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مَا قَدَرُوا اللَّهَ حَقَّ قَدْرِهِ

“RIGHT THOUGHTS OF GOD.”

“They did not have the proper idea about God” says the Qur’ān in three places, in reference to those who denied the revelation and disbelieved the Prophet. “They did not esteem God rightly.” (Surah vi. 82; xxii. 73; xxxix. 67.) Evildoers and scorners “have not reckoned with God a true reckoning.” How tragic such men were in the invalidity of their thoughts of God. How suggestive is the phrase, using the absolute accusative so beloved of Arabic grammarians: “They did not measure God a true measuring.”

Doubtless the idolater is wrong and he has only to open himself to the evident revelation to discover his gross mistake. Yet how easy is this state of error about God in a score of subtler ways that involve also the heirs of revelation! The implication of the verse goes far beyond the immediate context, even to include those who believe themselves loyal to everything the revelation says. For those who are sure they hold the right idea about God are for that very reason most exposed to the pride that vitiates their knowledge. One of the plainest tragedies of the Gospel history is that of a people who put themselves greatly in the wrong by the manner in which they believed themselves to be in the right. They stayed out of the Gentile judgement hall “lest they should be defiled,” but sensed nothing defiling in the judgment they wrested from the Gentile Governor against their Prisoner. Their ideas about God were invalidated by their own arrogant tenacity in the communal assertion of them. So the High Priests of Good Friday have passed into history as men whom the assurance of orthodoxy betrayed into a treachery to truth.

Yet sharp examples as they are of this solemn fact, they were by no means unique. Indeed, we miss the whole inclusive meaning of the history of the Passion of Jesus, if we do not recognize in its human content the universal nature of human pride and communal assertion and the ever present menace of loyalties that betray their trust. Painfully easy is it to reproach in retrospect the history of man and faith and to conclude, about a score of institutions and a host of deeds: "They did not have the right idea about God." Yet this capacity to recognize misguidedness elsewhere in time and place does not of itself ensure that we shall see and disown it in ourselves.

One of the puzzles of the Qur^ʿān for the Christian reader is just this characteristic pre-occupation with the denunciation of the non-theist and the non-surrendered. Doubtless in the urgent context of Muḥammad's preaching idolatry was the supreme danger and its annihilation the burning need. In the situation self-criticisms of the non-idolaters might have blunted the edge of the great crusade, and "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought" the campaign for the eradication of the most obvious of the evils. But in the perspective of the centuries the question must arise whether the sharp and re-iterated Quranic distinction between the Muslimūn and the Mushrikūn, between the gainers and the losers, the guided and the deceived, the faithful and the faithless, does not lend itself to congratulation and self-approbation. If one says: "They did not have the right idea about God" with too sharp an emphasis on the initial pronoun, one is already in danger of deserving the reproach oneself. It must always remain a spiritual truth that "judgement must begin at the house of God." With his over-concentration on an evil that is being demolished externally to himself, the iconoclast, for all his anti-idolatry, may be on the way himself to "a wrong idea about God." There is invitation in the Qur^ʿān itself to sense and allay this danger, by taking, in their widest import, as

we do here, its own words. Have we authentic thoughts of God?

Plainly the answer involves both the conception and its expression. For true reckoning with God is conduct as well as creed, behavior as well as belief. When we seek an answer we are compelled to ask about the true criteria. How are we to identify the true thoughts, how discern the false ones? Where, in word and deed, in thought and act, shall we seek the validly identifying clues to God, by the nature of Whom all else must be determined? So deep, beyond mere idolatry, beyond mere Quraishī incredulity, does this thrice reiterated Quranic saying take us.

The answer to these questions plumbs the depths of Muslim-Christian inter-relationship and explores the profoundest issues, to the service and elucidation of which this Journal is dedicated. Let us not try in these brief paragraphs to state the Muslim answer to the Qurʾān's own question. Rather, with that answer in a reverent will to apprehension, let us consider the criteria in Christ and at the Cross. Here, for us, are the authentic ideas about God. "It is," in the words of old Horace Bushnell of Hartford, Connecticut, "as if there were a cross unseen, standing on its undiscovered hill far back in the ages, out of which was sounding always just the same deep voice of suffering and patience that was heard by mortal ears from the sacred hill of Calvary." The meaning of the Cross is that the power behind the universe is a Love for Whom evil really matters and by Whom our redemption from it is achieved.

God has set us in a world of mystery and of freedom, in which, as our history cries to us, we have gone grievously astray. But this manifest astrayness has not found our Creator at a loss. Through the mystery of our waywardness we are won back by forgiveness to a finer relationship with God. We know Him for what He is and this knowledge provides a sure pattern for our relationships with each other. By insisting on the perpetual significance of repentance it forbids that vitiating pride about our knowledge of Him

which is the curse of all merely legal or revelatory relationships with truth. If, in Fairbairn's great words, "theology has no falser idea than the impassibility of God," faith has no finer conviction than the confidence that the Love, which gives us its measure at the Cross, is the meaning of the ages, the clue to our finitude, and the promise of our eternity. What we know so painfully as sin, exists in God only as suffering. Just as for us, nothing is lost when we make an offering of it, so through God everything is retrieved by the self-offering of Christ.

It seems to us that the dying brigand had the right idea about God when he said to Jesus: "Lord remember me when thou comest into Thy Kingdom." For here indeed was a King, and in His type of Kingship is the Kingdom where we all may find ourselves in newness of life and peace. But all this is to be known and understood as something which was what it was because God is what God is. "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father."

There is in the Jewish Mishnah an eloquent directive about the ritual of the daily offering in the Temple. It was the duty of a solitary priest to go before dawn into the darkness of the inner enclosure, to clear away the ashes of the altar fire, which was kept continually burning. The rule was that going in alone he carried no lamp. There could be no other light in that place. He walked only in the light of the altar fire itself and by its own light he saw it renewed. A dim picture maybe: but here is its point. The light of the Cross is the self-sufficient light. In this light, truly we see light. Explore the meanings of the self-offering of Christ and there glows for you in unmistakable warmth and splendor the light of the glory of God.

"There is no refuge from God," says the Qur'ān, "save unto Him." If we would know Him we must seek Him in His own criteria. The wonder of this revelation is that it provides not only the assurance of its content but the guidance of its temper. We must know not only *what* we should hold about

God, but *how* we should hold it, lest we discredit the faith we believe by the spirit in which serve it. In Christ, understood as the Word or personal disclosure in earthly history (and what a history), of the nature of the Eternal, we understand ourselves possessed of a sense of God which is an invitation to fellowship and obedience. Truly we do not have "the right idea about God" if we say He has sent nothing down; if we say He has brought nothing down; if we say He has not Himself come down, for us men and for our salvation. We do not have the right idea about God if we forbid to His omnipotence the most Godlike of all deeds in the restoration of His erring creatures, nor if we withhold our confidence in the offer of His mercy out of a reservation about His inscrutability. For this God is a God of pledged and proffered pardon, Who calls us into sonship and peace, Whose service is more than servitude because His sovereignty is more than Lordship. Rather: "We have seen and believed th Love that God hath to us: God is Love and he that dwelleth in love, dwelleth in God." Yet this assurance is wedded to humility because it is only ours through His giving of Whom it so gloriously tells.

It will not then be presumption to trust Him to be always what He is. So inclusive is this faith that the custody of it for those who do not have these "ideas about God" is a responsible part of its very meaning. In penitence, reverence, gratitude, worship, even boldness, we may come to Him, knowing that all these attitudes, and their import for our daily lives, are no more than the corollary among us men of all that He is in Himself.

".....fervent love
 And lively hope, with violence assail
 The Kingdom of the Heavens, and overcome
 The will of the Most High: not in such sort
 As man prevails o'er man; but conquer it
 Because 'tis willing to be conquered: still
 Though conquered, by its mercy conquering."

THE LANGUAGE OF MUSLIM DEVOTION. II

THE WORSHIP OF PENITENCE A

THE SINNER DESTITUTE BEFORE HIS LORD

AL-MUDHNI^B-AL-FAQĪR LI RABBIHI

The prayer-rite in Islam is a rite of praise, and penitence has no place in its *arkān*, but it is an act of praise and is performed by sinful men, and thus it is a generally followed *sunna* (rule of conduct) to insert a forgiveness-seeking prayer.¹ "When he performs his prayer-rite the last thing he shall say between the *tashahhud* and the greeting of peace is "O God forgive me my former and my latter (sins) my open and my secret (sins) and my extravagances and what Thou dost know, for Thou art the Former and the Latter."² *Adhkār-al-Nawawī*, p. 33 (Tradition, Muslim from °Alī).

This brings us to the question of the sense of sin and the worship of penitence in Islam. It is a common remark of Europeans, living in Arab lands, that a sense of personal sinfulness is rare among the people of Islam. That this should be a first impression is not surprising in Near Eastern countries where popular etiquette is not averse from the happy announcement of one's own good qualities, and where a correspondent will send to a well-known paper such a prayer as the following: "Not for a day was I a sinner or an evil doer that this bitter, painful punishment should be laid on me. But I call Thee to witness, oh Lord, that I have known nothing all my life but feelings of love, compassion, mercy, sincerity, manliness, chastity, purity, cleanness, honour, nobility, and absorption in love of country and humanity. These are all the sins or some of the sins for which, and in the prosecution of which, I meet with censure and malice."³

Pride is a universal disease of the human heart, and may be less deeply rooted in the man of naïve conceit than in one too proud to lay himself open to the charge of conceit. Looking deeper we may find the sense of sin alive in Muḥammad's community.

On this point Dr. Kraemer writes: "The curious thing is that, in many utterances and institutions of practical religious life in Islam, the need for forgiveness and redemption is breaking through. For instance, Indonesian Muhammadans practically put the visit to the sepulchre of the prophet in Medina above the pilgrimage to Mecca,

¹ The form varies. In the Hanifite rite the forgiveness-seeking for parents is commonly used here.

² The modern Ahmadiyya movement of India appears to have an objection to the word "forgive," and in its translations of this prayer for missionary use renders it by some such phrase as "make me to prosper."

³ °Abd-al-Hādī al-Ḥadīdī in *Raus-al-Yūsuf*, Cairo, Oct. 1936.

thus coming into flat contradiction with one of the fundamental tenets of Islam. They regard this visit to Medina as an effectual means of cleansing from sin."

With these remarks we turn to see what the manuals teach us about the worship of penitence. The Muslim and Christian worshipper alike regard themselves as set in a world of temptation and testing (*ibtilāʿ*) and exposed to forces urgent to evil outside themselves as well as within. "My God, Thou hast created me, a body, and with it hast given to me instruments of obedience or disobedience, and hast appointed for me in my own nature a soul clamant for selfish ends, and after this Thou hast said to me: 'Abstain, my servant!' Through Thee (only) can I guard my innocence. Keep me then from evil. Through Thee (only) can I be shielded from sin. Then Thou keep me." *Munājāt*, attributed to 'Alī Zain-al-'Abidin, *Al-Ṣaḥīfat-al-Sajjādiyyah*, p. 159.

When Iblis was cast out God cursed him; and lo he said: "O Lord, by Thy Might and Majesty my desire for the son of Adam shall never cease so long as the spirit remains in him." And God, Mighty and Majestic, said: "By My Might and Majesty I will not deprive him of the opportunity of repentance so long as the spirit remains in him." *Tahārat-al-Qulūb*, Al-Dīrīnī, p. 98.

THE MOST DREADED SINS

While the prayer manuals do not contain such detailed and searching confessions as those of the Jewish Day of Atonement, it is yet possible to see what forms of sin are most dreaded by the Muslim conscience. There is a well-known division (based on Surah iv.30), not unlike that in Latin Christianity between mortal and venial sins, of sins into "great and small." In the life of conscience this does not play a very great part, for the educated conscience learns to find in all sin that estrangement from God which is mortal. "The good deeds of the ordinary righteous man are evil deeds for those close to God." (*Risālah Qushairiyyah*, p. 35). Moreover, the Muslim Church does not appear to have decided officially on her list of *Kabā'ir*. Our manuals quote a tradition pointing to the early days of the Islamic community. (From Abū Ḥuraira) "The Apostle of God said: Avoid the seven mortal sins. He was asked: 'And which are they, O Apostle of God?' He said: Associating aught with God, and wizardry, and the killing of men, which God has forbidden, except with right, and consuming the property of orphans, and taking usury and absenting himself on the day of a military expedition and calumny against believing well-conducted women." *Tahārat-al-Qulūb*, Al-Dīrīnī, p. 99.

The same writer quotes a summary of pious opinion on the subject: Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī said: "I collected them from all the sayings of the Companions, and I found them to be four sins of the heart, which

are associating (aught else) with God Most High, and persistent disobedience towards Him, and despair of God's mercy and assurance against His stratagems. And four sins of the tongue which are false witness, and slander of chaste women unaware, and perjury which is an oath sworn with the determination to lie, and scoffing, to which God has attached the result of corruption. And three sins of the belly, the drinking of wine, and consuming the property of orphans, and eating of the fruit of usury while knowing that he does so. And two of the secret parts, adultery and unnatural vice. And two of the hands, murder and stealing, and one of the feet, escaping from an army, and one of the whole body disobedience to parents." Ibid., p. 100.

But these lists do not appear in confession and in prayer against temptation. In most of the manuals the only named sins—named rather in anxious prayer against them than in confession—are those sins against the Godhead most horrible to the Muslim soul, *shirk*, sin against the Unity, the sin of sins; and *kufr* the sin of impious unbelief against Al-Qayyūm, the Self-existent One, and His manifestations in Islam—a sin which carries with it not mere absence of belief but that coupled with ingratitude.

If for the man of the Chinese civilization the essential sin was that which broke the due proportions of the rightly adjusted life; if for an Africa, now rapidly passing, the essential sin was that which broke the unity of the tribe; if for Israel of old the essential sin was unfaithfulness to Jehovah's covenant; for Islam, not only yesterday but today, the essential sin is unfaithfulness to that revelation of the Divine Unity which it is Islam's business to proclaim with passionate insistence. More than one hundred and fifty times does the root *sharaka* echo through the Qur^{ān} with terrible protest and threat whether against Arab idolatry or a misconceived doctrine of the Trinity. This sin, if conscious, may be unforgivable. How must the believer guard against slipping into this horrible pit! "And Thou art the Forgiver of every sinful action save only *kufr* and *ishrāk* of terrible results." Poem by M. ibn-al-Shahīd of Algiers in *Majmū'u al-qaṣā'id wa-l-ad'iyah*.

A constantly printed little prayer is the following, attributed to the Prophet: "I take refuge with Thee lest I should fall knowingly into the sin of associating aught with Thy Godhead and I ask Thy forgiveness for such sin unknown to me." *Majmū'at-al-Wird-al-ʿamm*, p. 87, and frequently in the manuals.

The saints, with their spiritual penetration saw the essential nature of this sin of association where there was no formal expression of it.

Al-Shādhilī said: "O God I repent towards Thee; then give me refuge and bind me and strengthen me and succour me and stabilize me and keep me clear from sin and shelter me in the midst of mankind and do not disgrace me in the eyes of Thine Apostle. Then it was

said to me: 'Thou art an associator (*mushrik*)' I said: 'How?' And it was said to me: 'Thou didst fear disgrace in the eyes of created beings; thou art only afraid of being put to shame before men, but thy heart should be dependent on God, not on men.'" *Al-Mufākhir-al-ʿAliy*, Aḥmad ibn ʿIbād (Shādhiliyyah).

"O God, if without my knowledge impious unbelief (*kufr*) entered into my surrender (*islām*) to Thee, I repent and say with singleness of heart: 'There is no god but God and Muḥammad is the Apostle of God. O God, if without my knowledge associationism (*shirk*) entered into my declaration of Thy Unity, I repent and say with singleness of heart: 'There is no god but God and Muḥammad is the Apostle of God'", *Ḥizb-al-Ḥifz*.


The ordinary man, less prone to refinements of spiritual thought is thankful enough to find prescriptions against *shirk* or *kufr*, and these are not wanting: "Say: *Yā aiyuhā-al-kāfirūn* (Surah cix) then sleep on thy right side for this is immunity from *shirk*". *Rabīʿ al-Fwād*, ʿAbdallāh al-Sharqāwī, p. 135. Against *kufr*, *ḥamd* may be efficacious, for does it not include that element of thankfulness the lack of which is part of the blackness of *kufr*? "Praise be to God — a praise the blessed power of which make us safe from unbelief". *Majmūʿat-al-wird-al-ʿāmm*, p. 53.

The other words in our manuals descriptive of sin will be found set out in vocabulary form in the third article. Here we may note that in studying this vocabulary the reader accustomed to Christian Arabic will remark the absence of a group of familiar words concerning the vileness, corruption and defilement of sin — such words as *Khubth*, *najāsah*, *danas* and *fasād*. These words, so common in Christian confessions of sin, and necessary in Bible translations to represent such words as ἀσελγεια, ακαθαρσια have hardly found their way into the Muslim prayer-manuals, although *khubth* and *fasād* are Quranic words, and the Prophet is often described as *maʿṣūm min al-adnās*, — immaculate.

THE SENSE OF SIN

As men grow in depth they pass from the consciousness of sins to the consciousness of sinfulness, of an inward state or sway of sin. The Arabic language has no love of abstract nouns, preferring verbal expressions.⁴ But the absence of a noun need not imply the absence of an experience. The Old Testament, for instance, no more than our prayer-manuals, has any word corresponding to the English use of 'conscience.' Yet the fifty-first Psalm is for all men the cry of stricken conscience. The absence of convenient nouns demands a rather close

⁴ Here is one of the difficulties of New Testament translators in rendering into Arabic a language rich in abstract nouns. Such words as *adikēmata*, *erga asebeias*, *hamartēmata* pass much more readily into Arabic than *adikia*, *asebeia*, *hamartia*.



scrutiny of Arabic devotions to note the expression of the sense of inward sinfulness.

One common thought, that of the all-seeing eye of God, is clearly a stirrer of conscience. Already in Israel and in Christianity it had proved so.⁵ In these prayers it is based on that strong recurring note of the Qur^{ān}, beating like a drum through the book, *wa Allāhu bi mā ta^ʿmalūna ba^ʿṣīr* — “God is the observer of your doings.” The thought that the all-seeing eye notes wrong within us of which we ourselves are unaware brings us very near to the sense of *sinfulness* as against merely having-committed-sins. Whatever theology may have striven to express of remote transcendence, these Muslim worshippers have the sense that all is naked and open before the eyes of “One with whom they have to do.” “Nothing was ever invisible nor will be invisible to Thee; from Thee no secret is hid, nor does aught stray away from Thee under cover of darkness.” (*Al-Ḥizb-al-Sai^ʿfī*, and frequently in the manuals.) “I beg Thy forgiveness for all that Thou knowest. For Thou knowest that of which we do not know. Thou being the knower of the unseen.” (*Dalā^ʿil al-Khairāt*, Ḥizb for Tuesday, and frequently in the manuals.)

FEAR

In the work of conscience, in Islam as in other religions, a sense of fear and danger has its part to play, drawn out, as always, by the thought of death: “And sincere repentance is always demanded from the worshipper, especially at bedtime for fear lest in that sleep he may draw his last breath.” (*Khaṭwat Al-Husūn al-Saba^ʿat-al-Munī^ʿah* M. al-Faḥī al-Marākashī) “Indeed I know that any one of my sins is enough to bring on me Thy painful chastisement.” (*Du^ʿā fi qadā al-hawā^ʿij*, ^cAlī Zain al-^cĀbidīn.)

“O Lord, old age and shame draw in on me, for carelessly I gave no thought to death. O Lord, my sins have blackened my record, and what can I do when that record is published? O Lord, Thou knowest my sins. Wide is Thy giving and destitute Thy servant. O Lord, these two have I obeyed, myself and Satan; these two I did not resist. I (am full of) hidden sin.” (*Al Qa^ṣīdat-al-Muḍarra^ʿh*, Al-Būsīrī.)

This sense of fear is seen to be a salutary and desirable quality: “The true believer sees his sin as a mountain overhanging him and dreads its fall on him. The hypocrite sees his sin as a fly that alighted on his face and which he brushed away.” (*Ṭahārat-al-Qulūb*, Al-Dīrīnī, p. 103.) “The fire of fear burnt out the growth of concupiscence from our hearts.” (*Faḥ-al-Rasūl*, M. ^cUḥmān al-Mīrghanī, p. 103.) —

⁵ We may compare with the Quranic *Al-Ba^ʿṣīr* Hagar's “Well of Him that liveth and seeth me,” echoed so long after in the experience of another who had been seen by a well, and who said “Come see a man which told me all things that ever I did.” (Gen. xvi.14, John iv.29).

“Give us a portion of the holy fear of Thee that will be a barrier between us and disobedience.” (*Al-Munājāt-al-Injīliyyat-al-zwustā*, °Alī Zain-al-°Ābidīn.)

“AGAINST THEE ONLY HAVE I SINNED”

How far do these prayers conceive of sin as *against* God? Can this thought, so rich and deep in Judaism with its sense of a covenant between the Lord and His worshippers, so rich and deep in Christianity with its sense of love exposing itself to the wounding — find its place also in Islamic devotion, in spite of the stiffest doctrine of Divine transcendence ever formulated?

At first sight one would say: No. The Qurānic shout of confidence that neither those who retire from battle nor those who reject the Prophet’s message can injure God one whit (Surah iii. — 144, 176, 177), is often in the prayers caught up into a formulary of *tanzīh*. “Thou, whose empire suffers no loss from the disobedience of rebels, whose dominion is not increased by the faith of the affirmers of Unity.” (*Al-Munājāt-al-Injīliyyat-al-zwustā*, °Alī Zain al-°Ābidīn.) “O Thou whom sins harm not and who sufferest no loss in giving pardon.” (*Ḥizb Yaum-al-Khamīs*, M. °Uthmān al-Mīrghānī.

Such phrases would seem to bring a strange sense of breakdown of communication between the sinner and the God who is *not* the Sinned Against. That word ‘against’ was a bridge, if only where wrath and terror meet. Whatever theology may have to say, this is intolerably arid for personal religion. The experience of the worshipper belies it, and the prayer manuals usually show much more kinship with another and warmer climate of the Qur’ān, a single *wird* sometimes combining both ways of thought. A sense of sinning *against* Allāh is reached by the presupposition of a covenant between Him and the believer, a thought deeply embedded in the tissue of the Qur’ān. One of the commonest openings for a Muslim confession of sin is: “I am Thy servant, and I have not been obedient to Thy covenant and promise.” (Numerous uses in the manuals.) Given a covenant between two parties, however unequal, the one can sin against the other. And this idea is extended in prayer to cover a more individual pact of spirit than any inherited share in some primitive pact with the pre-creation *ṣūrah* of Adam, with Abraham or with the people of the *Sharī’ah*.

“I ask Thy forgiveness for all that I promised Thee in my soul and then failed to fulfil. I ask Thy forgiveness for every work which I purposed to do for Thee alone and into which I admitted human respect.” (Said to have been taught by Al-Khaḍr to Muḥammad). And thus the author of *Dalā’il-al-Khairāt* can say: “I have faults in that which is between me and Thee.” (*Dalā’il-al-Khairāt*, p. 57. See also the Shī’ah prayers for Yaum °Arafāt) So religion builds the

bridge, that bridge of trembling hope and fear, which theology seemed likely to pull down. The sinner in these prayers does not conceive of himself as a child returning to his Father, but neither is he a lonely mortal before an unknowable and unresponding Remote.

"And if one of you loses delight in his converse with God or his religious observances let him betake himself to repentance and much seeking of forgiveness, for what happened to him is only the result of some sin into which he fell." *Rabī^c-al-fu²ād*, 'Abdallāh al-Sharqāwī. "O God Thou art not veiled from Thy creatures except when sin veils their sight of Thee. He who travels towards Thee is near to Thee except when the burden of sin separates him from Thee. O may my prayer for forgiveness make thin the veil of my sin." (*Muṭālib-al-Dunyā wa-l-ākhirah*, 'Alī Zain al-'Ābidīn.)

THE ENEMY WITHIN

"The self urgent to evil." (Surah xii, 53) is the great Quranic phrase for the lower nature that has to be mastered. Our prayers describe these urgings by two words constantly used with a sense of guilty malaise. *Hawā*⁶ predilection, inclination, "my own sweet will," waywardness as of the wind (for whose wanderings the verb *hawā* is used), and *shahwāh*, desire, appetite, passion, "carnal lust," not always in the literal sense but often also in the sense in which "carnal" is used in the New Testament for the thoughts and desires of the natural man. The prayers seem to echo that saying of Abū Muḥammad al-Jurairī: "He who is mastered by his lower self becomes a captive in the power of his selfish desires (*shahawāt*), confined in the prison of his own inclinations (*hawā*)." (*Risālah Qushairiyyah* p. 51). The classical Qur²ān text (Surah lxxix. 40) about the conquest of *hawā*: "He who fears his Lord's assize and denies his soul its lower desires, for him Paradise shall be his place of repair" is turned in our manuals into a prayer, and again and again the prayers reflect the inward struggle.

"Make us those in whose hearts the door of selfish desire is locked." (*Majmū^cat al-Wird-al-'Āmm*. p. 8) "Make us those who preoccupy themselves against their selfish desires (*shahawāt*) by the remembrance of Thee, and contend against the claims of greatness through clear knowledge (of Thee) and put out the fire of selfish desire (*hawā*) through the sprinkling of the water of life." (*Al-Munājāt-al-Injiliyyat-al-Wuṣṭā*, 'Alī Zain al 'Ābidīn).

THE SINNER'S WEAKNESS

The inward struggle results in a sense of weakness touchingly expressed in many of the prayers of deeper experience: "I have lost

⁶ *Hawā* has had a curiously variegated career. In those of our prayer manuals which have a Shādhili descent it is used simultaneously for sinful inclinations that must be given no quarter, and for spiritual longing recognised and codified as an early stage in the "way" of the soul.

my purpose. I am stripped of will, lacking in strength and power... O God, my soul is a ship wandering in the seas of (her own) will where there is no refuge and no shelter from Thee but in Thee. Appoint for her, O God, in the Name of God, her course and its harbour." *Ḥizb-al-faḥḥiyyah* and *Ḥizb-al-Ḥifẓ* °Abd-al-Qādir al-Jilānī. "My breast is oppressed, my thoughts wander, I am bewildered. Lord have mercy on one whose disease is great, whose cure is impossible to him, whose sickness increases while his means of healing decrease, whose strength lessens while his will grows stronger. Thou art his refuge and strength, his help and healing. *Al-Ḥizb-al-Kabīr*, °Abd-al-Qādir al-Jilānī.

SINFULNESS

Have we not in these prayers of the inner struggle a sense of sinfulness for more interior than the usual acknowledgment of *dhunūb*, and approaching that sense, so well known to Christianity, of a sinful nature to be forgiven and redeemed, as well as sinful acts? A phrase expressing natural bent (*intiḡāwā*?) comes very close to this conception:

"I ask forgiveness of the great God for those forbidden things towards which my inmost thoughts inclined." *Majmū'at-al-Wird-al-°Amm*. p. 7.)

The use of the word °*aib*, as though a moral defect resembled some blemish of the skin that one would fain cover from sight, has produced a curious sentence quoted in one of our manuals from °Abd al-Wahhāb-al-Sha°rānī, which comes very near to implying a *state* of sinfulness. The picture is like Isaiah's description of his sinful nation: "From the sole of the foot even unto the head there is no soundness in it." (Is. 1.6):

"My brother, the most devout of persons in religious practice, if the real man were revealed, would see himself all blemishes which had run together and joined each to each until they became the very form of the man." (*Al-Faḥḥ-al-Rabbānī*, Aḥmad al-Tijānī.)

The following confession surely expresses the worshipper's sense not of sins only but of sinfulness: "My God, my Lord and Master, this is the position of him who now makes confession of many a fault, many a disobedience, many a misdeed, of lack of moral control. I sinned as I did from inability to deny my own sinful desires. Thy case against me is a clear one, Thy judgment on me must take effect, and there is none that can help my weakness against Thee, save Thee Thyself." (*Ḥizb-al-Taḍarru°*, Aḥmad al-Tijānī). "How shall I not fear Thy punishment with the evil of my state?" (*Wird-al-Sahār*, Muṣṭafā al-Bakrī.) "O God, I confess before Thee that I do not know a single believer on the face of the earth with more of disobedience and transgression than I, nor in a worse spiritual condition, nor with less of holy fear than I, O Thou Guide of the erring. O God

my sins outweigh the sins of them all the first and the last." (*Ḥizb-Imām-al-Ramlī*).

REPENTANCE

Although there have been questionings amongst the doctors, (Ibn Ḥanbal for instance) as to the necessity of repentance for those who are Muslims, the chosen people, who "have Abraham (and Muḥammad) to their father," our prayers show that the worshipping soul knows this experience described by the root *tāba* to come back (synonym *anāba*, to come back, Muḥammad being described as *al-Muṭawwāḍi^c-al-Munīb* (the humble repentant one). The word *taubah* does not occur in the Sunnī prayer-rite but Shī'ahs say: *Astaghfir Allāha rabbī wa atābu ilaihi*, "I seek God's forgiveness and I repent towards Him." Al-Shādhilī said: "If you failed to show the fear of God in right behaviour, do not fail to show it in repentance and return to Him." (*Al-Mufākhīr al-^cAliy*, Aḥmad ibn 'Ibād, p. 53.) "He (M.) said I repent towards God a hundred times every day." (*Ṭahārat-al-Qulūb*, Al-Dīrīnī, p. 4.)

The teaching of the Qur'ān that God loves penitents — *yuhibb-al-tawwābīn* (Surah ii. 222) is echoed in the prayer manuals. "I am near to the rebellious one when he has ceased from his rebellion and I am far from the obedient one when he ceases to obey." (*Al-Ghawthiyyah* cf. Ezekiel xvii.21-23.) But echoed still more is the message that God Himself is *Al-Tawwāb* (Surah ix.15, 119 one of the Ninety Nine Names) — the Prone to return, to relent. The prevenient turning of God to the sinner is seen to underlie all turning of the sinner to God. A commonly used form is: "We ask Thee for a turning first on Thy part towards us, and then a resultant turning on our part towards Thee." (*Al-Wird-al-Kabīr* (Al-Shādhilī).

"A man said to Rābi'ah: "My sins are many: if I repent will God turn towards me?" She said: 'Nay if He has already turned towards you, you will repent.' " (*Ṭahārat-al-Qulūb*, p. 96). This sense of God's turning towards the sinful has made of repentance a meeting place. The modern Indian Christian mystic, Sadhu Sundar Singh, in his *munājāt* heard words from his Lord that are endorsed by the experience of some of the writers of our Muslim prayers. "With my finger I wrote upon the ground the sinful state of each of those who brought the sinful woman to Me for condemnation with My finger too I point out in secret to my servants their wounds of sin; and when they repent, with a touch of the same finger I heal them. When a man turns towards Me in repentance, I cleanse the temple of his heart with the whips of love and make it a heavenly abode for the King of Kings."

A TURNING OF THE WHOLE MAN

The adjective *naṣūh*, sincere, is the companion of the noun *taubah*. "We ask Thee for sincere repentance before death." (*Aurād Aḥmad*

al-Tījānī. p. 7.) "That I may be sincere to Thee in repentance because I fear Thee, and that I may be single-hearted in this sincerity because I love Thee. (Shī'ah Du'ā for the 28th day of Ramaḍān.) — Lightly as the word *tubt* (I repent — used for instance by a servant in apologising for some small fault) is taken on the lips of men in ordinary speech, Islam has seen that sincere repentance calls for a re-alignment of life.

Mu'ādh ibn Jabal said: "O Apostle of God, who art to me father and mother, what is sincere repentance (*taubah nuṣūḥah*)? He said: 'That a man be contrite for the fault that befell him and apologise to God; then, as milk returns not to the udder, he shall not return to it.'" (Al-Ṭabarī, i.38.) *Taubah* then, is the word most commonly used in Muslim religious books for 'conversion,' which comes so near to its meaning of 'turning.' A single story from the manuals will illustrate this use of the word: "Dhū al-Nūn al-Miṣrī said: 'As I was making my perambulation of the House (the Ka'bah) I saw a youth wearing a woollen garment (sign that he was a Ṣūfī) and strutting. He was saying as he went: 'My God, this is the step of one whose boast is in other than Thyself, who glories in other than Thee. How can it become the step of one who has no other love than Thee?' I asked him: 'What is this story?' He replied: 'Oh, uncle, look at yonder slave of the Amīr of Mecca! 'I stepped forward' (Dhū al-Nūn continued), 'and there was a youth trailing his mantle vaingloriously on the ground. And I said to him: 'My boy, you are strutting because you are the slave of the Amīr of Mecca, and this poor Ṣūfī is behind you although he is the slave of the King of heaven and earth. Go back and let him take precedence, he is more worthy than you to bear himself proudly.' Then I saw the boy step back and change colour, and he said to the poor Ṣūfī: 'Step forward for, by God, you are worthier than I. Blessed is he who is like you.' Then he ended his perambulation and went away with bowed head, for the words were working in him. And he returned to his master and bought his freedom from him, and having sold all his possessions and donned a woollen robe he returned to the Ka'bah on the third day, and meeting me he said: 'O Shaikh, I wonder if God Most High will receive me after all those great sins.' So I said to him: 'Be cheered, my son, for you are dear to God. Do you not know that He calls those who are wandering away from Him? Then how much more those who are coming towards Him? Be single-hearted in your resolve, for He will receive you in spite of your past doings.' He answered: 'O Uncle, you have healed my heart after it was all but broken, may God reward you with good for your exhortation!' Then he went away and on the seventh day a man came to me and said: 'O Shaikh, may God give you a great reward in that repentant youth, for he has died.' I said to him: 'Will you not show him to me?' And he conducted me, and I found the boy at rest, his face like the full moon. And I asked how it had been with him. They told me that he had entered that place and

made his ablution and remained before the *mihṛāb* weeping for his soul. 'And in the morning we found him dead.' *Ṭahārat-al-Qulūb*, Al-Dīrīnī.

RESTITUTION

Despite the great riches in the manuals of prayer regarding sin as self-wronging there is in many cases an apparent oblivion as to the wronging of others.⁷ For the most part there is little in them of that delicacy of conscience towards others, which caused Al-Sirri al-Saqaṭī to ask forgiveness for thirty years because he had rejoiced that his shop had been saved from a fire in which those of fellow-Muslims had been burnt. Yet Miss E. Mitchell, who lived for many years among Muslims in the Faizabad, reports that it is there customary for a man upon his deathbed to seek the forgiveness both of his friends and of his enemies.

The typical reference in the prayer manuals to sins against fellow-creatures runs as follows: "O God, I have sins between Thee and me and sins between me and Thy creatures. O God, forgive me for Thy part in them, and for Thy creatures' part, do Thou take the responsibility and pardon me of Thy generosity." (*Dalā'il-al-Khairāt*, p. 57, and frequently in the manuals.)

But although the prayers show little trace of that grief for the wronging of others which is part of the anguish of penitence, instructions on repentance often include the duty of restitution or reparation: "When a man had in his presence said: 'I ask forgiveness of God.' 'Alī rejoined: 'May thy mother be bereaved of thee, hast thou any perception of what asking forgiveness means? Asking forgiveness is one of the stages to be passed through by exalted souls. It is dependent on six aspects; first, remorse for the past; second, determination never to return to past sin; third, payment to created beings of their rights so that thou mayest meet God Most High free from all responsibility; fourth, that thou shalt determine to give to every religious duty its due form and full performance; fifth, that thou shalt afflict the flesh that has grown on thy bones and reduce it by thine attrition till the skin cleaves to the bone and a new flesh shall grow between them; and sixth, that thou shalt make the body taste the pains of obedience as thou didst make it taste the sweets of rebellion. When thou hast done this thou canst say: 'I ask forgiveness of God.' " (*Majmū'a-al-Aurād-al-ʿĀmm.* p. 9.) "Jacob had been blamed for 'falling to nourish orphan neighbours.' So after this Jacob used to order a crier to announce at dinner time and at supper time: 'Whoever desires to dine or to sup let him come to the family of Jacob.' For this cause it is said: 'He who has sinned let him perform a good deed

⁷ Though in the Dantesque hell of Al-Jilī, sinners against others are placed lower than those who fail to fulfill obligations of the sacred law. (*Insān Kāmil*, Bāb 58).

corresponding to the type of wrong that he did by his transgression.'” (*Ṭahārat-al-Qulūb*, p. 105.)

THE BROKEN AND CONTRITE HEART

“O Lord endow me with a lowly, humble, prostrate heart, and a weeping eye ... and sincere acceptable repentance.” (*Aurād Aḥmad al-Tijānī* p. 40.)

Here we come to the experience of the grief of penitence; described by the words *nadāmah*, contrition; *kamad*, wearing grief, attrition, remorse. (*Hazan*, mourning grief, though used in Ṣūfī literature does not appear to have found its way into the manuals.) “And it is said he who turns from transgression from fear of the chastisement of God Most High is repentant (*tāʿib*) and he who returns from shame at God’s gaze on him is contrite (*munīb*) and he who returns for God’s greater glory is a penitent (*tawwāb*), *Ṭahārat-al-Qulūb*, p. 96.) “O Lord, if contrition (*nadam*) is repentance before Thee, well, I am the most contrite of contrite souls. And if the forsaking of disobedience is to return to Thee, well, I am the most contrite of contrite souls.” *Duʿā fī-al-taubah*, *Al-Ṣaḥīfat-al-Sajjādiyyah*, p. 276.) “Make us to be those who taste the bitterness of attrition (*kamad*) till they are saved from their defects.” (*Al-munājāt-al-injīliyyah*, p. 222.)

QURANIC EXAMPLES

Two Quranic types of sin (supported by traditional additions to the Quranic stories) are held up before the readers of our manuals, the sin of Iblīs and the sin of Adam⁸ and two Quranic types of penitent, Dhū-al-Nūn (Jonah) and Adam. The Quranic prayers of both are constantly employed. Among the Quranic types of sin we find: “Beware of pride for pride prevented Iblīs from prostrating himself to Adam. Beware of greed for greed led Adam to eat from the tree. And beware of envy for it was only from envy that one of the two sons of Adam killed his fellow.” (*Al-Mufākhīr-al-ʿAlīy*, Aḥmad ibn ʿIbād, p. 20.)

Of Jonah and Adam typical penitents, we read: “My soul is darkened and Thy servant is in grief and care and anxiety. The whale of selfish desires has swallowed him and he calls to Thee with the call of the beloved, the preserved from sin, Thy prophet and servant Jonah, the son of Mattā, saying to Thee: ‘There is no god but Thee, glory be to Thee, lo! I was one of the wrongdoers.’ (Surah xxi. 87) ‘Answer me, then, as Thou didst answer him and help me with love in my isolation and loneliness.” *Munājāt-al-Shaiḫ Abū Ḥasan al-Shādhilī*.

“It is narrated that Adam when he ate of the tree, and the raiment

⁸ In spite of the protest sometimes made that his fall should not be regarded as ‘sin’ because he was a prophet.

of Paradise was stripped from him, wandered fugitive and began to hide himself among the leaves of the garden. And his Lord called to him: 'Dost thou fly from me, oh Adam?' He said: 'Rather am I ashamed before Thee O Lord.' And God Most High said: 'Did I not create thee with My hand. Did I not cause my angels to prostrate themselves before thee? Did I not breathe into thee of My spirit? Did I not give thee a dwelling in My paradise, in My neighbourhood? Why then hast thou disobeyed Me? Go out from My neighbourhood, for he who disobeys Me cannot dwell near Me.'

Then Adam said: 'Glory and praise be to Thee O God. There is no god but Thee. My Lord I have done evil and wronged myself. Therefore, have mercy on me, Thou who art the most merciful of them that show mercy. And turn Thyself to me, Thou who art prone to relent, and Compassionate.' And these are the words which Adam learnt from his Lord... And some of the traditionalists say that he said: 'O God, by the reverence due to Muḥammad, forgive me' and he forgave him." (*Ṭahārat-al-Qulūb*, Al-Dīrīnī, p. 95.)

Of the Adamic prayer for pardon, we read: The *Imām* Aḥmad narrated that Abū Ḥuraira said: The Apostle of God said: When Adam was sent down to earth he circumambulated the Ka'bah for a week and performed a prayer of two prostrations behind the prayer-platform. Then he said: 'O God Thou knowest my secret and my outward life, receive then my apology. Thou knowest my need, then grant my request. Thou knowest how I stand, then forgive all my sins for there is none that forgiveth sins but Thee.' " *Al-Mukhtarāt-al-Ḥusnā* 'Alī Ḥasan Sharīf, p. 26.) "Your father Adam wept over one sin three hundred years. Whenever he saw the angels mount to heaven he said: 'How I long for home!' " *Ṭahārat-al-Qulūb*, p. 142.

This thought must have been current in pre-Islamic Christianity. Cyril of Jerusalem in the 11th century said: "He (God) casts him out from Paradise, for because of sin he was unworthy to live there; but he put him to dwell over against Paradise (LXX of Gen iii.24) that seeing whence he had fallen, and from what and into what a state he was brought down, he might afterwards be saved by repentance." (*Lecture II* to those preparing for Baptism.)

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VIEW POINTS IN PAKISTAN. I

The daily business of living and earning a living is the chief concern of the people of Pakistan. But there is wide interest in rethinking and reshaping the form of the state, a state which constitutes probably the largest single concentration of self-governing Muslims in the world. The vast majority is deeply loyal to the idea of an Islamic state. Nevertheless there is, for the most part, no clear definition of what an Islamic state in fact is. In the acceptance there is less of piety and more of a solidarity fostered and aroused to self-consciousness by the slogans taught to vast audiences by demagogues and cleverly adapted to win the attention of the largely illiterate and uncritical masses.

For these every well-wisher covets a deeper, broader and more balanced political judgement by means of wider education and a growing experience of responsibility. For it is only thus that the division between 'us' the ruled and 'they' the rulers can give place to a unity free from suspicion and tension. The very uncertainties and experiments of the present have been intellectually stimulating to an important minority of writers and thinkers. There is a ferment of opinion and counter opinion which finds expression in journalism, the production of pamphlets, speeches and newspaper apologetics. Into this mass of production one must delve to follow the workings of the minds of the more or less uneducated. The materials cover a very wide field indeed and the treatment must needs be very selective. Full justice cannot be done to every side of the new apologetic for Islam nor to the cultural analyses being produced in great numbers in Lahore. In the absence of a more leisured survey selections are presented which the writer considers suggestive. It has been our intention to avoid in this survey any unnecessary duplication of material presented in the three articles contributed to *The Muslim World* during 1956 on "Pakistani Constitution Making" by Miss Grace J. Calder and the points discussed by Dr. G. W. Choudhury in his treatment of "Religious Minorities in Pakistan" in the same Volume of this Quarterly. For this reason, our emphasis in this article falls upon three conservative thinkers whose views on Islam's duty in Pakistan diverge from those that have in fact shaped the course of constitutional definition. Nevertheless they demand careful study: for they remain powerful elements in the total setting. Not the least of the aspirations of the Christian student of these thinkers is for a deeper, less naive and assertive, reckoning with the religious issues they know at least how to identify.

ABŪ-L-ʿALĀ AL-MAUDŪDĪ AND THE ISLAMIC STATE

Early in the field, even before partition, the gifted Maulana Abū-l-ʿAlā al Maudūdī in the organ of his party, *Tarjumān al Qurʾān*, made

clear what he thought an Islamic state ought to be. In general it may be said that it must be recognized as a religio-political concept in the minds of a great majority of Muslims if not a fundamental principle to which all instructed Muslims would subscribe. Bishop Subhān once said: "The principle of unity and order which in other countries is called *civitas, polis*, state, in Islam is personified by Allah." Islam is the embodiment of God's direct government in the earth. Maudūdī's aim was for Muslims to make common cause in the production of such a theocracy.¹ He thought that Muslims could be divided into three categories: Pakistanis, who were devoted to the setting up of a separate state; anti-British represented by the Ahrars and the Congress Party; and people taking a middle position. All of them, he considered, concurred in doubting whether it was practicable to attempt to work out the ideal of an Islamic state. It was, he felt, his mission to indicate how this could be accomplished. He took as his text Surah ix.33: "He it is who has sent His Messenger with guidance and the Religion of Truth, in order to set it above every other religion, though the polytheists may be averse to this." By "guidance" he understood the right conduct of life in this world, and including the conduct of all individuals, the management of domestic affairs, matters relating to society, the administration of the state, practical political wisdom, and international relations — in short human life in all its aspects. He is in much of this a disciple of Shāh Walī Ullāh who was a powerful thinker and who asserted that the miracle of the Qurʾān was not pre-eminently the eloquence of the Qurʾān but the substance of the law, the Sharīʿah. For Maudūdī this is also the religion of truth (*dīn-i-Haqq*). The word *dīn* is used because it lays upon men a peculiar "obedience" (*iṭāʿah*) in thought and deed. But *dīn* (now used for "religion") has the significance of "state" as used in these modern times, implying the acceptance of a supreme authority and implicit obedience to it. Bearing this interpretation in mind, the "true religion" must mean the rejection of the service and the worship of self and others, the acknowledgement of God's supreme and sole authority and service and obedience to Him alone. In this there is no room for individual independence or for the authority of one man over his fellows, a thought prompted in this place by the totalitarian systems and dictatorships of the time. All authority resides in God alone, and his authority extends to every part of life, throughout its whole range: the filial obedience of a son to his father, the submission of wife to her husband or of a servant to his master, the intention being that every subordinate submission in our human experience must be brought into subjection to the one over-riding obedience to God.

Polytheism, far from being a theoretical thing, is applicable to all who associate with and contaminate their obedience to God by some

¹ *Tarjumān al Qurʾān*, February, 1941.

inferior loyalty or form of submission. So far as the laws of nature are concerned, everyone is subject to them whether he likes it or not. But in so far as there is a choice open to men, some people will render implicit obedience to beings other than God, while some will divide their loyalties between God and others. This being the general state it was essential that from among the Muslims there should be created a party wholly surrendered to God and applying itself to the realisation of the great ideal in their own lives. This is what the earliest disciples of the Prophet exemplified in their own lives. Success in bringing this ideal to realisation depends on three things: (1) Calling on mankind to accept God's sovereignty; (2) forming a society consisting of such Muslims as are prepared to accept the call, with a full recognition of all its implications; (3) a direct assault on all systems which render obedience to others beside God.

All the present political parties Maudūdī considered to have deviated from the right way of achieving the Islamic ideal, because they thought that efforts in this direction could only be abortive in the circumstances at present prevailing in the world. Therefore they held that there are other political, cultural, social and economic schemes of which Muslims can make use without prejudice to their religious faith. Moreover, Islam requires certain specific religious beliefs, a cult and a law, which involve a change of religion and community for those not within the Muslim fold. Non-Muslims are prejudiced against Islam and this militates against their acceptance of the Islamic ideal. Moreover, the standard of morality among Muslims is not high enough to enable them to achieve the ideal set before them. For these reasons, says Maudūdī Muslims in India before partition turned to other expedients. Some considered it necessary to cooperate with Nationalists, in an interim compromise until the true Islamic ideal could be put into effect. Others considered that the separation of Hindus from Muslims was the panacea for all troubles. [This reveals Maudūdī as not at that time a "Pakistani"]. The third category of those who hesitated to commit themselves to the course Maudūdī advocated were not disposed to accept the restrictions which Islam would lay upon them in belief, dogma, cult and law, and for this reason preferred to remould Islam.

Maudūdī would not admit that nationalists acknowledged the supreme power and authority of God. Rather they affirmed man's independence and the primacy of a democratic form of Government. "There is no difference between the sovereignty of the British and the sovereignty of a democratic form of Government" he said. Both were substitutes for Divine authority. "From the Muslim standpoint, both forms of government are equally rebellious, impious, traitorous and wicked." The idea of the supreme authority of God cannot be promoted by encouraging people to believe that the sovereignty is theirs. He attacked the advocates of a separate state for Muslims in the following terms: "What has made their policy most objectionable... is

that while Nationalist Muslims fight in the name of their nation and in the interests of their country" the advocates of Pakistan "talk as if they were fighting for Islam and in this way Islam has become an element in political strife and non-Muslims regard Islam as their political opponent... In this way they have raised an obstacle to the spread of Islam in India... Sometimes they proclaim the merits of Islam... but such a pronouncement with a communal backing is only an occasion for communal pride instead of being a summons to accept the fundamentals of Islam... What they proclaim as Islam's glory is actually a contradiction of Islam." Theoretically in praise of Islam which abolishes distinctions among men on the grounds of race, community, nation and country, they are hostile to such distinctions and yet in actual fact they contradict this by agitating in favour of their own nation.

In regard to the way support for the Pakistan movement was promoted Maudūdi drew attention to the fact that politicians invariably made their appeal to born Muslims and that such people formed the mass of those recruited as supporters. These had the power to elect the officers and executive of the movement and stamped the whole organization as a communal one. If the object were really religious and based on the fundamental principles of Islam it would be far otherwise. "To reckon the individuals of a nation to be true Muslims just because they are Muslims by birth and to hope that any collective action of these persons would necessarily be in accordance with Muslim principles would be radically wrong." "The truth is that nine-hundred and ninety nine in a thousand of the multitudes which form the Muslim community *have no knowledge of Islam and are unable to distinguish between right and wrong and conform neither morally nor intellectually to the ideals of Islam.*"

In further criticism of the votaries of partition he says: "The primary aim of the "Pakistani" Muslims is to set up an Islamic state in those provinces where Muslims are in a majority, on the basis of the form of democracy which the British purpose to establish in India. Later on there would be taken steps to change this gradually into a purely Islamic state. ...They are completely in error in the supposition that if in those provinces where Muslims are in a majority there were set up an independent state on democratic lines this would contribute in the end to the establishment of a government based on God's absolute sovereignty." Such states as that envisaged were already in existence in Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt. What it was thought to create in the new state of Pakistan these other states had already. Had they advanced appreciably towards the creation of a purely Islamic state?

Maudūdi described the efforts of those who wished to alter Islam to suit the times as trying to make the medicine palatable. To join such a group it would not be necessary to suspend the whole Muslim

creed, the Shari'ah, the Muslim modes of worship, pretending that such concessions are only temporary. They must be regarded, as it were, as an interim period of indoctrination preparatory to the full application of Islamic commandments. Maudūdi considered such alterations and modifications quite unlawful to Islam. Muslims are not the authors or inventors of Islam. "Islam is not our property for us to offer it to others, with alterations suitable to the requirements of the market". Such fundamentalism would seem to reject the possibility of the reinterpretation of Islam and its modernisation.

Maudūdi thought that one mark of the truly Islamic state was a total absence of nationalism: "an ideological state hitherto unknown in the world. Of ancient times people only knew those forms of government based on the rule of a tribe or class and only later did they learn forms of government built up on racial and national distinctions. But government based on an ideal, the acceptance of which would entitle a man to inclusion and participation in the government without distinction of nationality it had never been possible for the world, limited as it was by its narrow outlook, to conceive." He suspected that Christianity had come to a dim vision of this but it could not find a complete plan to put into operation and was therefore unable to build such a state. Communism has created great propaganda for its ideal and even tried to build a state on that ideal and by this means the world has begun to perceive the significance of such a state. But this too has been corrupted by nationalism and the ideal has been lost. Islam alone which from the beginning prevented the state from being contaminated by any taint of nationalism, has built a state solely upon the ideal and invites mankind to accept it as a non-national government.

An outstanding characteristic of the ideal Islamic state is the conception of God's sovereignty. The land belongs to God. He is its ruler and no individual, no particular class and not even mankind as a whole, has sovereign rights over it. Man can only legitimately act as God's vice-gerent, his Khalifah, as the recipient of a law and system of government derived directly from God and not of human devising, or he must follow someone else who has received such a law directly from God. In comparison with other forms of political state, a peculiar attitude and type of character and manner of life are necessary to construct and work this state. The Judges and Chief Justices of secular states would be "unfit to serve as clerks in it and the Police Superintendent unfit to act as an ordinary constable in it; the Field Marshal would be unfit to be a common private in this ideal state and Foreign Ministers, far from being worthy even to hold the most menial office in it, would hardly escape imprisonment on conviction for lying, treachery and dishonesty."

Such a state as Maulana Maudūdi conceives the Islamic state to be can, he thinks, be created only by adopting the methods which the

Messengers (Prophets) of God used. But not much is known of how they acted. Brief allusions to them and their ways in the Qurʾān are not sufficient to enable us to construct a complete system. In the New Testament are some authentic sayings of Jesus which throw light on the way a movement should be directed in its early stages and on the problems likely to be met, but Jesus had no opportunity to conduct such a movement in its subsequent stages. It is, therefore, only from the life of Muḥammad that clear and perfect guidance can be given. Ultimately "the constitution of the state and its policy for home and foreign affairs were laid down by him". His life illustrates the minutest details of every phase of development of the government of an Islamic state. The Prophet did not consider it necessary to make some preparatory attempts to impress people by certain political activities and so gain ascendancy over them, subsequently using the power thus acquired to bring people gradually to the point when he could present his ideals in unequivocal language. He plunged straight into his task of reformation with his uncompromising declaration, "There is no god save God".

In the whole universe there is only one King, Lord, and Sovereign Ruler. Man should not be the slave of any creature. "There is no lawgiver here on earth, for the Law is His and He alone has the right and authority to make the Law and present it to his creatures." The persecution which Muḥammad and his disciples experienced was effective in weeding out the incapable, the weak-minded and the irresolute. The second stage of the development of the Islamic state began in Medina, where upwards of three hundred followers, fully trained in Islamic principles and able to act as true Muslims, undertook responsibility. Maudūdī considers that Jesus had similar ideas concerning the founding of the ideal state in its first stages and refers to Mt. v. 39-41; vi. 9 f, 24-33; vii. 7; x. 21 f, 28; xi, 28-30; xvi. 24; xxii. 15-21; xxiii. 2-28; Mk. xii. 28-32; Lk. xiv. 26-33 & xxii. 25 f. He considers that if the ministry of Jesus had been prolonged beyond the first stage, He would have been committed to a phase of military activity just as Muḥammad was.

In 1941, Maudūdī formed his Islamic Society and invited non-Muslims to join it, the condition being that they must recite the *kalimah* with a full appreciation of all its implications. Upon admission the member must begin to perform the five obligatory duties: testimony, worship, fasting, almsgiving and pilgrimage. They must try to avoid "great sins" and repent if they unintentionally fall into them, must forsake any profession which involved unrighteousness, like usury, selling intoxicants, taking bribes and fighting except in Holy War. They must make restitution of any ill-gotten possessions to their rightful owners, must resign from all legislative bodies, since it is the right of God alone to legislate, and they must return any title granted to them by Government and refrain from seeking redress or aid in

any court of justice of any government not based on Islamic ideals.

Set before all members were the following aims: to gain knowledge of Islamic principles sufficient to be able to discriminate between what was Islamic and what not; to shape their lives according to God's instructions and surrender themselves to His will; to avoid anything contrary to Qurānic teaching and the traditions; to cleanse their hearts of all worldly things, renouncing the friendship of the wicked and cultivating that of the pious; to cut themselves off from people serving in institutions not run on Islamic principles; to be honest, just, God-fearing in all their affairs and to have the one single purpose, namely to establish the true religion in the earth. No one was to be admitted to this Society who was engaged in any other than an Islamic Government, *if they considered such service to be lawful*. If, however, they were prepared to confess that such employment was unlawful, but for lack of faith were afraid for their livelihood, they could be admitted as associate members.

It must be remembered that all these proposals were made before the achievement of Pakistan. It can easily be imagined what difficulties such a program presented to those who were engaged in planning the new state and to the many permanent officials inherited from the old régime who knew the practical day-to-day requirements of a modern state which would include not only Muslims but considerable minorities of Hindus and Christians. It is hard to see also how such a view as that held by Maudūdī could be squared with the Declaration of Fundamental Rights. Such a program must be largely one of conversion.

SULAIMĀN NADWĪ, MUḤAMMAD SHĀFĪ AND THE BOARD OF TA^ʿLĪMĀT

The foreword to this semi-official document² starts with a contrast between Christianity and Islam that is of particular interest. Sulaimān Nadwī takes the saying of Christ; "Give unto God what is God's and unto Caesar what is Caesar's", as meaning that authority is to be divided between God and Caesar, a tenet which Islam rejects. This interpretation cannot be admitted. Between the two parts of this sentence there is no adversative relation but a complementary instruction. In rendering to Caesar, what manifestly by its superscription belonged to him, there need be nothing repugnant to the sovereignty of God, any more than there could be something contrary to God's sovereignty in the possession of private property. Nardwī continues with the quotation of three verses of the Qur^ʿān: Surahs xliii, 85, 84

² The title of the book which contains these is "*Basic Principles of the Qurānic Constitution of the State...containing the major articles of the constitution of the state, based on the Holy Qur^ʿān and being the lecture notes of the Dars-i-Qur^ʿān*"; author: Mufti-i-Azam Maulana Muḥammad Shāfī, member of the Ta^ʿlīmāt-i-Islām Board, Constituent Assembly of Pakistan dated 12/9/53 with a Foreword by Ḥazrat Maulana Sayyid Sulaimān Nadwī, President, Ta^ʿlīmāt-i-Islām Board.

and xviii. 26 (in that order). "To him belongs the Kingdom of the heavens and the earth" "It is he who is God in heaven and God on earth" "He does not share his command with any person whatever." He holds that the distinction between secular and religious is false. "The worshipper in the mosque, the soldier on the battle-field, the administrator of the state, all perform religious functions. Islam has given laws pertaining to the administration and conduct of the state."

Without explaining why there should be any period of degeneracy in a Muslim state, since it is all too often presented as self-sustaining by its own inherent virtue, Nadwī says: "The period of European political ascendancy synchronised with the period of degeneration of the Muslim World... Muslim governments began aping the West and gradually declared it to be necessary, not only in the domains of thought and culture, but also in the realm of constitutional problems".

The argument goes round in a circle. No authority is given for the assertion that Europe derived its ideas of the state from Islam, and if this be true could there be much harm in later Muslim governments "aping" the West in what, by his claim, they had originally borrowed from Islam? Nadwī would have been a sounder guide to his compatriots if he had not all too frequently lived in a make-believe golden age of the past. But turning to the present, he says: "Then came the establishment of Pakistan, ... the experts of Islamic learning turned to the need of executing that great and noble task in the light of the Holy Qurʾān and the Sunnah", of "codifying the Islamic Constitution." But he does not tell us why, if political guidance was given to the West by Islam in the Middle Ages, it should be such a new task to "codify the Islamic Constitution" today. "As a consequence, the Taʿlīmāt-i-Islam Board was formed by the Government to assist the Constituent Assembly with regard to Islamic guidance on constitutional problems."

The rest of this work consists of the proposals sponsored by this official body and takes the form of the instruction given by Mufti Muḥammad Shāfī to those who felt the need of better information as to what Islam had laid down with regard to a form of constitution which would be in conformity with the Qurʾān and the Sunnah.

The Mufti finds it necessary to rebuke those who quarrel concerning whether enquiry into the Quranic teaching is purely a matter for the *mullas*, and those people who accuse the *mullas* of claiming a monopoly in this field: "The saying: 'The Qurʾān is not the monopoly of the *mullas*, but every Muslim has the right to it' is nothing short of crass ignorance, because the question of the Qurʾān being anyone's monopoly could neither arise in the past nor can it arise in the future." In spite of this, many anti-clerical Pakistanis *have* raised the question. "The Qurʾān is not a book about a constitution like the constitutional documents of the present day. The constitutional principles it has enunciated are found scattered in different chapters... I shall try to

arrange these scattered gems of wisdom into a form nearer to the form of constitutional formulation in vogue today. Nevertheless it is evident that the task before me is not the formulation and systematization of the complete Islamic constitution, but only the statement and exposition of those fundamental articles of the constitution which have been explicitly enunciated in the Holy Qur^{ān}. As regards the codification of the complete Islamic constitution, *it is necessary to combine with these Quranic verses, the guidance contained in the sayings and doings of the Holy Prophet, (i.e. the Ḥadīth)* because the Book of Allah and the Sunna of the Prophet of Allah, together constitute the source of all problems relating to Islam."

It is doubtful how Shi^āhs might regard the inclusion of the Sunnah of the Sunnis among the authoritative sources of material for the construction of a theory of the Islamic state. They would differ in all probability in reference to the method whereby the "head of the state" was chosen. It is in this form that the vexed question of the Caliphate is raised in Indian Islam at the present day. Though small in numbers in comparison with the overwhelming Sunni majority, the Shi^āhs stand as a protest against the assertion that the Qur^{ān} lays down the method of electing a successor to the Prophet in the divine society of Islam. In his foreword, Nadwī commits himself to the specific point about the qualifications of the head of the state. In an Islamic state would the Caliph be the Imam, or vice versa, or would these two offices be held by different individuals? Furthermore if the work which Muhammad Shafi has attempted is so completely *de novo*, must it be assumed that the great doctors who in the past have written on *Fiqh* have given no clear and specific outline of what a Muslim state should be? If it is alleged that the West was influenced in its political evolution by the Islamic achievement in political philosophy can we conclude that only now, when Pakistan has come into being, have the principles of a truly Islamic constitution been gathered in compendious form?

The Mufti continues with a statement of the conclusion he has reached in his research in articles of which we herewith present the gist. The first asserts that the functions and aims of the state are to establish justice and equity for all citizens, to prevent internal disorder and guard against aggression from without, to organise for Muslims the prayers and the collection and disbursement of Zakāt, to confirm what is reputable (*al ma^ʿrūf*) and eradicate what is disreputable (*al munkar*) (quoting in support Surahs lvii. 25, ii. 252, xxii. 42). Anticipating that some might consider that the objective of the state might better be described as against *kuf^r* and *shirk*, unbelief and breach of the unity of God, Muḥammad Shāfi thinks that the state is more properly concerned with the prevention of public mischief and bloodshed. "Allah has ordained that while governmental authority may

exist (co-exist?), with infidelity (*kufṛ*), the combination of authority with injustice and mischief cannot endure."

The second article lays down the form of government in the same way as Maulāna Maudūdī. Sovereignty belongs to God alone. "The government of the earth is entrusted to mankind only as a trust and a delegated function." In support he cites Surahs v. 120; xii. 30 and 40; "The jurisdiction belongs to God alone," xxxvi. 83; iii. 25 and ii. 28. In the last verse, in connexion with the creation of Adam, God says: "Lo! I am going to place a vice-gerent in the earth," which is the support for the "delegated functions" of man. This differs to a certain extent from Maudūdī's opinion which uncompromisingly denies that man can be a legislator at all.

Article 3 lays down that nothing repugnant to the Qurʾān and the Sunnah should be enacted as legislation in an Islamic state. No "administrative step or order contravening the stipulations of the Qurʾān and Sunnah is permissible. Anyone who contravenes these is an unbeliever (*kāfir*), iniquitous or unjust (*ẓālim*) or wicked (*fāsiq*). The writer's comment on these verses is rather strange. These verses "do not say that those who judge and command in accordance with laws *which Allah has not revealed*, are unbelievers, wrongdoers or transgressors. This fact bears out the permissibility of legislation of legitimate type" (i.e. *mubāḥ*) "by human beings... No law can be legitimately made in opposition to 'what Allah has revealed', but in cases where no law has been given to us by Allah either directly or indirectly through His prophet, we have freedom to frame laws in conformity with the spirit of revealed guidance, and in consonance with the requirements of the age in which we live, the country to which we belong, and the general conditions that surround us. This gives a wide scope for legislative activity to the people." Reference to the sterner code of Maudūdī will give the reason for this explanation of rights to legislate and it must be regarded as a compromise to a more liberal interpretation. The inclusion of the *sunnah* or *ḥadīth* is in Shāfi's opinion authorised by the words of Surah lix. 7: "What the Messenger gives you take, and what he forbids you refrain from."

Guidance in the case of a difference of opinion between the rulers and the ruled as to the conformity of any particular law with the Sharīʿah must be sought in the Qurʾān and Sunnah, in which case the last word lies with the "experts of the Qurʾān and Sunnah." This is the substance of article 4. Lest anyone should say that this means that a certain class (the *mullas* or "clerics") would be specially privileged in the new state (against which there is a great mass of dissenting opinion) the following explanation is given: "Any believer who devotes himself to the study of the Qurʾān and Sunnah and attains the requisite specialised understanding and knowledge, becomes *ipso facto* the specialist and expert." This stipulation would seem to render a special Board of 'Ulamā unnecessary. It also puts a pre-

mium upon self-constituted experts in the absence of any agreed system of testing and authorizing them. The passage of the Qur^{ān} referred to in support of this article is Surah iv. 62, in regard to which the expositor says: "Those possessing authority or command" include both '*Ulamā*' and men in governmental command.

In contrast to the scorn of Maudūdi for a state based on democracy, Muḥammad Shāfi in article 5 lays down that "the form of government shall be democratic and consultative, and that the power to appoint and depose the head of the state shall vest in the people, who shall use it through their elected representatives." This appointment or dismissal of the head of the state is a matter of supreme importance. Even Muḥammad was required (Surah iii. 153) to consult with others, although "actually he had no need, because the doors of direct divine guidance through revelation were open to him. In spite of that he was commanded to do so for the sake of the education of his followers." Surah xlii.38 is also quoted as authorizing consultations.

Article 6 declares the system of republican government to be the most in accord with the spirit and ideals of Islam. The Quranic authority for this is given as Surah xxxviii. 25 which, being an exhortation to David on his appointment to be "a vice-gerent in the earth", seems hardly to support a republican form of government. The explanation, however, is that responsibility for administration and government depends on this vice-gerent, "khalifah or the *Amīr-al mu'minīn* (commander of the faithful)". "That is obviously possible only under the Republican system".

The author does not consider these articles and others, here omitted for reasons of space, to be exhaustive. He considers that even cursory readers of the Qur^{ān} may have knowledge of the principles which should be adopted and declares that the first three articles "carry within them a revolutionary concept which transforms all secular acts into religious, the governmental administration into worship, the mundane affairs of man into acts of virtue, and the human government into the Kingdom of God". The society envisaged must be "imbued with the highest ideals, with a lofty moral idealism and a robust outlook on life, with Allah's pleasure and not the satisfaction of selfish motives as its goal, its entire activity must be controlled by the fear of God and not by the flimsy deterrents to vice, fashioned by the ingenuity of man." Its constitution and law must be free from "racial, national, linguistic and geographical considerations." "Its government must be immune from those aberrations and emaciating influences which are the natural products of party systems, because of the stability of its constitution and its law, derived as they are from the unchanging and unalterable source of the Qur^{ān} and the Sunnah."

Article 7, stipulates that properties, treasuries and offices of the state are trusts which the government holds for the benefit of the people. As for the poor and needy, "the government should instruct

the officers concerned personally to search out the needy and assess their needs by means of thorough investigations on the spot." Umar used to go round Medina at night "to observe things and conditions for himself." An instance is given of his finding a woman with hungry children and his returning to the treasury, packing food into a bag, and carrying it, in spite of the protests of a servant, to give it personally into the hands of the woman. Not content with this he cooked the meal himself and saw the family fed, and would not leave till the children were happily playing. "There was no question of preparing and submitting applications in any office and getting them sanctioned. Even going to a bank to receive the money was not required. The head of the state was himself present." This is the Mufti's conclusion from an instance in a distribution of gold, silver and precious stones, made after the Persian Conquest in the early days of Islam, when Umar asked the people concerned to state their needs and take a share accordingly. When they protested: "It is your duty to find out those who possess the right to it, and assess the needs of each," Umar admitted the justice of their plea and prepared exhaustive lists of the needy Anṣār and Muḥājirūn, so that each could get his due without asking. Self-respect must be preserved "above all mundane considerations." Can Muḥammad Shāfi have meant this to be taken seriously? Could the millions of people involved in a state like Pakistan be dealt with in this personal and paternal way?

The learned doctor turns then to instances of men refusing public office and says: "Once it is realised that the offices of the state are not really meant to provide personal benefits, comforts and luxuries to their holders, but are primarily and essentially trusts of grave responsibility and accountability before God and man, no conscientious person would ever wish for an office." Officers should be appointed, "on the basis of their incorruptibility and soundness of moral character". In addition they should not be free to do as they liked but should be bound by law. "They shall be liable to public censure... every such officer deserves nothing less than dismissal." The vigilance of his superiors, the possibility of public censure, and the right of the people under the Islamic system of government to approach to any officer of the state whatever his rank, and submit their complaints and demand satisfaction will, according to this, assure the desired incorruptibility. "No administrative incorruptibility is possible without moral transformation... and unless the fear of accountability before God becomes the watch-word of entire state-activity." The writer says that though at present laws against corruption are enacted with a staff of officers to enforce them, there is no standard of judgement of the incorruptibility of the officers appointed. "We have a full-fledged Refugees' ministry but the entire refugee population seems to stand today where it stood yesterday." He desires everything to be put to the test of the Islamic code. "The Islamic code of life is

itself a touchstone which transmutes all base metals into gold. Indeed, the transformation of character is its great function." There is much with which one can sympathise here. When people are less religious, when they have doubts about a future life and future rewards and punishments, how can fear be the deterrent which the Mufti desires it to be? What motives can be supplied to promote "incorruptibility"? Fear of the consequences may, but not necessarily fear of consequences in a future life, as Communist régimes show.

The Mufti considers that Pakistan is confronted with a situation comparable to that occasion when the Prophet in the Farewell Pilgrimage said: "All practices of the Days of Ignorance have been trampled under my feet." He says: "We are confronted with a somewhat similar problem. The 'enlightened' Westernized Muslims are spell-bound by what the West says and does. They fail to see the moral and general havoc caused by Western ideas and ideals." Specifically, the administration of justice has become commercialized. "It is only by making people God-conscious that we can make them truly conscientious and eliminate the evils from the social and political life... Mere law cannot but remain helpless in suppressing crimes... The formal instruments of the law cannot succeed... in making men law-abiding." There is a genuine cry from the heart in the closing exhortations of this book. There is a fear of the secularism and materialism of the day but will the Mufti's conception of religion in the Muslim state stem the tide of unbelief and secularism?

On the practical side, there is much which is naïve, as when it is suggested that the personal supervision of ʿUmar among a small group of Muslims could be the pattern of action for the head of a state of many millions of people dispersed over a wide area and greatly diverse in race, language and manners. A point which is practically ignored or forgotten is that power tends to corrupt those who hold it. Disinterested power is hard to find. Misgiving increases when one reads Islamic history. Muslims too often read it uncritically and with enthusiastic and admiring piety which lends glamour to the pages. It contains little to encourage the hope of the evolution or attainment of an ideal state. The glorious prime of the ʿAbbāsids with their love of learning was hardly a pattern for politics. Changes of rule by violence, assassination and revolution were all too frequent. Has fear operated as a deterrent in the past? In fact, does the "fear of God" alone produce piety and the dedication of lives to the service of mankind? Particularly in the present era, when so much of man's subjugation of the forces of nature tends to fortify in him the sense of self-sufficiency, it is less the fear of God than the fear of natural consequences which acts as a restraint or a spur or incentive. Retribution in a future life is becoming less and less a stimulus to righteousness. Is it not something higher, of which not only Islam but mankind in general stands in need, the spirit of love and compassion such as

Christ revealed? Is the ideal to be achieved by a cold passion for the perfect law, or by the persuasion of a heart-winning personality, whose pre-eminent love promotes a contagion of love in other men?

It is interesting to turn from the Mufti's comments to those of Dr. Muḥammad Rafi-ad-Dīn in his study of Marxism.³ In the course of his discussion he points out that the equal distribution of wealth may be desirable and "part of the urge of human nature to love others", but "this urge can never find a free and full expression unless its counterpart, the urge to love the Creator, is also permitted to have a free and full expression." This basing of the ethic upon the command: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God... and thy neighbour as thyself" is very significant in itself and it is in marked contrast to the emphasis of orthodox theologians.

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³ Muḥ. Rafi-ad-Dīn M. A. Ph. D. *The Fallacy of Marxism*, published by the Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 1953.

OBSERVATIONS ON TURKISH ISLAM TODAY

A definite and interesting aspect of the "Islamic revival" in Turkey today is the appearance of numerous written discussions and expositions of Islam in particular, and religion in general.

As the Turkish builder repairs mosques and builds new ones, as the Turkish teacher discusses Islam in the Turkish Middle schools, so does the Turkish printer busy himself these days with discussions of the nature and character of Islam.

Printed material on religion falls into several classes. First, the Turkish newspapers devote more and more space to religious news and discussions of religious subjects and the presentation of religious serials of a "devotional" and "historical" nature. Secondly, learned books, both original and translations of Islamic Classics, have appeared from the Turkish Universities and the *Diyanet İşleri Reisiği*, the official governmental religious agency. Thirdly, numerous popular magazines devoted to Islam are found on the magazine stands, and existing magazines which devote themselves to culture, and which would compare with the American *Harper's Magazine* and the *Atlantic Monthly*, give considerable space to articles about Islam. Lastly, popular pamphlets and cheap books appear by the score. These are usually found on sale near the markets or are peddled by booksellers who wander through the streets displaying their books and cheap calligraphic wall plaques, quoting favorite passages of blessing from the Qur^{ān}.

RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION IN THE PRESS

The amount of space devoted to religious discussion in the Turkish press has increased in the last few years. As religion becomes a subject of political policy, religious news increases. Prime Minister Menderes' speech at Konya (of January, 1956), announcing that religious lessons would be placed in the Orta Schools, has brought forth extensive news coverage of the political discussion of his speech. Not only have the papers covered political arguments for and against the Prime Minister's proposal, but themselves provided editorial comments upon the question.

It is not only internal politics that has brought forth religious discussion in the press, but international politics also. The Cyprus question has fostered religious discussion in a negative form. Because the Cyprus situation is connected with the Eastern Orthodox Church's political power in Greece and Cyprus, the status of the Patriarchate at Istanbul has made news. In the October 13th, 1956, issue of *Cumhuriyet*, the leading Istanbul daily, there appeared a feature discussing the history of the efforts of the Russian government to use the Eastern Church as an instrument in Soviet foreign policy, by

Samih Sami. The October 8th issue of *Vatan*, another Istanbul daily, edited by Ahmed Emin Yalman, carried a front page story from Western Thrace about efforts to get the Turkish minority to think of themselves first as "Muslims," and not as "Turks." The report suggests that these minorities are called "pomaks," and not Turks. (Pomaks is a term for Bulgarian ethnic Muslims).

The other international issue that is generating religious discussion in the Turkish press derives from the present Near Eastern crisis. Turkey is firmly established as a central member of the Baghdad Pact. Along with the other Baghdad Pact powers, she has begun, under the Arab attacks against it, to stress more and more the Islamic nature of the alliance. During the past year various officials from Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other Islamic nations have made official state visits to Turkey. The religious connections have made news when these representatives have been photographed visiting mosques to perform the ritual prayer. The Vali of Istanbul and the President of Pakistan were photographed engaged in ritual prayer in the Eyüp Mosque in Istanbul. This mosque is one of the most sacred Muslim sites in Istanbul. Nearby lies the tomb of Eyüp Sultan, a companion of Muḥammad, who, according to tradition, died in the first Arabic siege of Constantinople in 672 A.D.

The Islamic nature of the Baghdad Pact has been made more prominent in the Turkish Press since the Suez Crisis. First of all, the Egyptian and Syrian propaganda against the Baghdad Pact has at times claimed that Turkey is not a Muslim nation, and the Turk is not Muslim. The front page editorial in the December 19th, 1956 issue of *Havadis*, a new Istanbul daily, answered the Egyptian charge (*Kim Müslüman değil?*, by Bahadır Dulgen). In this answer, the author questioned the authority of a "leftist" government to define and defend Islam, pointing out by implication that a "leftist" cannot be religious. He also affirmed the long history of Turkish defense and development of Islam, and the contributions that Turkey had made to the creation of Islamic culture. Turkey's determination to defend the Middle East against atheistic Communism, together with her Islamic past, better qualifies her to claim to be Islamic, than does Egypt's pro-Russian alliance.

Besides these references to religion arising out of internal and external political events, the newspapers themselves have responded to the religious interests of their readers by publishing feature articles on religion. During Ramaḍān, the Muslim month of fast, the majority of newspapers carry a "religious column." These columns give devotional paragraphs and discuss the significance of religion for the solution of personal problems.

On December 22nd, 1956, the 683rd anniversary of the death of Mevlana (Jalal al-Dīn al-Rūmī) Persian mystic and saint of the *Mawlawiya* order of dervishes, the newspapers carried pictures and

stories about the celebrations held at Konya. Though the dervish orders were outlawed after the Turkish Revolution, the dervishes are allowed to "dance" officially once a year at Konya on the anniversary of the death of Mevlana. The newspapers called these ceremonies "mere" demonstrations of the old forms of the dervish rites, rather than genuine expressions of religious devotion. They are often compared to the *Yeni Cheri* (Janissary) Band which appears on special occasions dressed in the traditional dress of the Ottoman times. The implication is that both are mere expressions of "historical pageantry," rather than a real attempt to reimpose an old pattern upon the modern day.

LEARNED EXPRESSIONS OF ISLAM IN TURKEY

More and more the Islamic past is becoming a serious subject of learned studies in the Turkish Universities of Istanbul and Ankara.¹ Religious studies and publications have come from the Arts Faculty in The University of Istanbul, the Divinity Faculty at The University of Ankara, and from the *Diyanet İşleri Reisliği*, the official Department of Religious Affairs. The most ambitious project is the Turkish edition of the *Encyclopedia of Islam*. This project has been undertaken by the Arts Faculty of the University of Istanbul, and has been in progress for over ten years. The Turkish Encyclopedia (*İslâm Ansiklopedisi*) contains translations of articles in the Leiden edition, plus original articles written by Turkish scholars to give it a more detailed coverage of the Turkish aspect of Islamic history and development. At present some seventy parts have appeared. The Turkish Encyclopedia appears like its Leiden counterpart, in 80-page sections. Several Turkish scholars have contributed to the new edition of the Leiden Encyclopedia, currently being published. Among these scholars are, M. Cavid Baysun, University of Istanbul; A. Decei, University of Istanbul; Halil Inalcık, University of Ankara.

The *İlâhiyat Fakültesi* (Divinity Faculty) of the University of Ankara is responsible for several recent scholarly books on Islam. The major work of this faculty lies in their journal (*İlâhiyet Fakültesi Dergisi*), which has been published at frequent intervals since 1952. This journal has carried a wide variety of articles, ranging from studies of Islamic Art, discussions of the problems of translating the Qur'ân into Turkish, historical articles about Christian studies of Islam in the 13th Century in which the work of Raymond Lull is examined, and discussions of Islamic philosophy. Besides this journal, the Divinity Faculty has also published several books. Most interesting among them is a text on The History of Religions (*Dinler*

¹ See Muslim World, Vol. XLVI, No. 4 pp. 295-312 and Vol. XLVII, No. 1, pp. 22-35 *The Faculty of Divinity at Ankara*, by Howard A. Reed, for a background on theological education in Turkey.

Tarihine Giriş), by Prof. Annemarie Schimmel-Tari a German scholar who is at present teaching the History of Religions in the Divinity Faculty. She presents an objective and general history and description of the world religions. Of particular interest is her presentation of Judaism and Christianity. Of great importance is her one hundred page glossary of religious terms, where she offers definitions and gives brief historical discussions of their use. In this section she defines the "sacraments," "protestantism," "Logos," "scholasticism," "ecumenical councils," "deism," "pietism," "Methodists," "liberalism," "modernism," "gnosticism," "Baptists," and many other terms unfamiliar in Islamic understanding of Christianity and the other world religions.²

A professor of architectural history at the Fine Arts Academy in Istanbul, Prof. Celal Esad Arseven, has published 5 sections of his extensive history of Turkish Art, *Türk Sanatı Tarihi*. (*Türk Sanatı Tarihi Enstitüsü*, Istanbul) (continuous publication, no date given for first part). Though this work is extensively devoted to Turkish Art, because Turkish Art is Islamic Art, the author does include a sketch of the general development of Islamic Art. His approach is more analytical. He attempts to show influences on Turkish and Islamic Art from the cultures in which they developed.

The Arts Faculty of the University of Istanbul published in 1955 a translation of the German Art historian, Ernest Diez's extensive works on Turkish art, *Türk Sanatı*. (*Türk Sanatı*, Ernst Diez, translated by Oktay Aslanapa, Istanbul University Edebiyat Fakültesi, Istanbul, 1955.)

The major publication of the *Diyanet İşleri Reisi*liği, which might qualify as a "learned" work, is the original book, *İslâm Dini*, by A. Hamdi Akseki, its third president. This book was published in 1954, though it was written in 1933. It was brought out in 1954 because it seemed to be the only acceptable text on Islam available when the Government sought a basis of instruction for Islam in the new *İmam ve Hatip Okulları*, government approved schools for the training of modern Turkish prayer leaders and religious functionaries. This book is officially accepted by the Turkish Ministry of Education, for use in these schools and the religious classes in the Teacher's Schools and Village Institutes, where teachers are given religious training to prepare them to teach the religious lessons in the last two grades of the Turkish primary schools. This book has grown in importance this year, when the Ministry of Education, recognising that no text was available for the religious lessons in the Middle schools, instructed religious lesson teachers to use this book as a basis for their instruction.

İslâm Dini is actually two books in one. The first part is an attempt to establish Islam as a religion which is in the temper and spirit of the modern world. The second part is an exposition of the details of

² For other publications, see Howard A. Reed, *op. cit.*: Vol. XLVII. No. 1. p.

Islamic rituals and a handbook of ethical precepts. Thus one can find many different kinds of information in this book. The first part is most important, because it shows how a "self-conscious" religious official presents Islam as adaptable to the modern world. Though no direct mention is made of the changes that have taken place in Turkey since the Atatürk Revolution, it is obvious that the author had these in mind when he presented his case. His line of apologetics is as follows: Islam is the "true" natural religion. This natural religion was first discovered by primitive man in the days of innocence at the beginning of human history. But soon this innocence was spoiled and animism, fire and sun worship, and various forms of idol worship and polytheism developed. Throughout this pattern of history there emerged a consistent line of Prophets, who attempted to bring man back to the "true" and natural religion. But, until Islam, these attempts at prophecy have been in turn corrupted and abused. Islam is the "seal" of the Prophets, and the valid, clear and true road to the pure state of man's religious awareness. Islam is consistent with natural science, because the God that Islam reveals is also the God of Nature.

Without attempting to make any serious examination of the problem of faith and knowledge, and without seeming to be concerned with the problem of how a "revelation of God" through prophecy can be passed down from the Prophet to the present moment through "secondary" prophetic instruments, (i.e. worship, theology, and the life of faith), the author proceeds to give an outline of Islamic tradition, law and theology. His aim is merely to present in outline form the traditional Sunni position. This section is invaluable to anyone seeking to grasp "Turkish" religious vocabulary. It also serves as a concise summary of the self-conscious expression of traditional Islam. Its translation would serve well as an outline for any Islamic course taught in a Western University. The second part is also informative because it gives in summary detail the intricacies of Islamic ritual and belief.

The Ministry of Education has in some degree joined this recognition of the Islamic roots of Turkey, in issuing several translations of Islamic classics as part of an extensive translation effort to make world literature available in modern Turkish. It has published in two volumes: the *Mukaddime* of Ibn Haldūn, *Pariltılar* by Fahrudin-i Irakî, *El-Munkizü-Men-ad Dalal* by al-Gazalî, *Nur Heykelleri* by Süherverdi, *Şehname III* by Firdevsî, *El-Hikem-ül Atâiye* by Atâullahî İskenderanî, *Maramat* by Harirî, *Füsûs-ül Hikem* by Muhuddin-i Arabî, *Maarif* by Sultan Veled, *Ariflerin Menkibeleri* by Ahmed Eflâkî, and *Fihî Mâfih* by Mevlâna.

RELIGIOUS MAGAZINES

Perhaps the most interesting development in Islamic writing in Turkey during the past two years has been the appearance of maga-

zines devoted entirely to religious matters. The most important of these religious magazines to make their appearance in the past two or three years are: *Din Yolu*, *Musulman Sesi*, *Islam* and *Sebilürreşad*. Of these, *Din Yolu* receives the widest circulation. It can be found on almost every newsstand, and among the comic books and magazines sold by the street corner newsseller. *Islam*, begun in 1956, presents the most ambitious assignment for itself. It is the newest of the religious magazines. It promises to cover all phases of traditional Islam, as well as discuss contemporary problems such as democracy, Communism, labor unions, women's rights and their relation to Islam. This magazine has in recent issues made much of Islamic activities in Germany, publishing articles about German Muslims. It also published in its 7th issue (November 1956) an article from the Imam assigned to Turkish troops in Korea, telling about his work in forming a Muslim community among the South Koreans. The tone of the article expresses full and interested missionary zeal. The writer expresses hope that a mosque will be built in Seoul.

Din Yolu, launched by the liberal Turkish scholar, Ismayil Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, began as an attempt to present a reformed Islam, which could co-exist with modern scholarship and scientific thinking. One of its prime purposes was to obtain a new translation of the Qur'ān in Turkish, on which Baltacıoğlu is currently working. One article expressed interest in the fact that American theological faculties offered courses in practical psychology and social work, and suggested that similar steps should be considered by the University of Ankara's Divinity Faculty. But some disagreement between Baltacıoğlu and his sponsors, brought a change of editorship in the fall of 1956, and though the magazine has remained popular in its presentation, its "crusading" liberal aims have been less discussed.

Sebilürreşad is the mouthpiece of a more orthodox expression of Islam. It carries articles by the Mufti of Istanbul, and devotes itself to carrying full texts of discussions in the Grand National Assembly concerning religious matters. It has been a partisan of religious instruction in the schools, and carries full discussions and news about the *Imam ve Hatîp Okulları*. It is widely read by students in these schools. One of its particular crusades is against the Freemasons about whom it carries frequent articles.

POPULAR LITERATURE

The bazaars and people's markets are filled these days with cheap books, which offer the literate villager and city dweller everything from digests of the *Kinsey Report*, French novels of questionable literary significance, and popular lives of the prophets, and other religious books. The number and variety of these inexpensive religious books is growing every day. One can find several different editions

of books of instruction on how to perform the ritual prayer, complete with photographs. Among these popular books one can also obtain a complete directory, giving all the necessary data for one seeking to make the pilgrimage to Mecca. This is complete with information about how to obtain foreign exchange, how to engage a guide in Saudi Arabia, a list of hotels one can stay in during one's trip, an outline of the ritual essentials of the pilgrimage, and a list of "endorsements" from recent pilgrims, who point out the ease with which one can make the pilgrimage.

Other popular books include selections from the Qur^{ān} and Tradition, lives of the prophets, discussions about sects in Islam (Sūfī and Sunnī) lives of Mevlāna and translations of his writings into modern Turkish, books promising to teach the reader Arabic without pains, editions of the popular poems from the Life of Muḥammed read in the mosques and homes in memory of the death of a member of the family, collections of private prayers for special occasions, and special books explaining the mechanics of Islamic worship and ethics written by contemporary imams and muftis.

Thus it can be seen that the scope of Islamic writing is wide and extensive. There seems to be something for every level of education and interest. The Divinity School at Ankara published a learned book on psychology of religion, in which the author quotes all the Western writers on the subject, even Karl Jaspers, the contemporary German depth-psychologist turned existentialistic philosopher, while the Mufti of Istanbul writes a 700-odd page explanation of the Sunni faith, (*Büyük İslâm İlmihalî*, by Ömer Nasuhi Bilmen). The variety of religious writing shows the extent to which the interest in Islam spreads through the whole range of contemporary Turkish society. The scholar seeks to understand Islam in terms of modern thought, while the butcher's helper buys an inexpensive book telling him how he can do his Namaz. With the Atatürk Revolution some thirty years away, Turkey is taking a new look at its roots. Islam looms large in such a search. Though there is still some question as to whether Islam can find its place in a modern and "secular" Turkish Republic, thirty years stand between the contemporary Turk and the Islam that Atatürk and others feared as a force of reaction and decadence. There is more confidence today. There is a "Republican tradition" and the charisma of Atatürk. Then there is a genuine longing, perhaps to rediscover and re-integrate the Islamic past into the modern present. Turkey, like other countries in the modern world, feels the fears and uncertainties of modern life; the atom bomb; the political problems of progress. In this sense, a revival of Islam in Turkey is to be seen in the same light as a revival of "theology" in American and European Christianity.

RECENT BOOKS PUBLISHED ON RELIGION IN TURKEY

- İslâm dininde oruç.* İstanbul 1956 Bürhaneddin Erenler Matbaası 100 krs. Author: Akşehirli, Mehmet Hilmi
- Beşinci Kırk Hadis mealleri.* Ramazan armağanı. Çeviren ve açıklıyan: Hasan Basri Çantay. İstanbul 1956 Nasiri: Mürsid Çantay: Ordu Caddesi 109 A. Bayezid 38 S. 50 krs. Hadis-i Şerif Külliyyati: 5"
- Büyük İslâm İlmî halî.* 4-10. kitap, (2 bs) İstanbul 1955-1956 Ali Ayni Bilmen. 137-744 pages. Price. 900 krs. Author: Bilâmen, Omer Nasuhi. Mufti of İstanbul.
- Dördüncü Kırk Hadis ve mealleri.* Çeviren ve açıklıyan: Hasan Basri Çantay. İstanbul 1956 (Nasiri: Mürsit Çantay, Ordu Caddesi 109 A Beyazid) 32 pages Price 50 krs. „Hadis-i Şerif Külliyyati: 4"
- İslâm dininde Hazreti İsa ve Mergem.* İstanbul 1956, Ruza Koşkun Matbasi; 32 pages, price 75 krs. Author: Elçiöğlü O. Cemaleddin
- Müşbet maneviyat etüdüleri.* 2. c. VII fsk. Ankara 1956 Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi 201-328 pgs; price 475 krs. Author: Evrin, M. Sadettin
- Hazreti Halid'in âdab-i ziyareti ve tarihi* bs. Çikaran: M. Akif Bencoşar. İstanbul 1956 Çikaran: Eyup Sultan camiinde katarçı. 15 pages
- Nicin namaz kiliyorum?.* 3 bs. Eskişehir 1956 Yesilnur Matbasi 32 pages, 50 krs. "Yirminci Asırda İslâm Dini Serisinden", Author: Işikovalı, Yusuf
- Din ve milliyet* (Ankara) 1956 *Diyanet İşleri Resligi*, 24 pages 30 krs. Diyanet İşleri Resligi Yayınları, Sayı: 44. Author: Kürkcüoğlu, Kemal Edib
- Tam âyetli, dualı, levhali, tabrikatlı Büyük namaz hocası.* Hazırlıyan Süleyman Fahir, İstanbul, 1956 Doğruyol Gazetesi Yayını 63 1 pages Illustrated. Price 125 krs.
- Üçüncü Kırk Hadis ve mealleri.* Çeviren ve açıklıyan: Hasan Basri Çantay İstanbul 1956; Nasiri: Mürsit Çantay: Ordu Caddesi 109 A, Beyazid; 40 pages price 50 krs.
- Kur'an Yolu;* İstanbul 1956 Bürhaneddin Everler Matbasi, 40 krs. Author: Varol, Halit.
- Çevşen-ül-kebir. İsm-i âzam dua-i Peygamber:* Eskişehir, 1956 Yesilnur Matbaası, 80 pages: Author Ahmed Ziyaeddin Gümüşhanevi
- Prophet Muhammed.* Ankara 1956 Güven Matbaası 43 pages; price 50 krs. Author Akseki, Ahmed Hamdi (Türkçe ve Almança)
- Hiristiyanlığı terk edişimin ve İslâmiyeti Kabul edişimin sebepleri;* İstanbul 1956 Çeltük Matbaası, 30 pages, price 100 krs; Author: Ali Ömer
- Altinci kırk hadis ve mealleri.* Derliyen ve çeviren: Hasan Basri Çantay. İstanbul 1956 Ahmed Saîd Matbaası. 32 pages;
- Mekteplere din dersleri konulması aleyhinde Manisa Mebusu Hikmet Bayur'un önergesi ve metaplere din derslerinin konulması hakkında Maraş mebusu Abdullah Ayetmizin Meclis kürsüsünde vâki beyanatı.* Ankara 1956 Yıldız Matbaacılık ve Gazotecilik T.A.Ş. 22 pages, price not given; Authors Bayur, Yusuf Hikmet and Aytemiz, Abdullah
- Türk çocuğunun din bilgisi,* İstanbul 1956 Üstünel Yayınevi 96 pages; price 100 krs; Author: Fahir, Süleyman
- Dua Dergisi;* Derliyen, Mustafa Ceylân; İzmir 1956 Yavuzdil Basimevi 18 pages. No price
- Kıyas-ı enbiya. Peygamberlerin hikâyeleri, 28 pergamber ve Hazreti Muhammed'in hayyatı;* l.c. 1-5 fas. İstanbul Hâdise yayinevi 1-160 pages; price 100 krus each; Author: Güngör, Salâhaddin
- Dini Ahlâk bilgisi.* Morale musulmane; İstanbul 1956 Hilmi Kitabevi; price 60 krus; 36 pages; Author: İzmirli, Celâleddin
- İslâm hukuku,* İstanbul 1956 Alkaya Matbaası, 116 pages; price 255 krs. Author: Ogan, M. Raif
- Çölde yükselen güneş.* Ankara 1956 Güzel Sanatlar Matbaası, 160 jages; price 300 krs; Author: Oruç, Mehmet
- Müminlere müjde. Hakikat yolu.* 2 fask. İstanbul 1956 Bürhaneddin Erenler Matbaası, 49-96 pages; price 100 krs; Author: Oter, Mehmet
- Nasir sûresinden bazı hakikatler;* İzmir 1956 Meşher Matbaası, 20 pages; price not given: Author: Şevilmis, Mehmet Fevzi
- Yedinci kırk hadis ve mealleri:* Derliyen ve çeviren. Hasan Basri Çantay 33 pages; 50 krs;
- İbret hocası;* Eskişehir 1956 Hilâl Matbaası; 22 pages; price 50 krs; Author: Yılma, Sadik
- İslâm yavrusunun kitabı.* İstanbul 1956 M. Siralar Matbaası 128 pages; price 200 krs; Author: Zapsu, Abdurrahim

THE CLASSICAL ISLAMIC ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

After Wensinck's brilliant study,¹ a fresh examination of the arguments for the existence of God in Islam might appear impertinent. Some justification for the present discussion, however, may be found in the fact that some of the material on which this study is based was not available to Wensinck, when his monograph appeared in 1936, and in the slightly different interpretation of certain relevant data here attempted.

The systematic examination of the proofs of the existence of God should be preceded by a legitimate enquiry: Is the demonstration of God's existence possible at all? In the Latin scholastic treatises of the Middle Ages, as for example in the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) this enquiry figures as the prelude to the demonstration of God's existence proper. Although Wensinck has discussed some aspects of the problem of knowledge (*erkenntnislehre*) in his celebrated *Muslim Creed*,² he does not touch upon this particular aspect of the problem in his monograph, except incidentally, as, for example, in connection with Al-Ghazālī's attitude to the question of God's existence.³ But this question, it would seem, requires a fuller treatment than is accorded it in that parenthesis.

In his two little tracts: *Faṣl al-Maqāl* and *al-Kashf ʿan Manāḥij al-Adillah*, Ibn Rushd (d. 1198) raises this question in a systematic way. In the former tract, he is concerned with a wider problem: viz. whether the philosophical method tallies with the teaching of revelation or not — to which he replies in the affirmative. "For if the aim of philosophy," he writes, "is nothing other than the consideration of existing things and their examination, in so far as they manifest the Creator — viz. in so far as they are created objects... revelation (*al-sharʿ*) definitely enjoins the consideration of existing things and commends it"⁴ — a thesis which he supports by a wealth of Qurānic quotations. When he returns to this question at the beginning of *Al-Kashf*, he distinguishes between three schools of thought on the specific problem of God's existence: (1) The literalists who reject rational argument altogether⁵ and claim that God's existence can be known by means of authority (*al-samʿ*) only.⁶ (2) The Ashʿarites (with whom he includes the Muʿtazilites) who admit the possibility of a rational demonstration of the existence of God from the concepts of

¹ *Les preuves de l'existence de Dieu dans la Théologie Musulmane*, in *Mededeelingen der Konink. Akademie van Wetenschappen*, Deel 81, Serie A, No. 2, Amsterdam, 1936.

² Cambridge, 1937, pp. 249 f.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 8 and again p. 9.

⁴ Cf. *op. cit.*, Cairo, 1935, p. 9.

⁵ *Faṣl*, p. 11.

⁶ *Kashf*, p. 42.

temporality (ḥudūth) or contingency (jawāz), as we will see later and (3) finally the Sufis who claim that we apprehend God directly but "whose method," as Ibn Rushd observes, "is not speculative at all" and which, even if its validity is conceded, is not common to all men.⁷

The earliest systematic discussion of the problem of knowledge (erkenntnis) as a prelude to theological discussions which has come down to us is found in Al-Baghdādī's (d. 1037) *Uṣūl al-Dīn*.⁸ It is possible that Al-Baghdādī continues a more ancient tradition, initiated by the Mu'tazilite doctors of the 9th century, as their preoccupation with such abstract questions as notions (ma'anī), science ('ilm), etc. suggests.⁹ But it is significant that Al-Bāqilānī (d. 1013), who is credited by some ancient authorities with having refined the methods of Kalām, does not dwell on this question at any length in the opening chapter of his *Tamhīd*.

The introductory chapter of *Uṣūl*, to which Wensinck has drawn attention and discussed at some length in *The Muslim Creed*, is thus of considerable importance for the understanding of the Islamic approach to the question of knowledge or science.

We cannot dwell at length here on Baghdādī's analysis of the divisions of knowledge ('ilm), its presuppositions, the conditions of its validity, etc. which are genuinely reminiscent of Kant and the subsequent schools of modern epistemology. On the particular issue with which we are here concerned, it should be noted that Al-Baghdādī defines demonstrative knowledge as knowledge "by means of reason" and instances "the knowledge of the temporality of the world, the eternity of its Maker, his unity, his attributes, his justice, his wisdom and the possibility (jawāz) of religious obligation (taklīf),"¹⁰ etc. In further expounding the objects of knowledge, as distinct from the objects of revelation (al-sharḥ), he states that the Ash'arites (aṣḥābunā) hold that reason is capable of proving the temporality of the world and the unity of its Maker, etc., as well as the admissibility in reason (jawāz) of what is possible and the inadmissibility of what is impossible, but adds significantly that religious obligations or prohibitions arising therefrom are not known by reason but only by revelation.¹¹ Hence were one to arrive at the knowledge of God, the creator of the universe, etc. prior to revelation by means of the natural light of reason he would be "a believing monotheist" but he would not thereby deserve any particular reward; so that if God were to

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

⁸ Stambul Ed., 1928, pp. 4-32.

⁹ Cf. *Maqālāt*, Stambul, 1930, pp. 372-3, 391 f., 471 f.

¹⁰ Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 14.

¹¹ p. 24. In *Nihāyat al-Iqdām*, Shahrastānī ascribes this view to Al-Ash'arī himself "who distinguished between the act of knowing God by means of reason and its *certainty* through it, stating that all knowledge is arrived at by means of reason but becomes a matter of religious obligation (tajīb) by means of revelation." p. 371.

reward him in the life-to-come, such reward would be an act of divine grace.¹² The Muʿtazilah, on the other hand, argue that man was capable of discriminating between good and evil, prior to revelation, and was in proportion deserving of punishment and reward in the life to come.¹³

Now it is patent that despite this distinction between the two aspects of our knowledge of God by means of reason: the one entailing reward or punishment, the other not, both the Muʿtazilah and the Ashʿarites were in agreement, as Ibn Rushd remarks, on the actual demonstrability of God's existence. What they differed on was simply the moral or religious implications of such knowledge: the Ashʿarites holding that punishment and reward are conditional upon the "advent of the law," the Muʿtazilah making them independent of the explicit dictates of the law.

Prior to the rise of the Muʿtazilah, who initiated the whole current of scholastic theology (*kalām*) in Islam, of course, the question of the demonstrability of God's existence, like the remaining questions of rational theology, could hardly arise. The early jurists and theologians, such as Mālik b. Anas (d. 795) and his followers were content with a theological knowledge rooted in Scripture. Like the Sufis, who believed that God could be apprehended directly, these Traditionalists sought the ground of their belief in God in a non-rational sphere: that of revelation or authority. Thus neither for Traditionalism nor for Sufism was a proof of the existence of God necessary at all, since the existence of God was given directly either in Scripture, according to the former, or in the mystical process of direct apprehension, according to the latter.

If the argument from causality (cosmological or aitiological argument), initiated by Aristotle and developed by his followers throughout the centuries, is rightly regarded as the classical argument for the existence of God in the West, the argument *a novitate mundi* (*dalīl al-ḥudūth*), of which the argument *a contingentia mundi*, (*dalīl al-jawāz*) is a mere variant, can be safely asserted to represent the classical argument for the existence of God in Islam. The Aristotelian argument, which rested upon the concept of causality, was never viewed with favour in the Muslim world, not even by the great representatives of Arab Aristotelianism: Avicenna (d. 1037) and Averroes (d. 1198). The former laid special emphasis on the argument from contingency in a manner which definitely influenced the later Mutakallims; the latter showed definite predilection for the teleological argument (*dalīl al-ʿināyāh*) which had a basis in the Qurʾān,¹⁴ and was of a more compelling nature than the other arguments, according to him.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 26, and Al-Shahrastānī, *Milal*, p. 31.

¹⁴ Cf. *Kashf*, p. 45 and Wensinck, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

The main reason why the cosmological argument was thus rejected out of hand by both the philosophers and the theologians was the fact that the concept of causality upon which it rested had been exposed to doubt since the beginnings of Kalām. Al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) continuing a long tradition of speculation on this theme, repudiates the validity of the causal principle in Question 17 of his famous *Tahāfut* on the ground that the alleged necessity of this principle is a mere illusion; because it is an unwarranted inference, based on observation from the correlation of events. Observation, however, shows simply that the alleged effect happens alongside the cause rather than through it (*cum se non per se*: *‘indahū la bihi*) and accordingly, such a correlation is not logically necessary but is rather the outcome of a mere psychological disposition or habit.¹⁵

It is clear from the foregoing that Wensinck's statements that the argument *a novitate mundi* is 'analogous' to the Aristotelian-Thomist proof *ex parte motus et ex ratione causae efficientis*¹⁶ is rather surprising, since the very validity of the causal principle is challenged by the Mutakallims. Moreover, the Aristotelian argument presupposes the cardinal metaphysical distinction between potentiality and actuality (which the Mutakallims also rejected, substituting for it the duality of substance and accidents); and is further independent, as Maimonides (d. 1204) and Aquinas (d. 1274) both recognized, from the thesis of the beginning of the world (round which the argument of the Mutakallims centres as we are going to see). Instead, Aristotle's causal argument for the existence of the Unmoved Mover grew logically and naturally from the Aristotelian thesis of the eternity of motion in an eternal universe.¹⁷

The Traditional argument of Kalām presupposes a preliminary thesis upon which the theological treatises place considerable emphasis: the thesis of the newness or temporality of the universe (*al-ḥudūth*). This circumstance explains the vehemence with which the opposite thesis of an eternal universe is combated by the advocates of Orthodoxy. Ibn Ḥazm, the *Zāhirī* jurist and heresiographer, who died in 1064, employs this as the principle on the basis of which he distinguishes between the orthodox or heterodox sects, Muslim or non-Muslim. Al-Ghazālī, as is well-known, devoted the first question of his *Tahāfut* to a refutation of the thesis of eternity, which he considers the most pernicious thesis of the philosophers.

The general procedure of the Mutakallims in proving the temporality of the universe consisted in showing that the world, which they defined

¹⁵ Cf. *Tahāfut*, Ed. Bouyges, 1927, p. 285 Cp. Hume, *Treatise*, Oxford 1941, p. 165, 93.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 26-27.

¹⁷ Cf. on this question a discussion by the author on the eternity of the world, in Maimonides, Averroes and Aquinas, in *Le Museon*, 1953, LXVI, pp. 139 f.

as everything other than God,¹⁸ was composed of atoms and accidents. Now the accidents (singular *‘araḍ*), they argued, cannot endure for two instants of time, but are continually created by God who creates or annihilates them at will. Al-Bāqilānī (d. 1013) who appears to follow the lead of Al-Ash‘arī in this respect, actually defines the accidents as entities “the duration of which is impossible ... and which cease to exist in the second instant of their coming to be.”¹⁹ Similarly, the atoms (sing. *al-juzʿ*) in which the accidents inhere are continually created by God and endure simply by reason of the accident of duration (*baqāʿ*) which God creates in them.²⁰ But insofar as this accident of duration, like the other accidents, is itself perishable, the whole world of atoms and accidents is in a state of continuous generation and corruption.

Although the argument for the temporality of the universe from the temporality of its component parts is the favourite argument of the Ash‘arite doctors, it is by no means the only argument of Islamic scholasticism. Unfortunately we are in no position, owing to the scantiness of our sources, to reconstruct the reasoning of the Mu‘tazilite doctors on this question; nevertheless there is good reason to suppose that Al-Ash‘arī and his successors simply inherited the methods of argument, on this and allied subjects, which the Mu‘tazilah had initiated.

As an instance of the interest of the Mutakallims in the thesis of a temporal universe, we might examine here at some length the five arguments for the beginning of the world which Ibn Ḥazm, the great Zāhirī theologian (d. 1064) advances in his *Fiṣal*;²¹ especially since Ibn Ḥazm appears to be the first Muslim theologian to have attempted a refutation of the eternity of the world, on the one hand, and a proof of its temporality, on the other, with any completeness.²² The biographer of Al-Ash‘arī, Ibn ‘Asakīr (d. 571 A.H.), reports that Al-Ash‘arī wrote a treatise called *Kitāb al-Fuṣūl*, in refutation of the Materialists and the ‘philosophers,’ who professed the eternity of the universe,²³ which as far as I am aware, is the earliest scholastic treatise dealing with the question of eternity in a systematic way, our sources record. Despite the statement of Al-Shahrastānī that Al-

¹⁸ *Uṣūl*, p. 33.

¹⁹ Cf. *Tamhīd*, Cairo, 1947, p. 42. Cp. *Maqālāt*, p. 370, where verses 8: 67 and 46:24 of the Quran are quoted in support of the thesis that accidents are perishable by nature.

²⁰ Cf. *Uṣūl*, p. 56 and *Tahāfut*, p. 88. For a full discussion of this subject see my article in *Al-Mashriq*, 47, 1953, pp. 151-172, and *Pines, Islamische Atomlehre*, Berlin, 1936.

²¹ Bk. I, Cairo, 1317 A. H., pp. 3 f.

²² Some of Ibn Ḥazm’s arguments figure in a treatise by the philosopher Al-Kindī (d. 870?) entitled: “On the Unity of God and the Finitude of the Body of the Universe”.

Cf. *Rasāʾil al-Kindī al-Falsafiyah*, Cairo, 1950, pp. 201 ff.

²³ *Tabyīn Kādhīb al-Muftarī*, Damascus, 1347 A.H., p. 128.

Ash'ari preferred the negative method of refutation (*al-ibtāl*),²⁴ as distinct from the method of positive proof, it is reasonable to assume that like Ibn Ḥazm, Al-Rāzī and others, he coupled the former with the latter species of argument.

Ibn Ḥazm's first proof of the temporality of the universe rests on the premise that the accidents and substances (*sing. shakhṣ*) composing the universe are finite and that time, which he conceives as consisting of transient moments, is finite also. In proving the finitude of these three terms: accident, substance and time, Ibn Ḥazm does not resort to the traditional method of the Mutakallims already mentioned, but maintains that the finitude of substance is evident from the finitude of its dimensions, that of accidents from the finitude of the substances in which they inhere and the finitude of time from the transitoriness of the moments composing it. The second proof involves the Aristotelian dictum that everything in act is finite. The universe exists in act and is numerically determinate, therefore it is finite.

In the third argument he resorts to the process of *reductio ad absurdum*. The thesis of an infinite time, which the eternity of the universe, implies, involves the following absurdities: (a) Since infinity cannot be increased, all the time that will elapse would add nothing to the time elapsed hitherto. (b) The revolutions of a planet (e.g. Saturn) which revolves once every thirty years would be equal to the revolutions of the Upper Heaven, which amount to some 11,000 revolutions during the same period since one infinity is not greater than another.²⁵ (c) The time elapsed since the beginning of time till the Hijrah (622 A.D.) and the time elapsed since the beginning till our day would be equal.

In the fourth and fifth arguments, he argues that, were the universe without beginning and without end, it would be impossible to determine it in number or in nature and consequently we could not speak of first, second, or third, in speaking of existing things. But this is contradicted by the fact that we can number things and refer to the first and last things. Hence the universe must have a beginning (*awwal*).²⁶

We cannot dwell longer on Ibn Ḥazm's discussion of this cardinal theme and the manner in which he resolves the many objections to his arguments. But it is worth noting that most of the arguments of the later doctors such as Al-Ghazālī and Al-Rāzī (d. 1209) are found here in an embryonic, though sometimes confused, state. This circumstance would appear to strengthen the view expressed by Maimonides (d. 1204), the great Jewish philosopher, that the Mutakallims were influenced in these arguments by John Philoponus (d. 568), author

²⁴ *Niyāhat*, p. 11.

²⁵ Compare Ghazali, *Tahāfut*, p. 32 and *Iqtīṣād*, p. 18.

²⁶ It is noteworthy that the Arabic (*awwal*) corresponds to both 'first' and 'beginning' or 'firstness', hence the plausibility of this argument.

of *De aeternitate mundi*, a refutation of Proclus's argument for the eternity of the universe²⁷ — since it would imply that the Mutakallims from Ibn Ḥazm downwards were drawing on some common source.

With the temporality of the world as a premise, the Mutakallims proceeded to prove that the world being created (ḥadīth) must necessarily have a Creator (muḥdith), by recourse to the so-called "principle of determination." In its barest form, this principle meant that since prior to the existence of the universe it was equally possible for it to be or not-to-be, a determinant (murajjih) whereby the possibility of being could prevail over the possibility of not-being was required; and this 'determinant' — they argued — was God. Al-Bāqilānī (d. 1013), who belonged to the second generation of Ash'arite doctors and who is credited with refining the methods of Kalām, sums up this argument in a succinct way. The world being temporal (ḥadīth), he writes, it must of necessity have a Maker and Fashioner (muḥdith wa muṣawwir), "just as writing must have a writer, a picture a painter and a building a builder."²⁸ To this argument, however, he adds two others in which the 'middle term' differs but which reveal the same dialectical structure. In the first, he maintains that the priority of certain things over others presupposes an "Agent who made them prior" (muqaddiman qaddamahu) since priority does not belong by nature to a pair of equals; and this "determinant of priority" is God. In the second, he introduces the concept of contingency (jawāz) and argues that things in themselves are capable of receiving various 'forms' or qualities. The fact that existing things are endowed with certain determined 'forms' presupposes a 'determinant' who has determined that they should receive these 'forms' and no others; and this 'determinant' is God.²⁹

The element common to these three arguments, it will be noticed, is the "principle of determination" which they all invoke. Only the first argument, however, presupposes in addition the beginning of the world or its temporality. As to the third, it constitutes the basis of the argument *a contingentia mundi* (dalīl al-jawāz) which was later developed by Al-Juwaynī (d. 1086) as Averroes states in *Al-Kashf*, in a treatise which has not come down to us, *Al-Risālat al-Nizāmiyyah*.³⁰ This proof, as Wensinck rightly observes,³¹ is affiliated to Ibn Sīnā

²⁷ Cf. *Guide of the Perplexed*, Eng. trans., London 1947, p. 109 and *Al-Fihrist*, Leipsig, 1871, Vol. I., p. 254. Cf. also De Boer's statement on Ghazālī's debt to Philoponus, *History of Philosophy in Islam*, London, 1903, p. 159.

²⁸ Cf. *Tamhīd* Cairo, 1948, p. 45.

²⁹ *Op. cit.*, Thus Al-Bāqilānī seems to antedate Al-Juwaynī (1065) in formulating this last argument, which Wensinck ascribes to Al-Juwaynī.

³⁰ Cf., *op. cit.*, p. 54-56. Compare Wensinck.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

(d. 1037) who seems to follow the lead of Al-Fārābī (d. 950) in this respect, as Madkour has shown in his monograph on Al-Fārābī.³¹

In his major treatise, *Al-Irshād*, Al-Juwaynī sets forth the more popular argument from temporality or ḥudūth. "If the temporality of the world (ḥadath) 's established and if it is established that (the world) has a beginning (muftataḥ al-wujūd), since the temporal can equally exist or not exist ... reason requires that (the world) must have a determinant (mukhaṣṣiṣ) who determined its actual existence."³²

Al-Baghdādī's argument, as expounded in *Uṣūl al-Dīn*, differs little from that of either Al-Bāqilānī or Al-Juwaynī. All rest, as we have seen, on the thesis that the world consists of atoms and accidents which have no subsistent being in themselves since they cannot endure for two moments of time. What, we might ask, is the extent of their debt to 'Abdul-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī?³⁴ The publication recently of *Kitāb al-Luma'* enables us to give a provisional answer to this question, pending the discovery of fresh material.

The argument of Al-Ash'arī in this treatise has a distinct Quranic ring. It has nothing of the dialectical stringency of the later arguments and rests on the observation of the 'phases' of man's growth from "a drop of water, to a leech to an embryo," which the Qur'ān has rendered classical. In so far as it is impossible for man himself to cause this change in his condition (taḥawwul), the author argues, it is necessary that an "Agent should have transformed him from one phase to the other and disposed him according to his actual state;" for it impossible that this should happen without an agent of transformation,³⁵ and by analogy the whole universe requires such an "agent of transformation." This terse argument is of course in keeping with the nature of *Al-Luma'*, as an introductory treatise, but confirms nevertheless the view that Ash'arite Kalām was not fully developed by the beginning of the 10th century so that the authors of this period in general were content with purely rhetorical arguments based on the Qur'ān or the Traditions. It is only with Al-Bāqilānī that a rigorous application of syllogistic methods of proof begins to make its appearance. But even here as we have seen no attempt at an elaborate analysis of the logical concepts involved is made.

The later history of Kalām reflects a greater refinement in employing the technique of argument and a greater subtlety in handling

³² Al-Fārābī et sa Place dans l'école philosophique Arabe.

³³ *Op. cit.*, p. 16.

³⁴ I should perhaps note here that the earliest statement of the argument *a novitate mundi* is found in a treatise of the philosopher Al-Kindī (d. 870?) already referred to. This statement is identical, in all essential respects, with the argument of the later Ash'arite doctors. Al-Kindī, it will be recalled, was a Mu'tazilite in theology.

³⁵ *Kitāb al-Luma'*, Ed. Macarthy, Beyrouth, 1952, p. 6. This tallies with Shahrastānī's account of this argument in *Nihāyat*, p. 12 and *Milal*, p. 66.

logical concepts. Ibn-Khaldūn distinguishes between the modern and the ancient stages in the development of Kalām and assigns the credit for introducing the 'method of the moderns' to Al-Ghazālī.³⁶ Whether the credit for initiating this new 'philosophical' stage in the development of Kalām rightly belongs to Al-Ghazālī or some earlier theologian, as Al-Juwaynī or Al-Bāqilānī, is a controversial issue. It is certain, however, that this stage, as we have seen, is subsequent to Al-Ash'arī's time, and belongs to the latter half of the 10th century.

Al-Ghazālī's major contribution to the discussion of the problem at issue was twofold. In the first place, he brought out in a very forcible way the radical opposition between the teaching of Islam and the Aristotelian conception of a universe developing itself eternally and everlastingly; and in the second place, he gave added point to the arguments already advanced by the Mutakallims, by amplifying and perfecting them. Wensinck's stress on the bipolarity in the thought of Al-Ghazālī, the mystic, and Al-Ghazālī, the theologian,³⁷ is perfectly justified. Nevertheless it is only in Al-Ghazālī as a Mutakallim and in his version of the argument *a novitate mundi* that we are interested here. The most succinct statement of this argument is found in *Kitāb al-Iqtisād fī'l-Itiqād*, which invokes, in the traditional manner of the Ash'arites, the "principle of determination." The syllogism runs as follows: Everything temporal (ḥadīth) must have a cause. The world is temporal. Therefore the world must have a cause. By *ḥadīth*, Al-Ghazālī tells us, he means "what did not previously exist and then began to exist." Prior to its existence, this 'temporal world' was 'possible' (mumkin) i.e. "Could equally exist and not exist." To tilt the balance in favour of existence a 'determinant' (murajjih) was necessary — since otherwise this 'possible' universe would have always remained in a state of not-being.³⁸

It would seem, considering the devastating attack which Al-Ghazālī levels against the concept of causality in Question 17 of *Al-Tahāfut*, that the introduction of the term cause in this context amounts to a flagrant contradiction. Al-Ghazālī, however, explains in the same passage that by cause here he simply means a 'determinant' (i.e. murajjih) and consequently the apparent contradiction vanishes. Owing to its Aristotelian associations, this term was never in vogue among the Mutakallims. The earliest systematic refutation of the concept of causality as implicit in the doctrine of Tawallud (or production), of which I am aware, is found in *Uṣul al-Dīn*³⁹ of Al-Baghdādī, who died in 1037, and which bears a striking resemblance to the more elaborate refutation of *Al-Tahāfut*. Nevertheless, theologians of the

³⁶ Cf. *al-Muqaddimah*, Ed. de Slane, p. 61. Cp. Gardet, *Introduction*, 1948, p.

72.

³⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 8 f.

³⁸ Cf. *op. cit.*, Cairo, N.D., p. 14.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

later period are not entirely averse to the use of the term *cause* in this special sense of 'determinant'. For instance, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209) one of the subtlest theologians of Islam, employs this term and its synonym 'illah repeatedly in his exposition of the scholastic proofs for the existence of God.⁴⁰

We might examine here Al-Rāzī's exposition of the traditional proofs for the existence of God as outlined in *Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn*, especially since this is one of the fullest expositions which our classical sources record, and one which Wensinck does not seem to have consulted in his important monograph.⁴¹

Al-Rāzī sums up the proofs of the existence of God under four arguments.

- (1) The argument from the possibility (*Imkān*) of the universe to the existence of a necessary Being (*wājib al-wujūd*), Creator thereof. (p. 70 f)
- (2) The argument from the possibility of the *qualities* of the universe to the necessity of a Determinant of the form, characteristics, and locus of bodies composing it, who is not Himself a body. (pp. 84-86)
- (3) The argument from the temporality of substances and bodies to the existence of a Maker thereof; (p. 86) and finally,
- (4) The argument from the temporality of the *qualities* of the universe to the existence of an intelligent Designer who disposes things according to His power and will. (p. 91)

It will appear from this brief analysis that these four arguments resolve themselves — as Al-Rāzī himself points out in the preface to his discussion (p. 67) — into two: the argument from temporality (*ḥudūth*) and that from possibility (*imkān*). The root-concept in the former proof is the concept of time; viz. the fact that the world has had a beginning in time or in Al-Rāzī's words, the fact that, before its existence, the world was in a state of not-being (*al-ʿadam*). The root-concept in the latter proof is the concept of contingency (*jawāz* or *imkān*); viz. the fact that the world, considered singly as in argument (1), or as a whole as in argument (2), could have been otherwise. Al-Rāzī, like the rest of the Mutakallims, however, does not distinguish sharply between these two distinct proofs, as Ibn Sīnā justly remarks,⁴² and is on that account liable to some confusion. Al-Rāzī, for instance, defines the 'temporal' (*al-muḥdath*) in his third argument as "that whose being in itself is contingent" which he further describes "as that whose essence is equally susceptible of not-being

⁴⁰ Cf. e.g. *Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn*, pp. 71, 77, 69, etc.

⁴¹ *Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn* was published in 1934, Wensinck's article in 1936. Of Al-Rāzī's works he only mentions *Tawālīḥ al-Anwār* and *Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb*.

⁴² Cf. *Kitāb al-Najāt*, Cairo, 1331, pp. 347 and 363.

and of being," which he adds significantly, "is the precise meaning of the possible." ⁴³

We might overlook this point and dwell on the similarities between these two distinct arguments. In the first place, whether we argue from contingency or from temporality, a necessary Being distinct from the series of sensible things (p. 70) must be posited as a Determinant of the being of the universe, on the one hand, and of the particular *mode* of being proper to it, on the other. This in fact is the point of the distinction between the two concepts round which these two arguments center. For the argument *a novitate mundi* presupposes, as we have seen, that *prior* to its existence the being and the not-being of the universe were equally possible, no account being taken of the mode of being proper to this universe as in the argument *a contingentia mundi*.

In the second place, the positing of a Necessary Being outside the series of temporal beings flows logically from the impossibility of the regress *ad infinitum*. That is why Al-Rāzī, more conscious of the importance of this circumstance than the earlier theologians, devotes a lengthy discussion to the refutation of the two concepts of circularity (*al-daur*) and the *regressus ad infinitum* (*al-tasalsul*). ⁴⁴ Although he summarizes what appears to be the traditional argument against circularity, viz. that if two possible things were said to cause each other, each would precede the other and consequently itself, which is absurd, ⁴⁵ — Al-Rāzī proposes a different argument which he states thus: "The effect (*ma'lūl*) requires the cause. Now if each of two (possible) agents was the effect of the other, each of them would require the other and accordingly each would require what requires itself. Therefore, each would require itself, which is absurd." (p. 81).

In refuting the *regressus ad infinitum*, Al-Rāzī begins by laying down as a postulate that it is necessary that the cause should exist actually at the time of the existence of the effect, or else the latter would be capable of existing by itself — i.e., independently of the agency of the cause — which contradicts our original postulate.

1. If so, then the regression of the series of causes and effects to infinity would entail that the whole series existed simultaneously. Now the whole series is either necessary in itself or possible in itself. The former alternative is absurd because "a whole requires each of its parts and each of these parts is possible in itself and that which requires the possible in itself is *a fortiori* possible in itself too." Consequently, the whole series is possible in itself and requires a necessary determinant (*mu'aththir*) distinct from itself, and this determinant is the Necessary Being.


⁴³ *Op. cit.* p. 86.

⁴⁴ *Op. cit.* pp. 80-84.

⁴⁵ Compare Baiḍāwī's argument reported in Wensinck, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

2. If the whole series is contingent or possible-in-itself as we have seen, and if every possible-in-itself must have a determinant, this determinant is either (a) the whole series itself, (b) something pertaining to it, or (c) something outside it. (a) is absurd since it entails that the series determines itself. (b) is also absurd because it entails that the member of the series, which was assumed to determine it, was also its own cause or of the cause of its cause. The former is absurd for the same reason as above (viz: that a thing cannot be its own cause); the latter because it involves us in the impasse of circularity. Hence the determinant must be something outside the series as in (c). But what lies outside the series of possibles must be necessary-in-itself, which is the Necessary Being.⁴⁶

3. Let us imagine a portion of the series of effects extending from the last effect (L) to infinity and consisting of five segments. Let us next imagine another portion extending from the fifth segment to infinity.



Now if we compare the first portion (A) with the second (B) then they would either be equal — which implies that the whole is greater than its parts — or that one is greater than the other; so that the shorter portion (B) would be finite, since it is shorter by four units; and the longer would be finite also, since it exceeds the former by four units. Consequently, the ascending (taṣāʿud) series of causes and effects would have an extremity and a starting-point which is contrary to the statement that it is infinite.⁴⁷ Not if that extremity is possible-in-itself, then it would require another determinant and thus would not be the extremity; if, on the other hand, it is necessary-in-itself, then we would have proved our case.⁴⁸

With Al-Rāzī, we might safely state, the 'Golden Period' in the history of Kalām comes to and end. The merit of this subtle theologian is that he reintroduced into scholastic discussions certain formal philosophical aspects which the overthrow of Arab Aristotelianism in the 11th century had tended to put outside the pale of orthodoxy. Even the casual perusal of his major works would show the extent of his debt to Ibn Sīnā. This partial readmission of philosophy into the counsels of scholastic theology in Islam will continue throughout

⁴⁶ Compare Ibn Sīnā, *Al-Najāt*, Cairo, 1331, p. 383.

⁴⁷ This argument is analogous to one of Ibn Ḥazm's arguments for the finitude of time — cf. *Fīṣal*, I, p. 16.

⁴⁸ *Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn*, p. 83.

the two subsequent centuries. But the theological treatises of this period, such as the Commentary on *Al-Mawāqif* of Al-Ijī (d. 1355) by Al-Jurjānī and *Al-Maqāṣid* of Al-Taftāzānī (d. 1389) — reflect the general cultural decadence of the times. We can hardly expect to find in these treatises any original contribution to the question at issue. At best they are debased imitations of the earlier treatises, which make up in length for what they lack in depth or originality.

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PRAYER OF THE NAQSHABANDI ORDER

O my God, how gentle art Thou with him who has transgressed against Thy law; how near art Thou to him who seeks Thee; how tender to him who petitions Thee; how kindly to him who hopes in Thee. Who is he who asked of Thee and Thou didst deny him? or drew near unto Thee and Thou didst hold him aloof? or fled unto Thee and Thou didst repulse him? Thine, O Lord, is the creation and the word of command. O my God, wilt Thou torment us in whose hearts is Thy unity? Whatsoever Thou thinkest, Thou doest. By the hiddenness of Thy names and by that which of Thy splendour the veils conceal, forgive this restless soul, this tormented heart. If it cannot endure the heat of the sun, how will it endure the heat of Thy fire, O Thou most gracious, mighty, kindly, compassionate One. O God, we seek, in Thee, refuge from all abasement save unto Thee, from all poverty save with Thee. O God, as Thou hast kept our faces from prostration to any save Thee, so keep our hands from being stretched out to any but Thee. For there is no god but Thee. Verily I was once among the wrongdoers. Praise be to God, Lord of the worlds.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF IBN 'ARABĪ. II

(I) CAUSE AND EFFECT

The hardest test for a non-dualistic philosophy is provided by such distinctly dualistic concepts as those of active and passive, cause and effect, and, finally, good and evil. Aristotelian logic is compelled (by its very nature) to accept the dualistic nature of these concepts. But the acceptance of such a dualism by Ibn 'Arabī would inevitably bring down the entire house of his monistic doctrine. That his doctrine actually passes the test is not due to the author's piecemeal justification, but to the fact that its validity follows organically from the basic principles of his philosophy.

For Ibn 'Arabī's universe is not the effect of a cause that is God, just as a phenomenon is not the Aristotelian outcome of the imprint of form upon matter or, in other words, of the necessary upon the possible. His universe is the outward expression of God's aspects of eternity and infinity. Thus his universe — both the phenomenal, and the invisible that we enter in the hereafter — is a constant process of creation.

In a system in which God provides both (what in Aristotelian terminology must be called) cause and effect, there must exist a like unity of origin on the plane of visible phenomena, and terms such as cause and effect can have no meaning. For Ibn 'Arabī God is the only source of both the lightning and of the destruction produced by it, of both the painter and the painter's picture. Both have their origin in Him, and so God is immanent in both of those phenomena we call cause and effect.

Ibn 'Arabī might have felt justified in explaining away the duality of active and passive by merely identifying the former with cause and the latter with effect. But to seek refuge in intellectual shortcuts was not his way of building up a philosophical system.

In the more conventional systems man appears as the passive agent created by the will of an active God. For Ibn 'Arabī man is passive only when he considers himself as apart from God, that is, exclusively as a phenomenon. As soon, however, as he becomes aware of his God-ness, he is bound to be active. Yet even in that condition he is also passive in so far as his 'active' nature comes from God whose agent he is. Thus he is both active and passive: active when viewed as Divine, passive when viewed as merely phenomenal. However, in Ibn 'Arabī's system these definitions have no real meaning. They represent merely our own mental conceptions born of our tendency to view everything in terms of opposites, contrasts, duality. Duality presupposes the existence of space, a dimension non-existent in pure spirit. It also presupposes the possibility of disharmony or disunity, and opens doors to the 'possible,' in contradistinction to the

'necessary.' Within the realm of pure spirit neither of these can occur. There can only be unity, harmony and necessity. So opposites, with their inevitable concomitants of space, disunity, impermanence, and so on, can be conceived only mentally, when we view the world non-spiritually.

What is true of cause and effect applies equally to active and passive. Thus the object of an action — its 'passive' recipient — is in turn active by his reaction to it. If I hit someone, the reactions of the latter's muscles, nerves, blood vessels, as well as of his mind and emotions, constitute quite as much an 'action' as did the original blow.

(J.) GOOD AND EVIL

It is by no means exceptional for Ibn ʿArabī to put forward more than one theory on a given subject, one either amplifying the other or treating it from a different aspect. As we would expect, Ibn ʿArabī's conception of absolute Reality (*Al-Ḥaqq*), which is that of absolute Good (*Al-Khayr-al-Mahd*), leaves no room for the duality of good and evil. In the universe, as known to us, he regards evil as non-existence or, rather, as the absence of real existence. Such existence (belonging, as it does, to Reality) must, of course, be 'positive.' Evil is thus the lack of a corresponding positive quality. Darkness is the absence of light, weakness the absence of strength, a lie the absence of truth, illness the absence of health. An organ becomes ill when health has been withdrawn from it. It cannot exist in a condition of 'neutrality' — neither healthy nor unhealthy — illness thus being not a 'quality' negative *per se*, but rather non-health. Everything that *really* exists is for Ibn ʿArabī good — otherwise it could not be there. Consequently he regards evil as a subjective, and not an objective, reality.

In the eyes of God all things must be good. Only man's ignorance calls some of them good and some bad. In his blindness man does not perceive that in the bad things goodness might possibly lie hidden behind their evil appearance. We might cite as an illustration of that truth the positive qualities of electricity which have always existed in, but which were discovered only after the evil forces inherent in lightning. Before their discovery man could see no good whatsoever therein. Likewise, the positive qualities within penicillin had potentially always existed within the mildew; but only the mould's negative qualities were known before Alexander Fleming's discovery. In its internal aspect, Ibn ʿArabī considers everything to be good; only in its external aspect, that is as mere appearance (*khalq*) may a thing appear evil.

Since good cannot produce anything that is evil *qua* evil, its evilness derives its apparent reality (that is, in the world of appearance) from man's individual reaction to it. A thing is considered evil because the

prevailing convention, morality or religious codes label it as such. It appears as evil because it creates conflicts with certain mental or emotional desires, or because it disagrees with our individual temperament. Ibn 'Arabī insists that even such evil manifestations as lying, disorder, ugliness, sinful action, merely denote the absence of a positive quality, the presence of which would deprive them of their evilness.

Now let us examine Ibn 'Arabī's second interpretation of evil. God's universe would not be perfect if it did not also include imperfections. Perfection, which implies completeness, must include everything, just as a perfect, i.e. complete, colour scheme cannot be limited to 'pretty' colours but must contain every imaginable hue — even 'dirty' greys and browns and black. Without them the scheme would not be complete. It follows from this that, in order to show perfection, the sum-total of happenings and actions within the universe must of necessity include 'imperfect,' that is, 'evil,' happenings and actions. Since, however, all those actions derive their being from God, it is He who ultimately decrees or commands them.

What then is the meaning of sin, *ma'siyah*, in Ibn 'Arabī's system? According to him, God decrees that an action must take place, but forbids man to perform it or, as he puts it, "the prophets are asked to communicate God's commandments to the people, but God does not always will that such commandments be fulfilled." The contradiction implied in this statement is apparent rather than real. What Ibn 'Arabī means is that God decrees an action irrespective of whether, in human eyes, it appears good or evil. God's decree (*al-mashī'ah*) makes such an action as indispensable as it makes the advent of night after day, of autumn after summer, and so on. God does not particularly command the darkness of the night or winter's cold, just as He does not particularly command the evil of any particular action. What He decrees is the action in its totality, irrespective of whether we regard it as good or bad. It is not the evil aspect in the action that He decrees but the action as a whole and as an inevitable expression of His law. In other words, He wills the *action* but not the evil within it. He must approve of *all* actions because they are all His. The conflict (*nizā'*) between them (in so far as they contain what appears to us as evil) and human law or morality exists only for us who are ignorant of the decree behind all God's manifestations. Actions *qua* actions could not become manifest unless they were 'approved' by God.

Sin, then, in Ibn 'Arabī's doctrine, is disobedience not to God's will (which would be impossible for man), but to the "mediate religious command".¹ In God's eyes everything that is must be. Since it must be, it would be futile to define it as either good or evil. All that

¹ *Al-Fuṣūṣul*, p. 319.

can be said about it is that it *is*. We are thus entitled to conclude that for Ibn ʿArabī morality, in a spiritual sense, does not exist or, to put it differently, that he considers morality as a purely human code. Within a non-dualistic system such as his, in which everything derives from God, there can be no room for the ordinary concept of morality.

And yet morality enters Ibn ʿArabī's doctrine as it were through a back door. But it is a morality conceived not in the conventional way of relative values — more good or less good, and thus quantitative — but a 'morality' that is purely qualitative, and that derives its validity from purely spiritual considerations. Even in Ibn ʿArabī's scheme man must strive for the good. Yet he must do so, not because such striving denotes virtue or moral soundness, but because it concerns itself with the positive alone. For only the positive — light, truth, health — represent reality, existence. A life of 'evil' is a life of their opposites or 'absences,' and thus of spiritual non-existence. It is not an affirmation of life but of escape from it, of only apparent existence.

'Aware' of the dilemma confronting man living in a universe in which everything is willed by Him, God has given man means by which to differentiate between a life of affirmation and one of escapes. It is due to God that man can distinguish between perfection and imperfection, good and evil, harmony and disharmony. If man were not under the obligation to choose the real rather than its opposite and thus the 'moral' rather than the 'immoral,' there would be no meaning in God's injunctions to man to be 'good.' If everything on the *human* level were equally 'good,' there would be no validity in some of the Divine Names which, by themselves, imply the 'moral' character of the relationship between God and man. God the Pardoner (*Al-Ghaffār*), the Merciful (*Al-Raḥīm*), the Tormenter (*Al-Muʿadh-dhib*), the Guiding (*Al-Hādī*), would be meaningless if man regarded every one of God's manifestations as equally 'good' (in human terms) and had no need of His mercy or his guidance. In the purely spiritual sphere, that of absolute existence, Ibn ʿArabī obviously cannot accept the dichotomy of good and evil and with it morality. But in the world of appearance, the one in which man normally lives, even he must stress the contrast between moral and the immoral action. However, the decisive factor for him is not the moral aspect of an action but its reality.

(K) FREE WILL AND PREDESTINATION

The problem of free will and predestination preoccupied the Muslim philosophers from the very dawn of their contemplations. The Qurʾān abounds in sayings stressing both man's freedom of action and God's absolute power over man's destiny. The various philosophical schools employed the most ingenious methods to resolve the implicit conflict; but it cannot be said that they ever succeeded in

their attempts. The Determinists (*Al Jabriyyah*) held that man's actions are determined by an outside agent, namely God; according to the Ash'arites, God created man and all his actions; the Mu'tazilah held that while a man's action derives from his free will, his ability to act is God-given. But however subtle their arguments, none of the schools provided a satisfactory reconciliation of the Quranic theses insisting on both God's omnipotence and man's free will.

Ibn 'Arabī disagrees with the doctrine of *jabr* as a compulsion forced upon man from an outside agent. Yet it was obviously impossible for him to accept free will, for this would have left him no alternative but the opposition of man's will to that of God, and thereby have introduced dualism. Since, according to him, everything has its origin and being in God, free will, as ordinarily understood, can have no place in his system. Does it follow that his God is a kind of tyrant who steps in every time man performs an action and imposes His dictate upon him? Does it mean that human choice is governed by a relentless determinism and that man is the helpless victim of Divine arbitrariness? For Ibn 'Arabī man's choice is not dictated by perpetual interference on the part of God but by man's own inner laws. Every leaf, flower and fruit is 'predetermined' already by the seed from which it evolved. It is not Divine capriciousness that makes one seed grow into a big oak tree and another into a weakly maple; their respective inner laws are contained in their seed. Ibn 'Arabī accepts man's own choice, but finds it inherent in his own nature. Since, however, that nature derives from God, free will, in the accepted sense, plays no part in our philosopher's doctrine.

To understand his theory of human will it is necessary first to know that what he really means by 'will' is not exactly our habitual meaning. It signifies, rather, desire, *shahwah*. It is not will but desire that makes a man crave the satisfaction of some appetite. Desire, according to Ibn 'Arabī, is concerned with material objects. Will, on the other hand, is a spiritual force whose object is never a material one. Will drives man towards spiritual fulfilment, and, finally, towards the Divine. As such it is free from all pleasant or unpleasant sensations. Even to feel pleasure at the hope of gaining a vision of God is not the outcome of will but of the desire 'for an object.' But, of course, Ibn 'Arabī's 'will' and its gratification are the privilege of a few exceptional beings, such as the saints and mystics.

Though Ibn 'Arabī occasionally tries to place a personal responsibility on human shoulders ("let him praise no one but himself and blame no one but himself," he writes in the *Fususul* p. 160), such efforts carry no ring of conviction, and we suspect that they were a half-hearted sop to the orthodox. In actual fact he denies free will even to God. God merely decrees what He knows must take place in accordance with the laws that have their being in Him. It is impossible for Him to will what does not lie in the nature of the thing itself.

This means that human fate is not pre-determined but *self*-determined. Individual fate is simply man's essential character as it exists from eternity in the Divine knowledge. Man receives as much of good as the 'necessity' of his nature demands. It follows that fate is God's decree concerning things. It is conditioned by His knowledge of their essential nature. So whatever fate decrees is decreed by means of the thing itself. Even God cannot give man either more or less of certain qualities than he actually possesses. In other words, even God cannot perform a miracle that would violate the laws that have their being in Him.

When we consider Ibn ʿArabī's doctrine of free will together with his statements on the nature of good and evil, we find that he is far from being a predeterminist. Though everything is determined by the inner laws governing the nature of the particular agent, it does not follow that the agent is cognisant of those laws. He has to act in almost complete ignorance of them: in other words, he acts as though the 'predetermined' character of his 'choice' were absent. At the same time, if he wishes to lead a life of Reality, he will strive for the positive or that which has true being. Thus, however much the nature of his choice and the outcome of his actions might be determined by his inner laws, he will act as though he were a free agent, and he will even act 'morally,' however little conventional morality may be his incentive.

(L) AL-FANĀʾ

Ibn ʿArabī devotes a great deal of thought to mystical experiences and to the 'mechanism' within them. The usual Ṣūfī term for "union" with God is *fanāʾ* (passing away, or annihilation). But not all Ṣūfīs agree on its meaning, nor on the meaning of its opposite pole, the term *baqāʾ*, or enduring. Most of the Ṣūfīs before Ibn ʿArabī use the word *fanāʾ* to describe a purely subjective state. They agree that in *fanāʾ* consciousness of the phenomenal world is lost; that *fanāʾ* leads to a gradual unification with God; and that it involves a giving up of all personal desires, and resignation to the will of God. But, as Dr. Affifi points out (op. cit., p. 139), with the exception of Al-Qushayrī, no Ṣūfī defines *fanāʾ* or *baqāʾ* as clear psychological states: the one as "abandonment of the phenomenal," the other as "concentration of the Divine and spiritual." As Al-Qushayrī says (in his *Risālah*, p. 32), "the two states together are like a lover's absorption in the beloved." Practically all other Ṣūfī statements on *fanāʾ* were vague.

Ibn ʿArabī was not only a Ṣūfī but also a philosopher, whose intellectual capacities were second, to none in Muslim thought. In his views on *fanāʾ* he disagrees not only with most Ṣūfīs but also with those Western mystics who describe a state corresponding to *fanāʾ*. How can even a mystic, he asks, "die to self," and yet be conscious

of God? Consciousness (irrespective of its object) implies continuation of self. A passing away of self cannot mean anything but sleep. In such a state, "the mystic is neither with his 'self' nor with his 'Lord': he is asleep, he is unaware." Ibn 'Arabī dismisses as ignorance the assumption that the mystic has become God or died to himself.

Ibn 'Arabī considers *fanā* from both a mystical and a metaphysical aspect. In a mystical sense, *fanā* is a passing away of ignorance and a becoming aware of the essential oneness of the whole. It is realization of one's non-existence as form (phenomenon). This, he claims, can be achieved only intuitively. In a metaphysical sense, *fanā* is a passing away of the forms of the phenomenal world and continuation of the one universal essence. It is the disappearance of form at the moment of the manifestation of God in another form or, as he puts it, "the disappearance of a form is its *fanā* at the moment of the manifestation of God in another form."² It can be said then (on the basis of Ibn 'Arabī's, and the atomists', doctrine of the world as being in a constant process of creation, that is, of destruction and recreation) that *fanā* is catching the infinitesimal moment between the annihilation of one Divine Attribute and the emergence of a new Attribute. (What Ibn 'Arabī appears to mean is that, since Divine Attributes, by their very nature, exist in time, only the 'instant' between them belongs to eternity—the dimension of pure essence. And so it is only then that the timelessness of *fanā* can be reached.)

In his endeavour to give an objective assessment of *fanā*, Ibn 'Arabī delineates it as a gradual process which he divides into seven stages. These are as follows:

1. Passing away, from sin. This Ibn 'Arabī does not interpret in the usual Ṣūfī manner as the abandonment of all sin, but as a realization that all actions are right (not in a moral sense but as coming from God). That which is sin, is to regard one's actions as coming from oneself.

2. Passing away from all actions in the realization that God is the agent of all actions.

3. Passing away from all attributes of the 'form' in the realization that they all belong to God. As Ibn 'Arabī puts it; "God sees Himself in you through your own eye and, therefore, He really sees Himself: this is the meaning of the passing away of attributes."³

4. Passing away from one's own personality in the realization of the non-existence of the phenomenal self, and the endurance (*baqā*) of the eternal substance which is its essence.

5. Passing away from the whole world in the realization of the real aspect which is at the bottom of the phenomenal.

6. Passing away from all that is other than God, even from the

² *Fuṣuṣul*, p. 230

³ *Fuṣuṣul*, p. 198

act of passing away (*fanāʾ al-fanāʾ*). The mystic ceases to be conscious of himself as contemplator, God being both the contemplator and the object of the contemplation. (This is very different from the common Ṣūfī view of the disappearance of consciousness which Ibn ʿArabī defines as mere sleep.)

7. Passing away from all Divine attributes. The universe ceases to be the 'effect of a cause' and becomes a 'Reality in appearance' (*Ḥaqq fī Zuhūr*). This seventh stage represents the fullest realization of the oneness of all things, and must be the final aim of all mystical endeavour.

It may be objected that Ibn ʿArabī tries in vain to give an intellectually acceptable explanation of the mystical experience, since such an experience is essentially incommunicable. It must, however, be conceded that no individual experience that involves quality and not merely quantity is communicable except by approximation. No one has ever been able to convey to others the essence of the feeling of being in love, or of the sensation of plunging headlong into icy water. All communication is effected by symbols, whether verbal, mathematical or of any other nature. Though the symbols used by a mystic differ more profoundly from the experience they symbolize than do most symbols from their respective experience, the difference between the two kinds of symbols is not fundamental. If we wish to communicate a mystical experience, we can do it only by employing symbols similar to those we employ when communicating any kind of qualitative experience. These symbols, being media belonging to a plane different from the plane of the things they symbolize, must needs distort the truth of the experience. It may well be that a mystical experience sweeps through the different stages as tabulated by Ibn ʿArabī as though in a flash, and that his detailed tabulation is too complex and artificial to explain it. It may seem too particularized and intellectual, but it contributes to a clearer understanding of the mystical experience.

Summing up, we might say that for Ibn ʿArabī the goal of *fanāʾ* is the attainment of *true* knowledge by the passing away of everything phenomenal, that is, everything other than God. Attainment of such knowledge can be equated with awareness of God. This, however, must not be interpreted as becoming God. Rather is it God's recognizing Himself through, and within, the medium of man.

(M) THE LOGOS

No other Muslim thinker has dealt more thoroughly with the doctrine of the *Logos* than has Ibn ʿArabī. The *Logos* doctrine—not necessarily always under that name—plays an important part in Islamic philosophy. In their preoccupation with it Muslim thinkers based themselves inevitably on Plotinus. To some extent Ibn ʿArabī did likewise. Yet, in his hands, that doctrine assumes its own peculiar character. Incidentally, it forms one of the main subjects of his *Fuṣuṣul*.

For Ibn ʿArabī the *Logos* is the creative, animating and rational principle and, as such, Reality of Realities. It is the inward aspect of the Godhead and the Godhead is its outward aspect. It is God's consciousness and, as such, contains all the ideas of existing (or potential) objects, without, however, in itself, having multiplicity. It is through the *Logos* that the world is brought into manifestation. Since the world manifests its perfection, it, too, must be, and indeed is, perfect. Besides being the principle of Divine creativeness, the *Logos* naturally has rationality. In fact it is through the *Logos* that God becomes conscious of Himself. For even in the case of God, thought is a function not of the thinker as a whole but of His mind.

Now, according to Ibn ʿArabī, the Divine consciousness reaches its supreme point in the Perfect Man. So it is in the Perfect Man that God knows Himself perfectly. It is to Him that God says (according to a ḥadīth): "I have not created a creature dearer to me than thee. With thee I give and with thee I take, and with thee I punish." Evidently Ibn ʿArabī's *Logos* represents the 'agent' through whom God can emerge from His absoluteness, His unknowableness (and, in a sense, unknowingness) into manifestation.

So far Ibn ʿArabī's doctrine would seem to differ but little from that of either Philo or Plotinus. Where he completely parts company with his Greek predecessors is in his interpretation of the manifested *Logos*. Who is this Perfect Man, for him? It is the Prophet Muḥammad. Does this mean that Ibn ʿArabī takes over the Christian doctrine of Incarnation, and assigns to Muḥammad the status of Jesus in Christian dogma? Such a deification of Muḥammad would, of course, be regarded in Islam as polytheism. However unorthodox Ibn ʿArabī might be, he was not likely to propound a doctrine that would have cleared the way for what Muslims consider to be an essential dualism (if not worse) in Christianity. But then his Logos-Muḥammad is not the man Muḥammad from Mecca but Muḥammad as the active principle of Divine knowledge, as the spiritual (and not phenomenal) head of the hierarchy of sainthood and prophethood.

Seeds of a *Logos* doctrine were sown in the Qurʾān itself. In a number of instances the term *rūḥ* (spirit) and *kalimah* (word) are employed to denote a *Logos* concept, as e.g. in Surah iv, 169: "Verily the Messiah, Jesus the son of Mary, is but the Apostle of God, and His Word which He cast into Mary and a spirit from Him." On another occasion, Jesus is described as God's word: "The Messiah, Jesus son of Mary, was only the messenger of God, and His word that He committed to Mary." In his *Fuṣṣuṣul*, Ibn ʿArabī calls every prophet a *logos* but not *the Logos*. Saints and prophets are, in his view, the perfect instruments of the universal *Logos*. But while they individually manifest this or that particular aspect of the *Logos*, Muḥammad alone unites in himself all these aspects.

Particularly interesting is our philosopher's interpretation of the

difference between the *Logos* (Muḥammad) and mankind to which Adam — another aspect of the *Logos* — stands in a somewhat similar relation to that existing between Muḥammad and other saints. In fact Muḥammad and Adam are for Ibn ʿArabī practically identical. But while in the phenomenal world Muḥammad is the inward aspect of Adam (Humanity), in the world to come, that is the spiritual, Adam will be the inward aspect and Muḥammad the outward of the same Reality, i.e. the *Logos*.

Now it must be repeated that Ibn ʿArabī does not identify the *Logos* with the earthly person of the Prophet but with the Spirit of Muḥammad, of which the man from Mecca and all the prophets, including Moses, Abraham and Jesus, were individual manifestations. (Though by no means identical, that relationship is somewhat similar to that between Jesus of Nazareth and Jesus Christ as the incarnation of God the Father.) The entity Muḥammad, combining in itself both the Spirit of Muḥammad and Muḥammad the man, is for Ibn ʿArabī the link between the eternal and the temporal, the Real and the phenomenal. While Muḥammad the man was born, was active, and died in time, the Spirit of Muḥammad exists in all eternity. It is identical with the First Intellect (*Ḥaqīqat al-Ḥaqāʾiq*). It is the 'depositor' (*mulqī*) of the *logoi* (*kalimāt*) of the entire world, and, as such, identical with the Holy Spirit (*Rūḥ*). Muḥammad is, thus, the Perfect Man and, as such, the most perfect manifestation of God who Himself is Absolute Perfection.

While every human being is potentially a microcosm, only the Perfect Man is an *actual* microcosm which manifests *all* Divine perfections. Only in him are united all that is manifestable and all the manifestations that, otherwise, exist only separately, whether in a spiritual or phenomenal state. Though Ibn ʿArabī does not actually say so, he almost leaves us under the impression that the Perfect Man (as realized in Muḥammad) surpasses the Godhead in perfection, for he alone is not merely spiritual perfection but equally its phenomenal manifestation. But such an impression would be wrong, for it would suggest (if only by implication) some sort of duality between Godhead and the Perfect Man. Indeed Ibn ʿArabī stresses that the Perfect Man is "to God as the eye-pupil is to the eye... and through him God beholds His creatures." ⁴

While there are many similarities between Ibn ʿArabī's *Logos* doctrine and corresponding doctrines in Christianity, it would be wrong to deduce that the former derives from the latter. Christian *Logos* conceptions are based on the idea of the Incarnation which Ibn ʿArabī utterly rejects. His Spirit of Muḥammad is not a second Person in the Godhead: it is God Himself viewed from a particular aspect. Furthermore, the God of Christianity *is* spirit, *is*

⁴ *Fuṣuṣul*, p. 19

love, while Ibn 'Arabī's God is beyond all attributes⁵ and acts and reveals Himself only through a particular Agent whom he calls the Spirit of Muḥammad. The difference is far more than merely a semantic one. Paradoxically, it might be said that while the God of Christianity is everything and yet becomes Incarnate (in the person of Christ), Ibn 'Arabī's God, while nothing but pure essence that acts through an 'agent,' does not require an incarnation. While the God of both Christianity and Islam *created* the universe and is the Creator, Ibn 'Arabī's God manifests Himself in the infinite forms of the universe.

It might be asked why Ibn 'Arabī should have spent so much time and effort upon evolving so complex a doctrine of the *Logos*? We can only assume that, like so many philosophers before him, he found it impossible to conceive of creation, that is, the relationship between God and the universe, without some 'hierarchical' system. Hierarchy is inherent in every ordered system. It must needs dominate the macrocosm as well as the microcosm. No man could function properly without organizing his various functions in some inner hierarchy. Thus he will not put the whole of his physical energy into picking up a pin, just as he will not expend the whole of his emotions for a minor pleasure or a minor irritation. An innate hierarchical system within him instinctively makes him assign certain duties to certain inner 'agents' rather than employ the whole of himself for each one of them. Likewise, God does not act (or manifest Himself) *in toto* in the greatest as well as the least significant of His manifestations. He will assign specific agents for specific functions. Hence the acceptance in most religions of archangels, angels, spirits, and so on.

A hierarchical system is of course the basis of most Muslim doctrines of creation as it was of those of the Neo-platonists. But whereas their system implies duality, (God on the one hand, and His emanations (or creatures), with the succession of Universal Reason, Spirits of Spheres, the phenomenal world, and so on, on the other,) Ibn 'Arabī's system shows no such duality. It might be said that while their hierarchy is a vertical one, beginning with God at the top and reaching matter at the bottom, Ibn 'Arabī's system is a centrifugal one or, rather, one in which all the hierarchies remain within the circle. They are merely the different modes, the inner and outer manifestations of one Reality. That Reality might be said both to act from a centre and to be all-embracing. The doctrines of the philosophers only pretended to solve the problem of duality between a unitarian God and a universe of multiplicity and imperfections, and they did it by the use of such terms as 'emanation' instead of 'creation', 'necessity' of God's nature instead of God's 'will', and so forth. Al-Ghazālī *appears*

⁵ The word 'attribute' is used here in its common sense and not in the specific sense in which Ibn 'Arabī uses it when he refers to Divine Names becoming Divine Attributes.

to have solved the problem by accepting the simpler Quranic doctrine of creation. In actual fact he left the intellectual solution in the air. Ibn ʿArabī would seem to be the only one who solved the problem both from the mystical and the philosophical points of view; that is, in so far as such a problem can ever be solved intellectually, and the solution be expressed through the imperfect medium of language.

We might perhaps summarize Ibn ʿArabī's *Logos* doctrine in the following manner:

Logos is Reality of Realities, first Manifestation of the Absolute; *Logos* is Reality of Muḥammad, not the man of Mecca, but Muḥammad the principle or the Spirit of Muḥammad; the *Logos-Muḥammad* unites in himself all the prophets who, in turn, are minor logoi; the *Logos Muḥammad* had been manifesting himself in all the genuine prophets long before Muḥammad of Mecca was born.

Each individual prophet manifests but one particular 'Name' of God, whereas the *Logos-Muḥammad*, the Seal of the Prophets, manifests *all* His names; the *Logos-Muḥammad* is the step from the Godhead to the phenomenal universe; it is the link between the eternal and the phenomenal.

And since Ibn ʿArabī approaches the *Logos* problem from more aspects than one, we might conclude by saying that: in its metaphysical aspect the *Logos* is Reality of Realities; in its mystical aspect the *Logos* is Reality of Muḥammad; in its human aspect the *Logos* is the Perfect Man. Naturally all the three are identical, as a man remains the same, irrespective of whether we consider him as a spiritual, biological, intellectual, racial, social or any other entity.

(N) HEAVEN AND HELL

Divine mercy and divine punishment run like a thread through the Qurʾān, and thus heaven and hell play an important part in Muslim doctrine. Whatever else the Qurʾān might be, it most certainly is a book of the most pervasive moral implications. By no stretch of the imagination can the same be said of Ibn ʿArabī's doctrine. In a scheme such as his, there is little room for orthodox morality. In view of this, it is surprising to find that he speaks of both heaven and hell and of the ultimate effects of moral and immoral actions.

Unlike some of the Ṣūfīs, especially Al-Muḥāsibī and Al-Ghazālī, Ibn ʿArabī does not attempt to tell us what we ought to do; how to behave in order to avoid hell and to deserve heaven. Now morality, it has been argued earlier, is primarily a matter of degree and thus of quantity. Ibn ʿArabī is seldom concerned with quantity, with the substantial aspects of the universe. His concern must needs be the essence, the true reality of, and behind, phenomena. And essence, unlike substance, is not a matter of quantity but of quality. Yet since heaven and hell depend upon human behaviour in a moral, that is primarily a quantitative, sense, it would be difficult to equate them with the domain of pure essence.

In spite of all this, Ibn ʿArabī not only speaks of heaven and hell, but he does so in the detailed and luxuriant vocabulary of orthodox Islamic literature, especially of the Ismāʿīlians and Carmathians. But, as is to be expected, when he speaks of heaven he means something very different from the orthodox heaven, and his hell has not much in common with the hell of the learned ʿulamāʾ. While the language he employs in describing these two regions is designed to mollify the orthodox, the meaning behind it is his own. It is in fact the geography of heaven and hell — he even provides a diagram of both these areas — that left so deep a mark upon Dante, and was taken over by him in the *Divine Comedy*.⁶ But, having almost overwhelmed us with traditional descriptions of Paradiso and Inferno, Ibn ʿArabī assures us that these are mere words, and he invites us to interpret them as we like or, rather, as he likes.

Inevitably the agonies of hell are for Ibn ʿArabī nothing but symbols, and the existence of both heaven and hell in their conventional meaning is denied by him. He regards both as purely subjective states of the soul. His hell is nothing but the realization by the self of its own enslavement, which is selfhood. One Arabic word for hell, *jahannam*, he interprets as distance, or being-away from God. In consequence, to be in hell means to imagine that a real gulf exists between man and God, and to be oblivious of the fact of their oneness.

Jannah, the Arabic word for heaven, or paradise, he interprets as deriving from *janna*, to conceal. *Jannah* is thus for him the Divine essence in which all multiplicity is concealed; consequently, the realization of absolute unity. In the one case the soul, being the slave of a self that stands between it and the Divine, imagines itself to live in separation from God in a world of multiplicity. In the other case it enjoys the delights of 'living' in a state of complete unity. Since Ibn ʿArabī insists upon the ultimate salvation of every soul, there is in the last analysis really little difference between his heaven and his hell. The only difference between the damned — whose existence he seems to accept merely to be on the safe side with the orthodox — and the blessed is that while the latter will behold the beatific vision, for the former that vision will be too veiled to be recognized. But, finally, the veils will be removed even from their eyes, and even they will share that experience.

Ibn ʿArabī's heaven and hell appear to have much in common with those of Ibn Sīnā. Yet he is more charitable than the great Persian doctor. It would, however, be wrong to attribute his attitude to sentimentality or to some whim on his part. His heaven and hell form a logical part of a doctrine which cannot possibly admit duality even in after-life. But this essential non-duality of heaven and hell is not 'manufactured' artificially. It forms a logical part of it. How could

⁶ See *Islam and the Divine Comedy*, by Asin y Palacio

there be the opposites of 'real' hell and 'real' heaven in a system in which all things, both good and evil, have their being in God or, rather, in their own laws which, however, derive from God? Had Ibn ʿArabī tried to conform to orthodoxy and accepted the traditional heaven and hell, then indeed the unity of his doctrine would have disintegrated into dualism.

(O) LOVE AND BEAUTY

In the Qurʾān, it is the quality of Divine mercy rather than of Divine love that predominates. Love implies reciprocity, and it would be presumptuous of man to assume that his love of God must impel his Maker to love him in return. In Ṣūfī doctrines, of course, love of man and God can be said to form the central core. Ibn ʿArabī is no exception to that rule. But his interpretation of the man-God love relationship differs from that of the other Ṣūfīs. He agrees that the basis of all religions is the worship of God. But could man worship anything without loving the object of his worship? Without love worship is impossible. In fact, for Ibn ʿArabī, love is that which pervades all beings and holds them together. However much love may differ in its forms and expressions, it is fundamentally one, for it represents the Divine Essence. Since, however, the highest object of man's love is God (or Divine Essence), that object, too, is love. In other words: that which, in man, turns lovingly towards God is, too, of the Divine Essence. As Ibn ʿArabī puts it: "I swear by the reality of Love that Love is the cause of all love," and: "Were it not for Love (residing) in the heart, Love (God) would not be worshipped."⁷ Thus Ibn ʿArabī's inevitable formulation becomes: love loves love. This, of course, is the natural climax of a doctrine of absolute non-dualism. This climax also denotes the dynamic and living quality in the idea and the function of love.

It must follow that for Ibn ʿArabī true worship implies neither the verbal invocation of the Divine name (as by the orthodox in their prayers) nor even the heart's concentration on God (as by the Ṣūfīs). True worship means for him contemplating God lovingly in all His aspects — from the most spiritual to the most material, in short, in everything that exists, including the contemplator himself. This, however, is far from the triumphant and, some would say, vainglorious cry of Al-Ḥallāj, "*Anā al-Ḥaqq*".

Since the fundamental factor underlying all Divine manifestation is love, we would naturally assume that, for Ibn ʿArabī, love is the supreme purpose of existence: an end than which no other can be of equal worth. And yet he tells us that love as such has no intrinsic value! There is something even beyond love, something that is love's inmost 'cause.' That something is Beauty.

It comes almost as an anticlimax to find a thinker who probes so

⁷ *Fususul*, pp. 387 & 390, qu. by Affifi, p. 151.

deeply into the very heart of existence elevating an aesthetic quality — even if it be the highest — to the supreme position in the Divine scheme. Yet even in this unexpected conclusion Ibn ‘Arabī is still perfectly consistent. For is it not true that love without the incentive of beauty is a mere abstraction? Do we not love only what we consider to be beautiful? The standards of beauty may differ, and that which one person deems beautiful another one may regard as ugly. What matters is that for the lover — even if for no one else — the object of his love must be beautiful. He may be in love with a person regarded by all others as hideous. But if he loves that person, he does so because there is some element of beauty in that person — not necessarily physical — to evoke his love. We may be in love with a reptile or any other creature or object generally regarded as repellent, because even such a creature might well be endowed with beauty visible to us but concealed from others. Rembrandt falls in love with ugly old Jews in Amsterdam or with the darkness of shadows, and Utrillo with the peeling plaster on houses of mean Parisian streets on a grey winter evening; because both artists found beauty in such unlikely models. And because they are deeply in love with those hidden aspects of beauty, they succeed in making that beauty manifest to all.

Man loves God, says Ibn ‘Arabī, because God is beautiful. (Al-Fārābī discerned God’s beauty in the beauty of the order permeating the God-created universe.) Indeed it is inconceivable that we could love God without considering Him beautiful. An ‘ugly’ god might be feared, but he cannot be loved. We might offer him our sacrifices, but never our love. God, on the other hand, loves His creatures — man and all creation — because these, too, are beautiful. Whence do they derive beauty? Clearly, it is God’s beauty that is the source of every kind of beauty, whether spiritual, intellectual or physical, even though God’s own beauty as such must of necessity be beyond all form.

There still remains the question: why should God love the visible beauty as contained in the ‘visible’ forms of the universe? Ibn ‘Arabī tells us that God loves it because in the beauty of created forms His own ‘form-less’ beauty, in fact His very being, is reflected. “Does God not say,” Ibn ‘Arabī exclaims, “O David, My yearning for them is greater than their yearning for me?” The 17th century English author, James Howell, seems to have perceived a similar truth when, in his book *Instructions for Forreine Travell* (1642), he wrote: “By looking downward one can see the stars in the water, but he who looks only upward cannot see the water in the stars.” Without the water the stars could not contemplate their own beauty.

Beauty and the love it inspires are thus the cause of all creation. They are equally the cause of the return of all creatures to God in the double movement of their urge for Him and His urge for them.

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ROM LANDAU

BOOK REVIEWS

Humor in Early Islam. By Franz Rosenthal, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1956, pp. x, 154, Appendix, Bibliography, Indexes; 11 plates. \$ 5.

It is seldom one meets a work of such documentation and scholarship which is at once so readable and revealing. The definition of humor essayed by Mr. Rosenthal is directly applicable to the subject matter of the illustrations given in the translation of anecdotes and "traditions" which, fortunately, occupy more space than the analytic text which is itself excellent. This definition connects humor with "the relief felt at the momentary lifting of one of the many restrictions which the physical and social environment imposes upon man ... any suggestion of a deviation from ordinary reality and the conventions of human society."

Much of the humor, particularly in Oriental literature, which rests in linguistic nuance is, of course, not fully communicable in translation. "The humor of puns and all the other variations of verbal jokes has its origin in the fact that human linguistic expression moves in quite narrowly circumscribed and usually logical channels. Any deviation from those channels is keenly felt as a release from the conventional restrictions and, therefore, is humorous."

It would scarcely be expected that the readers of early Arabic literature could fully appreciate the humor resting in peculiarly Arab situations. "The linguistic form on which they depend and the social conditions and religious knowledge which they presuppose must be studied and understood in order to appreciate the Arabic stories and to recreate for them an atmosphere of living actuality which is essential for humor." Students of Islam, however, will find in this collection of writings a rich source of material for understanding.

We are introduced principally to Ash^cab whose somewhat shadowy (and indeed shady) life-span seems to have been somewhere in the late 8th and early 9th centuries. Anecdotes of buffoonery, wit, irreverence, and the audacious earthy insult have so gathered themselves about his name that it is difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle history from legend. Your reviewer is one reader who does not care.

There are three main categories of "jokes" preserved as evidences of Ash^cab's paramount place as wit and comic: (1) the political. He could use barbed wit, the clever retort, the caricature, to elevate his preferred party (the ^cAlids) and disconcert the ^cUthmanids. (2) the religious. These anecdotes are audacious in the extreme and must have caused no end of consternation in orthodox circles. Supreme among the targets of satiric wit were the pious formulae of the *hadith*. "Both the pedantry of *hadith* transmitters and the arbitrariness of their forgeries are brilliantly characterized in the immortal story of Ash^cab as a *hadith* transmitter who starts talking about the two outstanding qualities of pious Muslims and then stops and explains that his authority had forgotten one and he himself had forgotten the other. It is a joke worthy of an Ash^cab that on the strength of these stories he himself came to be considered a genuine transmitter of traditions.

He was noted also for spoofing by grimace and gesture the prayer cycle. (3) the jokes of the urban middle class. Just as our comedians make capital of characteristics which they may not actually possess, Ash'ab has trouble with his own breed, with his wife for the most modest of foibles, with his children, with bargaining in the bazaar. He outwitted simple people and played practical jokes, on one occasion at least falling into his own trap. He showed a "disconcerting preoccupation" with subjects not fit for the drawing room or mixed company.

This book contains an Appendix "on laughter", a compendium of views on humor from Arabic sources. There is an Index of selected rare or explained Arabic words, an Index of proper names and localities with a list of recognized fools, wits, and entertainers. One finds Muslims of the early days of Islam warm and human through the scholarship of Mr. Rosenthal.

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MALCOLM S. PITT

Persian oil, A Study in Power Politics. By L. P. Elwell-Sutton, Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., London, pp. 343, Maps on Covers, 1955,

"This sorry story," as the author tells it in 23 chapters, has been divulged by a scholar who is no stranger to Persia, as his less controversial works ably demonstrate. But it is this very fact of general "Persian" knowledgeable ability, which suggests a careful consideration of what is propounded in this volume. It makes sad reading — sad for the Persian, sadder for the American, saddest for the Briton. It is one more account of what might have been in "this present world" and never was. The reader must ultimately be left to come to his own decision in apportioning responsibility, though this should not prove an insuperable problem.

The author, Lecturer in Persian at the University of Edinburgh, has made "an attempt to trace the whole story of the relations between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Persian Government and people since their first contact at the turn of the present century." His sources are in English and Persian. There are references to the inevitable "language difficulties," which in themselves demand (what they seldom get) an understanding of the mentality that lies behind verbal expression.

Some readers will be grateful for the absence of footnotes, but for the more meticulous the lack has been met through an index with 400 to 500 headings. Quite obviously many of the allusions to persons are based on experience. But the author is familiar too with the history in detail, whether in the almost tedious sequence of meetings between representatives of the A.I.O.C. and the Persian Government or the far-reaching influence of the great Oil Cartel. There has been no sparing of pains. Perhaps there was some justification for those who argued at the time of the despatch of the Stokes "Commission" that it would have been better had its members been briefed by University Professors. After all, the Oxford University Press published "The Legacy of Persia" about the same time. Its perusal, even on the plane, might have been worthwhile.

For the rest, the more interesting chapters are those which open and close the book: — from the early caution that Dr. Mosaddeq does not constitute the whole story, to the pungent comment that throughout the dispute Britain gave to the outside world “the impression that she is motivated principally by self-interest.” The burden of disproof must rest with those who would deny that “British policy has *seemed to be* (Italics ours) a confused mixture of old-time imperialism, commercial cunning, administrative blundering, and sheer ignorance.”

Accepting the statements made in this book as based not on purely personal experience, but on experience corroborated by others, there are sentences that make hard reading for a public that thinks the principles of responsibility and fair play are still their characteristic “at home *and* abroad.” Vis-à-vis the social life that should have been between Persian and Briton, the author remarks that “the rarity was the Briton who made a genuine attempt to mix with Persians on his own, and he was regarded as wrong in the head” (p. 102). Or in political relationships there is this: — “Mosaddeq made one last attempt to get the British Government to see reason” (p. 256). Perhaps the remark of a Palestinian refugee in 1954 may suffice as a reason why this book should be read and pondered. “We have come to see that what is wrong with western countries is not their peoples but their politicians.”

Redhill, Surrey, England

E. F. F. BISHOP

Changing Society in India & Pakistan. A study in Social Change and Social Stratification. By A. K. Nazmul Karim, Dacca, Oxford University Press, Pakistan, 1956, pp. 173.

The purpose of the book is to study the impact of British rule on social change and social stratification in India & Pakistan, with special reference to East Pakistan. In part I of the book, the author tries to discuss the main features of social life in pre-British India, both in rural and urban areas; part II is devoted to a discussion of Muslim social classes mainly in East Pakistan and in part III the author gives the description of the social organization of a village in East Pakistan.

In dealing with the conditions prevailing in pre-British days, the author gives an account of both Hindus' and Muslims' societies in the sixteen Century. While his description of the Hindu society has been, on the whole, satisfactory, his analysis of Muslim society is faulty and imperfect. Mr. Karim tells that the caste system in Muslim India is “similar in many respects to the Hindu Castes.” (p. 123). “*The Ulema* or the Muslim religious classes began to be venerated just like the *Brahmins* in Hindu society; in the same way, the Muslim ruling classes occupied the position almost similar to that of the *Khshatriyas*.” (p. 138).

The author seems to have ignored the basic distinction between Hindu Caste System based on Hinduism itself and the social classes which sprang up in Muslim India. The essential feature of Hindu society is a rigid caste system. A Hindu belonging to the lower caste is completely segregated from those belonging to the higher castes; inter-marriage or even common place of worship is forbidden under

the Hindu caste system. No such feature developed in Muslim India. Therefore it is difficult to accept Mr. Karim's finding that Muslim society divisions in India were similar to Hindu caste system. The author has relied on Hindu sources and quotes Hindu authors extensively for his description of Muslim society. He has omitted the Muslim sources and this may be the cause of his inadequate analysis of Muslim society.

Mr. Karim mentions the following new social classes created under the British rule in rural areas.

(i) The landlords (ii) The tenants under these landlords (iii) The class of peasant proprietors divided into upper, middle and lower strata. How far these classes were the product of British rule is a matter of controversy. Even before the British rule, the Indian social structure underwent some significant changes. The author, however, points out rightly that the process of the rise of the new classes was uneven among the different sections of society and in different regions of the country. The main limitation of this part of the book is that the author is not clear in his conclusions nor does he speak about the effects of industrialization of the country, accompanying British rule, on the social life.

The author devotes a chapter to what he calls the emergence of "The Bengali Muslim Middle Class." He points out the important role which the new middle class in East Pakistan is destined to play in the political life of Pakistan and rightly contrasts the relatively insignificant role of the middle class in West Pakistan where the upper classes continue to dominate political life. The author might also have pointed out that in the contemporary politics of Pakistan, the disparity of the role of the middle class in the two wings of Pakistan, has important bearings.

The book ends with an interesting and useful description of "Rural East Pakistan to-day."

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G. W. CHOUDHURY

A History of South-East Asia. By D. G. E. Hall, New York, St. Martin's Press, Inc., copyright 1955, pp. xvi + 807, \$ 10.00.

Materials for study of the history of Southeast Asia are abundant, and much scholarly research has been done in this field. For the most part, however, European scholars have tended to restrict their horizon to the history of that part of Southeast Asia which came under the colonial domination of their own country. Now that most of Southeast Asia has gained its independence and it has become usual to consider the area as a single unit of study, the need is felt even more strongly than before for a comprehensive survey of the history of Southeast Asia as a whole. The work under review is a welcome and largely successful attempt to furnish such a survey. Prior to its appearance, the only recent work in English on the subject was Brian Harrison's *South-East Asia: A Short History* (London, 1954), which is too brief and undocumented to serve as more than a very general introduction.

The author of the present volume is Professor of the History of

South-East Asia in the University of London, and was formerly the head of the Department of History of the University of Rangoon. He describes his book simply as "an introduction to South-East Asian history, designed as much for the non-specialist reader as for the student intending to pursue the subject further" (p. v), and points out that it is essentially a survey of work published by other scholars. That this is largely so, does not, however, detract from its value to the student, unable or unwilling to consult the mass of original documents and scholarly studies in a half-dozen or more languages upon which Prof. Hall has drawn. He has in fact done much more than simply to abstract the work of other historians of Southeast Asia. His own contribution is evident in the selection of materials, their organization into a coherent picture of the history of the region as a whole, the appraisal of conflicting accounts and interpretations of certain controversial matters, and the presentation of results of his own original investigations of source materials dealing with the history of Burma and Malaya.

In scope the book extends from the period of prehistory, treated very briefly in an initial chapter, to the political developments which have taken place in Southeast Asia since the end of the Second World War. For the early period of Southeast Asian history during which cultural influences from India played an important role throughout much of the region, Prof. Hall properly relies heavily upon G. Goedès' *Les États hindouisés d'Indochine et d'Indonésie* (Paris, 1948), but he has supplemented and revised Coedès' views in the light of more recent work, including the drastic reinterpretations advanced by Dutch scholars. The account of early European contacts with Southeast Asia and the subsequent penetration and domination by European powers makes up over half of the book. This is the period of Southeast Asian history for which there is fullest documentation. Prof. Hall has well traced the main lines of political and economic development.

The weakest part of the book is the brief introductory treatment of the prehistory of Southeast Asia. This is far too condensed to convey to the reader a true notion of the complexity of the problem or to allow him to judge the relative validity of the archaeological, racial, ethnographic, and linguistic evidence on the basis of which the various versions of Southeast Asian prehistory have been constructed. It is unfortunate that Prof. Hall has perpetuated the confusion in the usage of the term "Indonesian" by employing it himself in three quite distinct and often contradictory senses without explanation. He first introduces the term as a designation for a prehistoric immigrant group which brought a certain physical type and certain cultural traits to Southeast Asia, and uses it subsequently by extension to refer to present-day peoples supposed to be of the same physical or cultural type. He also uses "Indonesian" in the accepted linguistic sense to designate groups which speak languages classified in the Indonesian subdivision of the Malayo-Polynesian family. Finally, he employs "Indonesian" in its modern political sense as the designation for the inhabitants of the state of Indonesia. Now most Indonesians in this third sense are also Indonesians in the second sense, but the

converse is not true: many speakers of Indonesian language live outside the boundaries of Indonesia. In addition, most of the present-day peoples called Indonesians in the first sense neither speak languages of the Malayo-Polynesian family nor live in Indonesia. The reader thus has no way of knowing what Prof. Hall means when in a given instance he labels a certain group "Indonesian." In fact, the hill tribes of Indochina which Prof. Hall calls "Indonesian" are so by virtue of their physical type, their languages being for the most part Mon-Khmer; whereas the Chams of southern Annam, whom the author also labels "Indonesian," are such in the quite different sense of speakers of a Malayo-Polynesian language: but the reader, and perhaps Prof. Hall himself, remains unaware of the distinction.

The final section dealing with postwar developments in Southeast Asia suffers, as any such account must, from lack of historical perspective, but on the whole Prof. Hall has succeeded better than many in achieving a sympathetic yet objective viewpoint. One might take exception to his statement on p. 699 that "... Malay national sentiment ... showed itself in a most unpleasant form at the moment of Malaya's release from Japanese thralldom, when in many places Malays began to kill any Chinese on whom they could lay hands." It would have been fairer, when laying such a charge against the Malays, to mention the injustices and oppressions which the Malays, rightly or wrongly, felt they had suffered at the hands of Chinese guerillas during the Japanese occupation of Malaya.

The student of Islam who is interested in Southeast Asia as one of the major Muslim regions of the world will not find much here that deals specifically with Islam in Southeast Asia. The introduction of Islam and its early propagation are discussed in a chapter of ten pages entitled "Malacca and the Spread of Islam," but in this brief compass the author cannot do more than present the bare historical bones of the subject. However, Prof. Hall's *History of South-East Asia* can be recommended to the scholar with special interests who wishes a reliable and detailed introduction to the general historical development of the area.

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RUFUS S. HENDON

Heritage of Islam. By K. Jamil Ahmed, Lahore, Ferozsons, 1956, pp. 320, illustrations, Index, Rs. 5/-.

This book looks at once to be a brief and rapid sketch of many themes in the history of Islam. It proves indeed to be encyclopaedic. It makes easy reading and was doubtless for the author easy writing, although it required of him patience and painstaking. It is an attractive volume as it brings before the reader's mind Islamic arts, architecture, sciences and philosophy — some twenty-one subjects in all, not inclusive of religion. It is intended for the average reader, Pakistani and western, although it may suggest at once from time to time for the seasoned student of Islam recollections of and further incursions into wider ranges of Islamic history and culture.

The book is made up of short articles, each a unit in itself, written and published in leading Pakistani newspapers and periodicals. The author is a devoted, enthusiastic Muslim eager to make his fellow-citizens effectively acquainted with their heritage in Islam. As an introductory study it is not profound. The reader's interest grows with the abundant illustrations — pages of them throughout the book. The author sees most of what may be set down to Muslim credit as Islam developed and spread in mediaeval times. Perhaps he makes more of some things than the bare facts warrant, — for example, Arab discovery of America centuries before Columbus. But if he seeks to inspire his fellows to still further accomplishment, his aim is valid, and we can wish for his work a wide reading in Pakistan, India, the Near East and the West. He enlists a western interest by freely quoting from western writers on Islam.

Yale University, New Haven, Conn. JOHN CLARK ARCHER

Mission on the Nile. By James Dempsey of Mill Hill, Philosophical Library, New York, 1956, pp. 247, \$ 6.00.

Since 1940, Fr. James Dempsey has been a missionary among the Shilluks of the Upper Nile Province of the Sudan. *Mission on the Nile* describes the hardships and frustrations involved in laboring in a remote region among a primitive people. Much first hand information about the customs of the Shilluk people, in matters connected with birth, marriage and death, is presented in a very readable style.

The origins of this particular mission go back about a century to a Veronese priest, Daniel Comboni, whose early efforts resulting in stations at Dilling, El Obeid and Berber suffered badly from the Mahdi revolt. This broke out in 1881, the year that Comboni died. Many priests and nuns were eventually made prisoners and some died in captivity. Following Kitchener's reconquest of the Sudan, the work was reestablished and enlarged. It was in 1938 that the Fathers of St. Joseph's Society of Mill Hill assumed responsibility for staffing the work which the Veronese Fathers had conducted for almost forty years.

The reader who is expecting to learn something about Sudanese political parties and the tensions between the peoples of the north and of the south in the Sudan, or the policy of Arabization of the pagan areas, or Muslim penetration into the Upper Nile Province will be disappointed. The chapter entitled: "Labor Troubles in the Sudan", instead of discussing the strikes of the railway workmen and their organization, tells rather of the vicissitudes encountered by the author and some Shilluk school boys who attempted travel when river transportation was brought to a standstill by a strike.

In spite of the lack of material on the political and economic problems of the Sudan, the author's very personal account of his many adventures makes good reading. His ability to see humor even in the most distressing and the most solemn occasions renders the book fascinating. "Ah well," he closes his final chapter, "as an American friend of mine, a Presbyterian missionary out here, once said to me, 'I guess you haven't got to be crazy to be a missionary, but it helps.'"

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E. E. ELDER

The Middle East: Its Religion and Culture. By E. J. Jurji, Philadelphia, the Westminster Press, 1956, pp. 159, \$ 3.00.

Any one interested in a thoughtful approach to the Middle East will find Dr. Jurji's a timely study. The author's extensive training and experience are evident in his latest publication.

The theme running through this book is that mankind is curtailing itself if it depends too much on men and politics in the quest for peace. Dr. Jurji believes the real challenge facing the world today is coexistence among the great religions. Our possibilities for coexistence both among nations and among religious faiths will be vastly increased when spiritual vision transcends nationalism. This vision entails the idea of the universality of God. As all creative aspects of culture come from God, they are the common heritage of all men. Universal intercultural exchange of all that is good is the keynote of this idea.

Four chapters (3, 4, 5, 6) trace the traditions and development of Christianity, Islam and Judaism in their Middle East setting. The author indicates that such a vision has had its part in the revealed sacred books and outstanding theological tracts of these three monotheistic faiths.

Although Dr. Jurji stresses the similarities underlying the three great monotheistic religions, he notes that it is important to be familiar with the unity of action once experienced by Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. More realistically, he emphasizes the place the Middle East has occupied in the intermingling of cultural and religious values yielding the basis for universality. In one of his later chapters he brings the reader up to date in a short, but excellent, description of the Protestant Christian impact upon that region today.

Dr. Jurji envisages the heights which may be attained when men dare to appreciate the sincerity of other faiths. While upholding what is good in his own faith, there is the possibility of great gain if man can subordinate his ethnocentrism and become strong enough to let his most sacred beliefs be scrutinized by all men who are seeking truth. "Loving each other in faith and in truth — as Christians, Muslims, and Jews — we might together build a better world." "It ought to make a startling difference, if among the world's populations of diverse creeds, the authority and wills of the living religions were consistently and decisively felt on the side of peace."

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CARL M. WHEELLESS

Social Implications of Industrialization and Urbanization in Africa South of the Sahara Unesco Publication Company, 475 Fifth Ave., New York 17, N.Y., 1956, pp. 743, \$ 9.

In this book the International African Institute of London, under the auspices of UNESCO, has brought together in condensed form the results of social surveys in areas of Africa during the past thirty-odd years. The first part by Daryll Forde is a general review of conditions, including a critical analysis of the nature of investigations and suggested improvements. Part Two is a compilation of the work of over thirty social scientists with comparisons and conclusions drawn

by Meran McCulloch. Part three gives a preliminary report of urbanization in Stanleyville including the socio-demographic structure, labor conditions, aptitudes and training of Africans, attitude to work and social patterns of urban life. Part Four contains the papers prepared for the UNESCO Conference held at Abidjan, in 1954, concerned with the many different features of urban areas. This book serves a very useful purpose, bringing together as it does the work of so many social scientists who have studied the rapid social changes taking place in Africa and presenting critical evaluation of these studies. It is important also for all persons interested in the changing Muslim world, inasmuch as a number of the areas treated are places where Muslims form a large part of the population.

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ROBERT T. PARSONS

Mid-East: World Center. Edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen, Harper Brothers, New York, Volume vii in Science and Culture Series, 1956, pp. 378 and Index, \$ 6.50.

"The flowering moments of the mind
Drop half their petals in our speech."

And that, in poet's language, is the problem of communication. But here in places there is some obscurity arising from the flowering of the speech. At least one reader finds it so in the opening and concluding Chapters by the Editor, entitled: "West emerging from East" and "West returning to East." They move from many a vista to many another and their question abides: "Can the principle of unitary man, in which spirit and nature exist in a symbiotic rhythm and the principle of dualistic man, in which man and nature are falsely dichotomized, meet in the Middle East in some procreative reconciliation? Can the new cosmology nascent in the 20th century articulate also in the Mediterranean lands the truth that mankind is that factor in nature which portrays in its most intense form the plasticity of nature?" p. 369. We do not know.

But not all of this work asks such bewilderingly formulated questions. Like all composite works, it is diverse in character and uneven, while some of the papers have appeared elsewhere, e.g. Bernard Lewis on *Communism and Islam* appeared in *International Affairs*, Vol. 30, No. 1, Jan. 1954. Dr. E. E. Calverley writes with great clarity on the essential meaning of the Islamic doctrine of the unity of God, pointing out that it is a Oneness of simplicity and not of number which is basically taught. All is well with this contribution save its title: "World Center of Islam." "Mid-Land, Mid-Sea, Mid-Air" by Ernest Jackh, (who also writes on modern Turkey) is another title that perplexes. It savours more of the journalist than the scholar. *Time Magazine*, however, would have added 'Mid-Night' just to make it a foursome. More seriously, is it not more than a trifle inexact to speak of "the gospels of the three prophets as well as of the three refugees who crossed the same Arabian desert and received their revelations under the same stars. Moses, Jesus and Muhammad all three reaching out from the Mid-land and the Mid-sea between three continents and three oceans." (p. 91). This is romanticism forgetting scholarship.

Yet there are solid contributions in this well produced volume, not least Chapter viii, by George Lenczowski on: "Political Institutions" where the reader will find a competent discussion of constitutional and political issues in Egypt, Syria and Jordan, as contrasted with the patriarchal society exemplified in Saudi Arabia and the modernized societies exhibited in Turkey and Israel (whose evolutions and dilemmas are finely analyzed). The warning that terminates the discussion of the "intermediate societies" (e.g. Egypt etc.) is well taken: "Political institutions of the Middle East can be properly understood only if due attention is paid both to the formal institutional framework and to the substance of political behavior." (p. 171). The writer adds:

"A simultaneous struggle against the remnants of foreign imperialism and in favor of a change from an unhealthy social structure taxes the energies of their reformers sometimes beyond the latter's endurance. Exposed to a number of forces working at cross purposes, such as religious, nationalist, and Communist influences, these societies are still seeking a formula which would give them greater liberty and greater justice without erasing their cultural heritage. They have advanced too much to turn back to the old safety of a life regulated by Islam. But they are hesitant to follow in the footsteps of Turkey and increasingly doubtful as to applicability of liberal Western standards to their own conditions." (p. 172).

"Regulated by Islam" perhaps begs some questions here. For the author clearly means it in the sense of conservative forms. But that understanding of Islamic regulation would be widely disputed by many who claim that Islamicity and conservatism are by no means synonymous.

Charles Issawi writes illuminatingly on "Economic and Social Conditions" discussing the area's natural and human resources, its population problems, the absence of large-scale industry, inadequacy of transport and the two important 'differentia' — oil and aridity. As for prospects, he concentrates alliteratively on *Land, Labor, Literacy* e*Lect*rification, and *Leadership*, as the salient issues.

The Chapter on Education by Dr. Taha Hussein includes a brief historical analysis of Egyptian education and an even briefer comment on the current trend of Arabic culture in which he returns to a favorite theme, namely that Arab culture is essentially 'Mediterranean' in its nature. Culturally, Arab Islam is Western in its quality and ethos. It has, therefore, a creative role in a day of cultural plurality.

These paragraphs in review have concentrated on the areas of this symposium that deal with near contemporary themes, only because of the impossibility of doing justice to the whole content of the book. This means no discourtesy to E. A. Speiser, Jack Finegan and C. S. Coon, who write on "Ancient Near East; Cradle of History," "Judaean Christian Heritage," and "The Desert and the Land" respectively. There are brief discussions of Language, Art, Science and Woman, in the modern section and of the transition from Religious to National Law.

Samuel Hugo Bergman's paper on "The Phenomenon of Israel," translated from the German, is the final article, prior to the Editor's concluding reverie. It is a moving study, perhaps unintentionally, of the bitterness of paradox. It presents the Zionist Movement as

emanating in its main stream from a "drive towards reconciliation with the world, after the walls of the ghetto, spiritual even more than physical, had been breached." (p. 351). In its haunting conclusion, the reader captures a sense of what this hoped-for repossession of Israel by a world of reconciled humanity means. The occasion is a performance of Beethoven's *Missa Solemnis* in one of the public parks of Haifa. About three thousand listeners stretched along the slopes of Carmel catching the strains of the Christian masterpiece.

"When the music came to an end and the lights went up and I saw all the young faces around me...I sensed the liberating effect of the establishment of this State of Israel. A gaping, burning ulcer on the body of humanity is beginning to cicatrize, slowly and laboriously after the terrifying experiences of World War II... *humanity possesses us once more.*" (p. 353)

If only the volumes of Palestinian comment and debate could plumb and mirror these depths! Yet the supreme instrument, ideally understood, of reconciliation is the sharpest provocation of enmity in today's world center. The means to the emancipation of the ghettoed Jewry of Europe, and their integration into the body of a reconciled humanity, is in danger of itself becoming a ghetto of frustrated liberation. Here is the bitter paradox. Perhaps "Mid-East" is not only a world center in the ways these contributors explore. It is also the sharpest contemporary crux of the suffering that can either choke or redeem. This is its most ultimate centrality: this is the sense in which its issues, more than oil, more than Suez, more than mid-air, mid-sea and mid-land, are inescapable.

Jerusalem, Jordan

KENNETH CRAGG

SHORTER NOTICES

The Middle East, Bridge or Barrier? By C.S. Milford, London, Highway Press, 1956, pp. 92. 4s. 6 d.

The author reports and reflects on a recent journey to visit the work of the Church Missionary Society in the area. Though impeded by its brevity, the book presents a useful summary of facts and views. Perhaps it should be *Bridge and Barrier* for, like the bridge-dam in Iran that inspires the cover design, it is through the circumstances of resistance and the obstacles of evil that the Spirit of Christ makes bridges into ministry and witness. One small point: on p. 33. Henry Martyn, died at Tokat, Armenia, and not in Shiraz. We must not abbreviate that last epic journey!

Agricultural Development and Research in Syria By A. F. Money Kyrle, edited by R. H. Porter, published by the American University of Beirut, Faculty of Agricultural Sciences, 1956, pp. 56 with illustrations and maps. \$ 1.00

This monograph presents the results of a survey begun in November, 1954, by the new Faculty of Agricultural Sciences at Beirut, with the help of a grant from the Ford Foundation. It reviews the existing literature and discusses the conditions of agriculture by regions and the development of irrigation, as well as crop-experimentation, animal husbandry, village improvement and horticulture. It concludes that inadequate transport, low humus rate of Syrian soil (due in part to consumption of manure as fuel), erosion and unbalanced agriculture are the main problems besetting the Syrian rural economy.

Constitutional Development in Libya. By Ismail Raghieb Khalidi, Khayat's, Beirut, Lebanon, 1956, pp. 128.

The author had close, personal opportunities to follow the story of Libya's drafting of a Constitution and he analyses the document against this background. The Constitution itself is presented in English translation on pp. 76 to 102, with prior discussion of Libyan history and the course of post-war changes in its juridical status. "Islam is the religion of the State" (Art. 50). "Libyans... shall enjoy equal civil and political rights, shall have the same opportunities and be subjected to the same public duties and obligations, without distinction of religion, belief, race, language, wealth, kinship or political or social opinions." (Art. 11). The author has succeeded in communicating to the reader something of the solid achievements of this story in the realm of definition and something of the sober hopefulness of this experiment in federal structure in yet another 20th century Muslim venture in political independence.

Islam and Russia, Issued by the Central Asian Research Centre in association with St. Antony's College, (Oxford), Soviet Affairs Group, London 1956, pp. 87.

This mimeographed work is an analysis of the Russian scholar N. A. Smirnov's book: *Ocherki istorii izucheniya Islama v SSSR*, (An Outline of the History of Islamic Studies in the USSR. — The Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Moscow, 1954.) The analysis proper is preceded by an Introduction by Professor Ann K. S. Lambton, who

describes N. A. Smirnov's book as the "first relatively comprehensive account of Islamic studies in Imperial Russia and the USSR." Written from a Marxist-Leninist viewpoint the book offers the characteristic ideas of religion as part of the "super-structure" of class society. The present analysis brings out the full scope of the book, supplemented by a comprehensive Bibliography, listing the works quoted in Smirnov's original text.

Kritik und Dichtkunst. Studien zur arabischen Literaturgeschichte. By Gustave E. von Grünebaum, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1955, pp. 161.

Nine of the eleven articles published in the present volume were written in English by Professor Gustave E. von Grünebaum and published between 1941 and 1952, mainly in the *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* and the *Journal of the American Oriental Society*. The two remaining articles were not hitherto published. Translated by the author himself they now appear in German with a comprehensive Index of names and technical terms. All the articles deal with Islamic culture and literature, mainly Arabic poetry. Uniting these articles in book form is amply justified by the uniformity of method and the interdependence of the problems discussed by the author.

University of Michigan Medical Bulletin, special issue, Arabian Medicine, vol. 22, No. 6, June, 1956.

Coinciding with an exhibition of rare Arabic medical texts, the University of Michigan has most commendably produced this special edition of its medical bulletin dealing with Arab medicine. It contains articles on Avicenna's Canon of Medicine, on the medical influence of Ibn Nafis, and on Ibn al-Haitham. There is also a vivid account of how Dr. Wells Thoms of the Arabian Mission of the Reformed Church at Muscat, Oman, acquired a copy of Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Najāt*, together with five volumes of his *Canon of Medicine*, as payment of medical fee by an impoverished pearl merchant who had been a patient. The book is now deposited in the University Library. Dr. Thoms' story and his rendition of some of the passages of the text make fascinating reading. The whole is a generous and imaginative tribute to the perspicacity of Muslim doctors and to the quality of their contributions to materia medica and ophthalmology in particular.

NOTES OF THE QUARTER

Rebuilding the Meccan Road of Hārūn al-Rashīd. Among interesting engineering projects in the Arab world is a revival of the celebrated pilgrim road from Holy Najaf in Iraq to Holy Mecca in the Hijāz. Hārūn al-Rashīd, who was a frequent pilgrim, first constructed the highway, some five hundred and fifty miles in length, between the two holy cities. He and Queen Zubaida alike used it. There were oases at various points along its route, formed by deeply sunken wells, whence water was drawn to be contained, for the use of travellers, in marble storage tanks. After some eight centuries of use, the road with its caravanserai fell into decay. The desert encroached and bandits multiplied. The two countries have now agreed to reconstruct the highway, each rebuilding the parts lying within its own territory. Some five or more years will be required and the cost will be more than forty million dollars. About a hundred artesian wells will be sunk to maintain water supplies. The modern builders will command resources from oil revenues of which their great Caliphal predecessor, for all his magnificence, could not have dreamed. But then there would have been no Aladdin's lamp! New pilgrims on the new road are not likely to occupy some three months of their lives in the journey, as was the case in 'Abbāsīd days.

Persian Translation of Encyclopedia. The Columbia-Viking Desk Encyclopedia is to be translated into Persian under the auspices of Franklin Publications and the editorship in chief of Dr Gholam Hussein Mossaheb, who is a former Under Secretary of Education in Iran. He will be assisted by a senior officer of the Ministry of Education and a distinguished advisory committee, headed by the President of the Iranian Senate. Financial assistance for the project has been given in equal amounts by Her Imperial Highness Princess Ashraf and the Ford Foundation. The translation, writing of new entries, printing and publication will all be done in Iran, under Iranian direction. Details in the American edition which are of slight or local interest will be deleted, to be replaced by material on Persian history, Asia and Islam, more suited to the needs of Persian readers. The venture is in line with the fine traditions of Franklin Publications in Arabic, Persian, Urdu, Bengali and Indonesian. Intended for the non-expert, the Encyclopedia should be a great asset in Persian schools and Colleges, the more so since the initiative behind it has come imaginatively from Iranian sources.

Publication is awaited within two years and the price will be as low as possible, the editorial (though not the production) costs being covered by the sponsoring grants.

Academic Freedom in Turkey. Towards the end of 1956, serious tensions developed in University circles in Turkey because of the extremely sensitive reaction of the Government to what in many countries would appear to be entirely legitimate attitudes of academic analysis and constructive criticism. The present Government seems

loathe to recognise the intellectual independence of University Professors. The Dean of the Political Science Faculty in the University of Ankara resigned in December after, it is said, being challenged by the State over his exhortation to his senior students to maintain an objectively critical attitude to State policy. He was also accused of deploring the Government's policy over professorial promotion. There would seem little doubt to the outside observer that the Government has behaved towards the academic world with a lack of respect for its integrity and its right to be untrammelled in its exercise of intellectual leadership. Those who justify the State's indirect control of thought accuse certain academicians of irresponsibility. But this remains a dangerous vindication of repressive attitudes, since intellectual responsibility in leadership is only engendered where it is trusted. Mischievous or distorted criticism of economic policy might legitimately be suppressed on the ground that alarmist and disruptive rumors masquerade under the form of academic criticism. But this does not seem to have been the case in the recent tensions, one interesting and novel aspect of which was the way the students rallied to the support of their Professors, even at the cost of their academic standing and perhaps of their careers. May be in this aspect of the situation is the best ultimate promise for a vigorous academic self-respect and for a governmental attitude less sensitive and inquisitorial.

Official statistics, meanwhile, indicate that of some thirteen hundred new books in Turkey during the first half of 1956, nearly five hundred were devoted to sociology, political science, education and economics. There were 327 works on the applied sciences and 215 of a literary nature. Only forty works appeared in the field of theology and religion and twenty-five on philosophy. The arts had sixty.

The Canal and the Traffic of Ideas. It is not normally the custom of this journal to attempt political comment. For one good reason it only appears quarterly and politics moves much faster than that! Moreover, its obligation is to the areas that underlie the surface of events. However, there are occasions when the politicians embroil and bedevil us all. October/November, 1956 would command a place in "Notes of the Century." Perhaps it is just for that reason that it is so hard to do its significance justice in Notes of a Quarter.

One of the few hopeful things about the Anglo-French veto of the rule of law at that time and of their aggression against Egypt, is a negative one, the hope, that is, that it may prove, in retrospect, to have been the last wild spasm of an attitude that found it hard to die in the days when it could no longer succeed. Asian and Arab nationalism are in no mood or shape to be handled after the manner of the age of Palmerston. Nor are the Governments that sought to pursue such a tradition, to the alienation of the sympathies of their most discerning citizens, in any position of diplomatic freedom to make a success of such a policy. The hard facts of economics and of 20th century power patterns were against their venture and it should have been the work of statesmanship, if not of moral integrity, to recognise these facts. In this case, as not seldom elsewhere, honesty and humility and integrity, would have been the truest realism. Instead we have

had a painful and shattering revelation of the inability of governing Anglo-French opinion to appreciate the nature of the mid-20th century world and the authentic form of national greatness. It remains to hope that in the hard, inexorable retrospect of this folly the surviving Palmerstonians will consent to reconcile themselves to the facts of their generation. For that, in Shakespeare's words: "It is not, and it cannot come to good," has from the first moment been the crystallly evident truth of the Suez miscalculation. And "miscalculation" is the kindest word, because it keeps to the realm of mathematics. We have been led by people who did not know how to add and subtract in today's world.

They have, however, only too painfully multiplied tensions and divided counsels. Blocked assets and a blocked canal are one thing. There are many other intangible blockages which will take more than salvage vessels to dislodge. Asia and Africa have received a savage jolt: the best traditions of British policy have been betrayed: religious tensions have been sharpened: the hopes of inter-religious expression compromised. Years of patient and studious concern for positive relationships have been thrown away in a gamble. The men of impatience have laid new burdens on the men of patience. Distrust has been sharpened, fundamental solutions to the grievous problems of the Middle East set back and perspectives distorted in befogging clouds of propaganda. Even the inquest on the affair cannot be a cleansing and refreshing process as long as it is conducted with reservations of pride or self-vindication.

Ecclesiastically the Christian movement in West Asia is in sharp jeopardy. Those who talked of 'loosening' a stalemate may find that they have loosened an avalanche, which may engulf those who disown them but must live with their consequences. Maybe one of the sanest pleas arising out of this melancholy and desperate event is that of Surah vii. 156: "Will You destroy us for what the foolish among us did?" But if the answer is favorable, there lies ahead the hard task of repudiating wisely and repairing unweariedly.

Al Azhar and Oriental Studies. The Jamādi al-Ūwīlā, 1376, issue of the Al-Azhar Journal, pp. 457-463, contains a sharp denunciation of western orientalism from the pen of Muḥammad Rajab al-Bayūmī. He accuses scholars and professors in this field as being merely "the eyes of their governments" and argues that there is no really objective and scholarly quality about their researches, since the motive is not disinterested. The article is followed by a half-page section in which the Journal moderates to some degree the asperity of its contributor's views by pointing out that, while western orientalism has in truth been vitiated by animosity of religion and self-interest of politics, there are orientalist and orientalist and that some have risen above the deplorable level.

Miscellanea. A group of Turkish educational experts recently completed a study tour of the United States, the purpose of which was to gather information about teaching methods and administration in the various types of educational procedures, with special emphasis on vocational and trade schools.

The Council of Ministers of Saudi Arabia has decided to adopt the solar system as a basis for the school year. The Muslim calendar will be preserved for religious occasions.

The new University of Khartoum was to be opened in December last. The Deans of the Universities of Cairo, of Al-Azhar, of Alexandria, Assiut, Damascus and London were invited to the ceremony, together with numerous University representatives from the United States, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Iran and the Gold Coast.

The Indo-Arab World, a new journal devoted to Indo-Arab friendship and mutual interpretation, was launched by the Indo-Arab Society of Bombay, in November last. It appears bi-monthly. The first issue contained a color picture of King Saud and a descriptive article on Jamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣir, whom it describes as "one of the giants of his age, shaping the currents of world history." For the people of Egypt "he has already done more than any other man or woman since the days of Cleopatra." It also contains an analysis of the deeper implications of the Suez crisis and remarks: "Into the heart of these (Asian) countries a new terror has suddenly struck. The sinister shadow of imperialism, which we thought had been dispelled, seems to have gathered force again with a new ferocity." These sentiments are comprehensible even if in the perspective of history these events appear, not as a new chapter in imperialism, but one of its dying spasms.

The Danish archaeological expedition is returning to Bahrain to continue its researches into the meaning of the numerous burial grounds that stretch from Alawi northwards over the island. Failing for years to locate any ancient villages, temples or any island capital, earlier archaeologists were inclined to conclude that Bahrain must have been a burial area for mainland kingdoms. The Danes have now, however, unearthed an ancient capital and found distinct traces of sustained civilisation. They are pressing these clues further in the island of one hundred thousand grave mounds.

The Saudi Arabian capital, Riyadh now enjoys radio telephone communication across the Atlantic. King Saud inaugurated the service in October, 1956, calling the Saudi Arabian Ambassador in Washington and enquiring about Saudis and Islam in the United States.

The Imam of the Shah Jehan Mosque of the Ahmadiyyah Community at Woking, England, died at his home adjoining the mosque. *Light*, the Lahore weekly, devoted its issue of August, 24, 1956, to tributes to his memory.

An educational town in Saudi Arabia, a new venture, is under way on the shores of the Red Sea, north of Jiddah. A model educational unit has been established with a student population of nine hundred, under a director trained in Egypt. Two former royal palaces have been incorporated into the scheme which is intended as a pilot project in Saudi education. The annual budget amounts to five million Saudi rupees. The unit has an industrial school, library, mosque and hospital and is equipped with air-conditioning.

SURVEY OF PERIODICALS

By SUE MOLLESON FOSTER

I. GENERAL

- APERÇU GÉNÉRAL SUR LES "QUARANTE HADITHS" DANS LA LITTÉRATURE ISLAMIQUE. Abdulkadir Karahan. *Studia Islamica*, Paris. 1955, part 4. pp. 39-55. A study of a literary form which has depicted aspects of Muslim life for centuries.
- ART UNDER THE MONGOL DYNASTIES OF CHINA AND PERSIA. Basil Gray. *Oriental Art*, Oxford. Winter, 1955. pp. 159-167. Discusses arts in Iran in the 13th and 14th centuries.
- THE BEGINNINGS OF CLASSICAL ARABIC. C. Rabin. *Studia Islamica*, Paris. 1955, part 4, pp. 19-37. The author suggests that the classical developed later than the everyday language.
- DEVELOPMENTS OF THE QUARTER: COMMENT AND CHRONOLOGY. *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, D.C. Summer, 1956. pp. 269-299. Covers March 1-May 31, 1956. Discusses in particular Tunisian independence and its government's struggles with France.
- EGYPTIAN ARABIC STUDIES. Richard S. Harrell. *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, D. C. Summer, 1956. pp. 307-312. A critical survey of colloquial works accompanied by a good bibliography.
- FIELD NOTES ON THE ARABIC LITERATURE OF THE WESTERN SUDAN. W. E. N. Kensdale. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, London. 1956, part 1-2. pp. 77-80. Lists the writings of Waziri Abdullahi dan Fodio, 1766-1828.
- LAKE VAN AND TURKISH KURDISTAN. P. H. DAVIS. *Geographical Journal*, London. June, 1956. pp. 156-166. Undertaken primarily as a botanical journey under the auspices of Edinburgh University, the expedition contributed a great deal to topography and native living conditions.
- PAINTERS AND SCULPTORS OF ALEXANDRIA. Robert Mulky. *Middle East Forum*, New York. May, 1956. pp. 18-26. Illustrated material and notes on artists in what is now known as a centre of Arab art.
- PALMYRÉNIENS, NABATÉENS ET ARABES DU NORD AVANT L'ISLAM. J. Starcky. *Histoire des Religions*, Paris. 1955, part 4. pp. 201-237. The author stresses the objectivity of the cults — the divinities having well-defined personalities.
- RÉFÉRENCES. *IBLA*, Tunis. 1955, part 4. pp. 515-540. An annotated bibliography of articles dealing mainly with North Africa and taken from about 100 periodicals.
- UMAYYAD POETRY. K. A. Fariq. *Islamic Culture*, Hyderabad. October, 1955. pp. 256-266. Discusses the relation of poetry and politics and the differences between Iraqi, Syrian and Hijazi verse.

II. ARABIA

- FOLK REMEDIES OF HADRAMAWT. R. B. Serjeant. *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, London, 1956, part 1. pp.

5-8. An extract from *Hilyat al-Banat* by Muḥammad Bahraq (1465-1524).

GRAND CANYON ARABICA. Genevieve Maxwell, *Middle East Forum*, Beirut. March, 1956. pp. 10-14. A description of the Ḥadramaut.

LA RELIGION SUD-ARABE PRÉ-ISLAMIQUE. A. Jamme. *Histoire des Religions*, Paris. 1955, part 4. pp. 239-307. Due to the severity of nature and the accompanying difficulties of life, the Southern Arabs worshipped a protective divinity, which would constantly guard in all their activities. Bibliography.

III. QUR'ĀN, TRADITION, THEOLOGY

IBN AL-SAMH. S. M. Stern. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, London. 1956, part 1-2. pp. 31-44. Examines Al-Samh's manuscripts of the Physics and Rhetoric of Aristotle thus showing his debt to his master, Yahyā b. 'Adī.

IBN KHALDŪN'S SOURCES FOR THE HISTORY OF JENGHIS KHĀN AND THE TATARS. Walters J. Fischel. *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Baltimore. April-June, 1956. pp. 91-98. A thorough analysis of ten sources and the mention of many other contacts which furnished information.

NOTES ON THE EDITION OF THE KITĀB AL-NAFS ASCRIBED TO ISHĀQ IBN ḤUNAYN. Muḥammad Saghir Ḥasan. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, London. 1956, part 1-2. pp. 57-72. This Kitāb appears to be the earliest extant Arabic commentary on the "De anima" of Aristotle.

PERSISCHE WEISHEIT IN GRIECHISCHEM GEWANDE? J. Duchesne-Guillemin. *The Harvard Theological Review*, Cambridge. April, 1956. pp. 115-122. Analyzes an article by Albert Goetze, which appeared in the *Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik*, and discusses his theory that a Persian original, antedating the Greek "De Hebdomadibus," was perhaps the foundation of Greek idealism and mysticism.

IV. HISTORY OF ISLAM

ETHIOPIA'S REVISED CONSTITUTION. William H. Lewis. *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, D. C. Spring, 1956. pp. 194-199. Presents a condensed version of the Constitution and compares it with the Constitution of 1931, which was less liberal in its composition.

EVOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT IN EARLY ISLAM. H. A. R. Gibb. *Studia Islamica*, Paris. 1955, part 4. pp. 5-17. New and valuable thoughts on the Umayyad and 'Abbasid caliphates.

THE IDEAL OF WORLD DOMINATION AMONG THE MEDIEVAL TURKS. Osman Turan. *Studia Islamica*, Paris. 1955, part 4. pp. 77-90. Believing themselves to be destined by God to rule the world, the Turks treated their subjects with justice and religious toleration.

ISLAM AND THE THEORY OF ARAB NATIONALISM. Sylvia G. Haim. *Die Welt des Islams*, Münster (Westf.). 1955, part 2-3. pp. 124-149. Analyzes the thought of Al-Ḥuṣṣrī Ziyādah and other moderns.

THE KĀRIMĪ MERCHANTS. E. Ashtor. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, London. 1956, 1-2. pp. 45-56. Cites the outstanding study by W. J. Fischel (1937) on these Oriental traders and includes

- material taken from an unpublished chronicle of Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d. 1449), the Inbāʾ al-ghumr bi-abnā al-ʿumr, and others.
- THE MUSLIM DIGEST. Durban, South Africa. April, 1956. Ramaḍān special issue. Over 200 pages of pertinent Muslim information in all fields.
- SUFISM IN SOMALILAND: A STUDY IN TRIBAL ISLAM. I. M. Lewis. *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, London. 1955, part 3. pp. 581-602. Studies Sufism in relation to Somali tribal customs.
- THE YUGOSLAV LANDS IN THE OTTOMAN PERIOD: post-war Marxist interpretation of indigenous and Ottoman institutions. Wayne S. Vucinich. *Journal of Modern History*, Chicago. September, 1955. pp. 287-305. A summary of Yugoslav literature on the subject.

V. RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL LIFE

- THE ABOLITION OF CONFESSIONAL JURISDICTION IN EGYPT. George N. Sfeir. *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, D. C. Summer, 1956. pp. 248-256. Deals with the non-Muslim courts done away by law in 1955.
- COMMENT PEUT-ON ANALYSER LE CHÔMAGE EN TUNISIE? G. D. de Bernis. *I.B.L.A.*, Tunis. 1955, part 4. pp. 437-460. The problem of unemployment is "structural" and can only be overcome by a transformation of the foundation of the national economy.
- CURRENT POPULAR TRENDS IN IRAQ. Doris G. Adams. *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, D. C. Spring, 1956. pp. 151-165. A survey, with comment, of the first census (1947) ever taken in the country accounting for a population of about five millions and showing how Iraq's resources of land, water and oil will improve the life of her people.
- DANS LE DELTA DU NIL: LE VILLAGE ET L'HISTOIRE. Jacques Berque. *Studia Islamica*, Paris. 1955, part 4. pp. 91-109. A study of the Egyptian peasant.
- THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSISTORIAL SYSTEM IN ALGERIA. Morton Rosenstock. *Jewish Social Studies*, New York. January, 1956. pp. 41-54. Describes means used during the past hundred years to change Algerian Jews into French Jews.
- HIGHER EDUCATION IN IRAQ. H. Hani. *Middle Eastern Affairs*, New York. April, 1956. pp. 129-132. Gives an outline of instruction.
- HOMES WITHIN REACH. Hall Winslow. *Middle East Forum*, Beirut. April, 1956. pp. 12-16. A detailed study of a plan of the Iraq Petroleum Company to provide privately owned homes for its workers in Kirkuk.
- DIE "IMAM-EHE" IN DER TÜRKEI. Gotthard Jäschke. *Die Welt des Islams*, Münster (Westf.). 1955, part 2-3. pp. 164-201. Discussion of the position of the Qāḍī in marriage ceremonies.
- INDUSTRIALISATION ET PLEIN EMPLOI EN TUNISIE. A. de Montmarin et C. de Bernis. *I. B. L. A.*, Tunis. 1955, part 4. pp. 395-436. The problems to be met are so immense and so essential that they must be solved by government planning and supervision.
- JUXTAPOSITION EN TUNISIE D'UNE ÉCONOMIE TRADITIONNELLE ET

- D'UNE ÉCONOMIE MODERNE. P. Marthelot. *I.B.L.A.*, Tunis. 1955, part 4. pp. 481-501. Discusses the problems caused by the inability of the urban centres to absorb the influx of people from the country seeking employment.
- PROPRIÉTÉ ET SOUS-EMPLOI. M. Callens. *I.B.L.A.*, Tunis, 1955, part 4. pp. 461-480. Suggests what government and private business should do in Tunisia to remedy this most serious problem.
- QUELQUES EXEMPLES DE RÉALISATIONS DANS LE CADRE DES STRUCTURES ACTUELLES DE LA TUNISIE. L. Bugeot. *I.B.L.A.*, Tunis. 1955, part 4. pp. 503-513. Describes attempts by some farmers, industrialists and engineers to relieve unemployment.
- QUESTIONNAIRE ON MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LAWS. *Notes on Islam*, Calcutta. December, 1955. pp. 142-147. Gives information on divorce, polygamy, custody of children, etc., but offers no answers.
- RECENT AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEDOUIN SETTLEMENT IN SYRIA. Adnan Mahhouk. *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, D. C. Spring, 1956. pp. 167-176. Describes the Bedouin background and habits and shows how the Government, through land distribution and education, is encouraging a more settled life for the tribesmen.
- SOCIAL REFORM IN EGYPT. Mary Rowlatt. *Asian Review*, London, April, 1956. pp. 154-157. An enthusiastic account of a tour through model village and welfare centres which are being built in many places and are planned for many others.
- SOCIAL RIGHTS OF MUSLIM WOMEN. H. C. Hassum. *Asian Review*, London. April, 1956. pp. 158-161. A resumé of the life of Princess Abida, Sultana of Bhopal, Pakistan's delegate to the United Nations and a worker for the further advance of the women of her faith.
- TURKEY'S NEW IMAM-HATIP SCHOOLS. F. Rahman. *Die Welt des Islams*, Munster (Westf.). 1955, part 2-3. pp. 150-163. Tells of the set-up and operation of this effort to overcome ignorance and build Islamic education.

VI. THE NEAR EAST

- THE ARAB LEAGUE: A REASSESSMENT. T. R. Little. *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, D. C. Spring, 1956. pp. 138-150. 'Abd-al-Nāṣir spurned the Baghdad Pact thereby allowing the cleavage of the League to continue because of Iraq's adherence to the Pact.
- THE MIDDLE EAST REACTIONS TO SOVIET PRESSURES. Bernard Lewis. *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, D. C. Spring, 1956. pp. 125-137. At present the Arab States are dazzled by Soviet promises, but the author believes that in the long run they will revert to the fairer and more generous dealing of the West.
- THE NEW EGYPTIAN CONSTITUTION. *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, D. C. Summer, 1956. pp. 300-306. Gives text of the document with a comment by Curtis F. Jones.
- THE PROBLEM OF ARAB UNITY. Edmond Rabbath. *Middle East Forum*, Beirut. April, 1956. pp. 9-11. Suggests a Federal Union Plan to avert what the author calls a "final catastrophe".

- THE PROBLEM OF COLONIALISM. Harry R. Rudin. *Current History*, New York. March, 1956. pp. 129-134. The author believes that U.S. foreign policy is ambiguous, supports imperialism, and fails to help Egypt solve her cotton problem.
- THE SUEZ MIX-UP. *The Reporter*, New York. September 20, 1956. pp. 10-21. Various articles on 'Abd al-Nāṣir, the Arabian Shaikhdoms and the dangers of Near Eastern nationalistic excesses.
- WAHRHEIT UND TRUG IM ABENDLÄNDISCHEN MENSCHENBILD. Hans Haeckel. *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte*, Köln. 1956, part 3. pp. 259-265. Discusses in detail Heinrich Weinstock's work "Tragödie des humanismus."
- WHO SPEAKS FOR THE ARABS? Malcolm Kerr. *Middle East Forum*, Beirut. May, 1956. pp. 15-17. Describes the work of Arab and pro-Arab groups seeking to gain American understanding and support.
- WHY ISRAEL WILL SURVIVE. Joseph Alsop. *The Saturday Evening Post*, Philadelphia. September 8, 1956, pp. 38-39; 60-69. The author believes "an intense, idealistic people will not let their own suffering — nor that of their neighbors — quench their hope for a Promised Land".

VII. POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS

- INDIA AND HER NEIGHBORS. *The Round Table*, London. September, 1956. pp. 336-347. Considers India's relations with Pakistan and Afghanistan from a Hindu viewpoint, the author finding that India under Nehru is too lenient to Pakistan.
- OU VA L'AFRIQUE DU NORD? *Esprit*, Paris. Juillet-Août, 1956. pp. 118-162. Various articles on Egypt, Tunis, Morocco, the outlook for North African Jews and for Europeans in Algeria by Lacouture, Tostain, de Champonay, Robi and Bonzac.
- PAKISTAN: TOWARDS A GENERAL ELECTION. *The Round Table*, London. September, 1956. pp. 382-385. The Muslim League and the Republican Party have both proved self-seeking and disappointing so, in view of the approaching election, it is hoped that a liberal and progressive party will appear.
- PERSPECTIVE OF THE ARAB WORLD: AN ATLANTIC SUPPLEMENT, *The Atlantic Monthly*, Boston. October, 1956. pp. 123-200. Comprises a collection of articles ranging in subject from history to art, music, drama, and poetry by such authors as H. A. R. Gibb, Albert Hourani, Ṭaha Ḥussein and many others.
- SUDANESE NATIONALISM AND SELF-DETERMINATION. P. M. Holt. *The Middle East Journal*, Summer, 1956. pp. 239-247. Presents the first part of a larger study and covers the rise of nationalism and the development of political parties.