to change of effective causes or of custom on which they were based. Thus the interpretation of many texts concerning legal transactions had undergone a change, together with many legal views and opinions that had to comply with changes in social interests and needs.

Such is the spirit of Islamic jurisprudence, a spirit that is flexible and progressive. This was expressed, interpreted and applied by a great number of Caliphs and Muslim jurists, including the two Caliphs ᶜUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb and ᶜUmar ibn ᶜAbd-al-ᶜAzīz, and the Ḥanafite Abū Yūsuf, the Mālikite Shams-al-Dīn al-Kurafī and the Ḥanbalite Najm-al-Dīn al-Tufī. (*Philosophy of Jurisprudence,* pp. 149-166).

But when Muslims no longer remembered that rule and wanted the provisions of law to remain immutable and rigid,—when they accepted to be bound by such provisions without amendment or alteration, even if customs, needs and conditions were amended or altered, and sciences, arts and living developed—it was inevitable that they should fall behind in culture and civilization and consequently suffer a decline in all aspects of social life.

To meet this deficiency, Muslims should understand the spirit of the law and resolve to apply its provisions only as long as their effective causes and conditions remain in existence. But when they cease to do so, provisions based on them should be subject to new interpretations. Ibn Khaldūn was right when he declared: "The conditions, customs and beliefs of peoples and nations do not indefinitely follow the same pattern and adhere to a constant course. There is, rather, change with days and epochs, as well as passing from one state

to another... such is the law of God that has taken place with regard to His subjects." (Prolegomena, p. 24).

VI. ASSOCIATION OF RELIGION WITH WAYS OF LIFE

Muslim jurists, as we have already mentioned, studied Islam as being a religion, a law and a social system. This is why Islamic jurisprudence contained provisions pertaining to acts of worship as well as to legal transactions.

As a consequence, there has been an inter-action between the teachings of religion and ethics on the one hand, and the provisions of law on the other hand. Thus we find justice and charity, coupled by the Qurʾān in one single verse: "God enjoins justice and charity," so that it has become a rule of justice not to do harm to one another, and a duty in legal transactions to abide by the principles of honesty and tolerance. All of this, no doubt, has been a source of benefit for the Muslims. It has made Islamic jurisprudence human and just.

Accordingly, earlier Muslim jurists made a differentiation in certain cases between the legal and the religious rulings, a differentiation similar to that made today between civil and natural obligations. They were, for instance, of the opinion that if a man had the right to repudiate his wife in law, his repudiation in order to be valid in religion must be based on justifiable grounds. Otherwise it would be proof of rashness and ingratitude towards the blessings of marriage which is based on love and mercy.

However, some jurists were influenced by dominant pre-Islamic customs and therefore did not go beyond this imperfect step. They declined to apply in such cases the ruling imposed by the teachings of religion. If they had done so, giving religious and ethical principles more consideration, along with as much implementation in law as had been possible, their attitude would have been closer to the spirit of Islamic jurisprudence and teachings.

In addition, we find that some jurists, especially during the period of imitation and decline, had, despite their differentiation between legal and religious rulings discarded such differentiation with regard to other matters. They mixed religion with the daily ways of life and studied Islam as comprising both categories in similar degree. They were, thus, unmindful of the fact that the basis in Islam is the religion and its teachings and that the world and its affairs are only the accessories. Indeed, their excess in this respect was such that incidental worldly matters were placed on the same level with the original, essential and immortal provisions of religion.

As a result, stagnation in Islamic thought and culture was bound to take place. Muslims of earlier days adhered to trivialities, so much so that they condemned as a prohibited innovation anything unknown during the time of the Prophet or their time. Thus, for instance, they

advocated the prohibition of the study of foreign languages, eating with the fork, wearing the hat, and other worldly trivial matters.

But if we refer to the essence of Islamic jurisprudence, we find that the teachings of the Prophet do not bind the Muslims except in cases pertaining to religion and ethics, along with their accessories. Traditions which refer to secondary matters of daily living and which the Prophet had mentioned as a matter of opinion, are not mandatory. In support of this statement, we may cite the tradition included by Muslim in his collection of traditions (Vol. 7, p. 95), namely that the Prophet once passed by some people who were fecundating palm trees and he asked: "What are these people doing?" The answer was that they were fecundating palm trees. To this the Prophet said: "If they would not do that (the trees) would be prolific." When they were told of his words they stopped that pollination. But the fruits did not ripen. Upon learning about this, the Prophet said: "I am only a human being; If I order you to do something regarding your religion you must comply. But if I order you to do something on the basis of my opinion, well I am just a human being. You know better in matters concerning your worldly affairs."

Therefore, no relation whatever exists between Islam and matters of daily living, unless these are concerned with a principle of religion. By religion, here, is meant the provisions of the faith, the unity of God, acts of worship, along with the principles of ethics and the fundamental rules of legal transactions. Outside these, the above-mentioned tradition leaves to the Muslims freedom in secondary matters relating to their daily life. It is because they know more about such matters, and because such matters are subject to changes in accordance with their needs and interests. (*Ḥujjat Allāh al-Balīghah,* by Al-Dahlawī, Vol. I, p. 128. Also *Qawāᶜid al-Taḥdīth,* by Al-Qāsimī, p. 256).

Muslims must comprehend this rule, and thereby separate provisions of religion from matters of daily life in the manner explained. They ought to adhere to their religion and ethical code, and manage their ways of life according to the spirit of Islam and requirements of science and civilization. It is by so doing that they will be able to put an end to their backwardness in this respect and to rise towards happiness and prosperity.

To sum up, the most important factor in the decline of Muslims is their neglect of the duties of Islam. Improvement of their condition can be brought about by their return to the true principles of Islam, their understanding of the effective causes of legal rules, and their giving what belongs to religion to religion and what belongs to the world to the world, along with their determination to destroy the walls of ignorance and imitation, to reject unauthentic texts, formalistic technicalities, particulars, and details, together with sectarian partisanship—all of which have distorted the real essence of Islam.

Muslims have to choose between two courses: the course of ignorant

imitators, thereby accepting darkness and ignorance and oblivion; or the course of the pious predecessors which leads to light and knowledge and life.

No doubt, these words may not please some narrow-minded conservatives who claim knowledge of Islam and its doctrines. But they shall never stand as an obstacle in the way of Muslims towards progress and civilization and betterment, for the grace of God is prior to their consent, and the interests of Islam and Muslims are higher than their interests.

Muslims today are facing the sweeping current of civilization. They have to walk in the train of modern life and be guided in this by true science, keen thinking and right faith. These can provide them with the necessary power to destroy the remains of blind imitation, along with the barriers installed by some poor-minded individuals against the free movement of reason, as well as against good and fruitful work, advancement and progress, unity and human brotherhood.

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THE MUSLIM DOCTRINE OF MAN

ITS BEARING ON SOCIAL POLICY AND POLITICAL THEORY

The present world situation, with its bitter clash of competing ideologies, forces the thoughtful to reformulations of their basic tenets of faith and philosophies of life. Especially is this true of the group of ideas which pertain to man's understanding of himself, and his relation to his total environment.

In the western world, we have been witnessing a far reaching effort on the part of philosophers, sociologists, political scientists, and theologians to re-state or re-evaluate their concept of Man and his destiny. This trend is evidenced by a number of books: Stace, *The Destiny of Western Man*; Du Nouy, *Human Destiny*; Berdyaev, *The Destiny of Man*; Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man.* This preoccupation with man, his nature, and his destiny is aroused by the realization that, in our days of political and moral upheaval, it is of the utmost importance to gain a clearer perspective of what man really is since men are the raw material of any political system and units of political activity or pawns of political manipulation. It therefore makes a tremendous difference to us to know what we believe about man, what he is, and what he can be.

In the Muslim world there have been, in the past hundred years, some notable attempts at reconstruction of the basic theological and philosophical presuppositions of Islam. Yet, for the most part, they have been along general lines with only incidental reference to this most important theme. There are some exceptions, such as the Turkish poet, sociologist and philosopher, Ziah Gokalp, and the Indian Muslim philosopher-poet, Muḥammad Iqbāl. These have tried to establish a doctrine of Man in relation to his total environment—to God, to society, to the world wide community—in terms of the religious and cultural traditions upon which Islamic civilization and society are based. Yet much more needs to be done along this line.

The Islamic world is at present confronted with two vast systems of political theory which are grounded in thoroughgoing but antagonistic theories of man. It behoves Islamic thinkers to analyze their basic concepts on this crucial matter, lest they be taken in by the clever propaganda of one or the other side and surrender for utilitarian purposes to systems of thought and of political organization that are alien to their most sacred traditions.

Not only is the Islamic world subjected to warring pressures from outside, but it is evident that there are at present divergent opinions and methods advocated by different parties within the Islamic world. This naturally renders even more difficult any effort at re-orientation or consolidation in this most critical issue of our times. These divergent theories should be examined to see if there is any possibility of

harmonizing them so that the Islamic world can present a united front.

The purpose of this paper is to review some recent trends and suggest lines of approach to a study of the essential Islamic doctrine of Man and to explore resources within Islam itself for a political philosophy that is indigenous to the Muslim world and not copied slavishly from eastern or western systems which may be foreign to its fundamental outlook. It is undoubtedly for Islamic scholars themselves to carry out this study in a thoroughgoing way. It would be presumptuous for any non-Muslim to do more than suggest lines of investigation.

Since the primary source of Islamic cultural forms is the Qurʾān it is fitting to examine the explicit statements and implicit presuppositions of this sacred text with regard to the nature and origin of man. A review of practices inherent in the original Muslim community may give us further insight into the genius of Muslim ethics and tradition from which they are derived. The more recent re-statements of Muslim poets, philosophers and theologians should add to the total picture.

When we turn to the Qurʾān we find explicit statements to the effect that man owes his existence to God. He is created from matter, moulded by God as the clay is moulded by the potter. He is a living creature for he is created from blood. Blood, as in all Semitic thought, represents the principle of life, which is spontaneous and to a certain degree self-regulative. Man is distinguished from all other living forms in that God breathes into him a portion of his own spirit. Since he is created, and created out of dust or clay, he cannot be thought of as being in any way equal to God and can never presume to set himself up against the divine authority. In one sense he is of the earth earthy and a dependent creature. Yet the spirit of God breathed into him sets him apart from and above all other dependent creatures, and gives him a unique affinity with his creator. He is a being capable of rational behaviour, of judgment, decision, and moral choice. The Qurʾān gives weight to this spiritual fact by asserting that God created man to be his representative or vice-regent on earth. He is set on earth to govern all the rest of creation which is made submissive to his will.

One of the most controversial issues in Islamic thought is the question of human freedom versus divine decree or predestination. This is not the place to elaborate on this point. It will suffice to say that there are authoritative passages in the Qurʾān to justify both positions. Many passages state explicitly or imply a doctrine of complete predestination. A survey of the divergent passages will reveal the fact that wherever attention is centered on God, stress is laid on His absolute and ultimate sovereignty. It is in this connection that men's actions, good and evil alike, are thought of as directly caused by the Divine will, since nothing happens unless God wills it or permits it. Even in matters of faith and disbelief the eternal decrees of God are

at work so that some are guided to faith and some are decreed to err. God's will is sovereign and He guides whom He wills into the right path, and whom He wills He leads astray into unbelief and error. When the focus of attention is turned on man, however, it is made evident that man is endowed by God with freedom and moral responsibility. Each man is a free moral unit, held responsible by God for his thoughts, decisions, and actions. This is what makes him an individual with affinities to God who is the supreme moral being. God mediates to him, through revelation, universal moral principles that are the expression of His eternal and holy will. Yet man is a center of latent power in that he is capable of responding to or of rejecting God's guidance. In Surah xxxiii: 72 we find an interesting and revealing passage which is meaningless unless human freedom is presupposed. God offers to all His creatures the responsibility of preserving the faith, of managing the world in the name of God. While all the other creatures refuse the burden of such a charge out of fear, man assumes it. Although he has not kept that faith or managed the world worthily and has become unjust and senseless, yet in this is both the measure of his greatness and of his sin. Had he not been free, he could not have sinned, yet at the same time the burden of responsibility could not have been placed upon him.

These two phases of Islamic doctrine became the subject of severe controversy when it came to the systematic formulation of creeds. The orthodox Ashᶜarī creed tended to exclude all secondary causes. In its effort to maintain the absoluteness of divine sovereignty it portrayed all human attitudes and actions, both virtuous and sinful, as immediate expressions of God's will. The whole trend of modern thought, however, has been in the opposite direction. Thus Muḥammad ᶜAbduh and Muḥammad Iqbāl both emphasize the moral autonomy of man. The final moral authority is with God, it is true, so that man's freedom entails accountability to God and the ultimate sovereignty of God asserts itself in history or in the final denouement of history.

Human history is dynamic. In a sense it is the sum total of men's choices. It is the result of man's use of his moral autonomy together with God's judgment of these moral decisions. There is a moral law at work in the universe. This law functions not mechanically but surely. It is the categorical response of God's will to men's deeds. When men break the moral commandments and reject the clear revelation of God, when they go against ultimate moral principles, they suffer the inevitable consequences. Thus history is the interplay of man's freedom and God's judgment. Constant reference is made in the Qurᵓān to past history as evidence of God's will at work in human affairs and this becomes the basis of appeal to men of good will and high purpose as well as to sinners to take heed of God's revelation and change their ways in accordance with the stated purposes of God.

Because all men exist by the will of God neither birth, nor occu-

pation nor social standing gives any man particular advantage over any other. Fundamental in Islam is a spiritual affirmation of the intrinsic equality of men as creatures of God. There are no special classes, or privileged groups, or special nations, since originally men were all one nation. (Surah ii: 209 and x: 20.) The only way in which men can categorize themselves is by their various responses to God, by faithful acceptance of God's guidance, or by rejection of his revelation. This is brought out implicitly in the theoretical bases of the early practices of Islam. Before God all men were considered equal. In the prayer, king and beggar worshipped side by side. The fast was, among other things, intended as a means of bringing all men, rich and poor alike, to a realization of their subservience to God and of the brutal fact of hunger as it affects all men equally. In the pilgrimage, when men entered the sacred precinct, they all put on identical one piece garments, thereby recognizing their equality and unity in the sight of God, since all distinction of class and wealth as revealed by clothing were thus wiped out. To a certain degree the *Zakāt* combines the element of non-dependence on material goods with a sense of responsibility towards God's creatures whom the accidents of fortune had left without security. In principle it is an equalizing institution. The laws of inheritance, although they have worked havoc at times in our modern society, also expressed the same principle of economic levelling. No man could inherit the whole fortune in lands or goods amassed by his father but had to share equally with all other male heirs. Finally, in the development of the law, there is a principle which could have the effect of curbing all capricious authoritarianism of individual rulers or doctors of the law. It is, in a sense, an appeal to the general will. Although in strict jurisprudence the principle of *Ijmāᶜ* (consensus) is reserved to the trained jurists it has within it the seed of a democratic principle. As Iqbāl points out, in practice it has sometimes been effective in giving expression to a more general consensus than that of a minority of the élite. The abuses and moral failures of individuals are, in part, or may be, in principle, balanced in the historical setting by the general will.

We have seen how the individual is considered important because he is a unit of moral power. In the Muslim tradition there is another concept that deals with the individual in the group giving men a measure of cohesion, a sense of corporateness that is sometimes lacking in modern western concepts of man. This corporate personality is provided by the concept of the *Dār al-Islām,* the brotherhood of the faithful. This is not merely a theoretical concept, it is an intangible actually which gives every Muslim a feeling of sympathetic solidarity with every other Muslim and also provides him with a sense of security. He belongs to an entity which is above color, class, nationality and state organizations. He can feel at home in many lands scattered from the Atlantic coast of Africa to the very heart of the

Pacific, wherever Islam is the predominant religion and culture. All this creates or is capable of creating an *esprit de corps,* a unity of peoples, the importance of which cannot be over-estimated. Unfortunately the feeling of solidarity of *Dār al-Islām* has not always prevented bloodshed and conflict between factions of the Islamic world. Also it must be said that this fraternity shows up most strongly when the Islamic world, or any part of it, has been threatened from some non-Islamic source, and has tended to be forgotten when no impending danger imperils the community from the outside. Yet this bond is an actual force and potentially could become a vitalizing factor in the Muslim world as a whole.

Let us now turn to some modern reconstructions of the concept of man dealing briefly with Muḥammad ᶜAbdūh, Muḥammad Iqbāl, and Ziah Gokalp in turn.

Both ᶜAbduh and Iqbāl emphasize the inherent moral autonomy of man. Muḥammad ᶜAbduh deals with this question in connection with the common western tendency to ascribe any backwardness or apathy that may be found in Muslim lands to the firmly held doctrine of a divine decree of predeterminism. After admitting that the common people are tinged with the fatalism which is derived from the idea of compulsion and predestination, ᶜAbduh asserts that thinking Muslims of all sects believe in man's freedom of choice. In his *Risālah* he states that man is "Conscious of his voluntary actions, weighs the consequences of them by reason, assigns value to them by will and performs them by a power within himself." By experience man learns, however, that there is a power greater than himself to which he is accountable. When the Qurᶜān speaks of "what ye do" and "what your hands have acquired," it implies responsibility and therefore essential freedom, for there would be no justice in holding man responsible for deeds and attitudes that are imposed on him by a will or power outside himself. ᶜAbduh appeals to the doctrine of *Ijtihād* as a proof of this. "To those who exert themselves We show our path" indicates that God's guidance is available to those who take the initiative and make an effort to discover truth, goodness, righteousness. Just as men are governed by special laws in their social life, so are they universally governed by the moral laws of God. These they can discover by insight and from divine revelation. Yet just as they are free to obey or disobey the laws of society, so they may respond to or rebel against the moral laws of God. In both cases, however, when they break the law they are subject to the judgment and punishment of the moral authority. Nations attain greatness or fall from it according to their deliberate moral choices or the general moral orientation of their social policies. Thus "verily God does not change the state of a people until they change their own state" (Surah xiii: 12) implies that there is a law of cause and effect at work in God's economy, but the initiative and responsibility is placed squarely on men

in their God-given freedom. God carries out his purposes in history through the checks and restraints of one nation upon another, yet in this historical give and take man can find through experience the way of truth and righteousness. (Surah ii: 252). God has given man sense and reason. These are adequate for him both to discover what is necessary for self-preservation and to discern what is right and wrong. Man is also endowed with emotion and feeling which give drive to his rational perception, and with free will to act upon the insights derived from reason enriched by emotion.

Muḥammad Iqbāl goes even further in asserting the uniqueness and sovereignty of the individual ego. As a disciple of Bradley he stresses the validity and inviolability of the inner consciousness of man and, as a corollary, he affirms the independent moral responsibility of each human being. He finds this idea expressed clearly in the Qurʾān when it states that each individual "shall come to him (the divine judge) on that Day (the day of judgment) singly" (Surah xix: 25). "No soul shall labour but for itself, and no one shall bear another's burden" (Surah vi: 164). "For its own works lieth every soul in pledge" (Surah lxxiv: 41). Thus the ego is private, unique, differientiated from other egos as a center of moral autonomy and responsibility. Each man's pleasures and pains are exclusively his own. Others may sympathize but do not share. God himself cannot feel, judge, choose for a man when more than one course of action is open to him. A man's personality is a directive purpose. This directive nature of the finite ego is derived from and proceeds from the directive energy of God. When God breathed into man of his spirit it is this essential, unique characteristic of His own nature that He imparted to man. It is man's fundamental experience of purposive actions, of striving toward and reaching ends which convinces Iqbāl of the individual man's efficiency as a personal cause. It is this directive control that makes man a free personal entity akin to the Ultimate Ego. God, as Ultimate Ego, permitted, even purposed, the emergence of a finite ego, capable of private initiative and in so doing He limited the freedom of His own free will. In support of this assertion Iqbāl quotes the Qurʾān "Say: the truth is from the Lord: let him who will, believe and let him who will, disbelieve" (Surah xviii: 28) and "If ye do good, ye do good for your own souls, and if ye do evil, it is also for your own souls" (Surah xvii: 7).

In dealing with the doctrine of *taqdīr* destiny, Iqbāl says that the destiny of a thing or a person is not "unrelenting fate working from without like a task master," it is the "inward reach of a thing, its realizeable possibilities" which may actualize themselves "without any feeling of compulsion from without." The Quranic verse "All things We have created with a fixed destiny" would then mean that each creature is endowed with "a fixed potential" which it is "free to realize or not." He considers the creative capacity of man as evidence

of his freedom, for all creative activity must of necessity be free since "creation is opposed to repetition which is a characteristic of mechanical action". Thus Iqbāl rejects all extreme forms of predeterminism, whether it be by the *taqdīr* of God, or by the necessity of mechanism.

The fatalistic element in Islamic thought is ascribed to the superimposition of Greek philosophical thought on the original religious insights of Islam. Reaching back through a chain of causation to a first and ultimate cause in the classical Greek tradition, the philosophers of Islam tended to regard the ultimate First Cause as the only cause and therefore denied the existence of intermediary secondary causes, thus making God the only and immediate author of all that happens in the universe. Two other factors hastened the growth of fatalism. One was political expediency which sought to justify political misdeeds by attributing them to the decrees of God. The other was the diminishing force of the life-impulse of original Islam which produced a lassitude and apathy favorable to a deterministic outlook.

Muḥammad Iqbāl carries this discussion of the relation of man, the finite ego to God, the Ultimate Ego, further in his treatment of the idea of immortality. Man's ego has its beginning in time with its emergence in the spatio-temporal world. This finitude is not a misfortune. "It is with the irreplaceable singleness of his individuality that the finite ego will approach the infinite Ego to see for himself the consequences of his past actions and to judge the possibilities of his future." Basing his thought on the Quranic passage which says: "Judgment shall be given between men with equity; and none shall be wronged: and every soul shall receive as it shall have wrought, for well God knoweth men's actions" (Surah xxxix: 59-70), Iqbāl states that only those individuals who, following God's guidance, have reached the high point of self-possession which is perfect manhood, can hope "to maintain their individuality in contact with the Infinite Ego." The way is open to man to belong to the meaning of the universe and become immortal. Personal immortality is not man's by right, it can only be achieved by personal effort and in the end the deed is the criterion of achievement. In support of this argument Iqbāl quotes the following Quranic passage: "By a soul and Him who balanced it, and breathed into it its wickedness and its piety, blessed now is he who hath kept it pure and undone is he who hath corrupted it" (Surah xci: 7-10).[1]

Proceeding further with an analysis of these two thinkers, we find that they recognize that man has what we might call a dual nature. He is both finite and free, subject to necessity yet in some ways tran-

[1] This is Rodwell's translation; Pickthall's translation is interesting here: "By a soul and Him who perfected it and inspired it (with conscience of) what is wrong for it and (what is) right for it. He is indeed successful who causeth it to grow, and he is indeed a failure who stunteth it."

scending necessity. Some of their discussions remind one strangely of the overall theme of Reinhold Niebuhr in his *Nature of Man.* Thus Muḥammad ᶜAbduh says that man is conscious that he is created "with a capacity to receive limitless knowledge," that he aspires "to enjoyments without limits and without end," that he is capable of "degrees of perfection that are also without limit." On the other hand, man is exposed to the sufferings of passion, to struggles against wandering desires, to illness which affects the body, to wrestling against many other requirements and needs (see *Risālah* p. 98 ff.). By nature man seeks truth, but because of the drive of self-centered will he sometimes makes untruth true. Thus he is a creature of contradictions. "He ascends by the power of his reason to the highest planes of the World of the Unseen (*malakūt*). He reaches up by his thoughts to most elevated truths concerning the World of Divine Omnipotence (*Jabarūt*). He matches his powers against the forces of the widest universe. But he also belittles himself and cowers and abases himself to the lowest degree of humiliation and submission" (*Risālah* p. 116).

Iqbāl similarly describes man as highly endowed, capable of thought, plan, purpose, creative action. Yet he finds himself low on the scale of life surrounded on all sides by forces of obstruction. "Surely We created man of the best stature, then We reduced him to the lowest of the low" (Surah lciv: 4-5). This fact makes man restless, seeking fresh scope for self-expression and thereby injuring himself. Superior to Nature, man was entrusted with a responsibility that Nature would not carry and it is that very superiority of freedom that is the cause of his downfall. Capable of shaping and directing the forces of nature, yet he is at times thwarted by them. It is then that he builds vaster worlds of the spirit in his own inner being and is enabled to rise above the forces of nature. Man shapes his destiny and that of the universe, now adjusting himself to its forces, now moulding its forces to his own ends and purposes, and grows spiritually in the process. One has the impression, although it is nowhere clearly stated, that sin in man is not due to the limitations of finitude but to the over-extension of man's freedom and self-transcendence. It is when he becomes proud and self-sufficient that he falls. The Qurᵓān insists on this idea repeatedly. Two passages will suffice: "Walk not proudly on the earth, for thou canst not cleave the earth, neither shalt thou reach to the mountains in height: all this is evil, odious to thy Lord" (xvii: 39). "As to those who believe not in the life to come, we have made their own doings fair seeming to them, and they are bewildered therein" (xxvii: 3). It is because man left to himself without guidance from God and dependence on God, falls into injustice and senseless pride that revelation is needed to correct the aberrations of his reason and will.

It is also because of the danger of individual failure that the corrective force of the State is necessary provided the state itself is informed with the guidance of God. According to Muḥammad ᶜAbduh

the state is an endeavour to transform the ideal principles of God into space-time forms. It aspires at realizing them in definite human organizations. In this sense alone, ᶜAbduh avers, is Islam a theocracy, not in the sense that it is ever headed by an infallible representative of God on earth. "The human potentate is always in danger of screening his own despotic will behind his supposed infallibility."

Another Muslim thinker deserves to be dealt with here because of certain distinctive features of his philosophy of man. I refer to Ziah Gokalp, the Turkish poet, sociologist, philosopher who is pointed out by many as having laid the theoretical foundations for the modern Turkish state. It is beyond the scope of this paper to deal at length with Gokalp's social theory as a whole. Some productive facets of his thought should, however, be mentioned. I am indebted for this portion of my paper to Uriel Heyd's *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism.* Whereas ᶜAbduh and Iqbāl emphasize the moral importance of the individual in society, Gokalp tends to reverse the order by suggesting that the individual rises to his full stature only within the matrix of a dominant society. Individuality, personal autonomy, belong to lower levels of human life. They are associated with his physical constitution, they are the product of his animal and sensual nature. The individual reaches full orbed personality only when he frees himself from his creaturely individuality and loses himself in intensive social consciousness. At that point he really becomes man. Personality is defined as "the totality of thoughts and feelings existing in the consciousness of society and reflected in the consciousness of the individual." Individualism denotes lack of ideals and is the source of moral decay. frustration and despair. Collectivism, the fusion of individuals into a group entity with a group consciousness is the only source of ideals and progress. Gokalp's collectivism was formulated under the influence of Durkheim, but the spiritual source of this theory is found in the Islamic tradition of fraternity and equality among the believers. Before he came under the influence of Durkheim, Gokalp wrote a poem which express the feeling of fulfillment in group consciousness.

> "The people who strive each for his own end
> To-day become all brethren wholeheartedly united.
> Egoism fades away, collective feeling fills their hearts."

Human personality is sacred only in so far as it becomes the bearer of the "collective" consciousness", when it merges itself completely in mystic abandon with the larger consciousness of society as a whole. Although Gokalp was at first inclined to equate this social entity to which the individual surrendered himself with the religious community, he later emphasized that this was a transitional stage of development and claimed that the final stage of fulfillment came when he found himself merged with the national consciousness.

Gokalp is also known for two theories—bearing on social policy

and political philosophy—theories which were revolutionary in his day and still are thought of as heretical in most parts of the Muslim world. One of these was his theory concerning the *Sharīᶜah* law of Islam, the other his advocacy of the separation of Religion and State.

Ziah Gokalp made a clear distinction between eternal and transcendent moral principles which are mediated to man through divine revelation and codified law which is an attempt to apply these principles to specific and transitory situations. The first are immutable and absolute; the latter is, by the very nature of the case, relative and subject to modification and reformulation with the changing circumstances of dynamic history. Since one of the most arduous problems of every progressive Islamic state is that posed by the necessity of adapting canon law to changing situations, while attempting to abide by the specific regulations of the Qurᵓān, this distinction of the Turkish sociologist would seem to be worthy of careful consideration. Eternal divine principles must of necessity be distorted and limited by any human adaptation of them to specific cases. To take the specific codes as equivalent to absolute principles will always be fraught with danger, the danger of seizing upon a relative, temporal good, formulated by a human mind, and putting upon it the final stamp of divine approval. This is pride and arrogance of the worst kind. The Muslim science of jurisprudence has provided several principles of adaptation, that of *ijmāᶜ*, of *qiyās*, and of *istiḥsān*, all of which are valid if the product of this effort is not endowed with a finality that belongs only to the broad, moral principles that are derived from God and are made known to man through inspiration and revelation. These always stand ahead and beyond man, both drawing him onward and upward and also judging him when he slackens his pace and claims he has arrived.

The other daring theory advanced by Gokalp is the principle of separation of the State and of institutionalized Religion. His claim is that in the earliest days of Islam the clergy, or *ᶜulamāᵓ*, were not active in government. It was only after a generation or two that they took on official status and were integrated in the administration of the state. This added greatly to their influence over government policies but deprived them of the independence which is necessary to a critical and prophetic religious influence on society as a whole. Gokalp advocated going back to the original status for the sake of healthy government and a dynamic religious life. It would seem that, in a sense, Muḥammad ᶜAbduh would have agreed in principle since, as we have seen, he rejected the theocratic idea, if theocracy means the rule in matters of faith and social policy of one man or a group of men who are thought of as infallible representatives of God on earth. If, on the other hand, theocracy is the constant endeavour of men to mould their temporal institutions into as near an approximation as possible to the ideal principles of God, as ᶜAbduh suggested, this purpose could be served even more efficiently by an independent

religious institution. This body would keep constantly on the alert for ever better ways of transforming the social and political structure in harmony with the eternal principles and would never be tempted to maintain the status quo for the sake of vested interests or privilege. It would seem to be of the essence of dynamic religion to keep itself free from the temptation of wielding secular power. The separation of State and Religion does not necessarily mean a secularized society, although it has sometimes resulted in that. If the religious forces are alive and influential they should not have to depend on secular power to have their insights incorporated into the social structure. A healthy society in the sight of God is one in which the majority of citizens are so convinced of the validity of moral and spiritual principles that they will constantly strive to permeate all their activities with the demands of the moral law of God. If they are not so convinced no direct, legal, or political power wielded by religious leaders will ever succeed in coercing them into right attitudes. The Islamic community should at least take this proposition into account, and neither accept it nor reject it without having seriously examined its possibilities.

Are there any general conclusions that can be drawn from this rapid survey? In the realm of social policy Islamic culture has a strong basis for social reform. The essential equalitarianism and democracy of original Islam should provide adequate motivation for any social movement that tends to alleviate the disabilities and negative discrimination experienced by any group within the community, be they women, fellaḥīn, small artisans, or industrial workers. Wherever stratification of society has produced a wealthy few and a majority of poor, reformers can appeal to the moral tenets that are fundamental in Islam, demanding legislation that will tend to raise the standard of living of the poor and provide all classes of society with equal opportunities for education, adequate incomes, and social expression.

In the realm of law, Islamic society can safely recognize that behind all human codes there is an immutable law of God. At best, human laws are only approximations of divine law and are therefore judged and found wanting when measured by the absolutes of the divine will. This should enable jurists to feel free to modify, improve, adapt their codes to the changing situations which confront them in the modern world, always keeping in mind the eternal principles of equality, justice and mercy that are of the very essence of God's nature and purpose for men. It should free them from the fear of tampering with codes lest they be invalidating the laws of God. Since all verbal formulations are the product of human minds and are adapted to particular situations they are relative and therefore not infallible.

In the political sphere the Islamic world is in a position to develop its own distinctive philosophy without slavish imitation either of communist forms, or western political theory with its tendency to atomistic individualism. We have seen that Islam recognizes the intrinsic worth

of individuals as owing their existence to God and responsible to Him for their actions. This means that no individual can be completely subsumed in a totalitarian structure such as that of Communism. In its theoretical and its practical form, communism makes the individual expendable if he does not serve the purpose of the state or subscribe without question to the party line. This could not be possible in an Islamic society such as ᶜAbduh or Iqbāl conceived of it. Neither can Islam ever make peace with the economic determinism or materialistic interpretation of history which are fundamental to Marxism. Man is not controlled by matter or by economic forces since he is essentially a spiritual being with affinities to God and thus a moral being, free in his spirit. God and not matter is in control of historic movements.

On the other hand, there is a collective dimension in the Islamic concept of man. His sense of belonging to a larger whole, his solidarity with other men who belong to the same community of faith, provide individual lives with a social context that is too often lacking in the individualistic west. There is a force, a security, a field of common consciousness provided by the brotherhood of Islam that may result in the kind of trans-national and trans-racial cohesion that men are anxiously trying to achieve in the rest of the world against the formidable obstacle of age old segmentation into sovereign national states. If the Islamic solidarity could be invoked for positive purposes to cement the many varied Muslim nations into a vital unity it could become a positive force in the world. It would be more vital still if it were not exclusive and could show the grace to include in its sympathy and brotherliness all the creatures of God. It is a fine thing when Pakistan will protest against injustices meted out to another nation far removed from it geographically because that nation belongs to the Islamic community of nations; it would be a finer thing still and blaze new trails in our war torn world if an Islamic nation would rise up in protest at injustice inflicted on any people, even outside the Muslim fold, in the name of the righteous purposes of a universal God and of the solidarity of man.

Since we are talking of nationalism versus internationalism it might be well to note that segmented nationalism is what Toynbee calls an aberration for which he blames the West. It has gained ground in the Muslim world as a legacy of the colonial era. Thus in the Middle East a dozen different nations have emerged whose lines of demarcation correspond in part to the spheres of influence formerly claimed by various European powers. There is rivalry and jealousy between them when within the Household of Islam there should be unity.

Finally, a word about the controversial question of the separation of the offices of religion and the secular powers of the state. The west has followed this path with mixed results. In some cases it has resulted in lowering of the influence and impact of religion on the corporate life of the nation. In others, it has definitely protected religious minor-

ities from the pressures of the politically religious majority. It has also set religious organizations free to become the ever alert conscience of society without the subtle and insidious temptation of giving religious and therefore divine sanction to the status quo and to those dominant classes that happen to be in a privileged position. It has also obviated that equally strong temptation to use political power to impose religious conformity. Perhaps the Quranic passage which says that "there shall be no compulsion in religion" is relevant at this point. If the link between Religion and the State could be maintained without leading to bigoted conservatism that denounces any new idea or theory on the basis that it is contrary to accepted religious doctrine or practice; if it could be kept free from fanaticism and regressive social policy, then it could be a real force in society. History, however, seems to show that all these dangers have been present wherever the religious agencies are involved in political administration. Sincere and patriotic Muslim leaders should weigh very carefully the pros and the cons of this issue before allowing their decision to harden into a congealed pattern that will be hard to break.

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ISLAM AS THE STATE RELIGION

A MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD VIEW IN SYRIA

The recent dissolution of the Ikhwān al-Muslimūn (Muslim Brethren) in Egypt, after the organisation had survived the earlier dissolution of all political parties by the Naguib regime, has drawn renewed attention to its ideas and to the forms in which it has advocated Islamic revival.

One of the most obvious and important of the issues involved is the role of religion in the definition and concept of the State. Opinion in Islam on this question ranges all the way from the militant 'laicism' of Ataturk in Turkey to the most avowed champions of an exclusive concept of Muslim citizenship within the Islamic nation. The status of non-Muslim minorities within the State in which Muslims preponderate is the other side of the problem. Is the religion of the citizen a matter in which the State should be entirely neutral (under conditions of public order)? Should there be entire equality in respect of electing and election to any, or all, offices in the State? What are the merits of any official identification of the State with Islam, and in what terms should it be?

The answers, both in thought and in constitutional promulgation have been several. A too complete identification has been feared by liberal elements as compromising, or at least, complicating, the position of non-Muslim citizens, whom national feeling must integrate. It has also been suspected as tending to lay the State open to excessive interference on the part of conservative and 'clerical' elements. There is also the problem of how, and through what bodies, to determine the Islamicity of particular laws if representative assemblies are to be called in question on doctrinal grounds.

The article that follows is a lucid exposition of the point of view taken on certain of these issues by a leader of the Syrian branch of the Ikhwān al Muslimūn. It should not, of course, be assumed that the Muslim Brotherhood outside Egypt entirely corresponds to the Egyptian original. It has nowhere else attained the numbers and the influence which it commanded in Cairo. Nevertheless the arguments expressed in this extract may be taken as indicative of how a strong advocacy of the Islamic State would present its own case and strive to re-assure the dubious—here dubbed 'secularists'. Though now four years old the article embodies and expresses attitudes still unpredictably at work in the current processes of Arab Muslim self-determination, and,—should we not say?—self-definition. Among other things the reader may be interested in the strongly pragmatic tone of what follows. Islam as State religion is justified on the ground of its indispensability to national morale.

Shaykh Muṣṭafā al-Sibāʿī, the author of this article, is a native of Ḥoms in Syria and was born in 1910. His education culminated in

receipt of the *ᶜālimiyyah* degree in Islamic law from Al-Azhar University in Cairo. Shaykh Muṣṭafā came into prominence in 1946 when he began publication of the Damascene newspaper, *Al-Manār,* and in 1947 when he was returned as deputy from Ḥoms in the parliament. At about this time Shaykh Muṣṭafā became leader of the Syrian branch of Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn (the Muslim Brethren).[1]

In 1949 Shaykh Muṣṭafā was again elected deputy and became a member of the constitutional committee in the parliament. In the same year he formed al-Jabhah al-Ishtirākiyyah (the Islamic socialist front), which was designed to be the political arm of the Ikhwān in Syria. In 1950 he achieved a certain amount of notoriety by suggesting that Syria should reorient its foreign policy and seek diplomatic support from the Soviet Union as a counterpoise to Western support of Israel. He thus aligned himself with Maᶜrūf al-Dawalībī, the then Minister of National Economy, who had slightly earlier expressed similar sentiments.

According to the text, it was *Al-Manār,* the newspaper which Shaykh Muṣṭafā had founded, that originally asked him to write this article.[2] Actually, the article was circularized to various Syrian newspapers and carried by many of them.[3] Currently owned and edited by Bashīr al-ᶜAwj, *Al Manār* has an estimated circulation of about 3,500 copies. It is commonly believed that the Ikhwān organization controls the paper although in April, 1950, the same month in which Al-Dawalībī and Al-Sibāᶜī made their pro-Soviet declaration, *Al-Manār* made a statement denying any connection with the Ikhwān. Nevertheless, it is probable that Al-Sibāᶜī still has a considerable voice in its policies, which are republican and nationalistic. The paper also advocates strict Islamic orthodoxy. The article was later published by the New York Arabic-language daily, *Al-Samīr.*[4]

The cause for which Shaykh Muṣṭafā argues in this article, namely, the establishment of Islam as the official religion of Syria, was not successful. The relevant part of the new constitution, Chapter I, Article III, approved by the Syrian parliament on September 5, 1950, reads as follows:

1. The religion of the President of the Republic is Islam.
2. Muslim law (*fiqh*) is the principal source of legislation.
3. Freedom of belief is guaranteed. The state respects all the heavenly religions [i.e.,Christianity and Judaism in addition to Islam]

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[1] For information on the Ikhwān consult James Heyworth-Dunne, *Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt* (Washington, 1950); *The Middle East Journal,* Vol. III, no. 2 (April, 1949), pp. 182-4; Franz Rosenthal, "The 'Muslim Brethren' in Egypt," *The Muslim World,* Vol. XXXVII, no. 4 (October, 1947), pp. 278-91.

[2] See below, p. 1.

[3] As for instance by *Al-Ayyām* on March 9, 1950.

[4] Serially on March 9, 10, 13, and 14, 1950.

and guarantees the free exercise of all forms of worship on condition that they do not disturb public order.

4. The personal status of the religious communities is guaranteed and protected.

The Constitution of 1953, drafted under the authority of General Shishakly, recently ousted, and adopted after a Referendum in the summer of 1953, follows the above four principles almost identically, in its Article 3.

"THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ISLAM AS THE STATE RELIGION OF SYRIA."

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful. Praise be to God, and prayer and peace on His messengers and on the advocates of truth and goodness—until the day of judgement.

In accordance with the desire of the committee on the constitution and of various sincere friends, I would have preferred the debate about the religion of the state to have remained confined to the members of the committee on the constitution and to the constituent assembly. Because of this preference I have refrained from any attempt to publicize the point of view herein defended either directly to the people, or in public assemblies, or in the pages of the press. In fact I have not hitherto expressed my opinion. However, now that *Al-Manār* has asked me for comments on my point of view. I have given them with candour and tact and with regard for the intelligence of those opposed to us (especially the members of the other religious communities), for all of which I believe the situation calls.

The day before yesterday I read a declaration, which some newspapers carried, by a group who called themselves graduates of institutions of higher learning and who asserted that they were all Muslims. However, their courage and fortitude failed them, for not a single one of them mentioned his name so that we might ascertain the truth of the claim that they had graduated from institutions of higher learning and that they professed the religion of Islam.

Furthermore, I read yesterday a declaration from the Greek Catholic Patriarchate in Damascus.

I have read others similar to it by various Christian prelates in the cities of Syria.

When the opposition stooped to the level of journalism to set forth their views and arguments, it also became incumbent on us to set forth our arguments and opinions in order to inform public opinion of the real facts of our thought and to criticize and expose the fallacious views of the opposition. After this rebuttal the decision will be completely in the hands of the people, since they are the source of all power and their authority is the governing authority,

which is represented in their constituent assembly and constitutional government.

Constitutions express the desires of peoples and the orientation of their leaders and representatives toward all the reforms which are necessary. There is no doubt that we Syrians are a part of the Arab nation, and the will of the Arab nation is crystal clear in that it wants to march to glory under the banner of religious belief and morality. That feeling has been natural to the Arab nation in the Jāhiliyyah period, under Islam, and at present. Every claim to the contrary belies reality. Every attempt to make the Arab nation deviate from this course will be shunned by the resolute will of the nation. Every appeal which tends toward secularism, atheism, and materialism represents a real danger for both the present and the future of the Arabs. For humanity, its nerves shattered by a materialism which has driven it to misery, looks today toward spiritual strength and belief. Surely we have no need to prove this tendency on the part of modern nations when we consider the fact that the United Nations has decided to open its sessions with a prayer to God because it is in need of His protection.

Hereafter, we will elucidate the point that the most modern and progressive nations, both Oriental and Occidental, have specified a religion in their constitutions. Suffice it to say that if humanity in general needs religion to restore its confidence and reassurance, we particularly need this confidence and reassurance, especially since the state of Israel has arisen on our borders. Moreover, Israel itself is a state which mobilizes religion to gather together the Jews of the world, to stir their enthusiasm, and to draw forth their wealth. Israel specified at the beginning of its constitution that it rested on those principles which the prophets of Israel had proclaimed. In the last article of its constitution it specified supervision by the judiciary over current laws so that it could check them with the sacred law of Israel and so that every modern law which was to be passed in the future would rest on the foundation of Jewish legislation. If this state has employed religion for getting a foothold in Palestine and for spreading its malevolent spirit to the adjoining regions (and we are the first who are exposed to this malevolent spirit), are we not compelled to find in religion that which enflames public feeling and arouses the peoples' enthusiasm, that which makes them donate their wealth for armaments and for military strength, and that which makes them exert and discipline themselves and makes them execute every law which will strengthen and preserve the state? Shall we not need religion after we have discovered in the battle for Palestine that those who wanted to rouse the Arabs in any other way failed, and that those who actually waged holy war, faced death, and suffered martyrdom were led to that only by the religion which prepares for them the eternity of paradise if they give their souls to it? We desire to build a state; therefore, let it be based on strong foundations. We desire to remedy

our problems; therefore, let us remedy them in a realistic spirit. We desire to solve a troublesome crisis; therefore, let us find the shortest cuts. I do not know any better way to represent our situation and the situation of humanity than by the words of Lord Samuel, leader of the Liberal Party in Britain, who said in a speech on the twenty-fifth of February, 1947: "Most [commentators] held also that the world's present crisis was at bottom a moral crisis, and that a revival of religion [in the widest sense of the word] was essential if it was to be overcome." [1]

As long as we need faith in order to conquer difficulties and solve our spiritual and moral crisis, let us frame this desire most clearly in our constitution so that the course will be clear for every future government, parliament, and would-be leader of the people. Thence it follows that a religion is absolutely essential for the state in accordance with the dictates of our patriotic and moral interests and of our independence. Moreover, no one would oppose this proposition except a person who wants to swim in the sea of atheistic secularism, to inflict more misery on us than we already have, and to take away the last remaining hope that in the future we will have self-confidence and the kind of morale which converts the desires of the people into lasting victories.

I. Democratic principles. The principle followed in the constitutions of the world, in the organization of parties, and in the procedures of representative assemblies, as acknowledged by the entire world, is that the opinion of the majority is to be followed and acted upon. If, therefore, we say that the religion of the state is Islam, it being the religion of nine-tenths of the Syrians and of ninety-eight per cent of the Arabs, will we have exceeded the truth or deviated from democracy? [Note in this connection that] the states which have specified a particular religion in their constitution have not only taken the religion of the majority as the official religion, but in many cases have even taken the sect of the majority as the official religious sect.

Thus the Argentine Republic specified in the second article of its constitution, promulgated on the eleventh of March, 1949, that it relies on, strengthens, and supports Apostolic Roman Catholicism. The Irish Republic specified in its constitution, promulgated in the year 1937, that the [Roman]Catholic Church is the preferred and privileged church in the Republic.

These examples do not include the constitutions of the Arabic and Islamic states. In fact there is no state in the world whose people

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[1] According to a personal letter from Lord Samuel, the speech from which this quotation is taken was delivered on the "Third Programme of the B.B.C.," February 23, 1947. The printed version appears in *The Listener*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 945 (March 6, 1947), pp. 311-12. The phrase "in the widest sense of the word" does not appear in Shaykh Muṣṭafā's Arabic rendition. Lord Samuel's help in tracking down the source of this quotation is gratefully acknowledged. [Tr.]

profess one religion only. Instead, in every state there is a majority and a minority in religion. Are we then innovating in this matter if we follow the principle which the nations of the world follow?

2. Domestic interest. No one can deny that the Syrian state faces today a painful internal situation. Any attempt to reform the spirit of a nation by rules and regulations without a psychological spur from religion and morality will be in vain. If we grant that we want our people to have a noble life, to be attached to the state, and to be defenders of the fatherland, the establishment of Islam as the religion of the state will stimulate the people, the overwhelming majority of whom are Muslim, into executing the regulations and decrees which the government enacts and promulgates in their interest. [This result will come about] because they will see therein a decisive religious pattern from which there should be no deviation. Every important government in the world, no matter how strong and advanced, needs this psychological religious restraint. How, therefore, can our budding republic, afflicted with growing pains, dispense with it?

3. National interest. We, the Syrians, advocates of Arab unity, consider ourselves to be a part of the Arab nation and consider our Syrian fatherland to be part of the greater Arab fatherland. Our republic is today a member of the Arab League and will tomorrow, by the grace of God, be part of a single Arab state. According to the lowest estimate the Arabs number seventy million, of whom sixty-eight are Muslims and two are Christians, and all the states of the Arab League (except for Lebanon which has a special position) either specify that the religion of the state is Islam in their constitutions, as is the case with Egypt, Iraq and Jordan; or else their existence is implicitly based on that fact, as is the case with Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

Thus the establishment of Islam as the state religion will be a strong factor for unity between ourselves and our Arab brethren and a formal symbol of the *rapprochement* between the states of the Arab League. Why, therefore, should we neglect the strongest factor—popular and official—for Arab unity? Why should we refuse to face reality?

4. Political interest. The world today is divided into great political blocs, and each camp tries to extend its influence—culturally, economically, intellectually and colonially—and expends great amounts of money and effort to that end.

There is no doubt that we, the Arabs, both in our current painful situation and in our future life, should have a sphere of influence which will support us in the international arena and will be bound to us by a relationship of love, friendship and cooperation. Islam has made for us in the East a sphere of influence which extends among the four hundred million Muslims, all of whom admire our language, our heritage, our Book [i.e., the Qurʾān], and our culture. So much, in fact, is this the case that Pakistan has recognized Arabic as an

official language. Furthermore, we see that in the United Nations Pakistan has strongly backed our rights in Palestine, for which defense she merits the thanks of the Arab states and peoples. On the other hand, the western Christian states have made common cause against the birthplace of the Messiah and the original home of his message. Did Pakistan then take this stand and take our language as an official language for any reason other than that she believed in Islam and has founded her state and life on it? You can say the same thing about Indonesia, which is still struggling for full independence. These two large states, the number of whose population reaches one hundred and fifty million, have specified in their provisional constitutions that their religion is Islam. Is not the acknowledgement of Islam as a religion one of the things which will strengthen the ties between us and these states and peoples, especially since it is our religion, which we exported to them and propagated in their countries? Do we not need commercial markets for our products? Do we not need economic assistance? Do we not find in these peoples a natural, virgin field for our influence, language, culture, heritage, and civilization? To whom can we leave our political, economic, and cultural interests? Can anyone tell us, candidly and boldly?

These then are some of the advantages which we will get if we specify this article in the constitution, and, as the reader will see, these are real advantages with none of which we can dispense in a life like ours, full of trials and tribulations. And what are the disadvantages which accrue from the introduction of the article? We desire to deal with them, briefly, although we hope to return to this subject for further exposition and clarification.

It is clear from what the heads of the Christian communities have written and from what we have heard that their objections [to the establishment of Islam as the state religion] are centered on two areas:

1. [They object] that the implication of the state's being Muslim will be that the rules of Islam will be applied both to Muslims and Christians; and, since the Christians have religious tenets, rules, and systems of personal status which differ from those of Islam, [they ask] how they can be compelled to submit to the authority of Islam.

This interpretation is erroneous from numerous points of view, the most important of which is that Islam respects Christianity as a revealed religion and leaves to its followers freedom of belief and worship without interfering in their affairs. Islam does not interfere with matters of personal status at all. It is not possible for any Islamic law with which sacred law and traditions of the Christians conflict to be forced on them. The law of Islam is clear on that subject, and the books of Islamic law are in front of us. The events of history cannot be denied except by a stubborn bigot. Indeed the Christian Arabs have continued to enjoy their own beliefs, forms of worship, and personal status from early Islamic times until the present. No state or govern-

ment oppressed them during the time in which Islam had complete authority. How then is it fancied that laws will now be imposed on them which are incompatible with their religion when we have a parliamentary people's state, the authority of which is vested in representatives, both Muslim and Christian? Moreover, despite the great respect which Islam has for Christianity, we are not satisfied merely to state the article in the constitution, but we have suggested that the article record the sacredness and the sanctity of the revealed religions and the sacredness of the personal status of the members of the other religious communities. How, after this reservation, can anyone worry about Christian beliefs and status?

2. [They object] that the implication of the state's being Muslim is hostility towards other religions, a decrease in the rights of non-Muslims, and an attitude towards them which differs from the attitude towards the followers of the official religion.

This idea is also highly erroneous, for Islam is not hostile to Christianity, nor would its establishment imply hostility to Christianity. On the contrary, Islam recognizes Christianity and the holiness of our master, the Messiah (peace be upon him). In fact Islam is the only other religion in the world which acknowledges Christianity and declares the impeccability of its noble prophet and his virgin mother. Further, the Qurʾān has ordered its followers to believe in all the prophets, including Jesus [ʿĪsā] (peace be upon him). Where then is the hostility? And where is the quarrel between Islam and Christianity? Or does not the establishment of Islam as the official state religion guarantee that Christianity is an official religion of the state by virtue of Islam's recognition of and respect for it?

As for the fancy of decreased rights for the Christians and increased privilege for the Muslims, where is the increase? Is it in freedom of belief, when Islam respects all beliefs and when the constitution will guarantee freedom of belief to all citizens? Or in personal status which Islam protects and which the constitution will include and protect? Or in civil rights and equality of duties when Islam does not distinguish between Christian and Muslim in those matters and does not give the Muslim in the state any greater right than the Christian and when the constitution will specify equality of rights and duties for all citizens?

I will place the proposed article on this subject before the reader and before all concerned so that they may see if there is anything to fear in it or anything underhanded which might harm Christianity:

1. Islam is the religion of the state.
2. The revealed religions are held sacred and holy.
3. Personal status within the religious communities shall be guarded and protected.
4. Citizens are equal in rights. Nothing shall prevent any citizen

from reaching the highest rank in the state because of religion, race, or language.

Now I ask all fair-minded people and especially the followers of the sister religions [i.e., Christianity and Judaism] whether the article which establishes Islam as the religion of the state guarantees everything? Where then is the fear and where the underhandedness?

Some of the nationalists object that the establishment of a state religion will destroy the unity of the people and that, since Syria has various religions, it is not right to establish any particular one.

The fact is that in Syria there are only Muslims, Christians and a very few Jews. As for the sects, all of them go back to these two religions. Further, the text which we have previously cited guarantees the rights and equality of all citizens as well as their beliefs and personal status. What distinction, then, does this text make?

Is there anywhere in the world a state in which there is only one single religion or one single sect? Yet when did this plurality of religions or sects ever prevent states from establishing a particular religion and even a particular sect?

National unity among the Arabs will not be achieved by throwing away the sympathies of sixty-millions and by neglecting the national religious tie between them. Although it is understood that the nationalism of Europe decrees as a fundamental tenet the expulsion of religion, that step is not incumbent on us, the Arabs. Nazi Germany may have found in Christianity a religion which was foreign to it. Turanian Turkey may find in Islam a religion foreign to it. But the Arabs will never find in Islam a religion foreign to them. In fact they believe that Arab nationalism was born only when they embraced Islam and that this nationalism would not be as vital as it obviously is were it not for Islam. Therefore, let the advocates of nationalism distinguish between Europe and the East, between the Christianity of the West and the Islam of the Arabs.

As appears from the declaration of the graduates of institutions of higher learning, the advocates of secularism in our country object that "the peoples who preceded us in the field of civilization have passed from the religious stage of organization and government, where religious leaders conducted affairs of state, to the nationalistic stage and then, today, to that stage of organization which is based on political and economic blocs of a secular cast."

We reply to them that establishing a state religion does not mean that religious leaders will conduct affairs of state. If this were the case, then the nations which have preceded us in the field of civilization would not have specified a state religion in their constitutions.

Here follows a list of some of the modern states which have specified a particular religion in their constitutions: Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Bulgaria, Peru, Costa Rica, Panama, Poland (before it became Communist), Italy, Greece, Bolivia (before the recent war),

Argentina, Eire, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Israel, England, Spain and Libya.

What do the secularists say about the action of these modern states? Does it not lead to the conclusion that an established state religion is compatible with the evolution of civilization and progress? Or do the secularists, despite their admission that these nations have passed from the nationalistic stage to the stage of political and economic blocs, consider them to be reactionary states which are still retarded? Why then do these secularists consider it natural for Bulgaria, Hungary [*Hunghāriya*], Czechoslovakia, Albania, Roumania, Hungary [*al-Majar*], and China to have formed a bloc on the basis of Communism, although it is a modern belief for them, and yet unnatural for Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Hijaz [*i.e.*, Saudi Arabia], and Jordan to form a bloc on the basis of Islam, although it has long been the belief of these regions? Is not Islam a comprehensive way of social conduct like Communism? In fact, Islam is loftier than Communism and nobler of goal. Or do you not consider it so, O secularists? Why then do you not frankly declare your suspicion of Islam and of its suitability for life?

The strange thing is that in their declaration the secularists urge the cementing of the ties which bind the Syrians to the emigrants abroad, but they do not pay any attention to the ties between the Syrians and the seventy millions of their Arab brethren. How will the establishment of a state religion sever the relation between us and the emigrants, particularly when we urge continuation of the bond between them and the fatherland. Even if we suppose that this establishment would cause coolness between us and them (and this is an impossible supposition, for in reality it would link us to the Arabs) do you want us to act in accordance with the desire of half a million or the belief of seventy million? If you prefer the former, you disbelieve in Arabism as a national bond and have already disowned Islam as a sound path of social conduct.

I repeat to these secularists that the bogey with which they frighten some cultured people, *i.e.*, that establishing Islam as the religion of the state will give clerics the final word in the country, is indeed a bogey —a bogey which frightens no one except those over whose minds fancy and falsehood have cast their long shadows; for there are no clerics in Islam who could have the upper hand. Further, we do not for a moment want by this establishment to eliminate the parliament, to reject the representatives of the nation, or to abrogate the laws. No indeed. Rest assured, everything will continue as it is. Our parliament, deputies, laws, and way of life will all remain, but they will be reinforced by loftiness of spirit, purity of hand, moral probity, and human nobility.

Some legalists object that making Islam the state religion will eliminate current laws and compel us to carry out the Islamic punish-

ments such as cutting [off the limb] of a thief and the [Quranic] penalty for the adulterer. This is a mistaken notion, for, since Islam is a perfect way of life which only reveals its soundness in a perfect society, we do not advocate carrying out the [Quranic] punishments. Included among the things which make a society perfect are that every stomach be satisfied, that everybody be clothed, that every mind be educated, and that every citizen be content. If thievery, for example, takes place after that situation has been achieved, it is an unalloyed evil in which only an inveterate criminal would engage. Islam desires to frighten those whom knowledge, satisfaction, and a noble life will not restrain from committing crimes.

In fact, Islam has encompassed those punishments with such stringent conditions that it is almost impossible to execute the law in a single incident among a thousand—a fact which proves that the object of Islam is to scare and frighten. The famous saying of the Prophet is sufficient for you: "Avoid [the necessity for] punishment by [the threat of] suspicion."

The substance of the matter is that we do not want to overthrow our current laws, but we do want, as far as civil law is concerned, a *rapproachement* between them and the views of Islam—in agreement with the spirit of the age and the best legal advice. If Islamic law is in agreement with modern views, do you then find anything blameworthy in taking it as a national Arab legacy of which you are proud and in which you glory?

We say this with full knowledge that the question of legislation is a special question unrelated to the religion of the state. The only reason for establishing a state religion is to color the state with a spiritual, moral hue so that regulations and laws will be carried out under the impetus of a deep, spiritual driving force. This establishment also aims at strengthening the bonds between us and our Arab brethren and at cooperation between us and the Islamic East. The question as to whether or not the establishment of the religion of the state will lead to enforcement of the Islamic punishments is, in our judgment, a curious one for anybody who realizes that, although almost a complete quarter of a century has passed since similar specifications were made in the constitutions of Egypt and Iraq, no such suspicion has been justified. This is something which we declare publicly without flattery or hypocrisy.

In conclusion, the essence of the proofs which the imposition of this article makes imcumbent on us and of the answers to those who fear it may be stated. Furthermore, we hope this question will be studied from a realistic point of view, far removed from sectarian partisanship and entrenched passions. We think that the venerable prelates, the heads of the Christian communities, will share with us a feeling of the danger of atheism to all religions, and we hereby declare that we would rather have Christianity the state religion than to have

the state atheistically secular. Would they then prefer atheism to Islam?

We want also to remind them that secularism does not guarantee the rights of the Christian communities and does not remove sectarian fanaticism. In fact, the one thing which does make that guarantee is the religion which advocates among its teachings that people be left to think as they please. All people are worshippers of God. In His sight the most honorable people are those who are most pious and useful [cf. Surah XLIX: 13].

We would like our brothers the nationalists to be Arab nationalists when they discuss this matter. We would not like them to support a fanciful feeling limited by a narrow viewpoint, in opposition to an established fact common to all the Arab world. We hope they will be not Syrian nationalists but Arab nationalists.

We are not going to say any more to the secularists except that we face them in the hope that they will not intervene between this nation and the sources of its strength. We are a people who want to return to God; therefore, do not interfere between us and Him. We want to seek the support of strong friends; therefore, do not deprive us of them. We want to cooperate with Muslims and Christians who hear the voice of heaven and the precepts of the Gospels and the Qurʾān; therefore, do not fill our minds with vanity or turn our harmony into discord through the tune of the devil.

"Say: this is my path, and I call unto God for clear vision—I and those who follow me. Glory be to God; I am not a polytheist [Qurʾān xiii: 1-8]."

Damascus on the 19th of Rabīʿa Second, 1369 and the 6th of February, 1950.
Muṣṭafā al-Sibāʿī.

Princeton University, N. J. R. Bayly Winder

NOTES ON THE NEW EGYPT

[James Batal, author of *Assignment: Near East* (1950) contributes the following reflections based on a half-year sojourn in Egypt during 1953, in which time he travelled extensively from Aswan to Alexandria in the course of research on behalf of the Society for Applied Anthropology of the City of New York. He notes the contrasts which impressed him, as between the Egypt of today and the Egypt in which he lived ten years ago. James Batal is a research-information specialist on the Near East as well as contributor of articles on that area for various publications.]

It is in the realm of religion that the visitor to Egypt senses a significant change, brought about by the present military régime. An example was set by General Naguib, himself a Muslim, when he adopted the Western custom of sending Christmas greeting cards to his Christian friends and leaders in the Christian community. The card was simplicity itself—a silhouette of two houses of worship standing side by side: to the left, a Christian church with its towered-belfry, surmounted by a cross; to the right, the graceful dome of a mosque with its slender minaret, the symbolic crescent above the mosque.

"We are all Egyptians," read the Arabic caption at the top of the card.

Across the lower part of the card was this verse, also in Arabic, from the famous poet, Shawqī:

"Religion is to the Judge.

If Thy Lord had desired it, he would have made all people one."

This card received such warm public acclaim that soon it was reproduced in a form of a poster, 18 inches wide by 26 inches long. Printed in the Government printing office, the poster was distributed throughout the Nile valley. It appeared on the walls of public buildings, schools, railroad stations, in cities as well as in villages whose populations are almost entirely Muslim in religion.

The blue poster represented a blue-print of brotherhood within the nation. General Naguib translated its words into deeds at many public appearances. The first such occasion was the grand celebration marking the completion of six months of government control by the military leaders. On the opening of the four-day festival, General Naguib reviewed thousands of paraders as they marched before the reviewing stand situated midway between the Kasr al Nīl Barracks (the former quarters of British troops) and the Egyptian Museum.

To General Naguib's right stood the Rector of Al Azhar University, on his left stood the Patriarch of the Coptic Orthodox Church and the Grand Rabbi of Egypt. With this gesture General Naguib united Muslim, Christian and Jew as equal citizens under the new government. Nor was this merely an isolated example wherein the military

régime recognized freedom of religious belief. General Naguib appeared before some ten thousand students at Al Azhar University and declared that "the army revolt had received its inspiration from the teachings of liberty and justice inherent in Islam." He also appeared before a Bible Missionary Society at the Coptic Girls' College in Abbasia, and praised its welfare movement in behalf of the poor. When Catholic leaders called his attention to an Egyptian-made film, about to be released which they considered as casting odious reflections upon Christians, he ordered a preview showing of the film. General Naguib judged it to be derogatory of one of the world's great faiths and ordered the film destroyed lest it create disunity among fellow Egyptians.

Under the monarchy, religion, at civic celebrations, was represented almost exclusively by Islamic leaders. Under the new régime, such monopoly no longer exists. Whenever members of the Revolutionary Council visit provincial capitals to participate in patriotic demonstrations its leaders either call upon the Coptic Orthodox Bishops or invite them to take leading roles in the proceedings as Egyptians. Wherever else they go, leaders of the young republic constantly preach unity. It is a theme echoed even by the Minister of Waqfs—the one post in the Egyptian Cabinet that thoroughly serves an Islamic institution. Speaking to a crowd at the Coptic Orthodox Church in the delta city of Mansura, Shaikh Aḥmad al Bakūrī said:

"We are all of us, whatever our religion, sons of Egypt. Our beliefs differ little, for both Islam and Christianity repudiate fanaticism and teach man to love his neighbor."

Today's patriotic cry in the Nile valley is "Unity, Discipline and Work." During a three-day celebration in Alexandria in the spring of 1953, the church bells at the Coptic Patriarchate peeled a welcome to the military leaders. Their theme at the rally held at St. Mark's school was that all religions are founded upon the principle of faith and unity. That is what the new republic asks of all Egyptians, not whether they are Muslims, Christians or Jews.

During World War II it was a familiar sight to see King Fārūq publicly and ostentatiously display himself as he would leave ᶜAbdīn palace to attend Friday prayers in a mosque. His route of travel in a bullet-proof automobile would be lined by hundreds of uniformed policemen who stood on both sides of the streets some 100 feet apart, waiting for the fleeting moment when the monarch would ride past. General Naguib does not indulge in such pretentious show. On the contrary, he attends Friday services in a mosque regularly but without pomp of public heraldry.

By calendar coincidence in 1953, the springtime feasts of the three monotheistic faiths fell around the same day-April 6th. It was Easter for the Orthodox Copts as well as for Catholics of all rites; Sham-al Nasīm for the Muslims and the Passover for the Jews. In a message

addressed to his "Orthodox and Catholic brothers," General Naguib regarded this coincidence of a common holiday as "a good augury, showing that Egyptians of all religious beliefs were marching together on the same road toward a common goal of freedom from the oppressions of the past."

On Easter day in 1953 General Naguib personally visited the Coptic Orthodox Catholic Patriarchates as well as the Egyptian Protestant Church in Garden City to offer each Christian sect his good wishes. To each he expressed the broad principle of the government: "Religion belongs to God, and the Fatherland belongs to all." A member of the Revolutionary Council also visited Ismailia synagogue, on the occasion of the Passover services.

Such open recognition by top-ranking Egyptian government officials of the religions of Christians and Jews in the national life of Egypt had rarely been publicly made either by word or deed under the Muḥammad ʿAlī dynasty. This theme of common Egyptian citizenship, regardless of religious belief, won warm support from non-Muslims. In May 1953, the Grand Rabbi Haim Nahum of Cairo called upon God "to consolidate and strengthen our complete unity." He also appealed to his compatriots to support General Naguib and the other leaders "who now work for the realization of our dearest vow—the complete liberty and independence of our country. May God give us victory and success."

When President Camille Shamoun of Lebanon made an official state visit to Egypt for a week, General Naguib joined him in attending mass at the Maronite church, a magnificent edifice in the Cairo suburb of Heliopolis.

When the President of Egypt was making a formal tour through Upper Egypt, he went out of his way to visit the orphanage founded just outside the City of Assiut in 1911 by Miss Lillian Trasher. So impressed was he by the work of the Protestant missionaries for the orphaned, the blind and the widowed, that he gave Miss Trasher fifty Egyptian pounds (about $143.50) to carry on the noble work. After saying that "nothing has ever given me more pleasure" than what he saw at the Assiut orphanage, General Naguib went on to "call upon all those who are engaged in social reform to visit this institution and learn from it what they should do if they really wish to achieve success."

During 1953, a new national anthem was introduced. Its title is "Unity, Discipline and Work," in keeping with the new national slogan that is designed to create a loyal consciousness in the Nile valley. The anthem was quickly made familiar through the radio and the cinema. Since radio broadcasting in Egypt is controlled by the government, the programs frequently open and close, and are often interspersed, with the playing of the Liberation Anthem. And when it is sound-recorded on film strips in the movie theaters, whose voice sings the

anthem? That of Leila Murad, a motion picture actress of Jewish faith. Her rendition of the new national song has been heard scores of times by twenty-million Muslims in the Nile valley.

That the present rulers of Egypt want to forget the past and start afresh may be seen in many facets of Egyptian life. In one facet, especially, is this true: the renaming of public buildings and the memorializing of genuine patriots. While he ruled as King, Fārūq by means of imposing a strict censorship on the press suppressed scandals involving himself, his entourage, the pashas, cabinet ministers and favorite politicians. After his abdication, newspaper and magazines feasted freely in exposing Fārūq's escapades and political scandals.

It is in the realm of human reaction for a new administration in any country "to clean house" after it takes control. It is a custom of countless centuries for monarchs or dictators to perpetuate their own and their antecedents' rule by erecting heroic statues and impressive buildings to glorify themselves. Egypt was no exception to this behavior. In spacious ᶜAbdīn square, Fārūq had ordered placed a huge bronze equestrian statue of his father, Fuᵓād. It had already been mounted on a pedestal of beautiful Aswan marble and merely awaited the day of its dedication. In Ismailia square another shaft, also of Aswan marble, was being raised, with a bust of the Khadive Ismail to adorn its top. For weeks the public had watched the erection of these monuments. But one day's events abruptly halted this nepotic worship. It was the military coup d'état of July 23, 1952.

The canvas that shrouded the fez-adorned Fuᵓād astride a horse remained undisturbed for months as the sun beat its withering heat upon it and as the winds from the desert filmed the cloth with fine sand. Then one day in the spring of 1953 a new scaffold arose, and any one in that square would happily tell you that Fuᵓād was coming down and a real national hero—ᶜArabi, who fought the Khadive Tawfīq in 1882—would take his place.

Even the name of the palace and the square facing it have been changed. They are now known as Republic Palace and Republic Square. And the buildings that flanked the square on one side and housed the royal palace guard are now the quarters of the Haiᵓat al Taḥrīr (Liberation Association)—a movement meant to supersede the former, privilege-ridden political parties.

To many Egyptians the memory of Ismail—who ruled while De Lesseps was building the Suez Canal and who sold 176,602 shares of its stock to the British in 1875—is not a cherished one. They trace many of their ills to that canal. They remained silent and looked askance at Fārūq's efforts to honor his sire. Today, however, the same Egyptians are vocal. They will eagerly explain how the name has been changed from Mīdān Ismāᶜīlia (Ismāᶜīlia Square) to Mīdān al Taḥrīr (Liberation Square) and how a symbol of liberation will replace the bronze bust that was planned for the top of the marble pile.

When the new government started "to clean house", it removed all the royal busts that formerly occupied important niches in the Council of Ministers building, directly opposite the Parliament. These were transferred to the Opera House, to repose as surplus relics in a museum.

Before the military coup, the two major universities were known as Fu'ād in Cairo and Fārūq in Alexandria. Today, most Egyptians call them Cairo University and Alexandria University.

The cleansing process is also affecting the name plates on some streets. (Cairo streets actually have blue enamelled name plates.) One in particular is worth mentioning because it indicates how the Naguib government is treasuring Egypt's glorious past. In Sayyida Zainab—a humble quarter in old Cairo—the street called Ibrahim Nawar al Rashidy reverts to its former name of Bahlawān, rich in its medieval lore. Bahlawān comes originally from the word Pehlavān which means "acrobat"—acrobatics being regarded as a part of chivalry during the Middle Ages.

Under the monarchy, the sinecure, the parasite and the politician's relatives were rather comfortably cared for. Such a group were independent, mostly arrogant, and felt themselves beyond the law. Under General Naguib's government, this attitude has sobered. While not all of the above-mentioned civil servants have been removed from the public payroll, their winnowing continues. At the same time, other government employees are at their desks, or on their jobs in the field, more than they have ever been before. The past tendency has been for University graduates to attach themselves to a government job. Such a policy resulted in an over-staffed civil service. The new regime recognizes this sad state of affairs, and therefore has decreed that as positions become vacant, no new appointees will be made to fill them. The reason is that there is little need for most such posts in the first place, and more important, their elimination is necessary if Egypt is to achieve a true renaissance.

Nowhere in the world are traditions more strongly respected than in the Islamic world. In Egypt the Ministry of Waqfs represents a hallowed tradition. Its basis of operation is primarily religious in character and goes back hundreds of years. Its business is essentially the management of trusts known in Arabic as "awqāf", from the singular "waqf". Now, there are two kinds of Waqf: *khairī* and *ahlī*. The former has reference to trusts given for the general public welfare in the form of religion, health, education or charity.

Waqf ahlī differs in that the bequests made to it are for relatives and succeeding generations of relatives of the bequeather. Such bequests may be in the form of lands, buildings or negotiable securities, with the stipulation that the original endowment remain intact but that the proceeds—as for example, rentals from land or buildings—go to the donor's children and his children's children. To put it

another way, *Waqf ahlī* is a private trust for the exclusive benefit of private individuals, but managed by the Ministry of Waqfs. For its services the Ministry generally receives about 10 percent of the income.

The Naguib Government recognized that in an age with constantly changing values the ultimate result of a *Waqf ahlī* operating over many generations was to sterilize its use for the common welfare. *Waqf ahlī* is actually a privately endowed institution, managed at public expense, with narrowly circumscribed benefits for a privileged few. Therefore, in another act to modernize the functions of government, the Naguib Government abolished the *Waqf ahlī* as an instrument of public policy. The impending result?—Lands and buildings long undeveloped are now being turned over to heirs and will be put to use like any other property. However, the *Waqf khairī* will continue, since in its broad aspects it acts like any educational or religious endowment operating for the common good.

While the Committee of Fifty drawing up a new Constitution does not contain any women, nevertheless women's right are expected to fare much better under the Republic than under the monarchy. The Muslim Brotherhood has opposed the granting of equal rights to women and it is fully aware, from its own supporters on the Committee of Fifty, of the new rights which Egyptian women will receive under the Republic. At the time of writing it appears that for the first time since Pharaonic days, women in the Nile Valley will have the right to vote:—even though only those who can read and write will have such a privilege. Since the coup d'état great numbers of civic-minded women are taking a more direct part in the public and social affairs of their country.

The Liberation Association (or "Movement" as the Egyptians themselves translate it into English) deserves more than the passing mention previously accorded to it. Its potentiality for the general welfare of the country is quite promising because it has within its framework the basis of democratic operation. The central headquarters are in Cairo—in the building that formerly housed the royal palace guard. Its plans provide for a chapter in each of Egypt's four thousand communities. Any "Son of the Nile Valley" is eligible to join, providing first that his character is free from wrong-doing. The enrollment fee is five piasters (a piaster is worth about 2.87 cents) and in addition the members pay five piasters a month, or a total of about $ 1.50 a year. Upon taking the oath of membership, the Egyptian pledges to serve the general welfare of his country and give his life, if need be, in defense of the fatherland.

Each Liberation chapter is governed by an executive council of ten members, who are elected from among their associates. One of these ten is chosen as delegate to the nuqṭah (district) council which usually includes about a dozen neighboring communities. Each nuqṭah in turn elects a delegate to represent it in the marqaz (county) council

which branch generally contains about a dozen or more nuqṭahs. Each marqaz chooses a delegate to the mudīriyya (province) council. There are fourteen mudīriyyas and five governorates (which, geographically, are somewhat similar to mudīriyyas) and each of these elects a delegate to the Grand Council in Cairo, a sort of supreme headquarters of high directors. National policies are formulated by the Grand Council.

In cities, it is permissible to have more than one Liberation chapter, in this manner: chapters may organize on a sectional basis such as would correspond to an election ward in the United States, or according to such professions or trades as lawyers, doctors, dentists, teachers, engineers, tobacco workers' union, textile union or municipal unions.

If the plan works out as outlined and its control does not fall into the hands of professional politicians, the Liberation Association offers a form for the development of a real democracy in Egypt. But the Liberation Association does not hold exclusive possession for democratic hopes. The Agrarian Land Reform movement offers that prospect, because it is predicated primarily on the destruction of feudalism in the Nile Valley through a scheme that is designed to raise the economic and social standard of life for some fourteen million who live off agriculture.

Plans to implement the expropriation of some 600,000 feddans (a feddan is 1.038 acres) of land seem to be based upon sound common sense while at the same time providing compensation for the former owners based upon financial evaluation which they had willingly accepted. Here is how the Agrarian Land Reform, already in completion of the first year of a five year plan, is working out:

Under the Agrarian Land Reform no one may own more than 200 feddans of land, plus an additional 100 feddans for his children. This law is aimed directly at the feudal landlords—those who owned thousands of feddans and who lived luxuriously from the sweat and blood of the humble fallaḥīn. Foremost in this group is the immediate family of ex-King Fārūq with ownership of more than 100,000 feddans, according to the administrator of the land division scheme.

The 600,000 feddans of expropriated land are to be given to the fallāḥīn over a five-year period. The first division will be from the landlords who possessed more than 5,000 feddans. The Agrarian Land Reform was decreed on September 9, 1952 and within a year from that date, deeds to more than 50,000 expropriated feddans in this classification had been given to fallāḥīn. The first awards were made on the anniversary of the military coup d'état in the delta towns of Ityai al Barud and al Zaᶜafrana.

The second distribution of land will come from those who owned from 2,000 to 5,000 feddans, and in the third year of the plan, the parceling will be made from those who owned from 1,000 to 2,000 feddans. The allocations in the fourth year will be drawn from those

wo possessed 600 to 1,000 feddans and in the fifth year, the final distribution will come from the category of owners of from 200 to 600 feddans.

The fallāḥ is eligible to receive up to five feddans. The price per feddan will be 70 times the tax rate on the same land. Thus, if a feudal lord had been accustomed to paying a tax of four Egyptian pounds (a pound equals about $2.87) on each feddan, the fallāḥ will be called upon to pay 280 Egyptian pounds (roughly about $800 in this particular example. Not all lands are taxed at the same rate. On some lands the tax rate is as low as half an Egyptian pound or 50 piasters). Obviously, the dire poverty of most fallāḥīn makes it impossible for them to meet such financial obligations. Therefore, the government has provided a plan whereby the fallāḥ will pay annual instalments over thirty years. Whereas under the feudal system close to two-thirds of the fallāḥ's production went to the benefit of his landlord, under the Agrarian Land Reform, all the fallāḥ produces will be his. Since the fallāḥ will be able to benefit wholely from his own labors, he will use the fruits of such labor to meet the required annual payments.

The Agrarian Land Reform provides protection, too, for the former owner. The government issues him bonds bearing interest at the rate of 3 percent per year, and the bonds are redeemed annually over a thirty-year period. How did the government determine the value of the expropriated land? On the principle of the survey which takes place every ten years. The most recent such survey was made in 1946. Under Egyptian law, if the land-owner failed to accept the evaluation assessed by the special agricultural survey team, he had a right to make an appeal within three years. If no appeal was made, then the silence of the land-owner was accepted as acquiescence in the government's assessment. Thus the evaluations became effective in 1949 and since that was the year closest to the promulgation of the Agrarian Land Reform Law, the government used it as the evaluation yardstick.

There are many other features of the Agricultural Land Reform Law which are designed to offer protection both to the former owner and the fallāḥ, but for a general review such as this, the foregoing are the most important. This also needs be said: To protect the country itself from any possible repetition of foreign control—such as happened when the Khadive Ismāʿīl sold his Suez Canal bonds to the British government in 1875—the law provides that the bonds may be sold only to Egyptian nationals, that the fallāḥ may sell his land only to his immediate family and that if the fallāḥ must yield ownership for any reason, then the government has the right to reconvert it, and then re-deed to another fallāḥ. A new system of cooperative societies is being set up under the Ministry of Social Affairs to assist the fallāḥ in his new ownership of land, in teaching him modern agri-

cultural methods and in helping him to meet his obligations—a system that is designed along the democratic procedure of a New England town meeting idea.

Under the monarchy, nearly all postage stamps were engraved with the picture of Fārūq—showing the slender face of a youth who became king at sixteen years or of a much older Fārūq with fat cheeks and bemedalled chest. The Republican government has issued several new series of stamps. One series honors the fallāḥ, showing him in typical peasant costume with the "faʾs"—a sort of grub hoe—slung across his left shoulder. The "faʾs" is the one universal tool which the fallāḥin have used for centuries in working the soil and creating wealth, —not for themselves but for the landlords. Another series honors the simple private soldier in the Egyptian Army. Both the fallāḥ and soldier series reflect the democracy of the new government in contrast to the monarchy's emphasis on class and privilege.

These are some of the movements that are generating a renaissance in today's Egypt. That they will all flower to success will depend, naturally, on the kind of continued support which the Egyptians themselves give to the Naguib government.

Fitchburg, Mass. JAMES BATAL

A CAIRO DEBATE ON ISLAM AND SOME CHRISTIAN IMPLICATIONS

"I cannot fairly be asked to abide by the decision of a tribunal which is itself on trial" wrote Francis Bacon in the Preface to his *Great Instauration* in the 17th century. The tribunal was the abstract type of reasoning, without reference to observation and experiment, which Bacon had disavowed, but which he knew his detractors would invoke. The sentence seems to epitomise something of the issue between an outspoken critic in current Egyptian Islam and the conservative response he has provoked. The one appeals to an Islam the other does not recognise: while the latter vindicates the Islam he does recognise in terms, largely, of an understanding which the former has rejected. The two works have happily been translated under the Near East Translation Program of the American Council of Learned Societies and are here discussed, together with a third work, appearing five years earlier, but belonging to the same realm of discourse.

They are in order of publication: *Al-ᶜAdālah al-Ijtimāᶜiyyah fī-l-Islām,* by Sayyid Quṭb (Cairo, 1945), here translated by J. B. Hardie under the title: *Social Justice in Islam*; *Min Hunā Nabdaʾ* (Cairo, 1950) by Khālid Muḥammad Khālid, and *Min Hunā Naᶜlam* (Cairo, 1950) by Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, both of which have been done into English by Ismāᶜīl R. al-Farūqī, with the titles: *From Here We Start* and *Our Beginning in Wisdom.* Their publication is a great service to those in the English speaking world who desire to enter more intelligently into the inner meaning of present tensions in Islam. [1]

The translations are not always above criticism. Khālid's work, with its tempestuous prose and forceful expression, seems to have presented the biggest problem to the translator and there are here some minor infelicities. ما جهلوا (p. 37) is "what they do not know" rather than "what they ignore" (p. 26), as an example at random. تصفية العلاقات بين المجتمع والدين (p. 46) would seem to be "Clarification of the relations between society and religion" rather than "a settlement of accounts" (p. 31). "We put forward these questions" (p. 50) is rendered "The questions which we are used to answer" (p. 35). "A fine house" might do better than "a towering building" for عمارة فخمة (p. 49 Arabic, p. 34 English). Similarly we suggest "exacting journey" rather than "cumbersome trip" for رحلتنا الشاقة (p. 42 and p. 29). 'Gratuitous' has a different sense than that intended in the phrase "This book is but a gratuitous torch" (p. 42 and p. 28). It would also improve the English on occasions if the definite article were omitted in relation to abstract nouns. There

[1] The contents of Sayyid Quṭb's work and of Khālid Muḥammad Khālid's were briefly outlined and discussed by Nicola A. Ziadeh, in *Recent Arabic Literature on Islam, The Middle East Journal,* Vol. 4, No. 5, 1951, pp. 505-510.

are also words like 'enounce' and 'empery' which are either non-existent or too archaic for good translation. Is it safe to translate الصدقات as 'charity' even on occasions? (though the translator has usually preferred "alms"). It might have been better to retain the Arabic word and adopt the device of notes, as did J. B. Hardie. (There has been an inadvertent slip in *From Here We Start,* on p. 25, since 1950 is not 1639 of the Hijrah, but 1369. Similarly in Hardie's translation of Sayyid Quṭb, p. vii, 632 A.D. is given as 111 A.H.) These, and others more serious, are defects such as find their way into all but the most competent of translations. Arabic readers, East and West, will be grateful for the work here done on a task which most of them would have found burdensome.

The purpose now is to review the contents rather than to criticise the translators of these works. For the issues here raised are big and engrossing enough to exclude any temptation to cavil over little ones. But there is at least one point in which a matter of translation involves a major area of discussion. Both Khālid, in his attack and Al-Ghazālī in his defense, use the word *kahānah,* which is here invariably rendered as 'priesthood.' It might be well to suggest that "priestcraft" would more exactly convey what the first author has in mind. The first of his four Chapters *Al-Dīn lā-al Kahānah* expounds with great vigor his view of Islam as a rational creed and code of behaviour, vitiated in large measure by the dead weight of an officialdom which transforms it into an ecclesiastical tyranny in treachery to its real spirit.

Al-Ghazālī's reply that, of course, in Islam there is no priesthood fails to meet the charge squarely. "It is a great error" he writes "so to enlarge the definition of priesthood as to include Islam as well as Christianity, the Mosque as well as the Church. Shaikh Khālid persisted in this error throughout his book" (p. 76). It may be doubted whether he did. For the essence of his charge was that contemporary Islam has suffered and does suffer from apathy and obscurantism because of the vested personal interests of official custodians. Whether or not the charge is true, it is not answered by pointing out that Islam lacks a theology of grace and, therefore, knows no sacraments and no ministry in the Christian sense. For that would be to treat of the diverse theological origins of authority, rather than with the fact of it. Christian and secular historians have used the word 'priestcraft' to distinguish perversions of priestly power from the legitimate functions of priestly ministry. As such 'priestcraft' relates rather to the incubus, the perversion, than to the concept of a role in the Divine economy of grace and education, which may or may not be called 'priesthood.' A hierarchy conceived in terms of law, not of grace, and deriving its special quality not from ordination but from

[2] References are to the 4th Arabic edition and to the first English.

an education and legal competence not open to the masses, can equally well become a usurper of intellectual freedom and a hindrance to social progress. It is on this level of a perverted or self-regarding authority that Khālid's charge has to be faced, not on the basis of a manifestly different religious origin and concept of such authority. Muslim shaikhs have assuredly never been 'priests' in the positive senses of 'priesthood' but they have sometimes been such in the negative sense of unworthy authoritarianism implied in 'priestcraft.' No religion can escape the necessity for official custodianship, in its doctrines, its worship, its continuity, its discipline. The peculiar genius of Islam having been legal, those custodians are custodians of revelation and of law and its interpretation. But the possibilities of unworthiness in such a role, with which Khālid is concerned, are no less great than if they had been custodians of revelation and of the Gospel and its communication.

Al-Ghazālī, however, does not take the measure of this point and suggests that the whole parallel is either the result of "exaggerated vituperation" of Islam, or else part of an arrant nationalism which subdues all religions, in an easy identity, to the claims of nationalism. He does remark: "We may call certain Muslims 'priests' by analogy, if their personal conduct warrants such appellation" (p. 76). But the possibility is then dismissed.

This initial discussion of a single term serves not only to introduce the theme of this debate between two Cairo exponents of Islam but also to indicate the close, sometimes almost vehement, relation of their discussion to the content and the history of Christianity. It is this second aspect which is here our chief concern. For there can be few matters of greater urgency to the sensitive Christian mind than the burden of its Muslim relationships as they are here to be read. But first it may be well to summarise concisely the argument and counter argument of the three books, so that the Muslim debate is first clarified. The reader must be armed with an active sympathy. For the debate has many parallels in intellectual history outside Islam and the very fact of it, given perspective and patience, is a thing of hope.

In *Al-ᶜAdālah al-Ijtimāᶜiyyah fī-l-Islām,* Sayyid Quṭb begins his Muslim exposition by deriving social science from the inclusive universe of Muslim faith, which is to be found, not in Ibn Sīnā or Ibn Rushd, who have no relation to the true Islamic philosophy, but in the Holy Qurᵓān and the Tradition. The created world is a unity emanating from a single Will: nature and humanity are, therefore, part of an ordered and an interdependent whole. This unity is uniquely and perfectly understood and expressed in the teaching of Islam whose singular path offers humanity a complete solution for all and every one of its problems. Social justice is this proper harmony which Islam creates between all the departments of life.

This justice is built on absolute freedom of conscience, complete

equality and the permanent mutual responsibility of society. The first derives from the supreme rule of the One God, in submission to Whom men are liberated from all unworthy bondage and from fear of poverty, or loss, or sickness, as well as from dependence on pleasure and passion. Equality follows from this since all distinctions are relative and do not permit of inter-racial or inter-class servitudes. And since "life in its fullness is all inter-related there is an all embracing identity of purpose between the individual and society" (p. 68) with mutual responsibilities between the two.

The author then turns to Methods of Social Justice in Islam in which Islam "has a profound knowledge of the depths of the human spirit" so that it not only uses commands and prohibitions but encourages man to rise to a sense of behaviour beyond the legalistic. Though recognising "the weakness of man and his need for external compulsion" it strives to lift him to a spontaneous fulfilment of the good in character (p. 69-70). The rest of this Chapter is an exposition of *zakāt* and *ṣadaqāt,* by which Islam "makes one fond of spending voluntarily and freely, in anticipation of the approval of God in this world and of reward from Him in the world to come" (p. 75). "In this way man reaches the height of generosity, the limit of liberality and the noblest form of beneficence which can possibly arise from the human spirit. Thus man is raised above his natural state and thus the higher side of his nature overcomes the lower, his spiritual nature conquers his animal nature" (p. 84).

A brief discussion of Political Theory in Islam then follows, in which Sayyid Quṭb specifically disallows any comparison between the Islamic State, which is *sui generis,* and other political systems. Any comparative study in this field, or any other, can only be derived from a fear or suspicion that Islam is inferior. The sense of superiority requires that the true Muslim scholar should study his own system and ignore all comparisons or contrasts, because "Islam has chosen its own characteristic path and concentrated its attention on all the problems of human nature" (p. 88). This self-sufficiency is one of the most evident problems in this kind of writing. It is hard for the outsider to see how all the problems of human nature are reckoned with, in deliberate neglect of vast areas of human experience and endeavor, whether in Greece, in Rome, in Egypt or in Europe. Need it be an attitude of inferiority to find other systems relevant? Does not the very principle of unity, already adumbrated, involve a common-ness in human problems and therefore meaning, if not always truth, in man's hunger and his search? But Sayyid Quṭb believes that the uniqueness of Islam demands its entire disconnection with the rest of political thinking. "Islam proposes independent solutions to human problems ... Islam is a comprehensive philosophy and an homogeneous unity and to introduce into it any foreign element would mean ruining it" (p. 90).

Turning to economic theory, the writer expounds in turn the right to the possession and the disposal of property, methods of acquisition, ways of possessing and spending, the poor-tax and other taxes. This Chapter, which the author describes as "the essential part", occupies some forty pages, or one seventh of the whole. There follow some ninety pages on The Historical Reality of Justice in Islam in which the previous claims as to justice, freedom, equality, social welfare, nobility and responsibility are illustrated from the narratives of early Muslim history and from tradition. "Islam completely established its universal aims in the conquered territories. It gave the conquered peoples absolute equality with the native Arabs, on condition that they chose Islam. It gave them their full human rights if they chose to pay the poll tax. It gave them just and humane treatment if they chose war" (p. 168). In spite of political and economic departure from the true tenets and practices by the Umayyads and the ᶜAbbasides, "the historical experience of Islam ... can provide confirmation of most of the theories and principles of Islam" (p. 221).

Sayyid Quṭb then turns in the last quarter of his book to consider the Present State and Prospects of Islam. The true Islamic society which has only purely existed for a relatively brief period following the Prophet must be renewed. There is hope, since the historical lapse though long was only partial. It took place only in the limited sphere of politics, while "the remainder of the teachings remained in force" (p. 228). (Not a happy translation!) And that partial lapse was the product of an unfortunate mischance—Muᶜawiya. "If we are to be fair to Islam we cannot hold it responsible for the Umayyads" (p. 229). Furthermore, even the Umayyad 'damage' to Islam is to be explained by the fact that it occurred while the faith still lacked the vital element of time required to stabilise it. Islam "was assailed by revolution before it had properly struck roots" (p. 230). If ᶜAlī had been the third Caliph instead of ᶜUthmān and if the Umayyads could have been delayed a little, the decline of pure Islam need never have occurred. Likewise, in the nearer past, the 'compromise' of Muslim principles in Muslim lands can be explained by factors like "the dark shadow of colonization" and Western materialism. Islam, then, should be thought of, not as essentially compromised by its history, after ᶜUmar, but rather as victimised by forces which overlaid and thwarted its true genius. But these forces are now in retreat. The period of weakness is at an end and Islam has both the call and the opportunity to take up the active reconciliation of Muslim actuality with Islamic ideals, until the former once again demonstrates the perfection and supremacy of the latter.

This prolonged analysis of the empirical 'Islam' of history in the name of the true 'Islam' of revelation effectively introduces the Cairo debate in which Khālid Muḥammad Khālid and Muḥammad al-Ghazālī are engaged in their respective works. Sayyid Quṭb in effect sets the

stage, though some five years elapse after his book, which should not be supposed to have been the immediate factor in Khālid's manifesto. But the latter certainly belongs to the same concern for a recovery of a Muslim history in harmony with the essence of Islam, for an actuality which once again, as in the time of the Prophet, embodies and fulfills the revelatory intention of God. Islam in current history must again discover and disclose its real identity. Our second author, however, differs profoundly from the first and the third in his assessment of how Islamic identity and Muslim self-consistency therewith should be defined.

Min Hunā Nabdaʾ finds the undoing of Islam, not mainly in external factors, nor in a historical lapse in a single area of its life, namely the political, but in internal factors and the failure of its religious leadership in imagination and loyalty. Like Sayyid Quṭb, Khālid appeals strenuously to the Qurʾān and Tradition, a fact which helped to win him a favourable verdict from the District Court of Cairo when the Council of High ʿUlamāʾ of Al-Azhar had successfully banned the first edition of his work. The complete text of the Court order rescinding this ban and confiscation is reprinted here, under the heading A Document of Freedom and Advancement. The author protests the pillaging of his text and the counterfeit issues published to discredit him and aggressively takes his place with others who have suffered for the sake of reform and have been accused of betraying religion. "Let the tempest gnash its teeth" he says, with a delightful mixture of metaphor which characterises his fervid, if not always, limpid, prose. Whether or not his contemporaries over-rate the menace or magnify the pioneer in him, his attitude and spirited advocacy are of real potential value in the interior life of Islam. For he does not enshroud himself in poetry as Iqbāl did, with a poet's retreat behind him, but is plainly, sometimes almost crudely, outspoken and specific.

Khālid has not sought to follow Sayyid Quṭb in asserting that Islam can safely ignore the significance of all human phenomena outside itself. He draws with evident relish upon the Voltaires and the Wells's of the West. This is because, though a loyal Muslim, he begins rather from the *de facto* situation of human misery and disorder as he finds it in Egypt, and thus feels himself akin with all other social critics and receptive of their diagnosis of apathetic religion and a conspiracy of faith and wealth to perpetuate a status quo. This is the first and most obvious underlying difference between Khālid Muḥammad Khālid and Sayyid Quṭb. Where the latter begins with an idealistic system of doctrine in whose light delinquent facts must be upbraided, the latter begins with stark actualities in whose light a delinquent expression of religion must be judged. This second course looks to the partisans of the first like a piece of antagonism to Islam, though conceived by the author as its rescue and fulfillment.

Religion, then, has first to be purified of 'priestcraft,' of its lethargy

in the face of poverty and its tendency to lull people into the acceptance of what they ought to change. It must cease to be "an agent responsible for safeguarding the mastery of the masters and the slavery of the slaves" (p. 36). It must also abandon such patent falsehoods as the belief that voluntary alms is either actually or theoretically a substitute for social justice. 'Charity' does not constitute an adequate economic system. We only really fulfill the Prophet's intention when we put the teeth of compulsoriness into concern for the poor. Like Sayyid Quṭb, Khālid asserts that begging is un-Islamic, but for a contrasted reason. It is un Islamic for the former, because philanthropy renders it unnecessary in principle, for the latter because an effective social order abolishes it in fact. What is needed is a socialism of rights and duties, not of alms.

Khālid is carried away with a crusading impatience against the neglect of human needs in the conservative emphasis on spiritual or religious duties (here rather unfortunately translated 'spiritualism'). "Is the man whose body is marred with disease and whose personality is dissipated through starvation capable of moral conduct? Is the deprived person who has never had an opportunity to educate and discipline his soul ever capable of living a virtuous life?" (p. 44). "Virtue prospers in a community endowed with economic abundance and prosperity" (p. 46). An adequate standard of living is the basic condition of the spiritual life itself. A filled stomach is a pre-requisite of a devout spirit; to achieve the second we must ensure the first.

The ʿulamāʾ in general are accused of insensitivity to this truth and of being consistently hostile to reason, lest they should lose their monopoly of the minds of men and their consequent ascendancy over their affairs. Reformers in Egypt like Qāsim Amīn have found themselves resisted by conservative men of religion, who are responsible for the backwardness and degradation of the people. "Seeds of anarchy and civil dissent are sown from the mosque pulpits in the messages of some stupid priests or in their lectures read aloud from obsolete sermon books." "It is certainly high time for planning a new policy for our mosques, for defining their mission and organising their functions" (p. 54). Though not a few leading Muslim writers have commented adversely on the inadequacy and formalism of the mosque sermon, there are none who have berated the preachers with as much bitterness and scorn as Khālid. As contrasted with the faith represented by these 'priests,' true religion is altruistic, democratic, rational and life-affirming, not egoistic, totalitarian, obscurantist and life-destroying. Unworthy 'priests' and their teachings should be silenced, the people immunized against them and their attitudes displaced by the true devotion to life, truth, beauty and justice. Friday sermons should be limited to a few well-chosen mosques and entrusted to competent and enlightened preachers. In villages the sermons should be produced by committees of genuinely religious men set up for this purpose. "The

task is—in general—to give the people an enlightened religious culture which will help them to liberate themselves from their yoke and chains and save the villages from those wretched sermon-books, a page of which is sufficient to exterminate a whole people" (p. 65).

With this vehement attack on pseudo religion, Khālid Muḥammad Khālid turns to examine further the problem of poverty. His second Chapter is headed: Bread is Peace. Whereas hunger always leads to chaos, order and security are synonyms for food. Paraded wealth and embittered poverty will never lead to peace. The remedy is inward, rather than outward and involves reform, rather than treaties. Insisting on his point with much courage, the author finds a comprehensive social program more vital than external self-assertion. In a *cri de cœur* which is eloquent even in its harshness, he declares: "We shall forever fail to command respect from others as long as we do not respect ourselves" (p. 82). This self-respect demands an end to social differences and a closing of the gulf between rich and poor. This means in turn the liquidation of the large agricultural estates and the termination of degrading and impoverishing conditions of tenure. Whether inspired or not by this manifesto, with its reproachful statistics and vigorous language, the Naguib regime has followed some of its ideas. A government which neglects its duties in justice and equality towards its own population and lower officials is generating its own failure and its people's misery. The only effective remedy is a state socialism in which the resources of the community are ordered for its benefit equally, under a government which is not at the mercy of exploiters. The riches of the earth should no more be monopolised than the light of the moon, the sun's warmth or the benediction of the clouds. Nationalization such as that accomplished in England must be put through. It is perfectly in accord with the spirit and the letter of religious doctrine so to do. Finally, Khālid enters an impassioned plea for a limitation of the spate of births which threatens to reduce the standard of living even while other measures begin to raise it. Quantity in Egypt can only be had at the expense of quality. Though marriage is the expected thing in Islam, there is no need that man and wife should conceive of themselves as a 'hatchery.' The Prophet himself called shortage of means and a large family the worst of calamities. The only remedy is for citizens to be alert to the danger and to refrain from begetting more children than they or their society can properly support. The real interrogative before every nation is not: 'How *many* are they?' but 'How fare they?' (p. 114).

The third and fourth, and briefer, sections of *Min Hunā Nabdaʾ* concern Religion and the State and the Place of Women in Society. The former takes up boldly the view held by many, including many younger people (presumably the *Ikhwān al Muslimūn*), that Egypt ought to be under a religious government. The author protests his love for those who misguidedly, as he sees it, hold this view, which

disserves both religion and the State. He pleads a like tolerance while he expounds an attitude which many readers will wish to anathematize even before it is fully stated. Religion has a mission of guidance which should not be confused with government. It is true that Muḥammad did assume political functions and was succeeded by Caliphs who did likewise. But this would not have been so but for "social expediencies which forced him to seek the welfare and happiness of his new community in person." His role as Prophet was his essential task. Despite the chances for success deriving from a new and noble faith, religious government comparatively early in Muslim history fell into factiousness and tyranny.

The purposes of religion can best be fulfilled by spiritual guidance and by leaving the external sanctions of order and policy to any adequate national form of state. Religion realises its tasks without a state, for goodness cannot be legislated or decreed into existence. The enforcement of prohibitions, for which religious rule is generally held necessary, is impracticable. Mutilation for theft, punishment for adultery, prohibition of alcohol, and the like, are either barbarous or impossible for lack of evidence. This is not to say that a State will have no policing duties, but that virtue cannot be commanded or made coterminous with indictable offences. Religious government is obscure in its authority, distrusts reason and the common man, glorifies poverty and stupidity, tends to exclusiveness and totalitarian tyranny and general stagnancy. True religion is in contrast both as to goal and spirit with the functions of the state. Religious leadership that holds to its proper path, with enlightened devotion, is the call of the hour. Let it possess itself in loyalty and make of itself "a source of light, a minaret of glad tidings, a beacon of warning and a call unto the true God" (p. 145). If government and religion are systematically in association each tends to make the other coercive.

Min Hunā Nabda[2] ends with a plea for the liberation of woman under the title The Disused Lung. (The translator has: 'Deranged'). As long as women are not allowed to take their full part in the life of society as voters, deputies and professional people, the nation will resemble a body deprived of one of its lungs. The writer cites several traditions to sustain his position and invokes the Prophet's saying: "Ye know better the matters of your own world," as conferring upon Muslim people the right to decide this question in accordance with their true interest. But in the last resort, he argues, "Traditions ... are but the social appearance of the nation: they constitute no eternal, immutable, and absolute principles to be unquestionably observed throughout time by all generations ... It is man that creates and makes tradition: consequently his adoration of tradition is an adoration of statutes" (p. 156-157). The denial to women of their social and political rights is a false and deluded means to safeguard their chastity. The

latter is safe not in a dungeon but in the self-respect and moral stature which full responsibility breeds.

Finally quoting Al-Ghazālī (the great Al-Ghazālī of the 11th century) Khālid Muḥammad Khālid ends with a strong plea for action. Cowardice, evasion and lethargy must be laid aside. Caution must not be allowed to impede decision. "A thousand mile journey" as the Chinese say, "begins with but a single step."

The contemporary Muḥammad al-Ghazālī takes up the challenge, not so much for action, as for reaction, or rather, for the refutation of the arguments and the proposals of *Min Hunā Nabdaʾ*. The form and content of this rebuttal are implicit its title: *Min Hunā Naʿlam,* with its suggestion that before we can act, we must know, and that this knowledge is only to be had by recourse, in undeviating loyalty, to the historic revelation. *Our Beginning in Wisdom* is a slightly shorter work and returns in large measure to the attitudes of assertive idealism already traced in Sayyid Quṭb. Muḥammad al-Ghazālī begins, not with the desperate awareness of wrong to be righted, which motivates *Min Hunā Nabdaʾ*, but rather with an insistent sense of dogmas to be vindicated. It is not that Khālid is not open to deep criticism on several radical points, as we shall see, but that the vindicator never quite takes the measure of his task or fully sees what requires to be vindicated. The wrongs Khālid analyses do not truly exist—ideally, and the solutions he proposes do not square with Islam. This is the gist of our third work.

It appeared very rapidly on the heels of its predecessor and has a preface by Ṣāliḥ ʿIshmāwī, a leading writer among the *Ikhwān al Muslimūn*. The attitude is that *Min Hunā Nabdaʾ* has betrayed the true Islam by providing its enemies with an arsenal of weapons. So we find a spirited 'rescue' of Islam from the confusing calumnies of one of its own Azharite sons, with little realisation of the duties that go deeper than retort. Shaikh Khālid has plotted "an ungodly and sinister journey" for the caravan of Islam. He cannot be allowed to succeed in his diversionary subtleties. Al-Azhar is not likely to proceed against him personally since not a few ʿulamāʾ have similarly erred without disciplinary action being taken against them. But there can be no doubt that he is in the wrong, dangerously so, pathetically so.

Muḥammad al-Ghazālī's first concern is a spirited re-assertion of the necessarily indissoluble connection between Islam and the State. Power to rule is indispensable to the true religion. The notion that Islam can properly exist in separation from political power is a ruse from Europe to undermine the faith. Nationalism is a further perversion from the same nefarious source. Muslims do not want a defenseless faith. When Muḥammad became ruler and head of state it was not an error, or a temporary expedient, but an essential truth of Islam. Historical abuses of such power are, of course, not Islam (p. 9). But this should not be turned into an argument for a separation

of religion and state. Rather it is a call for their better—more Islamic —integration.

> "Professor Khalid's contention—that religion consists merely of road signs intended to orient life's travellers and, as such, has nothing to do with the State—is pure fiction. The truth is that the road is full of gangsters. Unless religion moves along it as a strong, well-defended caravan, it will surely meet its end" (p. 15).

It is absolutely indispensable, then, that religion should have state power. This necessity is not to be obscured by the crimes of a corrupt religiosity. To return to a nationalist basis is to return to the old *Jāhiliyyah*. Muḥammad conquered in perfect accord with Islam's nature. But, in a rather enigmatic sentence, Al-Ghazālī adds: "The Islamic Kingdom was not built that Muḥammad might wear a crown, or that his successors might live in glory. The Islamic state has no room for caesars and emperors. Its ruler is a leader whose official task is no different from that of the imām in his mosque" (p. 43). Prophethood is not nobler or more essential than ruling, either for Muḥammad or for posterity.

Evidently this theme is the most important section of *Min Hunā Naᶜlam* and occupies one quarter of the whole. There follow three shorter Chapters which corroborate it by proclaiming the shamelessness of English, French and American democracy from which the 'secular-state' Muslims draw their parallels. The British in India, the French in Morocco and Truman's Israel, are all legitimate, and damning, examples of the evils of national states. Is Shaikh Khālid to pay these the compliment of imitation when they have desolated and bespoiled the patrimony of Islam? Is there any need to borrow legal and political notions and patterns from such sources? It is true, as Al-Ghazālī concedes, that there have been unworthy ᶜulamā,ᵓ yet the remedy is not to disqualify their office, but to revive its true discharge. As we have seen earlier, there is nothing but hopeless confusion, if not malicious heresy, in calling ᶜulamāᵓ priests. Shaikh Khālid is naïvely allying himself with movements and attitudes which, far from reviving Islam, have always been its undoing. True Islam is proof against the evils he deplores: let it be true to itself and the evils will disappear.

Min Hunā Naᶜlam, however, does not apparently appreciate that the other party in the debate is precisely concerned for this 'being true to itself' but differently interprets what such self-consistency means. So its author goes on to rebut the other's plea for the freedom of women. Man is physically superior and has greater responsibilities. Woman is not to be imprisoned behind walls or veils, but neither is she to be launched into unsuitable roles or taken from her natural place in society, and her ministry in home and family. Finally there is a brief rebuttal of the charge that the religious institutions of *zakāt* and *ṣadaqāt* have been made an excuse for apathy in the face of social injustice and human misery. Al-Ghazālī accepts that the plea for social

welfare is the strongest part of *Min Hunā Nabdaʾ* but he affirms that the solution is not what its author proposed, but instead a true 'Islamic socialism.' He goes on with frankness:

> "The reader may possibly ask whether Islamic socialism has been applied anywhere, and whether there is, at present, any living example of it to which he may turn. The answer is, unfortunately, No! There is none. The principles of Islam have been crippled in Islamic countries for a long time. This is not a matter for which socialism can provide a cure, despite its excellent programs, since the problem is one of first adopting that socialism itself. It is not a reform in the status of property or of some public utility: it concerns our religious ethos itself" (p. 141).

The final issue then is drawn. We are not to seek a modicum of justice by measures of social welfare by the State: we rely upon a resurgence of religious goodness which a true Islam will bring. The cure, in other words, is not legal or political, but moral, and so in turn religious. It seems odd to find this disavowal of the activist method of the social reformer in a champion of religion who has so strenuously insisted on religion being always seconded by political authority, a religion that is, in which the imām and the ruler are ideally one. But this deep issue leads us into the Christian implications of these three works. It remains only, in exposition of them, to add that Al-Ghazālī has such final confidence in his Islamic panacea that birth promotion not birth control is the right thing for Egypt today. The Prophet regarded woman's fertility as her most important quality.

So desperate in fact is the Egyptian population problem that there could not be clearer evidence that *Min Hunā Naᶜlam* prefers to be dogmatic rather than realistic, where it cannot be both. *Min Hunā Nabdaʾ* is based throughout on the contrary preference.

SOME CHRISTIAN IMPLICATIONS

No Christian concerned for constructive relations with Muslims today and an active sympathy for their problems can fail to read these three translations without being deeply moved and brought under exacting obligation. The situation disclosed bristles with difficulties but the issues cannot be shirked. Too often perhaps Christian missionary relations with Islam have been thought of as a *problem.* Maybe the truth is that they are an *art*—an art of alongsidedness, sympathy and imaginative ministry. It is not given always to see where such ministry may reach, nor what it will involve. But it must be shouldered—and "with God be the rest."

It is manifest that the underlying issues, latent but not always articulate, in these books, are very close to the heart of Christian theology and to the Christian doctrine of man. They are also very near to deep points of Christian experience both in personal and communal life. At least then there is the re-assuring fact of Christian relevance. Christians need not be caught in a barren and frontal controversy fit

only for pundits. Here are the issues that agitate the soul of contemporary Islam—and they are seen to be central to the Christian understanding of the world under God.

But with this new and urgent sense of relevance to Islam, Christianity, in its Muslim relations, may well find itself acutely depressed in these translated pages by the multiplied evidence of woeful ignorance about it. How can it be that honest and anxious Muslim thinkers such as these are so estranged and so far from the knowledge of what the Christian world believes and why? *Min Hunā Nabda*? makes little reference to Christianity except to illustrate the fact of an educated clergy and to suggest that some villages churches, as well as village mosques, might benefit from committee-written sermons. But Sayyid Quṭb and Muḥammad al-Ghazālī have whole Chapters devoted to the Church, its beliefs and history. It is here that unfamiliarity with the inside of Christianity is so tragically in evidence. There is no space to cite many examples. There is unfamiliarity with the New Testament itself. Compare Al-Ghazālī:

> "A quarter of a century ago, the Muslim Brotherhood was formed for the re-institution of the divine law: 'An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.' ... If the Jews and Christians had taken their religion seriously, they would have joined in this association too, for these divine laws were enjoined by the Torah and the Gospels long before the Koran was ever revealed" (p. 24).

No knowledge of: "But I say unto you?" There is equally a certain obtuseness about the account of Christianity in Western politics. "The leaders of the Church today are kings, though they wear no crowns... The declarations and speeches of Churchill and Truman can easily be mistaken for Sunday sermons in the Churches of London or New York" (p. 22). Christianity, which is blamed for separating Church and State, is credited with providing a fine example of religion armed with political influence. The same author attributes the conversion of Constantine to the desire of Christians to avoid persecution, whereas it should be much more properly understood as the world's recognition of the indestructibility of a Church which it had in fact persecuted for almost three centuries. Whole stretches of Christian history and thought are sadly *terra incognita* to these writers. This is said not to their reproach, but rather as a measure of the failure of Christian communication.

Sayyid Quṭb betrays a similar unawareness of the Christian idea of the relation of the realm of spirit to the realm of matter. He has not begun to penetrate the significance of the Incarnation, making Christianity in a real and far-reaching sense the most materialist of all religions, in that it believes in the realm of time and flesh as a place of the Divine self-disclosure. But Sayyid Quṭb finds in it "one of the clearest examples of the theory of opposition" between spirit and body, leading either to asceticism or libertinism (p. 21). Christianity looks at man, he adds, only from the angle of his spiritual capacities and

"seeks to crush down the human instincts" in order to encourage the soul (p. 24). Christianity is incurably world-renouncing, yet it is also implicated in aggressive imperialism. In his conclusion he remarks:

> "Christianity, so far as we can see, cannot be reckoned as a real force in opposition to the philosophies of the new materialism: it is an individualist, isolationist, negative faith" (p. 278).

There are other examples. These suffice in their painfulness. Can it be that this closed mind, this satisfaction with facile generalizations, arises only from antipathy, from self-sufficiency and from the emotions that generate the will to misunderstand? May it not also result from a failure in Christian patience and interpretation, in face of a formidable tangle of misconception, alienation and confusion? If so the summons to the Church is clear.

Another implication here is the notion that the problems of present-day Muslim states are separable from the rest of human experience. The desire to find wholly domestic solutions in Islam is readily understandable, but it seems sad that any disposition to be interested in what honest non-Muslims have sought, said or found, should be attributed either to a sense of inferiority or to treason. This attitude of aloofness fits ill with a universal faith. Western philosophical travail, its painful political trial and error, its strenuous social experimentation and aspiration, may not be valid for transplanting. Indeed travail has to be domestic and cannot be exported. But need they be dismissed as irrelevant and obnoxious? Can Muslims like Sayyid Quṭb and Shaikh al-Ghazālī, not be wooed from their attitude of mental isolation to some more hospitable sense that there are minds and hearts of goodwill in the Christian world who have sought light on identical problems? Must Christian thinking always be greeted with suspicion as something depredatory? Are we to remain for ever victims of the entail of past history, never able to speak soul to soul from Church to Mosque? Must pre-judgement for ever silence all that Christians, albeit unworthily and brokenly, are trying to say? How far do the answers to these questions lie with the Church and how far with the authors and readers of the first and third works here under review?

There is a further implication when we recognise the partial openness of the second work to human experience elsewhere—an openness for which, as we have seen, it is roundly denounced. Here the question shifts from Whether? to What? The inspirations of sections of *Min Hunā Nabda*[2] needed closer critical scrutiny on the borrower's part. It should be observed that his method may be that of the caricaturist who overdraws a true picture and that in his purpose to arouse action he cannot indulge in a philosophic reserve about his ruling ideas. But, subject to that proviso, it may be questioned whether he is not too near the surface in his insistence that poverty is the basic evil. The error is the same as Bernard Shaw's. It may be true that vice is

occasioned by low external conditions. It is not true that virtue is created by improved ones. This is not to argue that social reform should not be sought: it does mean that it is not to be sought alone. Salvation calls for more than the social reformer: it demands the Redeemer. Those who are drawn to the activist views of Wells and Shaw should not ignore Maurice, Chesterton and Temple, with their insistence on the fact that the regeneration of man and society lies beyond the competence of law or politics.

This leads at once into the whole issue of the relation of the State or the political order to the good life in human community, about which our three authors are so much concerned. Is religion doomed if it cannot enforce its precepts, as Quṭb and Al-Ghazālī suggest? Is Khālid right in arguing that religious principles are only guides and that the evils of a religious State are such that only a secular State is tolerable? Is the relation of religion to organised society only directive, or necessarily coercive or at least authoritative? Is it the true genius of religion to permeate, or to dominate, society? Is there a remainder in which the State has proper independence of religious sanctions? All these are deep questions and there is no space to discuss the characteristic Muslim and Christian answers, or even to identify them. But there is one observation on the problem at a point where Christian thinking as to man may prove most relevant to the Muslim debate on this issue.

The New Testament, postulating regeneration and the 'new community' of the Church, recognises that human society, as politically ordered, cannot be made coterminous with the Kingdom of God. It therefore recognises the varied resistance to good of the natural man, while striving always to bring that realm under the power of ethical standards only truly attainable within the fellowship of faith and on the condition of surrender. Both of these conditions the societies of the natural man cannot fulfill. Thus Christian ethics remain militant against evil it cannot *qua* law annihilate; it is regulative in so far as persons submit to redeeming grace; but it always transcends the attainment of the political order as such, without ever ceasing to be relevant to it. Its standards set the desiderata of the State and its laws, but can never be wholly achieved in history by these means. Christianity does not believe in the legal, or political, or natural, perfectibility of man. Its responsibility to society and society's law, behaviour and conditions, is real and constant; but society has a waywardness, a wilfulness,—composed as it is of sinful men—which makes the good by law always approximate, always liable to fail, always dependent upon something beyond the power of law, something which only redeemed persons can bring. Belief in grace and redemption has as its corollary the distinction between man the rebel and man the restored, and the consequent confession that the society in which the

Divine good is realised can never be identified with any State nor accomplished by government as such.

Summary has doubtless failed to do justice to this vital truth. But it would seem to be part of Christian duty to invite the attention of sincere Muslims to this aspect of the Christian understanding of man. It might help to illuminate the problem so frankly recognised by Sayyid Quṭb and Muḥammad al-Ghazālī—the problem of a Divine Islamic society capable of existence and yet not recognisably existent for any sustained time in Islamic history. Does not this problem underlie the diverse interpretations of Muslim un-Islamicity? Does it not lead to contrasted proposals either to banish 'religious government' as failure that must make way, discredited, for the secular State, or to renew that 'religious government' as yet scarcely tried? We have already quoted Al-Ghazālī's statement that the truly Islamic society does not now exist. For Sayyid Quṭb it exists, as we have seen, largely in ideal assertion. He is uniformly idealistic about the potential perfection of Islamic society. The duty of alms, for example, progressively takes over until such payment becomes a natural part of the will of the wealthy (p. 73). The doctrine of *Tawhīd* involves, in his view, that "Not one of God's created servants has the *power* to cut off any man's provision, or to withhold from him any part of his provision" (p. 36). But what are we to say when some man *takes* such power? And what will God *do*? But the same author does come near to the heart of the issue here concerned when he notes a distinction in Muslim legal and political thought between compulsion under law and exhortation under 'religion.' "It (Islam) leaves the lower level of achievement to the law, while to exhortation it prescribes the achievement of the higher level: thus it leaves for man a wide space between these two, a gap which he can overcome as best he may." (p. 99).

This passage is perhaps the most relevant in all the three works as far as Christian implications are concerned. Christianity agrees with the distinction and with the sense of a realm beyond achievement by law. But it finds, as indeed Muslim history finds with a recurrence here honestly confessed, that exhortation does *not* suffice for the higher realm. Here the Christian Gospel substitutes grace for exhortation and redemption for idealism. It agrees that the gap is wide, but it does not believe that man can "overcome it as best he may." It believes that God in His sovereignity has intervened to meet the need. It believes that the necessary gap between the level of life which law can achieve by prohibition and the level which God intended in His Love has been bridged in the Incarnate and the Crucified. It is in other words a gap that calls for God to bridge and God bridges it. But the bridging turns also upon faith and participation which only the person can make. The society of men is under obligation to the Divine Law as fulfilled in the Gospel but it only partakes of

that fulfilment proportionately to the faith of the persons who compose it.

This is far from exhausting the Christian implications of the three works in question. But here it must end. Can it be doubted that Christians who care have the duty of obeying the trust of this faith towards the Muslim caution and the Muslim aspiration reflected in this debate? The debate has by no means ceased: active discharge of the duty has hardly begun.

Baghdad ʿAbd al-Tafāhum

BOOK REVIEWS

The Christian Attitude to Other Religions, By E. C. Dewick, Cambridge University Press, London and New York, pp. x and 220, $ 5.00.

Dr. Dewick has rendered an important service by treating, in his Hulsean Lectures, a subject which, in recent years, has received too little attention from missionary scholars. The International Missionary Council, in preparation for its Madras meeting in 1938, invited Dr. Hendrick Kraemer to write a book on the Christian message. The result was the massive and erudite volume: *The Christian Message in a non-Christian World.* The influence of Kraemer's work has been widespread and profound. And its influence continues; for the book is still widely read. One result of the great debate initiated at Madras has been that the focus of discussion has tended to be on the question: What is the Christian Message? rather than the question: What has been and what should be the attitude of Christianity to other religions? This latter question, Dr. Dewick now asks and seeks to answer in this scholarly volume.

The book begins with an essay on the challenge from other religions, which includes within its preview the "political" religions of communism, fascism and nationalism, as well as the great non-Christian traditions of Asia. This brief treatment of the "political" religions is not pursued throughout the volume. After an extremely condensed statement in the following chapter on "the Answers from the Church today", the new religions are hardly referred to elsewhere and Dr. Dewick concentrates his attention on a careful examination of the message of Jesus Christ and the tradition of the church in relation to the great non-Christian religions. It is perhaps worth noting, in a journal devoted to the discussion of the Muslim world, that the treatment of Islam is less full and detailed than that of other oriental religions. This is not to say, however, that the treatment of the major issue is not, at almost every point, relevant and important to those engaged in Islamic studies. But it is natural that, after many years of distinguished service in India and of sustained and scholarly study of Hinduism, Dr. Dewick should draw many of his references and illustrations from the area in which he possesses wide experience and exceptional competence.

The book concludes with two chapters on: the recovery of first principles and the reform of missionary policy and practice. It is in these chapters that the author develops more explicitly than elsewhere his own theological convictions; though here, as throughout the book, a brave show of objectivity is maintained and Dr. Dewick is always detached, judicious and scrupulously fair in presenting varied points of view on every question. He plays the role of the perceptive "observer" with very great skill and much erudition. The book covers a vast area of discourse and contains a great mass of detailed and important data, not elsewhere available, so far as this reviewer is aware, in a single volume. Yet in its broad architectural structure no less than in the easy lucidity of its style, it is a model of clarity.

Dr. Dewick's own position on the crucial question with which the

book is concerned is clear enough, though he seldom asserts it directly. He parts company with Kraemer and with those who follow him, at many points. He treats the New Testament records from a more conservative textual standpoint than the form critics; and his firm insistence on the centrality of the historical events recorded in the Gospels is welcome. Yet his treatment of Jesus Christ appears to lay primary emphasis on his character and words and to give less than adequate recognition to the total significance of the incarnate *Word*. The chief weakness of the position taken is perhaps a failure to take with sufficient seriousness the New Testament view of time and the whole concept of a cosmic redemption, wrought within history, and beyond history, by the mighty acts of God in the birth, life, and death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, and the consummation of all things in Him at the end of time. Dr. Dewick appears to have resisted rather than assimilated some of the more recent emphases of Biblical theology. At some points, his writing has a distinct flavor of the 19th century, so that the reader is left with the feeling that what has been said, in effect, is not: *Forward from Kraemer,* but: *Back to Schleiermacher!* The book is nonetheless an important contribution to the great debate on the relation of Christianity to other religions. It provides not merely a point of view, but indispensable *prolegomena* to a discussion which, one may hope, will be pursued with increasing vigor—for it lies at the very heart of the essential task of rethinking the theology of the world Christian mission.

There are a number of minor errors, which should be corrected in a second edition. On p. 20, the word "many" has lost its "y". In a footnote on p. 28, William Paton is incorrectly described as "general secretary of the International Missionary Council." On pages 37 (footnote) and 41, two German names have become confused. On page 37, "Schlink" has become "Schlunk" and on page 41, the eminent professor of theology in Heidelberg (Dr. Schlink) has had his name inserted, by mistake, for that of Dr. Schlunk, the distinguished former professor of missions at Tubingen. On p. 180 Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr's book *Moral Man and Immoral Society* is described as containing his Gifford lectures. The Gifford lectures were, of course, on *The Nature and Destiny of Man.* On page 185, the National Missionary Council of Australia is misnamed; and on p. 206, in the bibliography, the title of G. E. Phillips' book: *The Gospel in the World* has somehow had the word "modern" added to it—incorrectly.

New York. C. W. Ranson

Introduction to the Qur'ān, By Richard Bell, Edinburgh, 1953, Edinburgh University Press, 8vo., pp. x, 190.

This is not a Quranic Introduction in the strict sense of the word, but a somewhat revised form of the Introduction the late Dr. Bell had desired to have accompany his now famous translation of the Qur'ān published by T. & T. Clark (2 vols. Edinburgh, 1937-39). Many of the criticisms of that translation would have been obviated had it been accompanied by the Introduction intended to go with it, but a variety of considerations, including that of printing costs, made

it impossible to print it at that time. With the years the need for it has grown, for in his translation Dr. Bell had made use of printing devices to show his idea of how the Sūras of the Qur'ān had been pieced together from a great mass of relatively short "revelations" that had been issued from time to time during the twenty odd years of Muḥammad's active ministry. The critical principles on which he worked, and the basis of his judgment as to the relative dates of passages and the reasons for their arrangement, were often not at all clear to the reader. Even to those of us who had the advantage of working with Dr. Bell on the text itself his reconstructions in the analyses at the head of each Sūra were not always fully intelligible. This present Introduction, prepared for the press by two of his former students, sets forth his justification for his theory of how the Qur'ān grew during the progress of Muḥammad's ministry, for certain of his translations that have been questioned, and makes clear the principles of his rearrangement of the material in the various Sūras.

It begins with an account of the environment into which Muḥammad came in 7th century Arabia, in particular of the religious environment which necessarily coloured his thinking and the form in which he set forth his religious message. It suggests a theory of how Muḥammad came to regard himself as a Prophet, what he thought the mission of a Prophet involved, and how he himself understood the process of "revelation" which led him to prepare a Scripture for his community. This leads him to a discussion of the form of the Qur'ān, its structure and style, which in turn opens up the problem of the compilation of the Sūras and the thorny question of the chronological order of the revelations. Dr. Bell thinks he can distinguish five distinct stages in the growth of Muḥammad's own idea of his Scripture, and can suggest the circumstances which, in some cases at least, brought about the development in his ideas. A final chapter concerns itself with more general questions of the content of the messages assembled in the Qur'ān, and the probable sources of certain material included therein.

The book is full of good things, for example, his discussion of the meaning of such terms as *ḥanīf, furqān, mathānī, āya, dhikr,* etc., of the problem whether Muḥammad could read or write, of the sense of *waḥy* and how Muḥammad understood his own inspiration, of the mysterious letters that head a number of Sūras, of the problem of rhyme forms and rhyme phrases, his criticism of the various schemes that have been suggested for arranging the material of the Qur'ān chronologically, his bringing out of Muḥammad's changing conceptions as to the reality or non-reality of false gods, and his discussion of the sources from which the Prophet drew much of his material. In this latter matter he is careful to note the uncertainty there must always be as to whether particular items came from a Jewish or a Christian source, and even more careful to draw attention to the way in which Muḥammad moulded and adapted this borrowed material for his purposes, but it is gratifying to find that he is not afraid, as some modern writers are, of frankly discussing this matter of sources.

As to Muḥammad's inspiration he has an interesting theory. He thinks that Muḥammad had been religiously inclined even from his

youth, and was rather a solitary, brooding individual, whose habit was to brood long and intensely over religious and other problems that distressed him. Ever and anon as he brooded there would come a sudden flash of enlightenment about his problem, much as Sir Walter Scott tells used to come to him when he was worrying over a plot in one of his novels. Probably every preacher who reads these lines will remember times when he chewed and chewed at a text and worried over his sermon for Sunday till he was in despair, when in a flash his message came, and firstly, secondly and thirdly fell beautifully of themselves into place without any effort of his. Men of science tell the same story of solutions coming, in a momentary flash of illumination, after weeks of fruitless toil, and it is at times difficult to resist the impression of prompting from outside ourselves, of inspiration. Now in Muḥammad's environment there were men who were wont to give utterance to pronouncements set forth in rhythmical form, who were popularly regarded, and perhaps regarded themselves, as prompted from without to make these pronouncements. Of these were the poets and *kāhins* (soothsayers), who were considered *majnūn,* i.e. inspired by the Jinn. There is some evidence that Muḥammad at first was not sure but that this was the case with him. He, however, had early been attracted to the circle of contemporary seekers for monotheism, and when in addition he began to have visions, in connection with some religious experience he went through about his fortieth year, he had a conviction that it was Allāh he had seen and that it was by Allāh that he had been prompted. Later he learned from the People of the Book that it was angels as God's messengers who appeared to men, and that it was Gabriel who was the agent of revelation, but the message was none the less of divine origin.

This theory makes intelligible the beginnings of the Prophet's ministry, and helps to explain the intense conviction with which he set about his mission of preaching monotheism in Arabia and labouring so diligently to bring to his own people the content of monotheistic religion as believed in and practiced by other communities with whom the Arabs of that day were in contact. It also justifies the translation of *waḥy* by "suggestion." Dr. Bell believes that it also assures the essential sincerity of the Prophet throughout his ministry. His sincerity at its outset is generally granted, but it is very difficult to see how a man could believe that passages such as the Joseph story in Sūra xii, which had recently been learned from Jewish informants, was given him by divine inspiration, or that passages such as lxvi, 1-6, xxiv, 1-20 and much of Sūra xxxiii, which settle in his favour matters concerning his own domestic affairs, were revelations from the Lord of the Worlds. Those who see in his character a progressive deterioration from a sincere beginning to a somewhat dubious ending can find in the Qurʾān itself an impressive body of evidence in support of their view, evidence which for the most part Dr. Bell passes over in silence. Nor, be it remarked, is constancy in purpose under ridicule and persecution necessarily an evidence of genuine inspiration. Both Joseph Smith and "Elijah" Dowie of more recent times displayed excellent constancy in the pursuit of their mission under very considerable ridicule and

persecution without that being any evidence of the truth of their prophetic claims.

Of more importance for our understanding of the Qurʾān is his theory of its composition. He breaks entirely with tradition in thinking that Muḥammad himself had a great deal to do with the preparation of the material in written form, and that Ḥafṣa's famous collection of material which was used by ʿUthmān's Committee in their preparation of the canonical recension, was what the Prophet himself had prepared, and left in very much the form in which we now have it. To many of us it seems incredible that if this were so the early Muslim community should have been unaware of the fact, but Dr. Bell's discussion of that matter deserves further consideration, and certainly does offer an explanation of several perplexing features of the Quranic text. Muḥammad began, he thinks, as a preacher of monotheism to his own townsfolk, a mission in which he was not particularly successful. His preaching at this stage was in form hardly to be distinguished from that of the *kāhins,* though his subject matter was of the glory, might, wisdom and beneficence of the one God as revealed in His creation. Growing acquaintance with Christians taught him about the series of messengers who in past times had been sent to preach monotheism to mankind, and with his consciousness of mission it was easy for him to think of himself as associated with that series of messengers from Allāh, so that he is *rasūl Allāh.* So, firstly from Arabian legend, and then from Biblical history, he built up a body of "punishment stories," which he repeats in his sermons with varied emphasis, the burden of which is how a messenger has been sent with a monotheistic message, calls on his people to do their duty to Allāh, but is laughed at and rejected, whereupon that community is destroyed, though the messenger and those who believed on him are saved. The lesson of each such story is applied to Muḥammad's own situation among his unbelieving and unresponsive contemporaries.

The next stage came when he learned about Scripture Lessons used in services of worship. Such in Syriac were called *qeryānā,* and with growing knowledge of earlier monotheistic religion Muḥammad begins to produce his own Qurʾāns, or religious stories, where, though the same personalities as in the punishment stories often appear, the point of the story is no longer the destruction of unbelieving peoples, but the example and consequent reward of the messenger, the punishment being transferred to an eschatological Day of Judgment. It is in these Qurʾāns that the Last Day, Resurrection, Judgment, Heaven and Hell become a prominent element in his teaching, and here the source material is for the most part Christian.

The final stage came in Medina when Muḥammad learned that the Jews and Christians, neither of whom showed any disposition to take seriously his claims to inspiration, were not one, as he had supposed, but two opposed religious communities, nor was Scripture one, as each of these had its own holy Book. He was also faced with the fact that in his changed situation at Medina the Qurʾān form he had been using did not suit very well for the instructions and regulations he was in constant need of issuing, so now we have the transition from Qurʾāns

to a Book (*kitāb*), and from his office as a messenger to that of a Prophet. It was from the Medinan Jews that he learned more about the nature of the prophetic office, and in particular learned about Abraham, so that now he set himself to produce a Book which would be for his community what the Torah was for the Jews or the Evangel for the Christians. In this Book he would set forth the original religion of Abraham which both Jews and Christians had corrupted. Unfortunately he died before this Book was ready, and what we call the Qurʾān is what his followers gathered up after his death of the material from the time of his early preaching to the material he had been revising and preparing for his Book, and published as the Scripture of Islam.

This Introduction is an easy book to read. One is carried along step by step in a progressive argument which is really very impressive, and if the author's premisses are granted moves on logically to his conclusion. Within so narrow a compass, however, it was not possible for him to set forth all the evidence for the positions he takes on a number of points, and indeed it was at times necessary to present results quite baldly without any argumentation at all. This makes it all the more urgent that the great mass of notes Dr. Bell had assembled over his many years of work on the Qurʾān, and which he was busy putting into order during the last years of his life, should find a publisher and be made available to students. The publication of this *Introduction* makes is abundantly clear what a tragedy it will be if so much valuable material from the pen of such a scholar is withheld from the world of scholarship.

School of Oriental Studies, Cairo. ARTHUR JEFFERY

The Shiʿa of India. By John Norman Hollister, Ph. D., Luzac & Co., London, pp. 440, £ 3.3.0.

This full-grown book is recognized at once as a technical treatise that goes beyond the field of elementary Islam. At the same time it is most interestingly informative as it sets forth the history of the ramifications of schismatic Islam in India. Those who live and work in India soon discover that the beliefs of India's pilgrims, dervishes and poets awaken a scholarly curiosity that only some comprehensive work of this kind can satisfy.

Readers who are familiar with the main differences between the orthodox Sunnī Muslims and the Shīʿa communities will appreciate the significance of the photograph that appears opposite page 106. It shows clearly the inscription that may be seen above the prayer-niche below the large dome of the Great Mosque at Gulbarga. On the upper line we read, *Allāh, Muḥammad, ʿAlī, Fāṭima, Ḥasan and Ḥusain.* On the next line below are the names of the first four caliphs, *Abū Bakr, ʿUthmān, ʿUmar, and ʿAlī.* The point is that for the Shīʿas ʿAlī is the only one of the first four caliphs who may be associated with Allāh or with the family of Muḥammad, for it is their contention that the first three caliphs gained their positions by political connivance rather than by divine approval. They believe that the majority group,

who came to be known later on as the Sunnis, were obviously misled when they refused to choose ᶜAlī as the first caliph. And when ᶜAlī did ultimately become caliph he was soon assassinated by his opponents. The Sunnis then persisted in their opposition and were unwilling to acknowledge either of ᶜAlī's sons as his successor. But for the Shīᶜas, each Imām (designated leader) who has followed in succession from ᶜAlī is literally "the remainder of Allah on Earth."

Those Shīᶜas who acknowledge twelve *imāms,* including ᶜAlī and his sons Ḥasan and Ḥusain, carry on the line through nine further of these designated leaders. They are known as "The Twelvers" (ithnā ᶜashariyya). But there are also those Shīᶜas who started a new line of succession after the sixth *imām,* Jaᶜfar al-Ṣādiq. They refused to accept Mūsā al-Kāẓim as the seventh *imām* because his father had previously designated his oldest son Ismāᶜīl, who died however before his father passed away. This is the group that call themselves "The Seveners," regarding the deceased Ismāᶜīl as the last of the original succession of *imāms.* And since then the Ismailis have had their own series of Ismaili imams, with variations due to subsequent conflicts.

Dr. Hollister devotes chs. iii-xii to a careful study of The Twelvers, to show how their religious beliefs and practices have been developed and modified throughout a long period in India. This involves an explanation of events that led to their coming to India, by gradual penetration in the course of the establishment of the Bamani Kingdom (1347-1526), which was founded by Ḥasan Gangu, who "traced his pedigree to King Bahman ibn Isfandiyar of Iran;" by the continuance of the strong political influence of Iran in India in the Mughal period, particularly in the reign of Babur and Humayun; and through the large number of Shīᶜite officials who served Aurungzib and Bahadur Shah I. The latter was himself a Shīᶜa.

The present-day Twelvers in India, with their principal strength in Lucknow, have baffled census takers repeatedly. Before the partition of India, rough estimates of the Shīᶜa population ran from five to twenty millions. In as much as they have considered it inadvisable for outsiders to be able to estimate their numerical strength accurately, they have resorted readily to their doctrine of dissimulation (*taqīya*). They have maintained an Intermediate College in Lucknow, where they have also a training school for their preachers and an association that publishes tracts to set forth Shiᶜite doctrines.

The name for the chief center of worship for the Shīᶜas of Lucknow, the *Imām Barā,* the place set apart for assemblies "for remembering the *imāms,*" emphasizes the fact that the Twelvers believe that for the forgiveness of their sins and for final salvation on the Day of Judgment they have hope solely through the intercession of Muḥammad, his daughter Fāṭima, and the twelves *imāms.* These are their fourteen mediators, to whom they address honorofic salutations. Because of their nearness to God, it is believed that through friendship for them all faithful Shīᶜas may hope for deliverance from any and every kind of evil. This is what they believe sincerely and for the most part without any doubt or question.

To show how exceedingly sensitive both the Shīᶜas and the Sunnis

still are "concerning matters that are really very old," Dr. Hollister reviews the numerous occasions in recent years when the British Government was called upon to put down outbreaks of violence between the two communities in Lucknow. Provocation would be given to the Shīᶜas when the Sunnis would gather for demonstrations in honour of the "rightly guided caliphs," and the Sunnis would naturally be angered when the Shīᶜas would meet in large numbers to publicly curse these "usurpers,"—Abū Bakr, ᶜUmar, and ᶜUthmān. And we are reminded how through the years Kashmir also has been the scene of violent Sunni-Shīᶜa clashes.

In summing up what is written by Dr. Hollister about the Twelvers, the modern reader finds himself disposed to ask whether the Shīᶜa of India, under the influence of Hindu thought and the impact of the scientific outlook that came with the British educational system, have made significant advance beyond the Shīᶜas in Iran and Iraq. Do they belong to the world of today, with a social consciousness that is alert and responsible, or are they to be studied rather as a surviving community whose interests still lie in the distant past? And when they come to know something about Jesus Christ, as set forth in the New Testament, do they continue to look to their *imāms* for forgiveness and salvation?

The second half of this comprehensive work on the Shīᶜa of India, chs. xiii-xxvi, could have been more clearly distinguished as Part II, perhaps with a photograph of the Agha Khan for its frontispiece—as "Exhibit A," which many people would like to have explained.

It is a long call from the Agha Khan of the 20th century to the Old Man of the Mountain of the 13th century. The latter was the Ismaili leader of groups of the Assassins who tried to hold out in the mountain fastnesses of Iran at the period of the Mongol invasions, whereas the former is the fabulously wealthy leader of the Ismailis in the world of today. He is esteemed as a distinguished successor of the *imāms,* by accepted Ismaili designation. For this great community, therefore, he may be said to be "the Remainder of Allah on Earth."

Truly it has been a gigantic task for Dr. Hollister to trace the history and to describe the character of the numerous Ismaili sects in India, and to set forth all their differences,—tribal, cultural and political. But with extensive use of monographs prepared by Wladimir Ivanow, and by diligent reading of many sources not readily available (see the impressive Bibliography), he has put into convenient form this systematic resumé or analysis of the "Seveners" in India, with chs. xvii and xviii on the Bohras and chs. xxv and xxvi on the Khojas.

The Bohra community of Ismailis in India is mainly composed of converts from Hinduism and their descendants. There are some though who claim to be descendants of Ismaili refugees from the Yaman, or from other parts of Arabia, or from Egypt. "This may well be," Dr. Hollister observes, "for when the Fāṭimid dynasty was finally destroyed by Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, the Shīᶜa and particularly the Ismailis, were persecuted and expelled from the country."

The head of the Bohra community, whom they call *Sayyidinā,* which means "our Lord," is also spoken of as "His Holiness." He is virtually

in the place of the *imām,* with power thrice delegated: by God to Muḥammad, by Muḥammad to the Imām, and by the Imām to his "all-powerful representative" (dāʿī al-muṭlaq), the present Sayyidinā Ṭahir Ṣaif al-Dīn. He has the title of a first-class Sardar of the Bombay Presidency. When he arrives in Bombay or Poona he is met by a representative of the Governor. He travels in a special railway carriage, with reserved carriages for his staff and attendants. On ceremonial occasions he sits on a *gaddī* with royal fly-flappers held before him and above him.

We read that for the other major group of the Seveners, the Khojas, most of whom were also recruited as converts from Hinduism, "the deity of their Imām is not predicated on any such metaphysical basis as a manifestation called Universal Reason with which he is equated; but on terms of an *avatar,* a term that meant to them an incarnation of Deity—the expected tenth incarnation of Vishnu in ʿAlī" (p. 381).

Much has been written of the present Agha Khan as a world figure. In 1937 he was President of the League of Nations. As a sportsman his name has come to be known on the racecourses of the world. Zealous for the advancement of education among Muslims in India he had a substantial share in the development of the Muslim University in Aligarh. For years he was actively interested in the Muslim League. And the way his own Khoja community have accepted him and honoured him is evidenced by their bringing their gold and their diamonds to give him his weight in gold or in diamonds in celebration of his birthdays. The value of diamonds to match his weight of 243 pounds was close to two million dollars. We are told that "during the week of celebration that preceded the weighing at Bombay as many as forty thousand of his followers, from India, Africa and the Middle East, were cared for in camps and fed without cost as a part of the Jubilee celebrations."

Nevertheless the Khojas have retained and continue to exploit the Hindu conception of the transmigration of souls, but with some modification. If a deceased member of their sect has recognized the Imām "he is hastened on toward heaven, but if not he must be born again on earth as a man. Before this, however, he must pass through eighty-four laks of rebirths in the shape of animals, and then he can be given one more chance of being a man who can recognize the Imams." However, "the Khojas do not recognize rebirths in the forms of stones and plants as the Shughnani Ismailis do" (p. 395).

The Shiʿa of India should be of great help to educated Muslims who wish to examine more carefully their own faith and hope, as well as to their missionary friends, in India and neighbouring Muslim countries.

Birmingham, Ala DWIGHT M. DONALDSON

Modern Lebanese Proverbs, "Collected at Ras al-Matn, Lebanon, Collated, Annotated and Translated to English", by Anis Frayha. American University of Beirut, Oriental Series No. 25. Imprimerie Missionaire Libanais, Jounié, 1953. 2 vols.: pp. xx and 748.

How is it that an alphabetic listing of four thousand two hundred

and forty-eight proverbs can be a fascinating and amusing glimpse into the intimate daily life of a Lebanese village? The answer is of course that these "proverbs" are no mere sententious and stilted sayings, (though some such are included), but they are for the most part the distillation of peasant wit and humor as applied to the most common everyday experiences of Lebanese village life. If you can read a single one and close the book, you are as self-controlled as the proverbial man who eats one salted peanut and then desists. This kind of thing naturally resists translation, but a few examples can be offered:

"Clean your house, for you do not know who will step into it; wash your face, for you do not know who will kiss it." (# 4005.)

"He knows neither who laid the egg, nor who built the hencoop." (# 3315.)

"As long as we continue to sit on this mat, nothing will happen, important or not." (# 3357.)

"A shower in April is worth a hen and its brood." (# 1981.)

"After lunch take a nap; after supper take a walk:" (# 1184.)

The collection is one which Professor Frayha has kept within well-defined limits, as he explains in his preface. Far from being a comprehensive compilation of all Arabic proverbs, it is confined to those sayings that were current in a single representative village of Lebanon. Professor Frayha believes that they are, nevertheless, known pretty well throughout the mountainous regions of Lebanon, though not all of them in the coastal plain. Such a limited collection is thus a study of a particular locale, and is to be compared with and supplemented by collections of proverbs from other parts of the Arab world. A list of such collections (some of them apparently made by students of his in the American University of Beirut) is given in the introduction, and to them there are constant references in the text.

The introduction discusses the definition of proverbs and their origin, the literary style and popular use of those in this particular collection, and the significance of proverbs as an index of various things in the attitudes and habits of thought of the group that uses them. Further studies that might be based on this material are suggested.

The collection is thus not only of popular interest, but is a real contribution to various fields of investigation, historical, linguistic, ethnological, anthropological, and psychological. A different method of arrangement than the strictly alphabetic might have been of more help to such studies. As it is, the same proverb may be repeated in different sections of the two volumes almost verbatim except for a shift in the initial word, while only a cross reference relates the two. It would not be easy to arrive at a satisfactory arrangement, but at least several groupings could be made: e.g., weather and seasons, neighbors, business, moral virtues, family relations (mother-in-law, daughter-in-law, etc.)

Not the least significant aspect of the publication is its reproduction of the colloquial language. The full vowelling helps to give the precise sound of the word and the phrase, completely differentiating it from its classical counterpart. Only occasionally does the author (or the

printer!) fall back through overpowering force of habit into a literary vowelling or transliteration that is "correct" but out of place in a sentence otherwise wholly colloquial. The preservation of this exact colloquial pronunciation and grammar is of real interest, not only for anthropological and linguistic studies of a comparative nature, but also as another contribution to the study of the whole problem of relating the spoken language to the literary and seeking to bridge the gulf between the two.

Beirut, Lebanon. H. G. Dorman Jr.

ʿAllamatnī al-Ḥayāt. Edited by Dr. Aḥmad Amīn, Kitāb al Hilāl, Cairo, 1953, pp. 194.

Edward P. Morgan and Edward R. Murrow, of the Columbia Broadcasting System in the United States, have conducted a five-minute program under the title *This I Believe,* in which they have brought to the microphone a variety of people, great and small, to discuss in public their intimate beliefs. Listeners may assume that they have undergone considerable editorial 'processing' in advance, as to the techniques necessary to make their reflections both brief and incisive. A subsequent volume with the same title gathered together certain of the more striking presentations. Both the book and the continuing program have enjoyed considerable popularity. Franklin Publications, in its campaign to make available Western thought and attitudes in literary form to the Arabic-speaking world, invited Dr. Aḥmad Amīn, former Dean of the Faculty of Arts in the University of Cairo, and a leading Arab writer, to edit a translated selection of twenty-five American 'confessors' with the same number of newly written *'confessiones'* from the Arab East. He invited Dr. John Badeau, of the American University at Cairo, to co-operate in the choice.

It may have been intended to use the Arabic ones also over the Western waves, but so far this has not happened. The interest of this review naturally concentrates on the original Arab contributions, headed by General Naguib himself. The reader who expects deep or purposeful affirmation of religious conviction will be disappointed. Islam figures little in these pages, just as Christianity figured little in the American series. It may have been partly due in the first to the selection of speakers, and in the second, to the interpretation of the assignment. The occasion seems to have been taken as calling for philosophical rumination on the lessons of life, rather than the studied utterance of a positive *credo.* This attitude is strongly evident in the title of the Arabic edition. *This I Believe* might well have been rendered *Huna Iʿtiqādī* (Here is My Faith) or *Īmānī al-Shakhṣī* (My Personal Faith). But no! *Life has Taught Me* is preferred—a title which certainly captures more exactly the drift and import of this popular publication. In accepting editorial responsibility, Aḥmad Amīn notes his misgivings about the religious implications of the heading *This I Believe,* and substituted the alternative to indicate the idea of reflection on life's goals rather than on religious convictions, beyond, of course, a general recognition of the supremacy of the spiritual.

It must be observed, however, that man cannot either wisely or permanently hold in dissociation what life means to him experimently and what he may, or may not, believe religiously. Perhaps one of the chief weakness of this book is precisely this divorce between theology and ideals—a weakness that characterises both the Arabica and the Americana. There is, beneath that, the further question what the Christian Church has been doing that so many intelligent people of goodwill, if not always of depth, can express their philosophy of life without reference to it: and why it is that prominent Muslims largely exclude Islam from their retrospect in the school of life.

The editor singles out one distinction between the East and the West here. The Arab 'confessors' he declares are lacking in a basic faith in humanity whereas this, with a zestful acceptance of life, is very evident in the western contributors.

After General Naguib, who writes on *The Invincible Will of the People,* the most prominent Arab writers (topics in parentheses) are Muḥammad Ḥusain Haykal (*A Quiet Conscience the Key to Happiness*): ʿAbbās Maḥmūd al-ʿAqqād (*My Attitude to People*): Mrs. Doria Shafīq (*While Life Hope*): Salāmah Mūsā (*A Youth at 66*): Aḥmad Zakī Abū Shādī (*Selfishness and Depravity are Twins*). Charles Mālik and Philip Hitti are contributors wellknown in the U.S.A. The Editor himself writes on: *A Dirhām of Wisdom is better than a Qanṭār of Knowledge,* but he is far less forceful than in many of his own essays published elsewhere. Perhaps it is that there is a made-to-order quality about the writing of many of the contributors and genuine inspiration did not wait, as it rarely does, upon necessity. Some are content simply to relate a reminiscence, which may not take fire on the page, or to indulge in introspection over education. Ḥafiẓ Wahbah of Saudi Arabia summaries his life-story with the caption: *To Have Travelled is to have Arrived.* But if this is not great literature, who should complain? A life after all is a vast thing to condense into six hundred words. But the venture is made and what men make of life, actively or reflectively, is never uninteresting.

Not the least perceptive of the essays is that of Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm on *Life is Purpose and Will.* After explaining his choice of a life of letters, rather than the law, or politics, or commercial writing for the cinema, he takes refuge from the fear of misdirected decision in the confidence that to have striven is its own sufficient justification. Absolute success is not to be had. Success in the sense of 'arrival' is not as important as the development of one's spirit. "There is one thought which torments me constantly ... it is having to suffer from error in estimating one's powers and selecting one's purpose... My one comfort is that I believe that honest endeavour spent in delving into the depth of the soul in order to bring forth its good is a noble task in itself, even though in the end it shows only the stones and sands of ruined hopes." A. K. C.

Among Arabic Manuscripts, Memories of Libraries and Men. By I. Y. Kratchkovsky, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1953, pp. 196, 5 plates, $ 3.00.

As the writings of Asin Palacios and others connected with *Al-*

Andalus have demanded that the Arabist add Spanish to his linguistic repertoire so the scholarly work of Kratchkovsky has threatened to make the knowledge of Russian an imperative. To those of us who were willing to do the first but hesitated to undertake the mastery of Russian this volume, number 16 in the Russian Translation Project Series of the American Council of Learned Societies, is most welcome. A number of Kratchkovsky's works have been made available to us in German but we are glad to see any additional translations from the pen of this great orientalist whose death occurred in 1951.

The essays in this little book were composed toward the end of his life and they serve to give us some interesting side-lights upon the long career of this brilliant scholar. They are written in an informal, reminiscent manner and should be enjoyed by the average reader as well as the specialist in the field. Wandering pleasantly over his past life, Kratchkovsky relates his adventures among manuscripts and with important men connected with those manuscripts. Sufficient details are included to give interest to the account but it is not his purpose to present a scholarly discussion of the subjects upon which he touches. While he declares that the book is not to be taken "for the author's personal memoirs", it is essentially just that. He means, of course, that these are casual reminiscences and are not to be considered the formal and official memoirs of his life. Each sketch, the book contains about two dozen, is a unit in itself. They have little connection with each other, chronologically or otherwise, except as they are grouped in chapters under such broad headings as "From Wandering in the East" or "In the Asiatic Museum."

Those acquainted with the field of Arabic studies will read with interest his references to well-known scholars of the past and various personalities connected with Arabic literature. Even the random reader will catch something of the spirit of adventure which is present in all good scholarship. The author admits that he may appear "sentimental and romantic" in his attempt "to do a little propaganda for my branch of study and talk loudly about Oriental scholarship." The reader will also observe in the life of the author something of the degree to which this adventure in scholarship is the result of years of meticulous preparation and discipline. "The commands of ceaseless scholarship are severe", to use Kratchkovsky's own words. If the book inspires young scholars toward Arabic studies it should also indicate to them the nature and the severity of the standard of scholarship set by those grand orientalists of the passing generation.

Kratchkovsky displayed a breadth and a depth which are required of the first-class orientalist. His sweep of knowledge extended from pre-Islamic poetry to modern Arabic literature and yet in every instance he set for himself such severe standards of thoroughness that the variety and quality of his work could have been attained only by one of his devotion and power of sustained labor. He was well aware of this dilemma of concentration versus breadth. By nature he was enticed by "concentration on a narrow specialty;" but he realized the danger of "shutting oneself up within the scholarly egoism of classical Arabic studies."

This is not a great book but it is a pleasant and interesting one. Its primary significance lies in the fact that it records the intimate thoughts of a great orientalist.

School of Oriental Studies, Cairo KERMIT SCHOONOVER

Rebirth and Destiny of Israel. By David Ben Gurion, Philosophical Library, New York, 1953, pp. 539, $ 10.00.

When Sir Robert Walpole, whom the school history books allege was the first Prime Minister of England, retired to his country seat in Norfolk, he returned to a farm in an idyllic land, and to the pleasures of a retirement that was in no sense premature. Shortly after the publication of this book the first Prime Minister of Israel voluntarily retired, but to laborious days in the bareness of the Negev, against the wishes of many admirers who had insisted that his political work was far from ended. Yet he has withdrawn into the barrenness to demonstrate that the political leadership of Tel-Aviv is nothing, unless girded by that union of soil and soul which the pioneers of Israel have described as the formula of its remaking. Something of the personality within that decision is communicated in this book.

Yet for all its eloquence and sense of purpose it is profoundly disturbing, at least for the reader who does not allow himself to forget the Arabs. How admirable Israel would be if somehow it could have been achieved in a vacuum! If the urgent sense of mission within its history had been required to strive only with a reluctant soil and a grudging earth, exacting only the tears and toil this book, like Weitzmann's *Trial and Error,* depicts with powerful re-iteration. If only there had been a human vacuum into which such tenacious intention for a State could have pressed with its transforming inventiveness and driving energy. But there was not. The land was not vacant: nor was the soil unpeopled—not at least until War and the breaking of resistance came. Israel in a vacant Palestine would have been a phenomenon to kindle unoffensively the dullest imagination. But Israel in the Arab context repels while it attracts and dismays those whom it most amazes. Arab relationships are certainly the most urgent moral issue belonging to the State of Israel and may yet prove the most crucial factor in its future destiny. If Israel is not to remain a kind of independent and self governing 'ghetto' in a hostile Arab world, it must turn to the accumulated problems of its Arab relatedness with no less realism, no less capacity for sacrifice and imagination, than it has demonstrated in the stern but easier tasks of economic and agricultural creation.

There need be no apology or further explanation, then, if literature arising out of Israel, and the memoirs and speeches of its main architects, are judged by their perception vis-a-vis the Arabs. By that criterion, this edition of Mr. Ben Gurion's major essays and speeches from 1915 to 1952, translated from the Hebrew under the supervision of Mordekhai Nurock,—though obviously an important source book for the historian and a delight to the Jewish reader—must be judged a disappointment. Unfortunately it is not provided with an index, but had it been, the Arabs and Arab Palestine would have taken up little

space there. There are long sequences, admirable in their power to convey a feeling of action, of struggle and of heroic singlemindedness through all the vicissitudes of the early, middle and final Mandatory periods, the declaration of U.N.O. for Partition, the War and subsequent immigration, Operation Ingathering and the determination both to absorb and to survive, which one can read without ever suspecting that there were any dispossessed or that there were obligations outside one's own cause. The self-sufficiency of Zionism is at once the eloquent theme and the tragic blindness of this moving volume.

When the author does take cognisance of the human content of what, for Israeli purposes, ought to have been a vacuum, it is either with cynicism or with a hostility that the past may explain but which the present and future cannot justify. In the very last entry, *To American Jewry,* we find this paragraph on the Arab exodus after the War began:

> "In March 1947, the population of Palestine was 1,850,000—614,000 or 33 % Jews, 1,200,000 or 64 % Arabs and 36,000 Greeks, English and others. We took the first Israel census in November 1948, not reckoning all the Arabs since Galilee was still embattled: the population then was 782,000—713,000 or 90 % Jews, and the rest Arabs. At the end of 1948, hostilities over, it was estimated at 867,000—760,000 or 87 % Jews and 107,000 or 12 % Arabs." (p. 532).

This means of course the disappearance of 1,093,000 Arabs, only about one fifth of whom are accounted for by the Arab population of that part of Mandatory Palestine not incorporated into Israel. Elsewhere in a comment on the necessity for new measures of thought in Zionism the writer remarks: "You cannot cover the nakedness of grown men with swaddling clothes." (p. 505). Nor yet, it may be said, the nakedness of a displaced multitude.

It may of course be said that the natural self-interest of Israel does not allow the indulgence of scruples of conscience towards the Arabs,—given also the emotional overtones of a tangled story. But the question remains whether such self-interest does not indeed require here the recognition of moral issues in relationships. There is all too little sense here of the role of Arab attitudes in the frustrations of Israel. Mr Ben Gurion, of course, is well aware of Arab hostility. He notes that the area occupied by the Arab neighbours of Israel is 1,356,000 square miles and the number of their inhabitants nearly 20 million—an area, that is, "170 times as large as Israel's and a population 13 times as large by the statistics at the outset of 1952." (p. 464). "Never once in the past was Israel girdled at every point by a tight ring of that kind... This is the sweep of the problem of security and of politics which the Arab world presents to the young State of Israel." (p. 465-466).

But is it only "a problem of security and politics"—"a problem of security to daunt the lion-hearted" as he adds on p. 505? Is it not also a problem of the spirit to challenge the true-hearted? Or conversely is the security a matter only of defense, or also of peace?

Describing in another place, the code of Zion, the first Prime Minister declares: "We have set up a dynamic State, bent upon creation and reform, building and expansion. The revolution which is the State is only an overture to the two-fold revolution, in man and nature, which will come when our people is at last gathered together and re-settled in Zion, at peace." (p. 419).

The external conditions of that peace are as strenuous a task as the frowning Negev to which Mr. Ben Gurion has now turned. Its demands are not upon Israel alone. Any Arab who happens to read this book and who can enter into its heart as a personal document of Israeli dynamism, will find much to suggest and to chasten. Tenacity, ruggedness, vision, sacrifice, realism that could idealise and idealism that could 'realise', self-criticism, candour and indefatigable purpose—these are stamped upon the story and there is literature at times in their portrayal. "We all love immigration, but only few among us love the immigrants" remarks the writer. Similar candour in leadership must arise if the Arabs are to take the measure of their tragedy in Israel. If Israel seems bent on ignoring its Palestinian Arab corollaries, the Arab world cannot afford to ignore the significance of Israel's making. That figure in the Negev, the figure within these speeches and the history they passionately describe, is worthy of a place in mind when the Arab ruminates on the shape of the future.

A. K. C.

An Introduction to the Study of Contemporary Iraq. By Zakī Ṣāliḥ, Al Rābiṭa Press, Baghdad, 1953, pp. 235.

This is a useful book for students and researchers who wish to make a thorough study of modern Iraq, written by the Professor of Modern History of the Higher Teachers' College, Baghdad. "A Guide to the Study of Modern Iraq" might have been a more fitting title, and Part I on "The Making of the State" might well have been made to follow the other two Parts II and III on "The Means of Research" and "The Physical Environment" since these help to familiarise the student with the material at his disposal and with the nature of the country.

As a collection of lectures delivered to college students, the book contains some repetition. Some of the points of explanation might have been better put in footnotes. Part III on "The Physical Environment" might have given more information on social and cultural conditions and have occupied less space with the enumeration of small villages and towns. The work lacks a general bibliography and index. The author, however, refers to several authorities in the text and footnotes and seems to have read most of the relevant writings in English. He quotes Dr Majīd Khaddūrī, for example, but criticises him on certain points of statistical detail. The account of the political history is succinct and goes down to Midfaʿī's last Cabinet before Dr Jamālī took office.

Dr Ṣāliḥ offers some constructive suggestions for more improved and advanced study of modern Iraq, including the establishment of a Public Record Office, a library of contemporary Iraqiana and better

travel facilities for research students. Iraq, like all the Arab countries save Egypt, still lacks an Office of Archives. It would be greatly benefited if this need could be met. The author advocates enlargement and multiplication of Iraqi public libraries. Although second only to Egypt in the number of library books, Iraq compares ill with the library figures for American states quoted here from Gorgis ʿAwād's admirable book in Arabic on American libraries. The author is familiar with America because of his education but he is aware too of Europe and suggests that scholars studying the Iraqi Revolution of 1920 might follow the lines adopted by historians of the French Revolution. He also cites some figures of book circulation in Tel Aviv, where there are forty lending libraries to satisfy the desire for reading, and five general libraries the largest of which contains a quarter of a million volumes.

Written on a comparative basis, with a touch of originality, Dr Ṣāliḥ's work is stimulating, but some of its points might have been more carefully sifted. It strikes the present reviewer that the book as a whole is a framework for what the author wanted to say on archives, libraries and other cultural reform. The secondary material is therefore not so well presented. But the book achieves its main purpose and will be valuable to research students of modern Iraq. This reviewer would like to associate himself with the writer's conviction that a good and favourable climate is only a secondary factor in the rise of a great civilization. Of prior importance is the health, food and living standards of the people.

Baghdad and Chicago SAFA KHULUSI

The Islamic State and Other Political Essays. By Ajit Kumar Sen, Thacker Spink, Calcutta, 1950, pp. 141.

The author of this volume of essays was formerly of the Department of Political Science in Dacca University and is now Lecturer in the University of Calcutta. They have all been published previously in *Dacca University Studies* or other journals in India and Pakistan. They are reprinted for a wider circle and in view of the importance of constitutional issues in Indian Islam. The recent electoral swing away from the Muslim League in East Pakistan makes discussion of political problems in Bengal still more apposite.

The first of the essays bearing on strictly Muslim matters gives its title to the collection: *The Concept of the Islamic State.* The author insists that an Islamic State is not a Muslim State, nor a territory in which Muslims live, nor an Islamic society with an Islamic economic system, nor a nation ruled in an Islamic spirit. He holds that an Islamic State means an indissoluble union of spiritual and temporal power, for which a Caliph is a *sine qua non.* There can only be one Islamic State in the world: it is an obedience not a territory: it is by its nature totalitarian and egalitarian, but not libertarian. Since God is its law-maker it is "without electorate, representative legislature or political parties."

There is much to be said for the consistency of this account, but

it is difficult to understand how the conclusion to the paper squares with it. For the reader there learns that "the attempt to depend upon God as the sole law-maker is bound to prove a failure." Accordingly, "the Islamic State grounded in revelation is seeking a new orientation ... more men like Khuda Buksh, Ameer Ali and Iqbal are wanted for this task" (p. 30). It is not clear how the new dynamism he calls, for under such leaders, is related to the concept he has so strongly defined in rigid, revelatory and immutable terms, with conditions within which no contemporary dynamism could conceivably operate.

Study of what he calls the totalitarianism of Islam, its idea of a bond other than the territorial and its belief that "force is the midwife of society," leads to a discussion of *Communism and Islam,* in the second essay. It is a little repetitive and disjointed but its main thesis is that "Islam will usher in Communism, sooner or later" (p. 34). The reasons, somewhat superficially mooted, are that Islam resembles Communism in being an absolute faith, in making politics an instrument and refusing non-resistance, and in being non-territorial. Moreover there was the substance of Communism in early Islam.

It becomes evident when the author turns to a *Memo on Minorities* that he has defined the essential Islamic State in rigorous, if not impossible terms, in order to argue against the declaration of such a State on the part of Pakistan. It is obvious that minorities can only properly exist in a State which is democratic in terms of liberty as well as equality, and in which power is derived from the people, and not, as Al-Māwardī insisted, from revelation.

For the rest we have occasional papers on immediate points of East Bengal politics and on the issue of regionalism in the organisation of Pakistan. What he calls the "we-feeling" of Pathans, Sindhis, Punjabis and Bengalis presents a perpetual problem of tension within unity, which recent events in Pakistan have plainly underlined. It may be fair to observe that the practical and abstract issues in the definition of an Islamic State in Pakistan deserve and demand more than the somewhat haphazard and inconclusive treatment given to them here.

A. K. C.

SHORTER NOTICES

Al-Nashrat al-Thaqāfiyyah. Fuad al-Awwal University Press, Cairo, 1953, pp. 133.

The second number of a new publication in Arabic devoted to a presentation of the contemporary cultural and educational revival in Egypt. Particular attention is given to the growing facilities for the education of girls, and there are also administrative details of the Egyptian Universities, their research facilities and libraries. A useful compendium on Egyptian education.

Introducing Africa. By Carveth Wells. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, Revised Edition, 1954, pp. 235 and Index, $ 5.00.

"Essential factual information" says the author "has been collected about every country in Africa and presented in as painless a manner as possible." It is not clear how far the painlessness concerns the collecting and how far the presenting. The book seeks to describe the various cultures and areas of Africa, from Algiers to the Cape. Even Egypt, Madagascar and the Canary Isles are included. Treatment is, therefore, necessarily scant and popular, and in a few places even a little crude. The reader should not expect any but the barest reference to modern political or social issues relating to the Continent. *Introducing Africa* offers him a tourist's description of the main physical features, climate, a little history, some statistics and miscellaneous remarks. Since the book is a revised edition, it might have been expected to keep more abreast of current events. Compare this idyllic statement: "Beside this road (between Palestine and Egypt) is a first class railroad whose crack train, the 'Milk and Honey Express' runs daily between Cairo and Jerusalem." (p. 59). The author might add to the Arabic glossary in his appendix: Ya-rait! Would it were so!

Ijmāᶜ and the Gate of Ijtihād. By Kemal Faruki, Gateway Publications. Karachi, 1954, pp. 42.

This brief but incisive work is written by the author of *Islamic Constitution,* reviewed in January, 1953, p. 65-66. A series of questions addressed to certain leading *fuqahāᵓ* are first printed, with their answers the purpose being to elicit the view that past *Ijmāᶜ* on the part of the Muslim community under the guidance of competent Ijtihād has the validity of unchanging law. But this, it is then argued, means that something done by man results in a product that is on the level, for legal purposes, of the Qurᵓān, which is the work of God. This is to be involved in a form of *shirk* or association with God. It is insufficient to plead that such consensus-unto-law, on the part of the community transpires by Divine guidance. The result is on a par with what is uniquely God's, namely revelation. This cannot be. Thus *Ijmāᶜ* in the past is not irrevocable and the door of *Ijtihād,* as the means to fresh consensus, should be open. To deny present *Ijtihād* and finalise early *Ijmāᶜ* is theological heresy. The writer also pleads that the qualifications of the *mujtahid* shall be moral and religious, not merely legal and scholastic.

Al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ fī Muʾallafāt al-Amirīkiyyīn. Cairo, 1933, pp. 203.

This Arabic work on *The Middle East in the Writings of Americans* includes one Britisher (Professor Roger Soltau). It is one of the books to appear in Cairo, under the aegis of Franklin Publications, Inc. of New York. The editor is Dr. Majīd Khaddūrī. Five articles are reproduced on: The Role of the Middle East in Western Civilization (George Sarton): Islamic Art and Archaeology (Ettinghausen): Lessons from the Middle East (Soltau): Tennessee Projects in the Middle East (Bochenski and Chambers): and International Political Affairs in the Middle East (Quincy Wright). The whole is attractively produce, well-bound and has useful illustrations of the section on Islamic Art, as well as an intriguing cover design. Such standards of publishing should be very stimulating in Cairo.

Al Madhāhib al-Iqtiṣādiyyat-al-Kubrā. By George Soule, Maktabat al-Nahdat-al-Misriyyah, Cairo, 1953, pp. 229.

Another of the Franklin Publications Series. The original work, *Ideas of the Great Economists,* by George Soule, is done into Arabic by Rāshid al Barāwȳ, with cover design by ʿAbdal-Fattāh Muḥammad Haykal. It discusses Adam Smith, Malthus and Ricardo, before expounding the economic ideas of Marx, and later of Keynes and Veblen, in an illuminating and workmanlike manner.

Transactions of the Glasgow University Oriental Society. Vol. xiv, (1950-1952), edited by C. J. Mullo Weir, Glasgow, 1953, pp. 67.

Dr P. J. E. Cachia writes here on *The Conflict of East and West in Contemporary Egyptian Literary Taste,* with particular reference to Ṭaha Ḥusain. His comments relate mainly to literary criticism and are for the most part adverse. Egyptian literature is seen as over traditional in vocabulary, over emotional in its imagery and careless of the unities of great literature. The Rev. W. Idris Jones describes a pre-Islamic site, with a Sabean or Himyarite inscription, in the vicinity of Muqairis, east of Aden.

Daily Journalism in the Arab States. By Tom J. McFadden, Ohio State University Press, No. 15 Journalism Series, 1953, pp. 101 and Index.

An account of daily journalism in the Arab States, this publication fills a useful role. It would be well if the author could make an equally careful and illuminating survey of periodical Arabic writing—a field of perhaps much greater permanent significance than the daily press. This study arises out of a five month sojourn with help from the files of UNESCO and consultations with sundry journalists. The author does not include statistics—though he does include comparative percentages of home and foreign news, editorial comment and advertising matter (a comparison highly unfavourable to the American press in regard to the last). His aim is to interpret rather than to enumerate. After a historical introduction, he takes up the issues of business, politics and reform, in journalism. He concludes that the Arab press appears to be evolving toward greater freedom and responsibility, and that the only major threat to continued progress appears to be that of too much government control.

NOTES OF THE QUARTER

Egypt and England. "Fast breaking, world shaking events, which will be the news of tomorrow"—as some New York announcer-advertisers are liable to say—were certainly the order of the day in the strange, almost Gilbertian, sequence of events in March last in Cairo. But the observer, especially from a distance, may well confess himself at a loss about "the news of tomorrow." General Naguib was successively deprived of all his offices and confined to his residence, then re-instated to a nominal Presidency, and later to the office of Premier once more. It was announced that the military régime would definitely lay down its powers in favour of a Constituent Assembly to pave the way for a return to parliamentary government following summer elections. A further announcement declared that the military régime would not step down but would maintain its authority at least for the three years envisaged in July, 1952, and that constitutional forms of government could not yet be restored without risking the whole achievement of the period since that date.

It would appear that the two central figures within the military régime, President Naguib and Lieut Col. ʿAbd-al-Naṣṣār, have come to be identified in the popular mind with these opposing interpretations of the duty of leadership. That the issue is deep and radical within the inner circle is evident but it would seem impossible precisely to determine the immediate personal contribution of its members or the extent to which the Army and the population is divided with them. Of much greater ultimate importance is the searching quality of the national dilemma of which these rivalries, or differences, are the surface manifestation.

It is indeed a cruel dilemma which should provoke the active sympathy of all responsible opinion, for out of its resolution so much, for good or ill, must emerge. The forms of political democracy, launched under the Constitution of 1922, have proved to be in the main the instruments of class privilege and the selfishness of wealth. Those forms have lacked the prerequisites of economic democracy, without which its political counterpart is precarious and all too easily plays into the hands of corrupt self-seekers for whom office is not service but influence and where whom you know, rather than what you are, is liable to become the decisive factor. Such self-seekers do not normally legislate themselves out of office, nor, given their established control of the means of election, can they usually be voted out of their abuse of public trust. In such circumstances come frustration and a despair about the cleansing of society under democratic forms. These emotions in turn produce the revolution by force—the Army as the organ of such force necessarily enters politics to redress the evils on which politicians thrive at the expense of the liberties to which they pay lip-service, in defiance of the equalities democracy is supposed to provide.

But the violence done to forms of government by such necessary force cannot be perpetuated unless the door is to be open to intermittent coups justifying themselves by themselves and becoming their own law. That way lies chaos and the invitation to the unscrupulous.

The central problem is thus the justification of power. It cannot permanently remain based on the pragmatic value of force. But when can it be safely returned to constitutional forms? What means are there of making those forms safe against themselves and the corruption to which they give opportunity? Which should be preferred—government in formal rectitude (of democratic election) and actual incompetence or worse, and power in form unlawful and in fact beneficent?

Hard as it is to find the answer at any point, there is the further fact that the answer cannot be given once for all. It must always be under review and revision, until stability is gained and confidence in the honesty of force or the honesty of constitutionalism established in the popular mind. Such confidence in either sort is slow to arise, the more so when vocal elements of the population, much given to demonstration, are strongly interested in the issue, and where some causes line up behind the apostles of competence and cleansing through force and others, equally pressing, line up behind the advocates of the parliamentary possibility of incompetence and corruption.

It may be some comfort and strength to a nation caught as Egypt is in this cruel conflict of the forms of power to know that the problem is not new in history. Of all the nations that have suffered it not the least significant for Egypt's present discontents is the English nation, the 17th century forbears of the people who are now the first and most natural target of Egyptian aspiration. There is some melancholy and a certain hopefulness in pondering the significance for Muḥammad Naguib of Oliver Cromwell. The parallel of situations is complete, except that Cromwell headed a victorious Army that cast out the forms of autocracy in the name of liberty, whereas Naguib suspends the forms of democracy in the name of equality. Cromwell, it is true, found it necessary not only to execute a King who could not be bound by constitutional form but also to oust a Parliament which could not be brought into line with his ideals. The Egyptian Army has expelled a constitutional monarchy and its attendant party corruption in the pursuit of economic and social ideals which that order had delayed or denied. But the problem of validating the rule of force by the rule of law was essentially the same. Fitting the lawyer's wig on the soldier's bayonet—was the task. Cromwell sought political forms to fulfill his purposes. He experimented with a Parliament by 'vetted' election, with two successive constitutions and an interlude of uninhibited force between them. Finally the task proved too great for him. Death supervened, accelerated no doubt by his herculean labours —at least his son, declining to inherit these tasks of setting a nation to rights, died a country gentleman at a ripe old age. But beyond his death, he succeeded, for the history of his nation brought forth a system that was at once both parliamentary and free, both effective and constitutional.

That Egyptian future is yet to unfold. How and when there will emerge in the valley of the Nile a state that can afford to be democratic and need not fear to be parliamentary no one can now foresee. An egalitarian society in a constitutional form is the goal—a goal yet to be reached. Whatever may eventuate as between particular men, or as

between alternative types of immediate régimes, this is the basic theme of the story. If recent events have done nothing more they have unmistakeably disclosed the nature of Egypt's inward task in this generation. Whatever the news of tomorrow, this is what it will fundamentally be about. Westminster today may seem from the Nile a persistent enemy, but Westminster in the sixteen-fifties would have understood.

Turkey and Elections. It may be that there are lessons also in the other corner from Egypt of the Eastern Mediterranean. Orderly elections at the constitutionally appointed periods of four years serve to emphasise the steady functioning of Turkish parliamentary life. Yet it is the immediate legatee of a period of totalitarian rule, which in a way almost unique in recent history went into reverse when its main purposes were achieved. The agents of first the tolerance and then the political equality of an opposition were themselves the heirs of the architect of dictatorial change whose name has become a universal centre of veneration. The justification of his power may be said to be historically complete precisely because the legacy of change has come to be safe under constitutional forms. Part of the reason for that safety may well lie in the existence of two major parties well-matched as clear electoral alternatives,—a situation which unhappily does not exist in Egypt or Syria.

The Grand National Assembly which dissolved itself under the Constitution in March last had good reason to be satisfied with economic progress in Turkey during its four-year tenure. Foreign trade has increased almost 90 % in physical volume since 1950. The Turkish Federation of Women aims to secure the election of at least 50 women members in the new Assembly. The new Assembly will have 54 more members than the one recently dissolved, making a total of 541 seats. The increase reflects the growth in the total population of the country. Each member represents 40,000 constituents.

Some four months prior to the Turkish elections, the Nation Party, representing more conservative religious attitudes, was dissolved. Nine of its leaders received nominal one-day sentences after a trial lasting four months. This dissolution puts this group out of the election race. It has, however, in some senses a political heir in the new Republican National Party, whose founders, while protesting their devotion to Westernization, advocate the establishment of a body empowered to pass upon the validity of the laws adopted by the Grand National Assembly. While sustaining the laic character of the State this party wishes to eliminate any form of animosity towards religion. Though it invokes the principle of liberty, it is suspected in some circles as desiring what Ataturk's heirs would call "Islamic reaction." The head of the former Nation Party, however, has refused association with the new Republican Nationals, who seek among other things a Second Chamber and maintenance of equal rights for women.

Turkey Today. Public Instruction and Religious Affairs. Translation of an editorial by M. Nermi in the daily newspaper *Yeni*

Istanbul for Oct. 13, 1953; for which we are indebted to Mr. Paul H. Nilson, of the American Bible Society, Istanbul.

"As we know, the Ministry of Public Instruction has asked that the schools and places of instruction which are attached to the department of Religious Affairs be given to it or at least be put under its control. It goes without saying that this is a very proper and timely step since we have already accepted unity in education as a national principle (or problem), and for this reason must think of our cultural policies as a whole. We can no longer return to the duality in education which existed in the time of the Empire. However, our present situation is not wholly unified, because this educational principle has not been completely grasped and the Department of Religious Affairs directly controls a set of schools and places of training. After all our wanderings we find that we are back where we started from with a duality similar to the duality of the Mosque-run schools and secular schools of the past. It is obvious that this is contrary to the principle of unity in education and culture.

We do not wish to enumerate the confusions which have arisen in our country due to this double system of education but we must not minimize the things we have seen and heard recently. Where will we end up if the Ministry of Public Instruction and the Department of Religious Affairs start a tug-of-war? How will we be able to ensure unity in education in our homeland? We must remember that we are responsible to the generations we wish to raise and to Turkey's past history. Therefore this latest proposal of the Ministry of Education is of importance to the nation. We believe that it will be well received and supported by those fellow country-men who are vitally interested in democratic ideals.

The causes of this duality in education are fairly numerous but one of them, the old or Arabic script, is being used as a kind of shield for the others. You can tell this to the marines, but according to a group of ignoramuses who pass as wisemen this script is to be counted more or less as the foundation of religion. For, according to them, the Holy Book of Muslims is written in this script and reading or writing it in any other script is a sin against conscience (?). This point of view and contention is absolutely contrary to traditions and dependable sources of Islam. It is possible that some people of the organization of the Department of Religious Affairs may have become embedded in these erroneous views and for this reason they support the duality in the educational system. With this possibility in mind the latest proposal of the Ministry of Public Instruction will be better understood.

This attempt of those who would pass as religious experts to put the Arabic script to the fore as a religious principle is a subject worthy of being carefully weighed. First of all it is necessary that the subject be made clear in such a way that all our doubts (prejudices?) are dispersed. According to the most dependable religious sources the Qurʾān did not come down in written form but verbally. Again according to religious sources, the Prophet transmitted the Divine revelations he received orally and had his followers memorize them

since he was unable to read or write. The Qurʾān was given its written form much later by bringing together the memorizers (ḥāfiẓ). For this reason the Qurʾān is often spoken of as the Divine Word or the Eternal Word. Apparently the important thing is the Word and not the script.

The fact that the Qurʾān did not descend in written form and that for a long time it remained in the form of memorized Revelation from God shows that there is no value whatsoever connected with the Arabic script. We give the name *Sunnah* to the doing of the things the Prophet did. Since the Prophet never in his whole life used the Arabic script it is obvious that from a religious point of view the use of this script cannot even be considered *Sunnah*. So it appears that this Arabic script which we are asked to swallow as a doctrine, a foundation of religion, is being used as nothing more that a propaganda vehicle and has no religious significance whatsoever. Being aware of these facts we can not sacrifice our educational unity to such groundless views and claims."

East Bengal Elections. The crushing defeat of the Muslim League in the recent elections of a provincial Government came as an almost complete surprise. Ten million voters in what is numerically Pakistan's largest province turned out the League and voted in the United Front opposition. There had been some hints that the situation was serious in that the election was postponed in order to allow of longer compaigning from which the League, with its superior resources, might be expected to benefit. Miss Fāṭimah Jinnah, sister of the revered founder of Pakistan, was persuaded to fly to Bengal to lend her prestige to the Muslim League leaders who also campaigned energetically. The Prime Minister Muḥammad ᶜAlī stumped East Bengal and did not evade the basic election problems of poverty uppermost in the minds of the voters. United Front leaders, however, easily commanded the greater appeal. Every Minister of the former Cabinet was defeated and the Muslim League did not even muster enough seats to constitute a political party in the Assembly.

There has inevitably been speculation as to what the result may mean for the over-all unity of Pakistan. It is certain that the East Bengalis will both demand and receive much greater weight in national affairs. It would be premature to suppose, however, that the issue indicates an anti-Pakistan trend in the East, although during the election the Muslim League speakers accused the United Front of being financed by India. An editorial in the *Civil and Military Gazette* (Lahore) remarked, nevertheless, that Bengalis are "Bengalis first, Muslims second and Pakistans last," while pre-election editorials in the same paper spoke of East Bengal as "an unwilling partner." Other sources like the *Pakistan Times* attribute the outcome rather to economic factors. The United Front promised the nationalisation of jute and undertook immediate lowering of the cost of cloth and rice, while the Muslim League called for sustained sacrifices. There is also the fear of Western domination and the issue of state language. Muḥammad ᶜAlī, himself a Bengali, agreed before the election that

Bengali should be one of the two languages of Pakistan and declared that Bengalis would be "left behind economically as well as educationally" if they were obliged to learn Urdu. The size of the Bengali population, he said, justified Bengali as a twin language of the whole State. [It is worthy of note that Pandit Nehru in India has taken a similarly conciliatory attitude in India on the question of communal languages and has publicly supported the allowance of Urdu against over zealous partisans of Hindi.]

The outstanding leaders of the United Front are Ḥasan Suhrawardy, head of the Jinnah Awamī League, Fazlul-Ḥaq, and Bhashānī, of the East Bengal Awamī Muslim League. Their electoral victory complicates the position of the Bengali Muslim League members in the Constituent Assembly, who feel that they no longer represent the people of their province. Leadership in Lahore is determined that they shall remain until the Constitution is finally written and adopted, as a prelude to nation-wide general elections in 1955.

Opposition to the Muslim League in West Pakistan has been greatly stimulated by events in the East. The Azad Pakistan Party, led by Iftikāruddīn, a millionaire landlord with leftist sympathies, is becoming more vocal and vigorous. On the issue of American military aid and the Turkish pact, there would seem to be a deep cleavage between the East and the West of Pakistan. The United Front leaders, voted in overwhelmingly in the East, are against the aid, whereas popular opinion in the West seems to favor it. As for the future, Muḥammad ᶜAlī's view is that there are no parties as such in the Constituent Assembly and that, therefore, there can be no question of its dissolution because of the East Bengal results. It has a mandate to produce a Constitution. Meanwhile the United Front takes over the Provincial Government of East Bengal, and the Muslim League continues in power in the West, but with perhaps more, now, of the air of a caretaker, until elections under the Constitution begin to tell the shape of an unpredictable future.

The Student in Politics. Recent events in Cairo and Beirut have underlined anew the issue of the intellectual, or would-be intellectual, in politics. Plato in his *Republic* seems to have preferred a community under the wise government of the philosophers. Many Arab students seem to agree. The educated person has often the leisure, and sometimes the aptitude and opportunity, to appreciate the needs of his nation. It is thus that student bodies are clamant in their support of a return to the forms of democratic procedure, though, in the past in the Arab world, these have hardly been conducive to bringing the influence of the world of scholarship into effective relation to the world of the pashas. But military rule, if more beneficent, is hardly less frustrating to the politically minded on the student campus.

The recent strikes at Cairo University and Al-Azhar owed something of their spirit, if not their genesis, to a speech of Lt Col. ᶜAbd al-Nāṣir, before a meeting of the transport workers' union, in which he reprobated "government by the students." He asserted that student demonstration had always played into the hands of political parties.

As the new Egyptian postage stamps indicate, the worker and the peasant must come into their own in the total citizenry. It might be well if some among the student population concerned themselves with the social pre-requisites of a sound political order, by participation in adult education, rather than with the forms of that order, by demonstration.

But if the Deputy Premier's speech to the workers was the symbol of a deep issue, so also was the alleged telephone call of President Naguib to Muṣṭafā Nahhās congratulating him on the announced return, later rescinded, of the old political parties. The destiny of the Revolution is certainly an issue that both jeopardises and necessitates a sober as well as an alert quality of higher education. Here is another of the paradoxes of the present discontents.

The National Advisory Assembly in Cairo. The decision to set up this body, announced in Cairo at the end of March, is an obvious attempt at compromise between the irreconciliable policy to restore the old parliamentary system and that to persist with the Revolution at least until 1956. Elections for a Constituent Assembly will not now be held and political parties will not be revived. They will, however, be represented in the Advisory Assembly, together with other organisations. Some 470 political detainees have been released, including the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, Ḥasan al-Ḥuḍaibī. It is not clear, as yet, how the Assembly is to be gathered nor what will be the principles of inclusion and exclusion. The support of Egyptian labor unions seems to have had some significant part in the present success of the policy which prefers an Advisory Assembly to a constitutional parliament. While some internees have been released, new detentions have occurred in the wake of recent events, among them that of Aḥmad Ḥusain, leader of the dissolved Socialist Party. The ten year ban imposed on ex-ministers from the Wafd, the Liberal and the Saadist Parties, in which some fifty persons are involved, will clearly affect the composition of the Assembly.

From Cairo to Damascus. Almost identical issues beset the Syrian scene as those so manifest in Egypt, although the sequel to the ousting of former President Adīb Shishakly was not so fluctuating as the Cairo scene. Those militarily responsible for his ejection seem content to return authority, at least in form, to the old order. The Syrian Chamber of Deputies as constituted in Syria under Ḥusnī al-Zaʿīm before the first coup in 1949 has been re-convened. It will amend existing legislation in the direction of constitutionalism and will sustain the coalition government now installed in the execution of its duties, and then will be dissolved prior to new parliamentary elections, promised for June or July.

As in Cairo, so in Syria, the changes of the recent past have brought the release of many political prisoners and the return of some emigrés. Among them is Shukri al-Quwaiṭlī, former President, and Muṣṭafā al-Sibāʿī, the author of the article translated on pp. 215 of this issue. The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria has announced that it will not

engage directly in political activity for the present but will support candidates pledged to work for social reform. The Syrian and the Lebanese associations of the *Ikhwān* met in Damascus to discuss their activities in the light of the dissolution in Egypt.

The issue of constitutionality in Syria has not produced such spectacular personal differences between leaders as in Cairo. Differences on the shape of the future would seem to be rather geographical than personal,—between Damascus and the north. Five of the twelve members of the new Damascus Cabinet, succeeding Maʿrūf al-Dawālibī's legal cabinet of 1951, were late internees of Shishakly.

Marriage in Egypt. A draft bill has been prepared in Egypt restricting the number of wives and regulating divorce. Persons desiring to take a second wife will have to obtain the permission to do so from a judge, who will investigate their financial and social circumstances before giving ruling. In cases of intended divorce efforts at reconciliation are to be a prior requisite. Women divorced without sufficient justification are to be entitled to compensation. There are approximately 80,000 divorces in Egypt annually, and it is estimated that 75 % occur on inadequate grounds.

Commenting on the draft bill *The Egyptian Gazette* of Cairo (Jan. 19th) uses the familiar suggestion that the Qurʾān is virtually in favor of monogamy. The draft law, therefore, reflects the mind of the Prophet perfectly when it discourages, and enquires into, the desire after additional wives. "The Prophet by Divine revelation said that a man might take four wives if he were capable of treating each with perfect justice and impartiality—in other words if he could love and respect four women at once. This, said the Prophet, constituted an ideal which was practically impossible of attainment: and he left men to draw their own conclusions." It has, however, to be confessed that historically they did not always draw the same conclusions. The question must be raised as to whether even the contemplation of the possibility of plurality in marriage is not an offence against the ideal, rather than itself an ideal, albeit impossible.

But it is the fact of the draft law rather than the exegesis that justifies it which matters.

The Pilgrimage, 1373, A.H. While the Meccan authorities have announced that the pilgrim dues will be the same as last year, there has been a renewal of protests in Karachi against the attitude of the Pakistan Government to the pilgrimage in 1953, in an attempt to secure better facilities this year. These protests assert that while British India up to 1941 laid no restrictions on pilgrims, Pakistan has disserved them by currency and quota restrictions and disregard of matters affecting the comfort and efficiency of transport. There are complaints about inadequate egress and ingress arrangements at Karachi and at Jiddah.

Meanwhile the Pakistan Foreign Office has permitted Pak Hajj Transport Company to book 300 passengers for the land journey from Rawalpindi to Mecca, by way of Quetta, Zahidan, Isfahan and

Basrah. The outer journey will be made in June, and the bus caravan will return in October, via Karbala, Baghdad, Teheran, Meshd and Quetta.

The Legacy of Iqbāl. The great Indian Muslim poet continues to be variously claimed by his legatees in Pakistan. A recent article in *Al-Islam* (Lahore) scorns the idea that Iqbāl advocated Western thought or that he reprehended mullahs. It concludes: "Today Muslim society in Pakistan is dominated in every sphere by 'educated' but incapable people," quoting Iqbāl to disqualify such 'phoney' liberal leadership. But the passage quoted, as translated by the author, is an excellent example of how Iqbāl's words lend themselves to interpretation at the will of the reader: "I am laden with sorrow owing to the debasement of this caravan; I see not the light of living in its leader: he is addicted to the pleasures of the body, intoxicated by power and lacking in vision: his inner self is devoid of the faith that springs from the negation of deities other than Allah."

Indonesia. Voters lists' are being drawn up in the first Indonesian exercise in democracy which is to take place in January 1955. Elections will be made to a Constituent Assembly and a national Parliament. The early stages of the campaign indicate that the elections will be vigorously fought. Portraits of individuals are to be disallowed as party emblems. The Republic of Indonesia is reportedly planning to withdraw, in a friendly but decisive manner, from the Indonesia-Netherlands Union. Some fifteen hundred Indonesian students in the Netherlands will be withdrawn to other countries as part of the policy of educational independence.

During the 1952-53 school year close on twelve thousand students ware enrolled in the two universities, namely Gadjah Mada and the University of Indonesia. The latter has recently celebrated its fourth anniversary, since independence. Unlike Gadjah Mada University which was founded by Indonesian initiative, the University is the legatee of Dutch days. Many classes have now abandoned Dutch for Indonesian as the language of instruction and national teachers now outnumber slightly those from outside. Local customary law is receiving more prominence in legal studies. At the other end of the educational story, East Java, whose population grows by half a million yearly, expects to cover more than one million in literacy courses in 1954, compared with 400,000 in 1953. Five million textbooks in literacy have been distributed and the program is compulsory for those between 13 and 18. The utmost encouragement is being given to people up to the age of 35 to take the course. While in 1945 only 7 % of the nation was literate, the proportion is now put at 47 %.

Disturbances by armed supporters of Dar ul-Islam in Western Java in their campaign for a pure Muslim state to replace the existing Republic, continue to harass security forces.

Floods in Iraq. Heavy spring rains in Iraq caused serious flood damage along the Tigris valley from Mosul to Basrah. The damage

to crops and to the Basrah date plantation is estimated at about one million dollars. Baghdad itself was gravely threatened for a period in April, as were the cities of Kut and Aziziyyah south of the capital. An air lift was organised on a large scale to bring in sand bags to fight the waters and tents and supplies for those rendered homeless. The Arab states sent medical missions to Iraq to help in tending the injured and immunizing the population in the face of threatened epidemics. More than a quarter of a million people were evacuated from the low-lying areas around Baghdad.

The ʿUlamāʾ and the Constitution. Under the Objectives Resolution of 1950 a Board of outstanding ʿUlamāʾ of Pakistan was set up, under the title of the Taʿlīmāt-e-Islāmī Board, to advise the Assembly on Islamic Laws and the consonance of its proposals with Islamic principles. *The Civil and Military Gazette* (March 30, 1954) reports the decision of the Government to abolish this Board.

Kashmir. The Indian Praja Socialist Party recently sent a fact-finding mission to Kashmir. Its report, which has received much attention in the Pakistan press, affirms that among the people of the Kashmir valley itself there are strong pro-Pakistan feelings. It adds that there are numbers of Communists in influential positions although the Communist doctrine has no wide popular support. The *Pakistan Times* applies to India over Kashmir the logic India is using in relation to the French enclaves in India. India demands that French oppression of the parties eager to rejoin India should cease and that the press should be free to speak its mind. The paper comments: "What is sauce for the Pondicherry goose is not sauce for the Kashmir gander!"

The Islamic Quarterly. Having reported last quarter the launching of a new journal in Islamics, *Studia Islamica* of Leiden, news is now to hand of a new venture on the part of the Islamic Cultural Centre, at Regent's Park, London. It announces *The Islamic Quarterly,* the first issue of which appeared in April last. It is an academic journal under Muslim direction and exclusively concerned with Islam and Islamic Culture. There will be articles by Muslim and non-Muslim scholars and book reviews. The language will be English. Interested readers may address the new Quarterly at Regent's Lodge, 146 Park Road, London, N.W. 8, England. *Ahlan wa sahlan.*

Arabica. Yet another new journal, founded and published by Professor E. Levi Provençal, and issued in Leiden, is *Arabica,* which began to appear in January, 1954. It will appear three times a year in French and will treat of the language, history, literature and civilization of the Arabs. The Assistant Director is Professor R. Blachère of the Sorbonne. Dr Levi Provençal is one of the collaborating Editors of the new *Encyclopedia of Islam.*

Reason and Freedom: Comment in The Light. The Article on *Forces now Moulding Islam* by Prof. W. Montgomery Watt, published in our issue of July, 1953, was reprinted in *Al-Islam,* fortnightly paper of the Holy Qur'ān Society, Lahore, on November 1 and December 1, 1953. *The Muslim Sunrise,* of Chicago, also reprinted without acknowledgement part of Professor Shafaq's paper on *Al-Ghazālī,* of January last, in its issue of 1954, first Quarter (Vol. xxvi, No. 1.) The article on *Pakistan and the Islamic State,* by A. K. Nazmul Karīm which appeared in October, 1953, was reprinted in *The Light,* the journal of the Lahore Aḥmadiyyah, on December 8, 1953. Commenting on the author's observation that "Every word of the Qur'ān must be accepted by every Muslim as unalterable" the Editor of *The Light* writes as follows: "The question needs a reply. Stated clearly it is whether it is permissible for a man within the fold of Islam to question the validity of a certain, clearly stated principle of the Qur'ān or at least to examine its validity in the flashlight of free reasoning, by way of experiment and intellectual confirmation. In other words, when one has accepted, in the main, the Qur'ān as the word of God, is it still open to him to test the intellectual validity of the details? Or must he take everything on faith, that is, with a closed mind? As a matter of principle and logic none need accept the Qur'ān as the Book of God unless he is satisfied that it is wholly so in the main as well as in detail. The case of a born Muslim of course presents a difficulty. He receives Islam as a matter of tradition and not of verified truth. Such a person should put the Quranic principles to a fresh intellectual test to be able to make them truths for himself. Acceptance of Islam should be a voluntary act, speaking both physically and intellectually. It must be accompanied by an intellectual assent. The principle: 'There is no compulsion in religion' makes this quite clear. The process of intellectual re-examination may be short or long according to the force of determination and clarity of thinking, which must vary from man to man." The Editor adds: "The principle of *ijtihād* or research embodies not only the application of Islamic principles to new circumstances but also this kind of intellectual re-examination of those principles in the light of new experiences in a new age. Islam has nothing to lose but everything to gain by such a re-examination."

This lucid comment itself raises certain further questions. How many in Islam would recognise as valid this interpretation of *ijtihād* as applicable to the Qur'ān itself? What also in the event of such a re-examination leading, not to the satisfaction of what the writer calls "the sceptic section," but to the persistence of their scepticism? Is the individual then fully free to follow the dictates of his mind even into unfaith? Or is investigation approved on the condition, or the assumption, that it will lead to confirmation? This is not to say that it *will* not so lead, but that it *may* not. But what then? This insistence in *The Light* on the right of the born Muslim as well as the outsider to investigate before commitment to faith would seem to widen the historic Muslim concept of freedom for communities to remain what they are into the larger freedom for individuals to move where conviction takes them.

"The Muslim World" Indexed. Readers may be interested to learn that the Quarterly is included in a new religious periodicals Index, details of which follow.

American Theological Library Association: *Index to Religious Periodical Literature,* an Author and Subject Index to Periodical Literature, 1949-1952, Including an Author Index to Book Reviews. Prepared by Libraries of the American Theological Library Association and Compiled and Edited by J. Stillson Judah with the Assistance of Leslie Joan Ziegler. American Theological Library Association, 1953. (Distributed by The American Library Association, 50 East Huron Street, Chicago 11, Illinois.) pp. ix, 220. $ 5.00 paper, $ 6.00 cloth.

An index by author and subject, with cross references, to thirty-one scholarly periodicals not included in the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature,* or the *International Index to Periodicals,* in the fields of Bible, Theology, Church History, and related disciplines, covering the years 1949-1952, together with an index to book reviews appearing in these periodicals. The resources indexed may be suggested by the following: 83 entries found under Dead Sea Scrolls, 41 under Church and State, 27 under Lord's Supper, 15 under Karl Barth, 27 under Reinhold Niebuhr, 55 under Communism, 32 under the World Council of Churches, and 15 under Missions (plus 19 cross references to related topics). The *Index* locates critical reviews for approximately 2,000 books, *viz.,* nine titles by Oscar Cullmann are covered by 21 reviews, and seven titles by H. H. Rowley are covered by 30 reviews, etc. It is expected that succeeding volumes of the *Index* will be issued in the future.

Miscellanea. Turkish newspapers in Cyprus have expressed opposition to the British readiness to grant constitutional reforms to the people of the island. They insist that such changes would be as unsatisfactory to the Turkish elements in Cyprus as would unity between the island and Greece. The Turkish minority is strongly opposed to any plan for the island's self-government.

One outcome of the World Islamic Conference held in Jerusalem in December, 1953, was a collection in Kuwait for Arab refugees. In January, 1954, a delegation of leading Kuwaitī men brought five thousand dinars to ᶜAmmān, to be applied to refugee relief, through the *Ikhwān al-Muslimīn* of Jordan.

A Swedish company is constructing hospitals for the Saudi Arabian Government. The first is at Ṭāʾif, the town that figured in a bitter pre-Hijrah rejection of the Prophet and subsequently clung to idolatry with unusual persistence. The hospital is to have 400 beds and will cost six million dollars. Nine other hospitals are planned to follow.

A Royal decree of December, 1953, in Saudi Arabia establishes a Ministry of Education, to which a brother of the King was appointed, Fahd ibn ᶜAbd al-ᶜAzīz. A new Ministry of Agriculture has also been set up.

Agreement has been reached between Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan on the repair and maintenance of the pilgrim railroad through

the Hijāz to Mecca, which is to be considered as *Waqf*. The three states will appoint representatives to a Board of Directors and the railroad will be exempt from dues.

A sum of 50,000 rupees has been contributed by the Government of Pakistan for the rebuilding of the Jordanian village of Qibya, devastated by Israel forces in October, 1953.

According to Radio Near East, Cyprus, the distribution of land to Egyptian fallaḥīn between February and July, 1954, totals 55,300 feddans. It is reported that three have been demonstrations of peasants in Al-Diwāniyyah district of Irāq demanding better conditions and a 50-50 sharing of the produce with their landlords.

When a Constituent Assembly was projected in Egypt in the spring several leaders of the Feminist movement, including Madame Doria Shafīq, went on hunger strike, in an endeavor to secure admission to the Assembly for women. A medical team was deputed to watch over their health.

Some weeks prior to the interlude of indecision as to continuance or non-continuance of the Council of the Revolution that body issued a Revolution charter, which may be regarded as the first formal statement of the movement's economic and political credo. It called on entrepreneurs (capitalists), workers, peasants, technicians and others to do their work co-operatively, and declared that the régime was neither fascist nor communist. The state is not conceived as a law unto itself but as a means to economic justice. Those described as men of science and social philosophy are invited to contribute to the general good, within a true economic order.

Rapid expansion is reported by *The African Challenge,* a Christian weekly circulating in Nigeria and beyond. New offices and print shop have been set up in Lagos in a ceremony attended by Muslim as well as Christian officials.

There is a proposal to prepare an edition of the letters of the late Professor Duncan Black Macdonald, former Professor of Arabic and Islamics at the Hartford Seminary Foundation and an Associate Editor of this Quarterly. He maintained an intimate and kindly contact with his students in many parts of the world. His scholarly and gracious concern for their problems is no small part in the affection with which they hold his memory. Any who have letters or post cards to lend for purposes of publication are invited to write to

Miss Elizabeth de W. Root,
55, Elizabeth St., Hartford 5, Conn., U.S.A.

SURVEY OF PERIODICALS

By Sue Molleson Foster
Union Theological Seminary Library

I. GENERAL

The Arab Theatre. Jacob M. Landau. *Middle Eastern Affairs,* New York. March, 1953. pp. 77-86. Gives an historical sketch of an art which shows an ever increasing importance in general culture.

Die Asiatisch-Arabische Dreizehner-Gruppe. Heinrich Berchtoldt. *Ausserpolitik,* Stuttgart. February, 1953. pp. 103-115. Surveys the position of this group in the United Nations.

Beginnings of Civilization in the Middle East. John Waechter. *Palestine Exploration Quarterly,* London. May-October, 1953. pp. 124-131. Describes sites at Karim Shahir and Jarmo in Iraq and in Jericho in Jordan all indicating village life flourishing eight thousand years ago.

Berber Dialects and Berber Script. Walter Cline. *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology,* Albuquerque. Autumn, 1953. pp. 268-276. Excerpts from Dr. Cline's uncompleted "Bibliography of the Berber Languages" arranged by Leslie Spier.

Churchill of Lebanon. N. N. Lewis. *Royal Central Asian Journal,* London. July-October, 1953. pp. 217-223. An account of the life and work of Col. Charles Henry Churchill who lived, revered and admired, in Bhouara from 1841 to his death in 1869 and many of whose Syro-British descendants are prosperous citizens.

Developments of the Quarter: Comment and Chronology. *The Middle East Journal,* Washington, D. C. Autumn, 1953. pp. 504-519. Covers June 1 through August 31, 1953.

Document. The Syrian Constitution of 1953. Mary Louise Manley. *The Middle East Journal,* Washington, D.C. Autumn, 1953. pp. 520-538. Full text and introductory comment.

Explorations in Western Palestine. Nelson Glueck. *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research,* Baltimore. October, 1953. pp. 6-15. Covers archaeological diggings in the Negeb on the West side of Wādī al-ʿArabah.

Front and Center for Egypt's Real Boss. James Bell. *Life,* New York. March 8, 1954. pp. 109-116. A sketch of the life of Lt. Col. ʿAbd al-Naṣṣār and an account of his many activities.

Future Archaeological Research in Afghanistan. W. A. Fairservis, Jr. *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology,* Alberquerque. Summer, 1953. pp. 139-146. Surveys possibilities in five definite areas and reports accomplishments by the French Archaeological Mission and by expeditions from the American Museum of Natural History.

The Middle East. W. B. Fisher. *Geographical Review,* New York. April, 1953. pp. 256-259. A bibliography of some recent works with short reviews.

Our Best Friend in the Near East. Ernest A. Hauser. *Saturday Evening Post,* Philadelphia. January 30, 1954. pp. 25; 91-94. An account of Celâl Bayar, President of Turkey.

Scientific Discoveries of the Muslims. M. A. Khan. *Islamic Culture,* Hyderabad. Part 1, 1953. pp. 23-63. A classified list, with some comment.

Some Remarks on the Study of History in Islamic Countries. Halil Inalcik. *The Middle East Journal,* Washington, D. C. Autumn, 1953. pp. 451-455. Concerns itself principally with Turkey and the difference between Turkish and Ottoman historical writings.

II. ARABIA

Economic Review: Saudi Arabian Currency and Finance. Arthur N. Young. *The Middle East Journal,* Washington, D.C. Autumn, 1953. pp. 539-556. The second part of a statistical survey.

Les Expéditions Archéologiques Americaines en Arabie du Sud. A Jamme. *Oriente Moderno,* Roma. March, 1953. pp. 133-157. Describes work done by the American Foundation for the Study of Man during 1950 to 1953.

Notes on the Kathiri State of Hadhramaut. R. H. Smith. *The Middle East Journal,* Washington, D.C. Autumn, 1953. pp. 499-503. Ruling from his beautiful capital, Saiyun, Sulṭān Ḥusain ʿAlī Ibn Manṣūr administers wisely and the country is further benefited by the generosity of Sayyid Sīr Bubakr al Kaf.

Political Geography of Trucial Oman and Qatar. Alexander Melamid. *Geographical Review,* New York. April, 1953. pp. 194-206. Sketches the history of both peninsulas and shows the results of oil discovery.

Reconnaissance in Saudi Arabia. Henry Field. *Royal Central Asian Journal,* London. July-October, 1953. pp. 185-197. Describes Stone Age sites and finds along the Trans-Arabian Pipe Line.

The South-West Borderlands of the Rubʿ al Khali. D. G. Bunker. *Geographical Journal,* London. December, 1953. pp. 420-430. During investigations made by the Desert Locust Survey, considerable information was collected about the belt between the mountain system and the sand desert.

Towns and Architecture of the Hadhramaut. Mrs. M. de Sturler-Raemaekers. *Royal Central Asian Journal,* London. July-October, 1953. pp. 241-248. An account of three years' travel and investigations.

III. HISTORY OF ISLAM

A Dramatist of Turkish History and his Source. The late Professor Orhan Burian. *Royal Central Asian Journal,* London. July-October, 1953. pp. 266-271. Shows how Richard Knolle's *General Historie of the Turkes* (1603) influences the two Jacobean plays of Thomas Goffe—"The Raging Turke" and "The Couragious Turke."

Crónica Arqueológica de la España Musulmana. L. Torres Balbo. *Al-Andalus, Madrid.* Part 2, 1952. pp. 165-217. A valuable piece of research.

Iberia on the Eve of Bagratid Rule. C. Toumanoff. *Muséon,* Paris. Part 2-3, 1952. pp. 189-258. Tells of East Georgia during the 7th and 8th centuries.

Islamkunde und Kulturwissenschaft Tagungsbericht aus Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschafft. Band 103, 1953. pp. 1-37. The titled article is by G. E. von Grunebaum, but others are by H. J. Kissling on the dervishes in the days of Osman; by Werner C. Koeln on the Bedouins of Arabia; and by Bertold Spuler on Islam in Iran.

Muslim News Digest. *Notes on Islam,* Calcutta. July, 1953. pp. 66-80. A useful survey appearing in each issue of "Notes on Islam."

Muslims in India. *Notes on Islam,* Calcutta. June, 1953. pp. 49-50. Gives census figures for 1951, not including Jammu, Kashmir, and tribal areas of Assam.

Pietro Della Valle, Orientalista Romano, 1586-1652. Ettore Rossi. *Oriente Moderno,* Roma. January, 1953. pp. 49-64. Describes Della Valle's journey to the Levant, 1614-1626.

Les Princes d'Ormuz du XIII^{e} au XV^{e} Siècle. Jean Aubin. *Journal Asiatique,* Paris. Fasc. 1, 1953. pp. 77-137. An historical article accompanied by extracts from the Majma^{c} al-Ansāb and by genealogical tables.

The Return of Reschid Pasha. W. E. Morse. *The English Historical Review,* London. October, 1953. pp. 546-573. Discusses an incident in the diplomatic career of Stratford Canning, Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, British ambassador to the Porte for many years.

Turkey under the Democratic Party. *The World Today,* London. September, 1953. pp. 383-392. Surveys three years of steady, substantial growth under the leadership of Celâl Bayar.

IV. QUR$^{\circ}$ĀN. TRADITION. THEOLOGY

The Ahmadiyya Anjuman. *Notes on Islam,* Calcutta. June, 1953. pp. 50-61. The first installment of a study of the movement founded in 1889. This contains the life of Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad, 1839-1908.

Communism and Islam. Bernard Lewis. *International Affairs,* London. January, 1954. pp. 1-12. Writes on the qualities in Islam which would be for or against Communism as a creed and concludes that Muslims' profound belief in God will preserve them from the atheism of Communism.

More Niffarī. A. J. Arberry. *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies,* London. Part 1, 1953. pp. 30-42. An account of an autograph copy of the Mawāqif, with additional material.

V. RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL LIFE

The Arab Cinema. Jacob M. Landau. *Middle Eastern Affairs,* New York. November, 1953. pp. 349-358. Beginning as an experiment

in World War I, the industry has prospered and raised the cultural state of its patrons.

Child Psychology in Islam. Franz Rosenthal. *Islamic Culture,* Hyderabad. Part 1, 1953. pp. 1-22. Childhood is considered a state of imperfection and the article discusses many facets of that state.

The Land of Sinai. G. W. Murray. *The Geographical Journal,* London. June, 1953. pp. 140-153. Describes the great variety of peoples living in the section and tells of 100,000 refugees settled in appalling poverty in a strip twenty miles long by five wide near Rafa.

The Lost Generation in Israel. Bernard D. Weinryb. *The Middle East Journal,* Washington, D.C. Autumn, 1953. pp. 415-429. Shows the disillusionment of the young Jews, born after the creation of the state of Israel and lacking either a pioneer spirit or a dedication to Zionism.

La Législation Syndicale en Égypte. P. Chauleur. *Rythmes du Monde,* Paris. Part 3-4, 1953. pp. 232-238. Analyzes the main features of the most recent laws.

The Ma Dan or Marsh Dwellers of Southern Iraq. Wilfred Thesiger. *Royal Central Asian Journal,* London. January, 1954. pp. 4-25. A detailed account of this primitive people.

Problems of Modern Libya. W. B. Fisher. *The Geographical Journal,* London. June, 1953. pp. 183-199. Presents observations made during an expedition to Cyrenaica under the auspices of the University of Aberdeen and includes many tables of statistics.

Prospectives for Artificial Rain Enhancement in the Jordan Valley Development. Frank Meissner. *The Middle East Journal,* Washington, D.C. Autumn, 1953. pp. 484-498. Discusses the various irrigation plans now under consideration, believes them insufficient and advances the speculative and almost fantastic possibility of cloud-seeding near Mount Hermon.

Ramallah: My Home Town. Mariam Zarour. *The Middle East Journal,* Washington, D.C. Autumn, 1953. pp. 430-439. The people of this little city, of Arabian origin but now all Chrisitians, are tolerant and receptive to Western culture. They are now generously helping the 10,000 refugees who swell the population.

Réfugiés Palestiniens. J.-Em. Janot. *Rythmes du Monde,* Paris. Part 2, 1953. pp. 166-171. Comments on the deplorable conditions in the Arab refugee camps, gives statistics and regrets U.N. delay in bettering the situation.

The Role of Women in Social Reform in Egypt. Aziza Hussein. *The Middle East Journal,* Washington, D.C. Autumn, 1953. pp. 440-450. Describes the achievements of courageous women since the days of Princess Nazli Ḥalīm in the 1880s, whose home was a meeting place for advanced thinkers.

VI. POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS

Afghanistan und Paschtunistan. Fritz Bleiber. *Geopolitik,* Heidelberg. Februar, 1953. pp. 88-96. Discusses the possible union of these two lands and their future link with Pakistan.

THE ARAB-ISRAEL FRONTIER. Elizabeth Monroe. *International Affairs,* London. October, 1953. pp. 439-448. The author believes the one way to gain an end of deadly friction is for the Western Powers to convince the Arab States that Israel cannot be made to fail and that the Anglo-Franco-American Declaration of May 1950 will be implemented.

THE DECLINE OF THE WEST IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Brigadier Stephen Longrigg. *International Affairs,* London. July, 1953. pp. 326-339. A British reply to Mr. Hourani's provocative article which appeared in the January and April issues of *International Affairs.*

THE FUTURE OF THE SUEZ CANAL ZONE. *Round Table,* London. June, 1953. pp. 220-227. The author presents Britain's case for control of the area.

THE INDO-PAKISTAN BOUNDARY DISPUTES TRIBUNAL, 1949-1950. Nafis Ahmad. *The Geographical Review,* New York. July, 1953. pp. 329-337. Discusses the situation in East-West Bengal and East Bengal-Assam and suggests the desirability of setting up a joint permanent boundary commission.

JORDAN'S FRONTIER VILLAGES. N.C. *The World Today,* London. November, 1953. pp. 466-475. Depicts the tensions arising from the 1949 armistice line which cuts the villages off from their water supply, their orchards and their fields. Gives statistics.

KASHMIR: A CASE STUDY IN U.N. MEDIATION. Michael Brecher. *Pacific Affairs,* New York. September, 1953. pp. 195-207. Considers the progress made during five years of U.N. participation in the dispute and suggests meetings between the leaders of India and Pakistan might prove more constructive.

THE MEDITERRANEAN: PIVOT OF PEACE AND WAR. W. Gordon East. *Foreign Affairs,* New York. July, 1953. pp. 619-631. The defence of the Near East must not be neglected by the West as it increases its power in the Mediterranean.

NATIONALISM IN MOROCCO. Nevill Barbour. *Middle Eastern Affairs,* New York. November, 1953. pp. 359-369. A survey of the movement from 1926 to date.

STRATEGIC PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST. George F. Eliot. *Middle Eastern Affairs,* New York. October, 1953. pp. 313-323. A plea for understanding cooperation in the face of mounting tensions.

SUDAN IN TRANSITION. Sir James Robertson. *African Affairs,* London. October, 1953. pp. 317-327. Describes the awakening of the country in detail and expresses the hope that independence and not union with Egypt will be chosen as the best means for peaceful development.

THE SUEZ: INTERNATIONAL ROADWAY. André Siegfried. *Foreign Affairs,* New York. July, 1953. pp. 605-618. Gives forceful reasons for the continuance of the status quo.

TURKEY'S TRANSPORTATION. Vedat Eldem. *Middle Eastern Affairs,* New York. October, 1953. pp. 324-336. An encouraging statistical article.

VII. MISSIONS TO MUSLIMS

Christian Higher Education in India and Pakistan. C. S. Milford. *The East and West Review,* London. July, 1953 pp. 67-73. "An attempt to assess the needs and prospects of the colleges in the light of their past history and achievements" in connection with an appeal by the S.C.M. for fifty-three recruits.

The Intricacies of the Near East Situation. S. A. Morrison. *World Dominion and the World To-day,* London. January-February, 1954. pp. 45-50. Believing firmly that Israel's conduct will always be condoned by the U.S. and Britain backed by the U.N., the Arab States naturally distrust western missionaries and limit their activities.

Islam and Christianity among the Yoruba. J. S. Trimingham. *The East and West Review,* London. October, 1953. pp. 109-111. Islam is gaining many converts, especially in the Nigerian cities, while Christianity seems to have lost its impulse to preach the Gospel and missions also suffer from lack of man power and money.

A Christian Mission to Muslim Spain in the Eleventh Century. D. M. Dunlop. *Al-Andaluz,* Madrid. Part 2, 1952. pp. 259-310. Text and translation of a manuscript in the Escorial.

A New Day in Iran. *World Dominion and the World To-Day,* London. January-February, 1954. pp. 51-53. The recent changes have, for the present at least, put an end to Communist activity and it is hoped that Christianity will have wider scope.