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I REPAIR UNTO GOD

أَعُوذُ بِاللَّهِ

The language of devotion is not readily translated into another tongue. Its meaning and import are not always constant for its own heirs. They become even more difficult of definition for the outsider. The oft-repeated Muslim phrase—"I seek refuge with God"—provides an example. Used on at least six occasions in the Qur'ān itself, it has entered widely into Muslim prayer and expresses a variety of emotions, all in some sense invocatory of God's protection and security. In its poorest meaning it is a bare plea for defense against jinns and spirits. The refuge it seeks is then superstitious and negative, and its motives only fear and ignorant fancies.

But often it runs deeper. It becomes a cry for vindication in the face of injustice or calumny, a linking of human precariousness with the Divine stability, a thoughtful relating of the immediately perplexing to the eternally indubitable. So Mary in Surah xix, 18, startled by the visitant bringing news of her vocation to be the mother of Messiah, sought refuge with the Merciful. Elsewhere the cry springs from an oppressive sense of wrong and sin, actual or potential. Noah, reproved by God, takes refuge with Him from the temptation he was about, ignorantly, to accept. Likewise, in the two final Surahs of the Qur'ān, Muḥammad seeks refuge from evil, from envy, witchcraft and the powers of darkness. He appeals there to "the Lord of the daybreak" as most able to succour him in the night of the soul.

The phrase "I repair unto God" stands, then, in some measure, for two abiding truths of life, the sense of insufficiency in man and of reliability in God. It involves the

recognition that life takes more than man has of himself and that God is his succour and refuge. Faith is a seeking after that more than I have which being me demands. It is repairing for pardon and power to their sure source in God. "I have laid help" said the psalmist "upon one that is mighty." "Our sufficiency" as St. Paul saw it "is of God." "Ye are complete in Him."

This generation, both east and west, has no less reason than its predecessors to discover its human inadequacy and a proper wistfulness for God, despite all the external changes that have served to dissipate many of man's earlier fears. There are massive considerations in the contemporary scene that properly understood dispose the mind towards its need for God. They may press upon different people from different angles. For some it is an almost catastrophic sense of undoneness and frustration like that which overwhelmed the later H. G. Wells amid the ruins of his confidence in human self-sufficiency. For others it is the pressure of personal temptation, or failure in the presence of the recognised good unfulfilled, the admitted evil done.

Or perhaps the brunt of the sense of need lies in some aspect of the hard task of putting the world to rights seen from the standpoint of one's rôle in the community. Thus the late Ahmad Amin in his autobiography ponders the proper relation of the judge in the court to divorce cases. How, he asks, can law *as law* retrieve an evil situation? The judge may determine responsibility and innocence: he may accordingly order payments and wardships. But these measures of 'justice' begin by admitting the finality of the estrangement. Court orders as such cannot restore fellowship or redeem alienation. The conscientious judge will, of course, advise and exhort: but if these fail, he has no option, as judge, save to take the measures which leave the breakdown of love as it was. Justice here only mitigates some consequences: it does not save. But how, reflects the writer, are situations really saved? How are men made right?

The statesman, likewise, and the philosopher of revolution. These, if they are sincere, also come face to face with an evident need for the transformation of man which somehow neither man nor revolutions can of themselves produce. How many forces seeming to exorcise some evils have survived to generate new, and sometimes, more perverted forms of evil? How do we save the saviors, keep clean the cleansers, or, in Juvenal's oft-quoted words, how do we guard the guardians? Assuredly, as the Gospel says, "Satan cannot cast out Satan." Only good, positive good, can displace evil: only love overcomes wrong: only forgiveness wins: only God suffices for the needs of man. Our salvation, if there is to be any, must work in us but it must come from beyond ourselves.

One recent eloquent witness to the facts behind this truth, in so far as human nature and politics disclose it, can be read in *The Philosophy of the Revolution* by the Egyptian Prime Minister. Writing of the army intervention into politics in 1952, he records the discovery that displacement of the old régime did not of itself ensure the desired new day. Rather there was a popular tendency still to think in the same terms. The leaders felt the necessity of evoking a new quality of citizenship, in search of which they extended their own tenure of office beyond what military action as such had originally intended. Referring to his "picture of how dissension, chaos, vindictiveness and selfishness were unleashed" 'Abd al-Nāṣir writes: "I was not diverted by the joy at our success. That joy was not enough to convince me that our hopes could now become real and that the spring of a new life had come to Egypt."

A further notable feature of this contemporary Muslim political document is the insistence that violence and bloodshed achieve no lasting purging of evil. The predicament of men and nations calls for more than political action, more than military 'surgery', more than external revolution. Where does this awareness tend, if not back to the old petition: "I repair unto God."? Does it not acknowledge the regeneration

of men as necessarily involving the spiritual? Men are near to a sense of the indispensability of God when they recognize needs in human society too radical for human correction.

It then becomes of desperate importance to know if there is a Divine activity responsive to our cry. Is repairing to God no more than an illusion? If we repair, shall we find? Shall we find more than the law, already so plainly reflected in our knowledge that things ought to be different? Does God undertake on behalf of our need no more than the giving of the law which identifies our failure? If not, He is hardly a refuge.

It is a conviction as old as Christianity that He does much more than this. Indeed our awareness of need is only the reverse side of His grace. We repair to Him, only because He comes seeking us. He stoops to satisfy our need in love as well as law, in reconciling deeds of mercy by dint of which, through faith, men are made anew. Recourse to God is more than a necessity arguable from our plight. It is responding to the endless mercy discernible in the fact of Christ. In Christ the satisfaction of our deepest needs has become a wide open invitation from God; an invitation which must be tirelessly relayed among men by those who through 'repairing' have understood.

It was an 8th century poet, living not far from the land of Islam's genesis, who perhaps most wonderfully caught the echo of the world's wistfulness and the sublime availability of God.

"Hath He marks to lead me to Him
If He by my guide?
In His feet and hands are wound-prints —
And His side."

"If I ask Him to receive me
Will He say me nay?
Not till earth and not till heaven
Pass away."

Stephen of Mar Saba, seeking refuge in God, found it in the manward compassion of the Eternal.

THE EVER RECURRING MIRACLE

It was Dr. Charles R. Erdman who pointed out to us the steps through which a man is brought to Christ, in his exposition of the 9th chapter of St. John's Gospel. Here was a man born blind who came into contact with Christ. He knew little about Him, indeed nothing save that His name was Jesus. But he followed His instructions and he came back from the Pool of Siloam seeing. Then the following steps occur. First he gives the name of the One who had done the miracle. Then he thinks that this person is a prophet. Then he intimates in the 27th verse that he is a disciple of Christ and goes on to say that He cannot be a sinner or He could not do the miracles He did and he is cast out of the Jewish faith and his persecution begins. It is just here that Christ comes to him in his greatest need to succor and sustain him and puts the question, "Dost thou believe on the Son of God?" Then Christ reveals Himself and the man falls down and worships Him.

That is the miracle that happened in "The Days of His Flesh" but it is also the miracle that is happening now and has been happening all through the ages and will happen on to the end. Christ appears and makes Himself known and the time comes when He reveals Himself fully and the man falls down and worships Him. Here is the miracle that missionaries see constantly, that preachers encounter, that religious workers and laymen see enacted all over the world. How wonderful is this miracle! And how does it come about? Let us look into it for just a moment and see how it works in a Muslim country.

The Muslim begins in a slightly different way from the usual person. He begins with believing that Christ is a prophet although he does not understand what that means and so in the end he really begins just where everyone else does. First he must be brought into contact with one whose name is Jesus. We try to bring him into touch with Jesus in various ways. We use Bible shops, testimony, printed tracts, Bible portions, services etc. We have found that the Sermon on the Mount when printed and distributed brings a response, for the Muslim believes everything in that Sermon with the exception of "turning the other cheek." He has come into contact with Jesus and he wants to learn more. He begins to attend services and to listen to the Gospel.

The time comes when he appreciates what it means to call Christ a prophet. He begins to understand what prophecy is and how Christ stands out as a prophet. And then before he knows it, he tries to follow Christ. In other words, he becomes a disciple. He finds out how difficult that is and is surprised at how hard it is to follow Christ. He had always thought that Christianity was an easy religion and that it did not demand much from its followers. The difficulty urges him on and before long he gets into troubles with his former co-religionists.

Then he finds out that Christ has warned him that this would happen, that even his best friends and relatives would become his enemies and this strengthens his faith in the words of Christ, in that person who tells him the truth, for he believes that Christ tells the truth. All Muslims believe that all the prophets are sinless, Christ could not lie, and so there is no difficulty in making the next step, that Christ is sinless.

The time comes when he is persecuted and harried day by day, when there seems to be no comfort in life. He is faced with either a complete allegiance to Christ or going back to his fellows and it is here that Christ meets him and puts to him the final question, "Dost thou believe on the Son of God?" Here is the real test. Now he can really see, for he sees the Christ for what He is and for what He can do. Does he need anything more? Does he need the fellowship of his friends more that he needs Christ? Can they do anything for him that Christ cannot do? Has Christ everything for him? And the answer comes just as surely to him as it did to the man born blind. And is not the matter exactly the same? He was born blind. He could not see until Christ opened his eyes.

And there is the problem of the missionary as he meets those born blind. He must get them in touch with the Light of the world. He must get them into acquaintance and fellowship with Christ. He will do the rest for He performs His miracle day by day throughout the world and He will continue to perform it. What a joy it is to know that He can and will reveal Himself and that He can sustain anyone in any society or condition throughout the whole wide world.

Baghdad, Iraq.

B. D. HAKKEN

SURVEY OF PERIODICALS (concluded from p. 308).

DIE PFLEGE ARABISCHER AUSSÄTZIGER IN JORDANIEN. Paul Fabricius.

Evangelische Missions Zeitschrift, Stuttgart. October, 1954. pp. 152-154. Tells of a new undertaking of the Brethren in Palestine.

PROGRESS IN TURKEY. P. H. Nelson. *World Dominion and The World To-Day*, London. July-August, 1954. pp. 201-206. Discusses Turkey's problem in trying to reconcile her acquisitions in Western civilization with the teachings of the Quran.

READING IN THE NEAR EAST. E. E. Elder. *World Dominion and The World To-Day*, London. September-October, 1954. pp. 292-294. Praises the work of U.N.E.S.C.O. among refugees and others in stimulating learning to read and providing good reading material; the Laubach successes; the activity in the production of children's books; and the amazing output by Nationals.

LAND PROBLEMS IN TURKISH HISTORY

It is a well known fact that the Ottoman empire was based on an agricultural economy. Not only its economic and financial system, but also its military organization were closely dependent on the same base. Landholding and agriculture were carefully organized for the state purposes. Indeed the agrarian policy followed by the Ottoman state contributed most to the rise of the empire. There is no need to say that this system, applied for centuries in many countries under its rule, has resulted in important social and political consequences. Here let it be emphasized also that the system was the result of an historical process.

It may well be asked why all the cultivated lands in the Ottoman dominions were declared state property and why landholding was so closely controlled. The answer lies primarily in the origin of the Ottoman state itself, born as a Gāzī state on the borderland of two rival religions and civilizations, and, in spite of all further developments, it remained essentially a Gāzī state. It was this origin that gave the Empire its conspicuous features and made it a militant state, as well as shaping its culture, based on the composite frontier elements, into a form more tolerant and more capable of receiving new influences than were the old countries of Islam. This needs to be explained a little further.

The Ottomans, like the first Arab conquerors, were making their conquests in new countries, in Dār al-ḥarb, where no previous Islamic occupation left traditions. Thus not being bound by such traditions, they had a free hand to evolve their empire on the new basis they considered most fit for their purposes. Actually the Ottoman state was less successful in remodeling the conditions of land ownership in the Islamic zone of their dominions than in the Balkans. But the first Ottoman Sultans were also realistic enough not to oppose directly the established tradition in the newly conquered lands. In fact, in the Balkan countries the peasantry in general had never been proprietors of the soil which they worked, and this state of things facilitated the Ottoman policy of establishing there a régime of state property. It simply replaced the old native aristocracy and the small Balkan states in the proprietorship of lands. Now a universal state succeeded to the feudal lords and the old practices persisted. It must be pointed out that in this way many instances of *bid'ā*, that is innovation, slipped into the Ottoman legislation.

But why was the state so anxious to become the real proprietor wherever it made its conquests? State proprietorship was not only a natural consequence of the conditions present at the moment of conquest, but the Ottoman state always sought to take more and more lands under its ownership. It was the militant character of the state that necessitated this policy. For the Ottoman it was necessary to have

a standing army ready to march on a moment's notice, because war, for a Gâzî state, was almost a perpetual condition. Considering the scarcity of silver, which was the only currency in those days, the Ottoman state was compelled to collect its principal financial resources that is to say the 'Ushr in goods. Under this necessity it distributed the conquered lands among its numerous soldiers, assigning them these taxes as salary. These cavalrymen were to stay in their *timars*, fiefs, and to collect the 'Ushr themselves. It seems most likely that these practical needs led the state to take the lands under its close control, in other words, under its own proprietorship.

It is not the purpose here to discuss the Islamic literature on land legislation in connection with the Ottoman system. After the critical approach to the sources of Islamic land law by the scholars such as Becker, Poliac and lastly Lökkegaard, we see that the *fiqh* is so rich in principles as to provide foundation for almost any land system. Only after the final formation of their land legislation—that is to say in the 16th century—did the Ottomans try to adapt, or more exactly to interpret, their land legislation to conform to the Sharī'ah. Prior to this interpretation the land legislation contained *bid'a*, innovations, and even violations. We find then the great Ottoman jurists such as Ibn Kamāl and later Abū-l-Su'ūd who tried to explain the foundation of the Ottoman land system in view of Sharī'ah. It might be noted that just at that time the Ottoman state developed from a Gâzî state into an Islamic Caliphate ruling over the old capitals of Islam. The greatest of the Ottoman jurists, Shaikh al-Islām Abū-l-Su'ūd says as follows:

"In the Islamic countries there are three kinds of land according to the Sharī'ah. One part is called 'ushrī lands which are recognized as Mulk to the Moslems. These are their real properties. They possess them just like their other properties... They pay only 'Ushr. Examples of this kind of land exist in Hijāz and Baṣra... The second part of lands consist of *harâcî* lands which are left in the possession of unbelievers. These also are their real properties. They pay *harâc-i mukāsama* and *harâc-i muvazzafa* which can amount in some cases to as much as the half of the production. If the Moslems took these lands, they also paid the same *harâc* taxes. Now here are the two kinds of land described in the *Sharī'ah* books. But there is another kind of land that is neither 'usrī nor *harâcî*. They call it *arz-i memleket*. In principle it is *harâcî*, but the *rakabe*, the real proprietorship is reserved for *bayt al-māl*. According to some *fiqh* books in Iraq, *Sawād* land is of this kind... The lands of the Ottoman dominions are also of this kind. They are not the property of the villagers. They possess it simply in way of *ariyet* lease. They pay *harâc-i mukāsama* and *harâc-i muvazzafa*. As long as they cultivate the land and pay their taxes, nobody can interfere with them. When they die, their sons inherit it. If they have no son, then some one outside the family can get it by paying a tax called *tapu*... If the land is left uncultivated for three years it is liable to be taken away from the tenant by the decision of the *Qādī*... This kind of land cannot be sold, or granted, or given as a *mulk* or *waqf*. Such acts are absolutely against the law."

This land system no doubt existed much earlier than the above description. The real sources for the study of the Ottoman land legislation are the Imperial record-books. They are arranged by special

committees, who were sent to the various provinces to inquire and to record all the population and register the lands with their taxes every twenty or thirty years. The Turkish archives possess many thousands of these registers. Recently Prof. Bernard Lewis of London University published an interesting work based on the *daftars* of Palestine. The present writer published the oldest *daftar* of this kind dated 835 A.H. dealing with Albania. It proves that this land system was in force as early as the beginning of the 14th century. Each *daftar* has a *kanun-name* in the first page showing the laws and the customs in force in that province. They are used as law books for all land litigations. It might be added that this system existed originally in the Balkans and in Western Anatolia, which were conquered by the Ottomans or by other Gāzī states. In the rest of Anatolia and in other old Islamic countries the system could not be fully applied because of the old *mulks* and *waqfs* established for many centuries according to the Sharī'ah.

Nevertheless on several occasions some of the Ottoman Sultans tried to abolish most of these old *waqfs* and *mulks*. Under the weak Sultans the extension of the *waqf* and *mulk* lands became larger and larger. Many influential men obtained grants of land as *mulk* property, and often converted them into *waqfs*. When the energetic and warlike Sultans, such as Bayazīd the Thunderbolt, and Muhammad the Conqueror, attempted the diminution of the *mulks* and *waqfs*, this caused a deep uneasiness in the country. In the Ottoman empire there was always a struggle between the state and the owners of the *mulks* and *waqfs* as in medieval Egypt and Anatolia.

In the first place, the state was supposed to be the real proprietor. It had the *rakabe* that is the real ownership of the land.

In the second place sipahis became the military class par excellence. They were entitled by the charters given by the Sultan to collect certain taxes assigned to themselves on the lands. Also as representatives of the state on this land, they were given some rights of control over its use and its transfer. But the limits of their authority, and the details of their income, were clearly defined in the *daftars* and the *kanunnâmes*. They themselves cannot possess and cultivate the lands of the peasants. Any disagreements were to be settled by the central government. Due to the close control of the central government, these sipahis had no real similarity with the western feudal fief holders with whom they are so often compared. In the third place, came the actual agriculturists who only possessed and cultivated the land. In general the land was divided up in certain units called *Çiftlik*, — a piece of land of approximately 1000 square meters. A peasant family who took a lease of such a *Çiftlik* could not sell or make any change in its original state. And these units were not allowed to be divided up. So they passed, in inheritance only, to the son or sons in common of the deceased. If he left it uncultivated for three years, he lost all his rights on the land.

In the 16th century the inheritance rights were extended a little by recognising priority for the relatives. In this case they were allowed to pay the same *tapu* money as strangers. It is claimed that this land system could be brought under the term of heritable and perpetual lease.

As already pointed out, this system of state property and control was of vital importance for the military organisation. Because only by this system could the sipahi army in the provinces be maintained. On the other hand, this régime resulted in a fairly sound agrarian policy with its maintenance of small farms kept in the possession of the peasants. In this land system the formation of large estates and the division of *Çiftlik* units into too small units was prevented. The land was not left to chance, but it was carefully controlled to serve a definite policy. There are indications showing that the Ottoman government intended not only to guarantee its sipahis income, but also sought a definite control against any régime of landlords. The Ottoman state always fought against the local landed aristocracy. The Ottoman land system was a happy combination of the state's military needs and social security for the peasantry. Indeed this caused too strong a control of the state on land and abolished all liberty of peasant action. For a peasant could not leave his farm without paying a compensation to his sipahi. The land and classes were, so to speak, fossilized in that régime. One must always keep in mind that the state control and the working of the system were possible only by the regular registrations of the land and the provincial population as already described.

This typical régime began to degenerate during the second half of the 16th century when the first signs of decline of the Empire appeared. The principal causes of this breakdown in the agrarian régime can be summarized as follows:

(1) It seems that the American silver was responsible for it to some extent. The increasing production of silver had begun to pour into the Ottoman dominions from 1580, and this sudden increase caused a rise in prices and an economic disorder throughout the empire, which disorganized the old economic system, and also had a serious influence on the land régime.

(2) The weakening of central government and the abandonment of land registration left agriculture to chance.

(3) The Ottoman government neglected its sipahi army in the provinces, because now only the infantry, with fire-arms, could withstand the Christian armies on the European battlefields.

(4) The courtiers and the bodyguard, as well as the officials in the provinces, obtained the sipahi fiefs as personal estates. Through many devious means a large number of former peasant *çiftliks* also passed into the possession of soldiers.

(5) As a result of the disruption of the sipahi régime in the provinces the *miri* (state) lands now were subject to a new system of

lease called *Muqāṭaʿa*. In this way it became possible for the ordinary persons to get together lands in their hands as *Çiftlik* estates.

The *Muqāṭaʿa* system grew to very large proportions in the subsequent period. The *timar* lands, fallen vacant, were given on lease by the state to ordinary persons, in return for a payment often settled by auction.

Another way of exploitation of *mīrī* lands was to give them to tax-farmers (*multazims*), and this second method began to be used very largely both by the state and the holders of *timar*. Later on the tax-farmers acquired practically the same position as those possessing a *Muqāṭaʿa*.

As a matter of fact, this rising class of the owners of *Muqāṭaʿa* and *Multazims*, taking the place of the old sipahis on the land, had only the right of possession. But already in the 18th century, a tendency to consider these lands as *Sharʿī* properties was observed. Now the state's efforts to hold these *mīrī* lands back were not successful, because it had lost control in the provinces. The resultant situation encouraged all kinds of abuses over land possession.

The fatal results of this new régime were these: (1) The peasantry in dependence on the new land-holders was in a worse situation than ever. In *Muqāṭaʿa* the peasant had to pay not only the ordinary taxes due to the state, but also he had to give dues which had been established by usage to the land-holder. And when one takes into account the administrative inefficiency of the central government, one can easily guess the oppressive attitude of these new landlords.

(2) In the 17th century the rich and influential people in the provinces had the chance of gathering lands by way of the *Muqāṭaʿa* system and became so powerful that they assumed some governmental authority. Consequently a landed aristocracy of *aʿyān*, notables, emerged in the provinces. Moreover some of the *aʿyān* constituted dynasties and became opponents to the imperial government. They had their own armies and fought each other. In 1808 they forced the Sultan to sign a charter confirming their position. So, with the disruption of the original land régime, the political and social structure of the empire broke down. It may be added that this situation could be seen with its general characteristics in every part of the empire from Egypt to the Danube.

The Ottoman empire passed through a terrible crisis during the period between 1768-1839 which caused a final break down of its political and social organization. It was in this period that an Eastern Question (Question d'Orient) became one of the most arduous questions of international policy. Now an expanding imperialistic Europe was vitally concerned with the Near-East. Apart from the political consequences of European Imperialism, it caused those Near Eastern countries to come under the strong influence of western ideas. Then some of the Ottoman statesmen, who resided for some time in

the European capitals as ambassadors, realized that the only chance of survival for the broken down Empire was to reorganize it after Western states. We call this reform movement under Western influence *Tanzimât*, which was promulgated by a firman in 1839. This firman announced among other things the efficient protection of the peasantry against all kinds of abuses and extortions. It was followed by the promulgation of certain French codes of law translated into Turkish. The land legislation also came under the influence of the new movement. Accordingly in 1840 the Ottoman government promulgated a new law on tithes, according to which they were to be collected literally in a proportion of one tenth in all parts of the Empire. Until then *‘ushr* varied from one region to another. For instance it used to be taken as one eighth in Rumeli, whereas one fifth in Aleppo.

Another important step was the abolition of the tax-farming system which was the main cause of many social afflictions. The *Multazims* had also some control on the legal changes of a larger part of lands in the Empire.

In 1847 it was announced that a document given by the governmental authorities would be required for all changes of land tenure. In fact a new movement in land legislation was started when the hereditary rights were extended on *mîrî* lands, which, despite all usurpations by individuals, made up the larger part of lands in the home countries. By extending the hereditary rights from the son to other kin, and by recognizing larger and larger rights of use, the state transformed the *mîrî* lands into the real *mulk* properties, in the proper sense as in the West. As a matter of fact, when, in 1858, a new code of land law was promulgated, only father and mother had acquired the rights to inheritance. This important work of codification systematized the Ottoman land legislation with some modification due to the *Tanzimât*. One of its interesting provisions stated that a whole village was not allowed to be possessed by one person as a *Çiftlik* estate. This is an important indication of the conception of the *Tanzimât* against the large estates. But as usual this remained in the law book. Here it is an interesting subject of inquiry how far the Egyptian land reforms of 1858 are connected with the Ottoman code of law promulgated at the same date.

The evolution in extending the rights of possession on the *mîrî* lands went on. After the Crimean War in 1856 the Western Powers, supporting the Ottoman reforms, supposed that their liberal system would work wonders in Turkey too. They imputed all the misery of the country to the rigidity of land legislation. These views were adopted by the Ottoman intellectuals under Western influence. So, after the promulgation of the land law of 1858, all the subsequent amendments aimed at making the *mîrî* lands real properties for their actual possessors. In 1867 it was announced by a law, that those entitled to inherit

miri land, included also brothers, sisters, grandchildren and husbands or wives. The old *tapu* documents which were originally given only to testify the possession of *miri* land, were now accepted as the basis for all kind of rights on land. So in the end this proved a change not in favor of the actual possessors of land, that is to say the peasantry, but for an interposed class who became the main beneficiary of the reform. Because of the *tapu* documents in their hands, the *miri* lands became very nearly the real properties of this class who once had obtained these lands from the state as *muqāṭaʿa*. The peasants remained in these confirmed estates as *ortakci* (metayer) or as simple agricultural workers. The new situation after the reforms was perhaps worse for the peasantry than before. Because now any new social reform on behalf of this large mass of peasants was more difficult, since the lands were confirmed in the hands of their old possessors. Those Ottoman statesmen, unaware of the actual state of things and of the possible consequences of their act, promulgated automatically the reform laws inspired by their liberal advisors, and made everything worse. So, the national states succeeding the Ottoman empire have taken over difficult problems on land. For instance in the second half of the 19th century in Thessaly in Northern Greece 460 villages out of 658 formed estates (*Çiftlik*) owned by the landlords. The peasants had to give half of their produce to the landlord. The Balkan states had to make real land reforms on behalf of the peasants.

The Modern Turkish Republic, one of those national states constituted after the final break down of the Ottoman Empire, also tackled the problem as a major issue. As the first step *ʿUshr* was abolished.

In 1926 by the adoption of the common law of Switzerland as the Turkish common law, the Western concept of property was now applied without any conditions or stipulations continuing from the former land law. As a result the land law of 1858 with all its amendments have been entirely abolished. It should be also added that the discussion on this fundamental change occupied Turkish jurists for some time. In 1938, Atatürk proclaimed solemnly that the Turkish peasant is, and must be, the real master of the country, and afterwards all the Republican Governments followed this principle in their social reforms. In 1945 a new land law was announced. That was a revolutionary step indeed. In the first paragraph of that law the goal of it was expressed in this way: (a) To provide land and means for the peasants who do not have sufficient to maintain their families (b) to exploit constantly all the arable lands in the country. To reach this goal it was laid down that all landed properties over 500 dönüms (one dönüm 0.247 of an acre) would be nationalized for distribution among the peasants who need land. The state would pay for it by shares in 20 years, and the peasants who received these lands would pay their debts to the state, in 20 years without interest. The Govern-

ment would also furnish these peasants with the required implements, animals and money.

This law, considered a violation of the notion of property in common law and constitutional law, caused a strong opposition. In 1950, after two years of discussion, in the committees in the Grand National Assembly, the law was modified. In the revised new law, the lands liable to nationalization were those over 5000 *dönüms* and if a land of over 2000 *dönüms* was not cultivated by its owner, it might be nationalized too. The state started by distributing first the state domains and mortmaines.

From 1947 on, the Turkish government has been distributing the state lands. According to the statistical figures about two million families in Turkey need land. After coming to power, the governments of the new Democratic party have accelerated the distribution of lands. While the total sum of distributed lands was only 50,000 in 1948, the figure has reached 325,000 *dönüms* by the middle of 1953. It becomes apparent from these figures that there is still a long way ahead. But it must be also pointed out that lands over 500 *dönüms* in Turkey make up only one eighth of all cultivated areas. Even a nationalization of these lands would not bring a solution to the land problem. So all the arable lands remaining uncultivated at the present, should be changed into cultivated land and distributed by the state to the peasants in need.

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HALIL INALCIK

Addendum:

This paper was written in August, 1953. By the end of 1954 the total area of distributed lands amounted to about 10 million *dönüms* of which 198,730 peasant families had benefited. This figure includes 15,441 immigrant families who obtained 647,512 *dönüms*. In the meantime the rapid mechanization of agriculture has increased the amount of cultivated land considerably. Today it is about 190,000,000 while it was about 145,000,000 *dönüms* in 1950. (These figures show only the area for the cereals). In 1949 there were 1,800 tractors in Turkey. Today this figure has reached 40,000. In accordance with these developments the production in cereals has increased from 23.5 million tons in the three years between 1949-1951 to 36 million tons in 1952-1954. It is also to be noted that the population of Turkey has increased from 21 million in 1950 to 24 million today. (No census has been made since 1950. The last figure is an estimate of the experts.)

AL-GHAZĀLĪ'S THEORY OF ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT

The structure of political authority in Islam is by no means as simple as it seems at first glance. In the legalistic theory of the Caliphate expounded by the Sunnī jurists the Shari'ah is quite obviously the source of all authority, and political authority as well. As a body of more or less concrete law the Shari'ah itself must be authorized from some source, which is presumably qualified to judge right from wrong. Theoretically the Shari'ah is pre-existing and eternal; it represents the absolute good. Human beings may not change these laws; they may only know them or not know them, obey them or disobey them. The prerequisite for knowledge of the Shari'ah is acknowledgement of the established sources of the Shari'ah, i.e. "uṣūl al-dīn." The prerequisite for obedience is belief.

The ultimate source of authority is God; the good is that which God commands, and the evil is that which He forbids. The principal difference between the Sunnī and later Shi'ite persuasions is the Sunnī doctrine that the last and definitive revelation was the Qur'ān, and that Muḥammad was the last human being to be endowed with a special knowledge of right and wrong. The successors of Muḥammad may only know the Shari'ah by reference to the Qur'ān, to the behavior of Muḥammad, and wherever these sources are not explicit to the consensus of Muslims—or indeed by reference to analogous judgements. Thus the proximate sources of authority are the Qur'ān, the Sunna, Ijmā' and Qiyās.

The immediate source of authority is somewhat more difficult to ascertain. Learning, or *ilm*, is necessary for the discovery of what the Shari'ah is, and this qualification is the source of the title *ulamā'*. The Sunnī *ulamā'* are distinguished from others by their acknowledgement of the "canonical" sources of the Shari'ah. However since Islam recognizes no ecclesiastical hierarchy, and since its doctrinal tendency is catholic, the *ulamā'* form an undefined and unwieldy body. The business of discovering the law is at times very much like legislation, but the disorganized character of the *ulamā'* tended to convert their function to that of a huge, unwieldy board of judicial review. Obviously such action as might be undertaken by such a group must come after the political fact, and because of the nature of the institution the time-lapse between deed and decision might be generations. It would be wrong to deny the *ulamā'* any authority at all, for the 'Abbāsīd dynasty went to great lengths to secure the support of the *ulamā'* and to display respect for their judgements. The pattern of political behavior thus established was carried on by subsequent Islamic rulers. Nevertheless, it was characteristic of the Caliphs to claim the more remote authority for their government.

In a sense the Islamic community, because of its intimate connection with the principle of *ijmā'*, may be reckoned a source of authority.

However, since *ijmā'* is a source of the *Shari'ah*, and since it is a process rather than an institution, it cannot satisfy the requirement of an immediate source of authority. As a source of the *Shari'ah* it is theoretically anterior to it, and thus a more remote source of authority. In any case it is still subject to "discovery" and interpretation by the 'ulamā'. As a process its legislative efficacy is similar to that of custom in Roman and Canon law, so the time-lapse is necessarily great. The Islamic Community is not only the Islamic Church but it is also the personal sphere of validity of Islamic government. Membership in the Community is the result of belief, and belief is the basis of obedience to the *Shari'ah*. The purpose of Islamic government is to see to it that the *Shari'ah* is obeyed. In other words, the part the Community plays in political affairs is primarily passive, although Islamic government is clearly established for the benefit of the Muslims.

Regardless of the amount and kind of authority attributed to the 'ulamā' and the Community, neither group ever wielded sufficient real political power to transform their political function to that of an institution authorizing the day to day acts of government. Theoretically the Muslim system all but disregards the question of power; practically it was another question. Ibn Khaldūn is the most outstanding Islamic theorist of those few who dealt with the problem of power. He asserts that power and authority were joined in the Orthodox Caliphate¹. Ideally, of course, power should reside with the immediate source of authority in the Community.

The relation of the Caliphate to the *Shari'ah* is more difficult to define than that of the 'ulamā' or the Community. During the whole of the Umayyad Caliphate and the early part of the 'Abbāsīd the Caliph is much more the exponent of power than of authority. In the last centuries of the 'Abbāsīd Caliphate the Caliph could hardly be considered the exponent of power; was he then the most immediate representation of authority?

With the exception of Quranic law, the Caliphate and the *Shari'ah* developed *pari passu*. The Sunna of the Prophet did not become constitutive until treated as such by the successors of the Prophet. *Ijmā'* and *qiyās* are certainly later accretions. This historical fact has tended to complicate the relationship of Caliph and *Shari'ah*. In the main the Caliph is the executive of the *Shari'ah*, the commander-in-chief of the Muslim army, and the leader in formal religious observances prescribed by the *Shari'ah*. Above all, the Caliph is the head of the religious institution in Islam, and the only formalized part of it. Since religion was an all-inclusive concept, he was also the political institution.

The subordination of the Caliph to the *Shari'ah* was most clearly expressed as a by-product of early political controversy in the attacks

¹ Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddima*, Beirut, 1900, p. 203 ff.

on the piety and personal behavior of the Umayyad Caliphs.² That the political behavior of the Caliph must be in accordance with the Sharī'ah was implicit in 'Abbāsīd religious policy. The theoretical implications of this policy were limited only to the function of the Caliph once appointed and as a consequence fail to define the authority for the appointment of a particular Caliph, or the authority for the institution itself.

The circumstantial authority arising out of the contention that they were properly executing the function of the Caliphate did not exhaust 'Abbāsīd theory. Their personal claim to the office itself was based both on agnate descent from the Prophet and the action of divine Providence. This theory of constitutive authority was never denied by Sunnī theorists, but it was certainly omitted in the heavy casuistical overlay which attempted to camouflage the fact of dynastic succession. In time Sunnī theory of the constitutional process came to be a composite of the actual circumstances of the historical appointment of various Caliphs. These various circumstances were codified in detail, and with some juridical expansion by al-Māwardī,³ but the Sharī' nature of the constitutional process had already been established. Thus the Sharī'ah was recognized as authority for the acts of the Caliph and for the manner of appointment of a particular Caliph, but there remains the problem of the authority for the institution itself. Al-Baghdādī's answer that the Caliphate is required because there are certain explicit Sharī' duties incumbent upon the Caliph merely begs the question.⁴ We must be satisfied then with the conclusion that the authority of the Caliph is primarily circumstantial, i.e. he has authority for what he does rather than for what he is.

What the Caliph is depends rather upon historical events, and this is not surprising since the institution developed along with the Sharī'ah. History has a legislative character in Sunnī Islam, and the Caliphate is the prime example of the legislative efficacy of history. On the other hand the effect of historical legislation is primarily retrospective. As a result we are told what the Caliph was and not what he should be. Of course, Sunnī theories of the Caliphate are not slavish descriptions of obtaining conditions; but insofar as they deviate from the descriptive they also concentrate on the function rather than the institution of the Caliphate.

So long as sufficient measure of power was attached to the Caliphate, this question did not agitate Muslim theorists. We might say the institution of the Caliphate was almost taken for granted. However, when the Caliph lost control of affairs, circumstantial authority no longer applied to the Caliphate. Al-Māwardī is very much aware of this

² Goldziher has set forth the arguments of the early political factions in Volume II of his *Muhammedanische Studien*.

³ Al-Māwardī, *Al-Ahkām al-Sultāniyya*, chapter I.

⁴ 'Abd al-Qāhir ibn Tāhir al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl al-Dīn*, Istanbul, 1928, p. 272.

problem, but his treatment of it is entirely inadequate. He insists on the legitimacy of the Caliph who is constrained by one of his military aides, even though he expressly states that the "obligatory" character of the Caliphate is derived from the Caliph's duties as executor of the Shari'ah.⁵ Nevertheless, al-Mawardi has not necessarily contradicted himself—he has simply failed to state explicitly the source of Caliphal authority. It was this omission which permitted theorists of the post-Abbāsid period to apply the criteria of circumstantial authority to the actual but "unconstitutional" holders of power. The inevitable corollary was the establishment of power as the constitutive authority of the Caliph. Regarding the theory of al-Māwardī, our inference is that he considered the constrained Caliph legitimate because of the validity of the constitutional process by which he was appointed. The resulting situation is pure anomaly: the authority of the Caliph is his "constitutionality," while the authority of his constrainer is circumstantial (derived from his ruling in accordance with the Shari'ah); and the sum total is legitimate government.

Al-Ghazālī's attempt to solve this problem is much more serious than that of preceding theorists. In many respects his theory departs importantly from the well established pattern of Sunnī theory. On the other hand, these divergences are carefully couched in terms calculated to maintain the essentials of traditional Sunnī theory. While remembering that the classification of authority as functional, constitutional and institutional is only an analytical construction, which finds no place in Islamic theory, we may find this classification helpful in analyzing al-Ghazālī's theory.⁶

In referring to Islamic government al-Ghazālī uses the same term as his predecessors. However, it is almost immediately clear that he has something else in mind, and not the traditional Caliphate of even al-Māwardī. He follows the prejudice in favor of one-man-government, but his implication is clearly that of a multilateral rather than a unitary government. Most important of all is his association of the Caliph with the Sultan. We shall return to this problem, but it is necessary to realize that he assumes the co-operation of the Caliph and the actual holder of power in his discussion of the obligatory character of the Caliphate.

In keeping with the then traditional treatment of the question of the obligatory character of the Caliphate, al-Ghazālī first directs his argu-

⁵ Māwardī, *op. cit.*, Cairo, 1909, p. 16.

⁶ Functional authority is that which authorizes each separate act of the Caliph, without regard to the manner of his appointment. Institutional authority is that which provides that there shall be such an institution as the Caliphate. Logically, institutional authority must precede functional authority; though the office and its duties are conceptually joined. Constitutional authority provides for the manner in which a Caliph should be appointed. It will usually be found that the question of legitimacy in Islamic political theory relates to the constitutive process, while functional lapses are regarded as disqualifying and not illegitimizing.

ment against those who deny the Sharī character of the Caliphate, and then against those who deny its obligation altogether.⁷ The first argument is a positive one, and concerns the institutional authority for the Caliphate. The second is a negative argument, and sheds light on the nature of the Caliphate and the duties attached thereto. After dealing with these two arguments we shall discuss his treatment of the constitutive process with special reference to the qualifications of the Caliph and the constituent power.

The Mu'tazila asserted that the obligatory character of the Caliphate was based on "reason" and not upon the Sharī'ah. The Sunnī jurists insisted upon the Sharī'ah as the basis of the Caliphate. Al-Ghazālī follows the accepted Sunnī line, but he develops his argument in a more logical fashion, adding new elements. First he states that the Caliphate does indeed have utility, but he rests the proof of the Sharī obligation of appointing an Imām first on ijmā' and second and more importantly, upon the deduced will of the Prophet. He contends that the will of the Prophet was the source of the consensus of the Community. His argument is that the Prophet's purpose was the formal establishment of the religion of Islam. To secure this end both life and livelihood must be protected. The appointment of an Imām is therefore obligatory. He also indicates that only through the performance of formal religious observances may the bliss of the hereafter be achieved.

We have found the usual Sunnī insistence upon the Sharī character of the Caliphate an inadequate definition of the institutional authority of that office. In supporting this view the Sunnī theorists point to no specific provisions of the Sharī'ah. Instead they reason from the prescribed duties, deducing the executive institution.⁸ The weakness of their argument is manifest, for as we have seen, the Caliphate existed in fact before any of its duties were defined. By the addition of new elements to this argument, al-Ghazālī goes much further toward a definition of the institutional authority of the Caliphate. The most important innovation is his reference to the consensus of the Community, which is no less than the historical practice of the Community. This, of course, is historical legislation.

Technically the consensus by which the Community has authorized the institution of the Caliphate has reference to the consent of the Companions of the Prophet to the establishment of the Orthodox Caliphate. The phrase "consensus of the Community" is sufficiently vague to include the consensus of other generations as well. However, the consensus of the Community is not actually a legislative process, but merely evidence of the fact that what has been approved by the Community is actually provided for in the Sharī'ah. Despite this legal

⁷ Al-Ghazālī, *Al-Iqtisād fil-I'tiqād*, Cairo, n.d. pp. 104-109.

⁸ Al-Baghdādī, *loc. cit.*, Al-Māwardī, *op. cit.*, p. 3, see also al-Bāqillānī, *al-Tamhīd*, Cairo, 1947, pp. 185, 6 "Concerning the Purpose for which the Imām is Established."

detail we must conclude that the authority for the institution of the Caliphate is derived from the Community of Muslims. By the time al-Ghazālī writes the consensus of the Community had become a source of the Shari'ah in its own right. The Community at large has been endowed by the grace of God with a special character, summed up in the words of the Prophet, "My Community will never agree in error." The important thing to note is that consensus implies unanimity, or very nearly that. The Community as a source of authority is then considered collectively. Ijmā' is, as has been said, primarily a conservative principle, tending to approve and perpetuate existing phenomena. But it is correlatively a dynamic principle, expressing in a way the historical continuity of the Islamic Community. The institution of the Caliphate is intimately bound up with both the collective unity of the Community, as well as with its historical continuity.

Al-Ghazālī's logical bent of mind will not allow him to be satisfied with the mere evidential fact of ijmā'. Clearly, ijmā' itself contains no logic, while al-Ghazālī's intention is to frame the requirements of the Shari'ah in a manner best calculated to convince the protagonists of reason. Therefore he goes back to the source of the ijmā' which is, he says, the intention of the Prophet to organize the establishment of Islam.⁹ Primarily he is referring to the establishment of external observances of the religion such as prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage; and the execution of the *hudūd* punishments for such transgressions as drinking and adultery; the maintenance of Shari'ah law in such matters as marriage and inheritance; and the administration of Islamic justice by means of the Qādis. Under these headings come the collection of taxes and the government administration, for these are included either directly or indirectly in the Shar'ī requirements concerning them. Muḥammad may have desired to accomplish other, less concrete things as well, but here the main point is his purpose of organizing the administration of the (Sunnī) religion. Although it is here presented in slightly different terms, this is the same old argument leading to the functional or circumstantial authority of the Caliphate. Al-Ghazālī's argument goes on to show that the requirements of the Shari'ah imply the requirement of an institution of some sort to execute them. That institution, the form of which has been authorized by the consensus of the Community, is the Caliphate.

Though he rejected the argument of the Mu'tazila that the obligatory character of the Caliphate is based upon reason, al-Ghazālī agrees with them that it does have utility. Utility is a concept with a minimum of religious connotation. We have seen that the Shari'ah contains very many material provisions, but none of these could be classified by a Muslim as merely utilitarian. Obviously al-Ghazālī is referring to governmental functions common to all centralized coercive orders,

⁹ Al-Ghazālī, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

such as the maintenance of order and the security of life and property. This utility can only exist where power is present.

The subject of utilitarian power comes into al-Ghazālī's argument again when he attempts to prove that the Imamate is necessary for the realization of the Prophet's goal. It enters when he says that material security is a prerequisite for the carrying out of the Shari'ah.¹⁰ The concrete character of so many of the Shari'ah provisions necessitates, in the establishment of the Shari'ah, the setting up of a civic-religious institution. Obviously this implies the existence of a favorably disposed political power. This is provided by the Sultanate. His conclusion is that the Caliphate (execution of the Shari'ah) because of its relationship with the Sultanate (coercive power) is required as a result of the objective of the Prophet (the establishment and institutionalization of the Shari'ah). In the progress of this argument the Sultanate is brought in without any explanation of the relationship of the bearer of power to the Caliph; we only know that the function of the Sultanate is an essential element of the authorized Caliphate.

In a later argument al-Ghazālī opposes those who deny the obligatory character of the Caliphate altogether. Here we get into some confusion of terms. The contention of al-Ghazālī's opponents is that the Caliphate has lapsed because there is no qualified person to serve in that capacity.¹¹ The implication of their statement is that the Caliphate is not therefore a rigid requirement of the Shari'ah. At least this is in some measure the way in which al-Ghazālī chooses to understand their argument. In his own approach al-Ghazālī definitely confuses the terms obligatory (moral) and necessary (natural). The argument is simply: there ought to be a Caliph, therefore there must be a Caliph, therefore there is a Caliph. From this we are probably justified in deducing that the opposing argument runs: there is no Caliph, therefore need not be a Caliph, therefore there is no obligation to appoint a Caliph.

Al-Ghazālī's final argument on this question is his asking what would become of all those religious, social, economic and political phenomena which are regulated by the Shari'ah if there were no Caliph.¹² He contends that without the existence of the Caliphate no judgement of a qāḍī, no contract, no testament would be valid. In other words, the power of all qāḍīs and government officials is derived from the Caliph. In theory, Islamic government is perfectly centralized. The authority which any individual qāḍī has is completely derived from the Caliph, and not from the task he performs, as is the case of the Caliph's own authority. It is inconsistent, but there is no circumstantial authority for subordinate officials; their authority is only constitutive

¹⁰ *Ibid.*,

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 107

(derived from the manner in which they were appointed). Thus the absence of the Caliphate would turn every normal human relationship into sin, and lead to disorder and strife. He does not say what effect such social disintegration might have on the chances of the individual Muslim for salvation; but from other indications we may conclude that they would be considerably reduced.

We are now much clearer on the nature of the Caliphate in al-Ghazālī's theory: a) The Caliphate comprehends the necessary power to accomplish the maintenance of order. b) It represents or symbolizes the collective unity of the Muslim Community and its historical continuity. c) Deriving its functional and institutional authority from the Shari'ah, it is the only legitimate form of government in Islam. The legitimacy of the Caliphal form of government validates all acts of a legal and political nature, and it establishes the Caliphate as the focal point of the Shari'ah in the Community as well as the symbol of the divine guidance of the Sunnī Community by virtue of its obedience to the Shari'ah. It is not coincidental that these three aspects of the Caliphate correspond to al-Ghazālī's three sources for the obligatory character of the Caliphate: a) utility, b) *ijmā'*, c) and the objective of the Prophet.

So much for the Caliphate, but what about the Caliph himself? Al-Ghazālī joins the earlier theorists in giving a long list of qualifications for the job. Ideally, al-Ghazālī's qualifications are the same as those of al-Māwardī. The Caliph must be without physical defect, nor mental defect. He must be honorable, courageous, wise, and so on. It must not be thought that these qualifications are mere words. They do not represent abstract qualities, but rather their concrete equivalents. Thus, he must be able to defend the Muslims against their enemies and maintain internal order. He must be able to make judgements in accordance with the Shari'ah. He must be able to administer the affairs of state. Finally, he must be of Quraishite descent. Al-Ghazālī adds that he must be an 'Abbāsīd.¹³

These requirements are very great, and it is not surprising that they were in reality never completely fulfilled. The only stipulation which had been fulfilled was that of Quraishite lineage, and for three hundred and more years before al-Ghazālī the Quraishite Caliph had been an 'Abbāsīd. This fact more than anything else represented the unity and historical continuity of the Sunnī Community.

The inconsistency in al-Māwardī's theory stems from the fact that he insisted upon these qualifications in the Caliph, while permitting the Caliph to be inactive. On the Caliph's inactivity he clearly contradicts his own words. At one point al-Māwardī insists on the personal activity of the Caliph, while at another he validates his being constrained by one of his military aides. The reasons which might have

¹³ Al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn*, Vol. II, "al-Haram wal-Halal", p. 124.

justified al-Māwardī's equivocation no longer were effective in al-Ghazālī's time. We find al-Ghazālī facing up to the problems of the inactivity of the Caliph, and the related problem of his qualifications.¹⁴

To understand al-Ghazālī's treatment of this problem we must bear in mind his insistence upon the obligatory, even necessary character of the Imamate. We are not concerned with "an irresistible force" and an "immovable object." Al-Ghazālī tells us frankly that the necessity of having an Imām is so great that it compels the alteration of the qualifications when there is no other way out.¹⁵ The license of duress had, indeed, been applied previously by al-Māwardī to validate the rule of "Amirs by Conquest,"¹⁶ but he does not seem to have been able to bring himself to do the same for the constrainer of the Caliph. At any rate al-Māwardī did not permit, even in a case of duress, the lowering of the qualifications of the Imamate. Perhaps al-Mustazhir was obviously unqualified, or it might be that al-Ghazālī was more honest than al-Māwardī, anyway al-Ghazālī is willing to concede many of the qualifications in order to maintain the Caliphate. About the only concrete thing that he insists upon is that he be of Quraishite lineage. As a result, the personal qualifications of the Caliph are hardly applicable to the nature of the Caliphate. On the other hand the symbolic character of the Caliph could not be more sharply drawn. In other words the Caliph himself represents only one of the three major aspects of the Caliphate.

The qualifications of the Caliph are probably the most well developed part of the constitutive process in the hands of Islamic theorists. But they are very vague in their description of the constituent power. Al-Ghazālī says there are three ways in which one of those who is qualified for the Caliphate may be chosen: by designation of the Prophet, by designation of the ruling Caliph, or by designation of the holder of actual power. Al-Ghazālī tells us that only the last alternative applies in his day.¹⁷ Designation alone is not sufficient for appointment, for there must be the *bay'ā* as well. The *bay'ā* must be performed by the great men and the people of loosing and binding.¹⁸ It is not easy to ascertain who these people are, but we take the great men to be those with some measure of power; and the people of loosing and binding to be the 'ulamā'. In concrete terms this means that the most powerful Seljuq leader appoints the Caliph, then the

¹⁴ See Goldziher, *Streitschrift des Gazali gegen die Batiniyya-Sekte*, Leiden, 1916, p. 80 ff. analysis and p. 58 ff. text, for al-Ghazālī's early, detailed views, referred to in both *Iqtisād* and the much later *Ihyā*.

¹⁵ *Iqtisād*, p. 107, *Ihyā*, loc. cit.

¹⁶ Al-Māwardī, *op. cit.*, chapter III, p. 27, 8,

¹⁷ *Ihyā*, loc. cit.

¹⁸ *Iqtisād*, p. 107. The *bay'ā* is important, even essential, but not constitutive. Thus if a qualified Quraishite is an actual holder of power he may appoint himself as Imām according to al-Ghazālī. (This is denied by al-Bāqillānī, *Al-Tamhid* p. 180, and so may not be taken as generally accepted Sunnī theory.) Nevertheless the *bay'ā* remains necessary, having only a declarative effect.

appointee is recognized by the lesser Seljuqs, local princes, and the chiefs of the bureaucracy; and finally the appointment receives the consent of the 'ulamā'. There is probably a fourth stage in which the appointment is announced in the mosques, and the people accept the decision handed down from above. In view of al-Ghazālī's statement to that effect we must look upon the holder of power, or the Sultan, as the constituent power. All of the constitutive process beyond the bare fact of appointment by the Sultan is formality.

Al-Ghazālī's treatment of the constitutive process by no means contravenes the accepted requirements of the Shari'ah in this matter. It is true that al-Māwardī sets up special qualifications for those who choose the Caliph, as well as for the Caliph himself. But generally speaking, the Sunnī theorists are sufficiently vague about the question of selectors to allow al-Ghazālī's theory to meet their standards; particularly since they all insist that there need not be more than one selector. On the other hand, it is quite possible that he belittles the importance of the *bay'a* of the 'ulamā' too much. His reason for this is probably that the important question for him was whether or not the Sultan would choose anyone at all. But, of course, the Sultan was primarily concerned that his choice should be acceptable to the 'ulamā' and the people. Were he not concerned with the attitude of these groups, and perhaps his own salvation, the Sultan might dispense with choosing a Caliph altogether. Having chosen a Caliph, he has gone so far toward preserving law and order and the "establishment of Islam" that al-Ghazālī cannot conceive of the repudiation of his choice by the 'ulamā' or the people.

The constitutive process is then, loosely speaking, a Shari' process; but the constituent power is the Sultan. The limitations upon the Sultan's choice are real, as is the importance of the general *bay'a*, but since these have much greater reference to the functional and institutional authority of the Caliphate we shall do no more than make a mental note of them here. Our conclusion is that the constituent power for the appointment of the Caliph is the Sultan.

There is no contradiction between this conclusion and our previous statement that the source of all authority in Islam is the Shari'ah, for the Shari'ah has a tendency to recognize existing power in the constitutive process. Besides, so long as the Caliph had no power to do anything, the most important aspect of Shari'ah authority, i.e. functional authority, does not become operative. As a result the constituent authority of the Sultan is the critical political factor. One might argue that the Sultan derives this authority from the Shari'ah, but that would not be what al-Ghazālī himself has argued.

From the foregoing we see that the Caliph is different from the Caliphate, and that the authority for one differs from the authority for the other. We must now examine the relationship of the Caliph to the Caliphate, and of the Sultan to them both.

If the Caliph does not satisfy all the requirements of the Caliphate in himself, it is at least clear that he is the principal personal representative of the Caliphate. We have already established that the Caliph himself has a special connection with the authoritative source of *ijmāʿ*. On the other hand we know that he cannot possibly be the personal subject of functional authority, since he has no power. Contrarily, no governmental act unless performed directly or indirectly by the Caliph has any validity.

We have already seen that the Sultan is in some measure the authority for the Caliphate. However, the actual government of Islam is carried out by the Sultan. Circumstantial authority is not considered sufficient to legitimize the government of the Sultan. Al-Ghazālī goes even further, for he validates the government of the Sultan even if it is not in conformity with the Shariʿah.¹⁹ The only way in which the government of the Sultan is valid and authorized is through its recognition of the Caliph. As we have already stated, no government other than that of the Caliph is valid under the Shariʿah, and subordinate officials have only delegated authority, and not functional authority. Thus the validity of the government of the Sultan is established only upon the Sultan's oath of allegiance to the Caliph, and the Caliph's appointment of the Sultan. By his exercise of the constitutive authority, the Sultan recognizes in fact the institutional authority of the Caliphate, which rests primarily in the Islamic Sunnī Community, and in theory the functional authority which rests with the Shariʿah proper.

The fact that al-Ghazālī accepts this compromise sheds some light on the political objectives of Sunnī theorists. The total achievement of this arrangement is the recognition by the holder of power that the Shariʿah is the organizing principle of the Sunnī Community; and, in more concrete fashion, the establishment of Sunnī Islam. The element of compromise enters when al-Ghazālī argues for the legitimacy of this arrangement even though the Sultan actually ignores many provisions of the Shariʿah. Recognition of the Shariʿah by the Sultan without obedience to its provisions is form without content. This leads us to the second objective of the Sunnī theorists, and that is the establishment of order and the maintenance of discipline. The governmental scope of the Sultanate included very few of the interests which concern modern governments. By the establishment of order and the maintenance of discipline the Sultanate merely provided a favorable field for the activity of the established Islamic institution. Al-Ghazālī therefore felt justified in validating the government of such a Sultan. He was willing to make concessions regarding a limited number of Shariʿah regulations in order to preserve the religious life of the Community.

¹⁹ *Iḥyā, loc. cit.*

Just as the Caliphate comprehends the function of the Sultan, so does it also comprehend the religious and legal duties imposed by the Shari'ah. As we have said, the Caliphate is the religious institution as well as the political institution of Islam. We have also seen that al-Ghazālī does not insist upon the qualifications which the Caliph must have in order to carry out his religious duties. If necessary, the Caliph may enlist the aid of the most outstanding learned people of the day.²⁰ The principal political function of the 'ulamā' is the interpretation of the Shari'ah in terms of the problems facing the Community. In short, by their approval of the Sultan's choice of Caliph (*bay'a*) and by their fatwas, the 'ulamā' express the functional authority of the Shari'ah.

The term Caliphate stands for the whole of Islamic government. Although al-Ghazālī seems to follow the traditional prejudices in favor of autocracy, it is obvious that his is a multilateral conception of the Caliphate. In it there are three main elements: the Caliph, the Sultan, and the 'ulamā'; each corresponding to some aspect of the authority behind Islamic government, and each performing a function required by that authority. The greatest virtue of al-Ghazālī's theory is in its political realism; and yet he has maintained the essentials of the traditional theory. Each of the parts of the Caliphate represent not only an aspect of authority and a function of Islamic government, but also one of the major elements of political power in the Sunnī Community.

Was al-Ghazālī's theory an accurate description of the government of his time? Such a development of the Caliphate was the result of many diverse and fortuitous events. Nevertheless, the roots of this development may be traced back to the calculated policy of the early 'Abbāsids. The early 'Abbāsids based their government upon the power of troops imported from Khorassan, and not upon local Iraqī levies. They asserted their own legitimacy upon the circumstantial fact that they were ruling in accordance with the Shari'ah. They went out of their way to honor the 'ulamā' and give them a place at court.

Ultimately, the success of the system depended upon the maintenance of a delicate balance of power, and upon the continued co-operation of those forces. The fact of the matter was that when the relative power of each element of the government changed it was not supported by the others. Al-Ghazālī argued for the independence of the 'ulamā', and he urged them to resist the blandishments of the Sultan. When the Sultan was powerful he interfered with the succession to the Caliphate in a manner calculated to lower the influence and prestige of that office. When the Sultan grew somewhat weaker the Caliph was eager to exercise local power himself. Al-Ghazālī's theory notwithstanding, the existence of the Caliph alongside the Caliphate was an ever present temptation to re-establish the old order.

²⁰ *Iqtisād*, p. 107 l. 11, see note 14 above.

The multilateral conception of the Caliphate was not opposed to al-Māwardī's ideal construction. Al-Ghazālī did not reject the traditional Sunnī theory. In fact al-Ghazālī sought only to explain the political conditions of his own time in terms acceptable to traditional Sunnī thought. If he ground any axe at all it was for the Sunnī 'ulamā', who were certainly a most conservative body. Nevertheless, once the Caliphate could be resolved into its component parts it became possible for the rest of the parts to hobble along without the Caliph himself. In this sense al-Ghazālī paved the way for the post-ʿAbbāsīd development of Sunnī political theory.

The original inspiration for al-Ghazālī's theory of the Caliphate seems to have come from his early interest in Hellenistic thought. We find an interesting statement of the same principle in no less an exponent of the opposing "philosopher-king" theory than Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. Al Ṭūsī says that the second possible variation of the supreme government of the Virtuous City is wherein all the qualities required of a philosopher-king do not exist in one man, but are produced in several men collectively.²¹

More significant than the parallel passage in Akhlāqī-Nāṣirī is the reflection of al-Ghazālī's theory in the writings of Ibn Taimiyya. If anything, Ibn Taimiyya was more enamored of the past than al-Māwardī, but by the time he wrote the ʿAbbāsīd Caliphate was no more. Ibn Taimiyya argued that legitimate Islamic government in his day was composed of the Amirs and the 'ulamā' acting in co-operation with one another. Ibn Taimiyya's principle of "co-operation" leads him to repeat al-Ghazālī's theory of divided authority in accordance with the qualifications of various persons in opposition to the theory which accorded complete authority to the ruling warlord.²²

The origin and development of this principle presents many difficulties, but Laoust tells us that Ibn Taimiyya was influenced rather by the Arab neo-Platonists, such as the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā, than by al-Ghazālī.²³ It is unlikely that the idea itself originated with al-Ghazālī who was himself deeply influenced in his youth by the Hellenistic movement in Islam. Nevertheless, his application of it to the Sunnī Caliphate was certainly an innovation, and all the more noteworthy for its reappearance two centuries later in the works of Ibn Taimiyya. It hardly need be added that the 'ulamā' did in fact assume a special position of political authority as well as a part of the "original" Caliphal function in the Ottoman State, and to a lesser extent, perhaps, in the Mughul Empire in India.

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²¹ Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, *Akhlāqī-Nāṣirī*, Treatise III, Chapter III, p. 309.

²² Henri Laoust, *Essai sur les Doctrines Sociales et Politiques de Taki-D-Din ibn Taimiyya*, Le Caire, 1939, pp. 282, 294, 307, 315, 317.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 100, note 1.

ISLAM AS THE STATE RELIGION

A SECULARIST POINT OF VIEW IN SYRIA

The reasoning behind the claim for identifying the state in Syria with Islam has been made available to the English reader in an English rendition by Professor R. Bayly Winder of the article by Shaikh Muṣṭafā al-Sibā'ī, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and an active protagonist of the political interpretation of Islam.¹ His article "The Establishment of Islam as the State Religion of Syria," though written in an apologetic tone and aimed primarily at ameliorating the fears of the Christian communities of Syria about this establishment, nevertheless gives a certain indication as to the ultimate aim of identifying the state with Islam.

Shaikh Muṣṭafā starts by listing the positive reasons why he thinks Islam should be established as the state religion of Syria:

(1) Since, he argues, Islam is the religion of nine-tenths of the Syrians, and "the opinion of the majority is to be followed and acted upon," it follows that Islam must be the religion of the State.

(2) Since the Syrian State "faces today a painful internal situation," a "psychological spur from religion and morality" is needed to reform "the spirit of (the) nation." The establishment of Islam as the religion of the State "will stimulate the people:" (i) into executing the regulations and decrees of the government, and (ii) "to be attached to the State and to be defenders of the fatherland."

(3) The establishment of Islam as the state religion "will be a strong factor for unity between ourselves ('the Syrians') and our Arab brethren."

(4) "We, the Arabs, ... should have a sphere of influence which will support us in the international arena ... Islam has made for us in the East a sphere of influence which extends among the four hundred million Muslims."

These, he says, are "some of the advantages" which would accrue if Islam is established as the state religion.

Shaikh Muṣṭafā then takes up the objections of the heads of the Christian communities and replies to them one by one. These objections he sums up into two main ones:

(1) "The implication of the state's being Muslim will be that the rules of Islam will be applied both to Muslims and Christians, and, since the Christians have religious tenets, rules and systems of personal status which differ from those of Islam, how they can be compelled to submit to the authority of Islam?"

(2) "The implication of the state's being Muslim is hostility towards other religions, a decrease in the rights of non-Muslims, and an

¹ *The Muslim World*, Vol. xlv, 3-4, July-October, 1954.

attitude towards them which differs from the attitude towards the followers of the official religion."

Both these "interpretations" or "ideas" of the establishment of Islam as the state religion are erroneous, says Shaikh Muṣṭafā. And he goes on to assure both the "nationalists" and the heads of the Christian communities that the establishment of Islam as the state religion does not mean "that religious leaders will conduct affairs of state;" nor "will (it) give clerics the final word in the country;" nor "eliminate the Parliament;" nor "abrogate the (current) laws;" nor "carry out (enforce) the Islamic punishments;" nor "decreased rights for the Christians and increased privileges for the Muslims." In fact, he assures them that "everything will continue as it is. Our parliament, deputies, laws, and way of life will all remain ..." Why then the establishment?

However, from the above resumé of the ideas expounded in the article of Shaikh Muṣṭafā, it becomes obvious that the reasons behind the identification of the state with Islam are primarily and essentially political: (1) It is the majority religion. (2) It enhances loyalty to the state, observance of the laws and defense of the fatherland. (3) It is a factor in the movement for Arab unity. (4) It provides the Arabs with a sphere of influence in the international field. In other words, the demand for the establishment of Islam as the state religion is the result of a lingering political interpretation of Islam and a romantic fervor for the revival of the Islamic theocracy in Syria, among traditionalist Muslims, nourished by their increasing realization of the gradual recession of the authority of Islam in the political and social fields. They continue to labor under the belief that Islam—the institutions as well as the faith—is a "political" cornerstone, a pillar, of Islamic societies as essential today as it was in the past. This belief is frankly expressed in the principles of the Muslim Brotherhood and discreetly disguised behind such statements by Shaikh Muṣṭafā as this: Islam is a "strong factor of unity" among the Arabic speaking peoples. This unity is easily extended to include all Muslims, irrespective of their national identity. "Do we not find in these peoples a natural, virgin field for our influence, language, culture, heritage and civilization?" asks Shaikh Muṣṭafā, in the true spirit of early Islam. And he goes on to assert that "the will of the Arab Nation is crystal clear in that it wants to march to glory under the banner of religious belief and morality."

Such notions are indeed remnants of a bygone era, whose bearers refuse to recognize the emerging concept of state and society in the contemporary Middle East and the Muslim world at large. It is in this continued political interpretation of Islam that the issue of secularization is today deadlocked. The secularists point out the fallacy in such an interpretation of Islam under changed social and political conditions.

Two important political events which attended the break up of the Ottoman Empire have played a decisive factor in bringing about a reorganization of society and government in the Muslim world:

- (1) The rise of the concept of nationality.
- (2) The fall of the Caliphate.

Ever since the middle of the 19th century, the various national groups which were once held together in the Ottoman Empire re-discovered themselves and fell out. The Syrians were no less susceptible to the concept of nationality. And although the settlement after 1919 in the Levant States and the rest of the region of the Fertile Crescent was calculated to retard the growth of the concept of nationality there to its logical conclusion in the evolution of a homogeneous secular national state in all of geographical Syria, nevertheless the concept of the sovereign territorial political state triumphed over the Ottoman Islamic theocracy of the past.

This new concept of state found manifestation in (a) the rise of constitutional governments on secular basis with non-Muslims legislating for Muslims and vice versa in joint popular assemblies, and with civil (secular) laws dismantling almost completely (except in the realm of family relations) the structure of the once all-embracing *Shari'ah*; and (b) the organization of the political community on national territorial basis rather than the universal religious citizenship of Islamic theocracy, thereby transforming radically the political fabric of Islamic society.

Furthermore, the abolition of the Caliphate was perhaps the most momentous event in the history of modern Islam. With the fall of the Caliphate, fell the last cornerstone of the old order which held together a series of socio-religious institutions forming the comprehensive religio-political fabric of Islam, leaving predominantly Muslim societies free to adjust their organization in a way more compatible with the emerging concept of nationality. The Revolutionary Turkish National Assembly in the law of November 1st, 1922, which turned out to be the last step towards the total abolition of the Caliphate, expressed in a few words the very form and spirit of the new order in the Islamic world: "... recognizing no power and no body which is not based upon the National Will ..."

The consequences of the abolition of the Caliphate have been far reaching:

First, sovereignty—whether as source of executive power, or as an expression of juristic personality—which was formerly personified in, and exercised by, the Caliph, has now reverted to each of the several national communities comprising the Islamic world, and to whatever Assembly or Person it has been delegated to by these communities.

Second, the resultant organization of society, now based on the concept of nationality (no matter how inconsummate in certain societies) and on the national community regardless of faith, rather

than community of faith regardless of nationality, became consequently divested of its original religious mission, and invested with a national purpose. Its national will has been thus freed to express itself, to legislate, as it thinks fit within the limits of the national interest.

The allegiance which Society owed to the Caliph, and through him, by virtue of the nature and purpose of that office, to the Shari'ah, which is the embodiment of the political institutions of Islam, had, under the changed conditions of national organization, to pass to the state, inasmuch as the latter, and not any ulterior individual or institution, now fulfils the political functions of society, and embodies its political purpose.

Against this new background of national existence, the fallacies and dangers inherent in the claim for the establishment of Islam as the state religion in Syria speak for themselves.

"Islam is both faith (or religion) and legislation" wrote *Al-Bināʾ*² the mouthpiece of the Syrian Social Nationalist Movement, which spearheads the movement for secularism in Syria and whom most probably Shaikh Muṣṭafā has in mind in his reference to "the nationalists." "Is it possible then that the protagonist for the identification of the state with Islam could have intended by such identification to force all citizens, Muslims and Christians alike, to accept that particular faith?" We do not think it possible, continues the paper, that they would allow themselves to contradict to that extent the principles of freedom of belief and worship, not only in respect to the members of the other religious communities, but in respect to the Muslims themselves, for has not God said: "*la ikrāhā fi-l-dīn*?" If they do, then they have utterly mistaken the true concept of Islam. If, on the other hand, the paper wrote, they mean by the establishment of Islam as the State religion that Islamic law (*fiqh*) be the source of law and legislation, this means nothing less than declaring that the political order of the state in Syria be based on Islam and its laws flow from the Shari'ah as their source, which betrays their ignorance of the true function of law. "Law is the fence which preserves the unity and integration of society. How can law serve such a purpose if it does not create above the religious differences and sectarian conflicts among the various members of the national community a sense of unity and fellowship which would subject them to the same objective and fate?"²

In his article, Shaikh Muṣṭafā goes to considerable lengths trying to abate the fears of Christian minorities in Syria over the consequences of the establishment of Islam as the state religion. Although the fate of Christian minorities, and for that matter, any citizen, any human being, in Syria ought to be of the utmost importance, the question of a

² *Al-Bināʾ*, Damascus, July 1st to July 5th, 1953 carried a series of articles on Art. 3 of the Constitutional Draft of that year advocating complete separation of "Church" and State.

state religion, however, has ultimately, to do not merely with the status of non-Muslim minorities in an "Islamic" state, but rather with the status of the Muslims themselves and the fate of the entire nation. It is a question of the source of authority and power in the state. Is the government in Syria to be one of the people and on behalf of the people? Or is it to be one on behalf of the unimpeachable Deity through His unalterable laws? Are ecclesiastical interests and authorities to continue to maintain, by such a concept of government, their reactionary hold over men's minds and actions in matters that are not of the essence of the faith and the supernatural? Or are reason and the national interest to be finally recognized as the guiding factors in those matters? It is this double phased question of choice between a static and a progressive society, between a democratic and a theocratic form of government, which ultimately presents itself in an issue of state religion.

Along these lines wrote the "nationalist" paper *Al-Binā*² propagating the idea of the complete separation of "Church" and state in the Constitutional struggles which developed in Syria in 1950 and 1953:

"Religious institutions regard themselves as the bearers of a total complete ideology which encompasses all the needs and requirements of human life and deals with all the necessities of man—spiritual and material. From this point of view, those institutions regard themselves as the ultimate authority over human societies and their conditions. And since they are the keepers of the message of the faith, the revelation of God and his laws to men, they are bound to believe that they are in fact the ideal instrumentality to direct human life in its entirety. From here arises their tendency to become the last and absolute authority in all that relates to the spiritual and functional (*al ruḥīyat wal-ʿamalīyat*) in life."

Shaikh Muṣṭafā, himself, does not fail to assure us, whether unwittingly or not, when talking of the need for "a psychological spur" from religion to "reform the spirit of the nation," that that spur accomplishes that purpose because of the "decisive religious pattern from which there should be no deviation."

Speaking of this psychological spur, it is agreed with Shaikh Muṣṭafā that the Syrian people are today passing through a painful internal situation. But we disagree with him on the nature and causes of this situation as we disagree with him that the establishment of Islam as the state religion would provide the required spur to "stimulate the people and reform the spirit of the Nation." It is suggested that if the Syrian people suffer today from the stings and trials of a deep moral crisis, this moral crisis, if indicative of anything, is indicative of the bankruptcy of the justification for the dominant traditional social order. The justifications for that order are predominantly religious—they are the lingering political interpretations of Islam and the continued entanglement of "Church" and state in the national and individual lives of the people.

Certainly the crisis is not the result of any lack of religious fervor among the Muslims of Syria, as Shaikh Muṣṭafā tries to suggest.

It is rather the work of the creative progressive elements, who are seeking, among other things, the total separation of "Church" and state, and who in preaching a new national ideology are providing new values and a new outlook, thereby enhancing the transformation from the old order to the new. Needless to say, a society whose guiding ideology is based on, and determined by, religious or supernatural qualifications, ends up by becoming a static society after the original spur of the religion has dissipated itself.

Thus it is those two characteristics of the modern state—progress and democracy—so essential for the transformation and development of Syrian society at this juncture, which would ultimately suffer from an identification of the state with political Islam. "In the struggle which ensued between the communal will, the popular national will, and between the authority emanating from religion or God," *Al-Bināʾ*³ reminded its readers, "the decisive victory for the former was achieved in the French Revolution. And from that Revolution and the American Revolution which preceded it, developed the modern concept of democracy which ultimately means the representation of the popular will in government, and the rendering of this popular will of the people or the nation the predominant will and the source of all law."

Furthermore, in the interest of the national community as a whole and not merely minority groups, the issue of state religion is a choice between a form of national state integrated and stabilized through the development of genuine secular nationalism binding all citizens irrespective of religious faith, and the maintenance of a dangerous politico-religious balance at best, a struggle at worst, between the various religious groups inhabiting geographical Syria. The development of a homogeneous national state has been severely hampered by the persistence of a political interpretation of Islam. The popular notion of Arab "nationalism" is, as a result, strongly permeated with notions of political Islam. With certain groups it is even considered another form of Muslim temporal revival. For example, Shaikh Muṣṭafā expresses his understanding of this nationalism in the following terms: "Arab nationalism," he says, "was born only when they (i.e. the Arabs) embraced Islam and this nationalism would not be as vital as it obviously is were it not for Islam."³

With this injection of defunct theocratic notions into a modern concept such as Arab nationalism, the development of genuine secular nationalism in Syria is being severely hampered and the nation's regeneration blocked. This state of affairs is particularly articulate in

³ Ahmed Emin, in his *Economic & Social History of Turkey* during the First World War, has this to say on the development of Arab nationalism: "The Christian Syrians, influenced by systematic propaganda, by their higher degree of enlightenment, and by their restless temper, were not only constantly opposed to the Government, but they had also begun to develop a broad conception of Arab nationalism. ... For a long time the Muslims remained hostile to this propaganda. ..."

Lebanese politics and its self consuming efforts to maintain a delicate politico-religious balance among the several communities of the country. In an article published recently in the *Journal of the Maronite clergy, Al-Sanābil* of Beirut, a frank and objective assessment of the religious and political situation in Lebanon is made. The writer, whose initials are M. D., sums up this situation in the following words:

"Islam in the 20th century still maintains the qualities of its first decade, in that it is theocratic, and any relinquishing of theocracy is considered a depreciation of the essence of revelation. In this lies the knot of knots in those countries which are inhabited by Muslims and non-Muslims. This knot appears at its worst entanglement in Lebanon ... for the Muslims refuse to distinguish between that which is Caesar's and that which is God's ... This obstacle faces all citizens who are Christians or liberal Muslims as well, and who, even if they do distinguish between that which is Caesar's and that which is God's, and who would, therefore, agree to live in a secular state, are forced by the struggle for self preservation to take the same stand which the Muslims take, that is, by refusing to give up theocracy ... Hence their clinging to the institution of Personal Status even in those matters which are purely secular

"Thus Lebanon today is a battle ground from the social and the political points of view. Either the Muslims will accept a secular State, in which case Lebanon will find stability, and perhaps there will then remain no basic reason for its existence (i.e. as a state separate from the rest of Syria), or they will refuse, in which case, Lebanon will not be stabilized, and its existence, though shaky, will remain essential for the preservation of basic freedoms."⁴

We have noticed that this anomalous state of affairs which has existed since the 1920 settlement has resulted, as far as Lebanon is concerned, in the "stimulation," as Toynbee puts it, of an "anti-Syrian national consciousness among the Lebanese," (not devoid of a Christian religious motif) to counter the religiously motivated Arab "nationalism" in the rest of geographical Syria.

Not only has the incomplete separation of "Church" and state in Syria (to say nothing of a reversion to an identification more complete), retarded the integration of the national community and hampered the evolution of genuine secular nationalism, but culturally speaking as well, the prevalent theocratic notions of history and society have had a detrimental effect on Syria's cultural regeneration.

"Let the advocates of nationalism distinguish between Europe and the East, between the Christianity of the West and the Islam of the Arabs," warns Shaikh Muṣṭafā. But in what sense is the West Christian? Was not Syria an important cradle of this Western civilization? Such questions seem to be of no concern to the protagonists of an Islamic theocracy in Syria. To them the history of the country is arbitrarily circumscribed and made to begin only from the coming of Islam. All that came before may arouse their curiosity, but never their pride.

This dichotomy between pre- and post-Islamic Syria, coupled with a rejection of the former, which nevertheless is an integral part of the cultural heritage of the Syrian people, is not a question of only

⁴ *Al-Sanābil*, Beirut, vol. viii, No. x, October 1953, p. 577 ff.

academic historical importance. It is a question of the utmost significance to the rising generations of Syrians. Those generations grow up today to find themselves torn between two worlds of cultures while belonging to neither completely, — the one utterly inadequate in its decadence, the other lacking a national character and spirit they could call their own. Under the pseudonym "Meleager," a writer on Near Eastern affairs writes as follows on this "levantinism," in culture:

"One of the most important facts of the 19th and 20th centuries has been the loss by Islam of something of its sway, and the consequent spread of the Levant inland ... where Islamic civilization, splendid in decline, held undivided sway over men's minds ... For every Arab and every Moslem is compelled, whether he likes it or not, to live at least partly in the West ... (while) most Moslems and most Arabs still cling, articulately or as a sentiment, to the ethical and religious tradition they have inherited ..." ⁵

This cultural uprootedness is cause today of a severe and painful moral and spiritual crisis for those Syrians who are conscious of it. This crisis is to a great extent perpetuated by the stubborn clinging of the protagonists of a theocratic concept of life and history to their conservative notions, and their consequent retarding influence upon the trend and form of the cultural transformation now taking place in Syrian society. For only two results are foreseen to this cultural transformation: either a total leventinism will perpetuate itself, and with it the moral crisis, much longer; or Syrian Islam will completely relinquish its political theocratic premises to admit secular nationalism with its outlook on life and history. Such a radically new outlook is only possible through a complete and sincere separation of Church and state and the abandonment of the political interpretation of Islam. Only then will a cultural readjustment become possible by readmitting pre-Islamic Syrian culture—which is a major source of Western (world) civilization—into the cultural vistas of a predominantly Islamic Syria. To Islam the faith would be left the role which Christianity the faith plays in the West today, which is not legal, not political, but moral and spiritual.

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⁵ *Islam Today*, ed. A. J. Arberry & Rom Landau, London, 1941, p. 66: see Chap. 4 "Islam in Syria" by Meleager.

MUSLIMS AND TAŞWİR

TRANSLATED FROM THE JOURNAL OF AL-AZHAR

Foreword

The subject of *taşwîr*¹ is one which is not often dealt with in Arabic sources, by which I mean essentially works on Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*). In looking into these sources one goes from one work to another without finding any perceptible difference or concrete definition of the subject. Later writers copied from their predecessors without making additions necessitated by the prevailing situation or by changes in time and place. In some commentaries the question is given merely a simple and superficial treatment or interpretations are offered which have been copied from older writers. Thus the researcher into the subject of *taşwîr* finds nothing of value in these older works and discovers no opinions which can be considered decisive.

I am not seeking, however, to make a complete technical study of these works, but to discover the views of the jurisconsults (*fuqahā*²) as to the lawfulness or unlawfulness of *taşwîr*. I say "opinions of the jurisconsults" because I believe that Islam neglected this subject as unimportant. All that exist are a few *ḥadīths* which Muslim jurisconsults have used by way of explanation or comment in forbidding, disapproving, or permitting the making of representations (of living creatures), or acquiring or looking at them.

For this reason I believe that I am not far from the truth if I refer to "the opinions of the jurisconsults on *taşwîr*" rather than to "the opinion of Islam on *taşwîr*." For neither in the Qur'ān nor in the Ḥadīth do I find any clear provision outlawing *taşwîr*, nor is there any genuine explanation of the difference between *taşwîr* and *tamthīl* (the making of images). Neither is there any acceptable reason for outlawing what Muslims are agreed in calling "pictures" (*ṣurwar*) or "representations" (*taşāwīr*).

THE QUR'ĀN AND TAŞWİR

It is important for anyone investigating the subject of *taşwîr* to be acquainted with the Quranic verses which might "tabu" it or make it lawful. I shall refer to these verses in my final discussion as to whether *taşwîr* was prohibited or not and whether or not it is as indicated in the Qur'ān.

The majority, perhaps, of orientalists who say that *taşwîr* was

¹ Translator's note: *Taşwîr* means "portrayal" or "making a picture." In this paper it refers particularly to the representation of living creatures. Since English has no single equivalent, the Arabic word has been retained for convenience. The article appeared in *Majallat al-Azhar*, Vol. xxii, pp. 605-609, 730-735, 943-945 and Vol. xxiii, pp. 147-151, 468-472, dated 1370 and 1371 A.H. (1951 A.D.).

prohibited hold that the Qurʾān so provided in the Surah of the Table (Surah v. 92) where God (may He be exalted!) said: "Wine, games of chance, *al-anṣāb*, and divining arrows are unclean things which are of Satan's works; so avoid them that you may prosper." These orientlists have interpreted the word *al-anṣāb* as representations and have portrayed them as being unclean. Al-Nasafī says: "The *anṣāb* are idols (*aṣnām*); they are unclean because they are set up and worshipped." In that case we can say that they were classed as unclean and the believers were ordered to avoid them because they were worshipped instead of God. If they had not been worshipped, then I believe that they would not have been unclean and the Muslims would not have had to avoid them. Al-Nasafī also says in his commentary on God's (may He be exalted!) word: "and that which has been sacrificed to the *nuṣub*" (Surah v. 4) that the pagan Arabs had stones which were set up (*maṣṣūbah*) around the Ka'bah and that they used to honor them and seek to gain their favor with sacrifices." Perhaps there is some indication in this that these *anṣāb* were stones and not images (*ṣuwar*) or statues (*tamāthīl*). This is supported by Al-Zamakhsharī's statement in *Asās al-Balāghah* under the article "*nuṣub*" that "the *nuṣub* around a cistern are *naṣā'ib*, which are stones set up to support it. The pagan Arabs used to worship *anṣāb*, which were stones upon which the blood of sacrifices was poured and which were worshipped...."

In his commentary on God's word "Wine and games of chance..." Al-Qurṭubī says that *anṣāb* means "idols," but that it is also said that it means backgammon and chess. However, despite Al-Qurṭubī's well-known carefulness in commenting on verses containing commandments, he does not take up the subject of the *anṣāb* in this verse, but quotes the opinion of those who have interpreted it as meaning backgammon and chess. This is clear from the commentary on God's word: "And what is there after truth but error?" (Surah x. 33).

The Surah of Saba^c touches upon this subject in saying that in the religious law of Solomon statues (*tamāthīl*) were permitted and in no wise prohibited. God says: "They make for him whatever he wishes of riches, statues (*tamāthīl*), and trough-like bowls." (Surah xxxiv. 12).

Al-Naysābūrī, in commenting on the word *tamāthīl*, says that the *tamāthīl* were representations (*ṣuwar*) of the angels and the prophets which were ordered to be made in places of worship (*masājid*) of bronze (*nuḥās*), glass, and marble in order that the people might look at them and worship according to their custom. Al-Alūsī says, "It is said that the *tamāthīl* were representations of trees or headless animals as permitted by our religious law (*sharʿ*). There is no necessity for resorting to the latter since the religious law does not contain a prohibition against the representation of animals in their complete form. He adds that "Makkī says in his *Hidāyah* that some people have sanctioned representation and have adduced this verse in support of it."

This is a summary of the views of the commentators on those verses which immediately or remotely touch upon the subject of *taṣwīr*. No one can say that the Qurʾān has either explicitly or implicitly provided for the prohibition of *taṣwīr*. Neither can we readily accept the interpretations of the commentators, since these interpretations represent points of view which vary with individuals and circumstances. If the question of *taṣwīr* had been as important as other problems, such as those of strong drink, marriage, divorce and inheritance, the Qurʾān certainly would have dealt with it explicitly, as it did with other problems of conduct and worship.

THE ḤADĪTH AND TAṢWĪR

In works on Ḥadīth we find some ḥadīths which at first sight might be taken as indicating that the Apostle (may God bless him and grant him peace!) prohibited *taṣwīr*. However, there are contradictions in these ḥadīths and some of them contain indications that the Prophet approved of *taṣwīr*, not the contrary.

Anyone examining these *ḥadīths*—supposing that they are genuine—will find that the Prophet had feared that people might revert to their earlier paganism if representations (*ṣuwar*) and statues (*tamāthīl*) were permitted. But when he became certain of the firmness of the people's faith, he approved of these representations and did not further concern himself with them. The commentators, however, held to the idea that they were prohibited and produced exaggerations on the subject which they copied from one another. I shall set forth briefly these ḥadīths and the commentators' views on them and indicate the replies which can be made to these commentators.

The first ḥadīth is from ʿĀʾishah and says that "The Prophet never left in his house anything which bore a *taṣālib* without destroying it"—one version has "without cutting the arms off the cross."

Al-Shawkānī, in commenting on the word *taṣālib*, says that it is the representation of a cross, on a garment, etc. and states: "The ḥadīth indicates that it is not permitted to use garments, curtains, or carpets bearing *taṣwīr* (representations) and that it is permissible to put one's hand to changing an abomination without the permission of its owner, whether it belongs to one's wife or to anyone else." This interpretation resorted to by Al-Shawkānī is far removed from both the spirit and the letter of the ḥadīth. For it is not representations (*taṣwīr*) which are meant by *taṣālib*, but anything in the form of a cross (*ṣalīb*), since it might cause the weak minded to accept the view that Jesus (upon him be peace!) was crucified. The Prophet therefore destroyed crucifixes not because they were images (*ṣuwar*), but because of the idea conveyed by the cross.

Al-Shawkānī goes on to permit the alteration of this abomination on the strength of this ḥadīth, even though the ḥadīth contains no

provision for or indication of such a thing. Even if we concede that the ḥadīth makes some reference to the removal of an abomination, it contains no indication, such as stated by Al-Shawkānī, that it is permissible to put one's hand to altering an abomination without the permission of its owner, whether it belongs to one's wife or anyone else.

It is my opinion that Al-Shawkānī went too far in commenting on this ḥadīth and that he failed to understand it, with the result that his conclusions are more than one can accept.

The second ḥadīth states that the Prophet said: "The angels will not enter a house in which there is either a representation (*ṣūrah*) or a dog." Al-Nawawī, who belonged to the Shāfi'ī rite, in commenting on this ḥadīth says that "Our companions and other 'ulamā' say that the representation (*taṣwīr*) of the image (*ṣūrah*) of a living creature (*ḥayawān*) is severely prohibited. It is a grave sin since it is threatened with the severe punishment mentioned in the ḥadīth. The making of such representations is tabu under all circumstances, whether or not it is applied to something which has a base use, since it contains a resemblance to the creation of God (may He be exalted!); it makes no difference whether it is on a garment, a carpet, a dirham, a dinar, or a filis or on a vessel, a wall, etc. But the representation (*taṣwīr*) of the image (*ṣūrah*) of trees, the mountains of the earth, and other things which contain no image of a living creature is not tabu. Such is the judgment on the delineation (*naqsh*) of representations (*taṣwīr*). With regard to the use of objects containing the image of a living creature: if it is attached to a wall, a garment, a turban or some such thing, which is not ordinarily subject to abasement, then it is tabu; but if it is on a carpet which is trodden under foot, or on a cushion or some similar thing which is subject to abasement, then it is not tabu. In this respect there is no difference between something which casts a shadow and something which does not. Such, in brief, is the opinion of our rite on the question and in this respect it is supported by the majority of the 'ulamā' belonging to the Companions, their successors, and those who came after them. It is the opinion of Al-Thawrī, Mālik, Abū Ḥanīfah, and others. Some of our predecessors have said that things which cast a shadow are forbidden, but that representations (*ṣuwar*) which do not cast a shadow are all right. This, however, is an erroneous opinion, for nobody doubts that the curtain containing the image which was abominated by the Prophet was blameworthy, even though the image on it cast no shadow."

It seems clear that Al-Nawawī is much too extreme and that he followed the path of Al-Shawkānī in missing the point in interpreting and understanding these ḥadīths. We may briefly refute what Al-Nawawī says by the following:

Al-Nawawī absolutely prohibits the representation of the image of a living creature on the ground that it resembles the creation of God. But he allows the representation of images of trees and the mountains of

the earth, even though he knows that these also are part of God's creation. Indeed, when God challenged those of His servants who had gone astray, He asked them to create a grain of corn, a mote, or a grain of barley. If the motive for the tabu lay in a resemblance to the creation of God, then Al-Nawawī would have had to say that everything created by God was tabu, even trees and the mountains of the earth, since it was an image of something created by God. Furthermore, Al-ʿAynī says, in commenting on "Who is more unjust than he who creates something like my creation?" (said by the Prophet in speaking of God), that the comparison in "like my creation" is not to be understood in the general sense; it means "like my creation in making the image," and does not refer to all of God's creation.

There are two things we can conclude about Al-Nawawī, either he did not fully understand the reason for the banning of *taṣwīr* (even if such a tabu had existed) when he said that it resembled the creation of God, or he was lax and remiss when he permitted the representation of trees and other plants and the mountains of the earth. It appears that the reason for the tabu is one which was never considered by Al-Nawawī, for in any resemblance to, or imitation of, the Creator in an attempt to attain perfection or desire for completeness, there is nothing which necessarily entails unbelief or tabu.

It appears also that Al-Nawawī was neither immoderate nor lax when he held that it was permissible to represent the image of trees, etc., for these are things which it would be unreasonable to tabu, since a tabu is concerned with something which is worshipped instead of God.

1. Note by *Majallat al-Azhar*: This article contains a thorough study on the subject of whether *taṣwīr* is lawful or unlawful in Islam. Despite its strong points however, it could stand further clarification. We trust that those of our prominent ʿulamāʾ who have concerned themselves with the question of *taṣwīr* will favor us with their views on this problem. *Majallat al-Azhar*, Vol. xxii, Rajab, 1370, pp. 605-609.)

The third ḥadīth relates to the Prophet's authority that he said that "Those who will be most severely tormented on the Day of Resurrection are those who make representations (*al-muṣawwirūn*)."

Al-Ṭabarī, in his commentary on this ḥadīth, says: "The reference here is to that which one consciously worships instead of God, which makes one an unbeliever." Al-Khattābī says that "The punishment of those who make representations is great, for representations (*ṣuwar*) used to be worshipped instead of God: they are seductive to behold and some souls incline toward them."

There is then no alternative but to say that the reason for the tabuing was the resemblance to the creation of God. It is nothing more than a fear of reversion to paganism, which was not far removed in time from the Arabs.

The fourth ḥadīth reports on the authority of Abū Ṭalḥah, that the Prophet said: "The angels do not enter a house in which there is a representation (*ṣūrah*)."

Abū Ṭalḥah then says that "Zayd (from whom Abū Ṭalḥah received the ḥadīth) complained so we paid him a visit and found at his door a curtain upon which there was a representation (*ṣūrah*). So I said to 'Abdallāh Rabīb Maymūnah, the Prophet's wife, 'Did Zayd not tell us of the representation (*ṣūrah*) the other day?' 'Ubayd Allāh said: 'Did you not hear him when he said that an exception was to be made in the case of a figure (*raqm*) on a garment?'"

The comment of Al-ʿAynī on this ḥadīth is a sound and an accepted one. This is its text: "The lawgiver at first forbade all representations (*ṣurwar*), even a figure on a garment, since they (the Arabs) were still not far removed in time from the worship of representations. So he forbade them entirely, and when his prohibition had been established he permitted figures on a garment."

I believe, therefore, that if the Prophet permitted figures on a garment after the danger of deviation from the faith and relapse into ignorance and polytheism had passed, then there is no harm—it would appear—in using representations (*ṣurwar*) and statues (*tamāthīl*) as long as we adhere to the teaching of our religion and as long as there is no thought of sanctifying or worshipping them. Nevertheless, I therefore believe that the view that the making of representations (*taṣwīr*) is always tabu reflects doubt as to the sincerity of those who had embraced the faith and a feeling that it had not yet become firmly fixed in their minds, which naturally did not please the Muslims and the jurisconsults.

To complete the refutation of the statements of Al-Nawawī I shall adduce what Al-ʿAynī says in particular in commenting on the ḥadīth: "The angels do not enter a house in which there is a dog or in which there are representations." He says that by "angels" is meant the angels of revelation, such as Gabriel and Israfil, who naturally have nothing to do with the rest of humanity. Al-ʿAynī, however, in rejecting the idea that the angels refuse to enter a house in which there is a dog because of the latter's uncleanness, says that this is unacceptable since neither the pig, which is even more unclean, nor the cat, which is a still greater eater of unclean things, prevent the angels from entering a house in which they are found. I hold that it is not reasonable that the angels should enter a house in which there is a pig and not enter a house in which there is a representation (*ṣūrah*), in view of the great difference between the representation and the pig.

I consider strange the statement of Ibn Ḥibbān, quoted by Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī in his commentary on the *Ṣaḥīh* of Al-Bukhārī, that "This judgement (i.e. the refusal of the angels to enter a house in which there is a dog or a representation) was true only of the Prophet. There is nothing strange in this since the Prophet had peculiar virtues and as

a consequence had no need of a dog to guard his abode or of an image to adorn his walls. The matter then is as stated by Al-^cAyni: "the tradition refers only to the Prophet and the angels of revelation who were bringing him the messages of his Lord."

Some of the ^culamā follow Al-Nawawī in tabuing both things which cast a shadow and those which do not. In this they rely on a ḥadīth of the Prophet which was passed on by the lady ^cĀ'ishah: "The Prophet returned from a journey, and I had curtained an alcove belonging to me with a curtain of mine on which there were some images (*tamāthīl*). When the Apostle of God (may God bless him and grant him peace!) saw it he tore it down, saying: 'Those who will be most severely tormented on the Day of Resurrection are those who imitate the creation of God.' So we made a cushion or two out of it." Those who say that there was a tabu adduce as evidence also the ḥadīth: "The Prophet made an appointment with Gabriel, but the latter kept him waiting until he became angry. The Prophet then went out, found him and complained to him of the treatment he had received. So Gabriel said to him, 'We do not enter a house in which there is a representation or a dog.'" According to another version Gabriel addressed the Prophet as follows: "I came to you yesterday but was prevented from entering by some images (*tamāthīl*) at the door. (For in the house was a hanging on which there were images (*tamāthīl*), and there was a dog in the house.) So let the head of the image be cut off so that it becomes like the trunk of a tree, and let the dog get out.' So the Prophet acted accordingly."

The proof, then, adduced by those who say that things which do not cast a shadow are tabu is the Prophet's order to tear down the curtain, cut it up and make two cushions of it. However, we require those who hold this view to answer the following question: If two cushions were made from the curtain it means that the representation (*ṣūrah*) was still in the Prophet's house, as clearly stated by the version of Ibn Ḥanbal. Did the angels thereafter refuse to enter the house? Did the angels make it a condition that they would not enter a house in which there was a representation unless it were abased? And was a cushion upon which the Prophet slept to be considered as abased in the eyes of the angels and thus not hinder them from entering his house?

I believe that the answer to these questions would tend to permit the making of representations and as a result moderate the severity of the jurisconsults and the strength of their reaction when this subject is discussed.

The ḥadīth of Gabriel, however, requires careful thought and consideration, since I believe that Gabriel brought down to the Prophet the words of God and the fundamentals of legislation and religion, and that he did not descend in order to inspire him to cut up curtains and make cushions and furnishings out of old rags. We may reply to the ḥadīth of Gabriel with another ḥadīth related by Al-Bukhārī on the

authority of (Mālik ibn) Anas, who said: “Ā’ishah had a carpet which she used to curtain the side of her house. So the Prophet said to her, ‘Draw it back away from me, for its representations (*taṣāwīruhu*) keep occurring to my mind while I am praying.’”

This ḥadīth is useful to us in two respects: 1) it refutes the ḥadīth about the tearing down of the curtain which is clung to by those headed by Al-Nawawī, who say that representation was tabued; 2) the Prophet let the curtain be and did not cut it up. He merely moved it aside, despite the fact that there were representations on it, so that it would not distract him while he was praying.

Thus we see that the commentators on these ḥadīths differed in their understanding of, and comments on, them and followed varying schools of thought. However, we have found among them some, like Ibn Ḥibbān, who say that the refusal of the angels to enter a house in which there is a representation refers only to the Prophet and not to the generality of believers. We have seen also that Al-Ṭabarī says that by “makers of representations” (*muṣawwirūn*) is meant those who make representations of things which are worshipped instead of God.

It therefore appears to us that both tradition and reason show the untenable position of those who hold to the tabuing of representations, whether or not they cast a shadow, whether or not they were used for ignoble purposes, or whether or not they represent living creatures ... ²

JUDAISM AND THE MAKING OF REPRESENTATIONS (TAŞWİR)

The prohibition of the making of representations in the religion of Moses is sanctioned by the words of the Torah in Exodus 20: “Then the Lord spoke these words, saying: ‘I am the Lord, your God, who brought you out of Egypt, from the land of bondage. You shall have no other god before me. You shall not make for yourself any carved image (*timthāl*) or representation (*ṣūrah*), neither of anything that is in the heavens above nor which is in the earth below or in the water under the earth. You shall not bow down to them and you shall not worship them.’” In another part of the Book of Exodus we read that the Lord said: “You shall not make alongside me a god of silver and you shall not make for yourselves a god of gold.”

This prohibition enjoined by the Mosaic religion in the Torah in the Book of Exodus is justifiable if we try to understand it in the light of the conditions and associations which surrounded this religion at the time of its appearance. It is well known that the Egypt which the Israelites knew so well, like other neighboring pagan lands, at that time was teeming with gods that were worshipped instead of God and that numerous statues of them in human and animal form were to be found

² Three brief paragraphs, introducing the following section, are here omitted for economy of space. Editor.

everywhere. The backsliding of the Israelites and their reversion from exalted monotheism to the worship of the calf was due only to the weakness of their belief in the new religion and to the great degree to which they had been influenced by the older ideas of their forefathers.

It was necessary, then, for the Mosaic religion to have recourse to a provision prohibiting the making of representations and statues, so that the people would not be seduced by them as they were by the calf, and so that the door would not be left open for raising doubts in the minds of its adherents regarding the existence of one invisible but all-seeing God who is the Kindly and Knowing One.

Islam's forerunners were Judaism and Christianity, which had conditioned men's minds to receive a divine faith and belief in the existence of one infallible God. There is nothing which calls upon Islam's jurisconsults—contrary to the truth—to pronounce the prohibition of the making of representations out of fear of reversion to polytheism or to forbid the imitating of the creation of God.

Even if we concede that this prohibition had some justification at the time of the rise of Islam because men were still close to the age of paganism, we do not need to accept this prohibition today or continue to hold to the prohibition of the making of representations, in view of the great need in our daily and social life for representations and images. For the *Shari'ah*, we believe, is valid for every time and place.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE MAKING OF REPRESENTATIONS

When Christianity first appeared it met with various kinds of persecution from the followers of Judaism on one hand and from the pagan Roman state on the other. Christianity existed for years in an inferno of persecution, and those who believed in it saw that the Jewish Pharisees and the oppressive Roman rulers would neither forgive their attachment to the faith nor miss an opportunity to torture and put an end to them. The initial belief of the Christians, however, was stronger than the scheming of the Jews and the violence of the rulers. Their faith led them to flee with their creed to caverns, caves, and underground cells, which they turned into places of prayer and worship. They also made for themselves special symbols the meaning of which only they could understand. The fish was the symbol of Jesus Christ the Savior and "Son of God"; the dove was the symbol of the Holy Spirit, while the figure of the shepherd carrying the lost sheep on his shoulders was symbolic of the Messiah who was sent to redeem mankind.

With the advent of the 4th century A.D. Christian thought emerged from the bowels of the earth into the open, when it was recognized by the emperors as an official religion of the Roman state. Henceforth Christianity spread to every part of the mighty empire and those who were concerned with its propagation saw that the best means of fixing

and stabilizing the new religion would be to follow many of the methods and much of the organization created by the pagan empire, and in doing so they had no fear that there would be any deviation from or abandonment of the faith. The result was that the church profited greatly from this adaptation, which in no way involved any danger to it. Nevertheless, the Christian art which had grown up in the service of the Church and its objectives had naturally differentiated itself from pagan Roman art, for it was simpler and more obedient to the desires of the Christian religious leaders. We cannot, however, overlook the fact that Christian art profited from the arts which were both contemporary to it and which had preceded it.

Since Christianity from the beginning had resorted to the use of representations (*şuvar*) to spread its creed and carry it from place to place by means of symbolic pictures (*rusûm*) it preserved its belief in art and held that it was necessary in order to illustrate the creed. It used art to bring the meaning of the Gospel closer to the minds and comprehension of the people, and it illustrated the important phenomenon of Christianity and the lives of the apostles and saints with painted plaques and images. It is worth mentioning that up to the 8th century A.D. there never arose any opposition or fear of the return of paganism or of backsliding from Christianity.

Some might say, however, that the opposition to representations or fear of them appeared in the 8th century A.D., as indicated by the rise of the iconoclastic movement in the Eastern Roman Empire.

The answer to this is that this movement had no connection with the Christian churchmen; it was started and propagated by the emperor himself for political and economic reasons which at the time justified it in his eyes. This movement, however, was confined to the followers of the Eastern or Orthodox church and had no effect on other parts of the Christian world. The service of the art of representation to Christianity has left a tremendous and magnificent heritage which it is not the purpose of this article to discuss.

THE PERSIANS AND THE MAKING OF REPRESENTATIONS

The artistic past of the Persians goes back more than thirty centuries before Christ as indicated by the results of the excavations carried out by Western archaeologists in Iran. Under such circumstances it is not easy for a people to trace its artistic heritage back to such a remote past, to change its artistic nature, or to close its eyes to the magnificent things produced by the glorious days of the past which it sees before it everywhere.

The religious thought which prevailed in Iran during the historical period did not prevent the Persians from practising the arts in their various forms. Zoroastrianism commanded the people to do what was good, to follow the example of the god of good and to help him to defeat the god of evil. This means that imitating the god in deed and

action was something which was encouraged by Zoroastrianism and that following his desires and wishes was a form of perfection to be sought after. In short, Zoroastrianism had no fear of imitating the god; on the contrary, we see that it was what every good soul strove for, since the primary objective was to attain perfection, and not contention and obstinacy.

Manichaenism used the making of representations (*taṣwir*) to carry out its mission, since Mani, the founder of this faith, was himself a skilled painter (*muṣawwir*) who decorated the books which he distributed among his followers with representations (*ṣuwar*) and drawings (*rusūm*). The Persians favorably received this effort, even though not many of them accepted the religious views of Mani.

The Persians embraced Islam when it came to their country and accepted its fundamentals and regulations with their minds as well as with their hearts. It seems that they gave greatest thought to the ordinance (of Islam) and that they understood most profoundly the truth which says that "Religion is valid for all times and places." As the Arab conquest of Persia was a revolution, as far as the form of government, the ruling persons and the character of the religion were concerned, the people's belief in Islam was in response to the call of the intellect and was not by way of submission to the power of the sword or fear of the violence of the ruler. The Persians, however, preserved their ancient way of life and guarded their arts with a noble and traditional loyalty. They practiced these arts under the protection of Muslim rule with the same relish with which they had practiced them before the appearance of Islam in their midst.

At that period of Islam the Persians portrayed some of the situations in the life of the Prophet as well as events of history. They also illustrated scientific books with pictures of plants and animals, decorated furnishings and utensils, and put figures on carpets and garments. They made objets d'art of porcelain and metal in the shape of birds and human beings without its occurring to them that there was any intention of violating their religion or desire to transgress against its teachings. Indeed, the Persians acted with a deep faith that Islam did not abhor or fear representations and that these pictures (*rusūm*), regardless of the artistic heights which they reached, could not turn men's souls away from the glory and loftiness of monotheism.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE VIEW THAT THE MAKING OF REPRESENTATIONS IS PROHIBITED

It cannot be denied that Islamic art was influenced by the jurists' views that the making of representations was prohibited. Such ideas hindered the freedom of artists to make representations of human beings and animals, with the result that those which were produced were stiff, dry, and far removed from any resemblance to nature.

The artistic ability of the Muslim artist, however, was transferred to decorative motifs which were mainly of floral and geometric character. The Muslims became skilled in these types of ornament and used them to decorate mosques, palaces, garments, hangings, furnishings, manuscripts, Qurʾāns, and everything made by them which was in need of decoration. This ornament spread to all parts of the Muslim world, whence it passed to the peoples of the West, who called it "arabesque" after the Arabs who originated it.

Among the results of the abandonment of the portrayal of human and animal representations by the majority of artists because of the dictum that it was prohibited was that what the Muslims did produce along these lines was inadequate and not realistic, due to the lack of long experience and genuine study of the subject depicted.

The jurisconsults, however, who had laid down their dictum with regard to representations and the makers thereof, did not apply it to calligraphy and calligraphers. They had no incentive to do so since it was the calligraphers who inscribed the words, miracles and testimonies of God. Furthermore, God in His glorious Book had sworn by the pen and had taught by the pen, while the Apostle of God had commended writing as one of the means of making a living.

These aphorisms on the virtues of calligraphy and its practitioners gave the latter great prestige and access to kings and princes, who vied with each other in collecting scraps of their writing and who employed these calligraphers to decorate palaces, mosques, etc. with various kinds of beautiful writing. Writers applied themselves to composing their biographies and writing about their art and its outstanding practitioners such as Ibn Muqlah, Ibn al-Bawwāb, Yāqūt al-Mustaʿimī, etc. While artists' signatures are rarely found on the objets d'art and other works which have come down from them, calligraphers' signatures were appended to everything they wrote, since they knew that the Muslim community believed that they were carrying on an activity which was noble, exalted, and pleasing to God and man, in contrast to their brethren, the makers of representations.

THE MAKING OF REPRESENTATIONS BY MUSLIMS

One may ask whether the dictum that the making of representations was prohibited led to the neglect of this art by the Muslims and their complete acquiescence in the opinions of the jurisconsults. Our reply to this is taken from the facts of history and the evidence of archaeology and indicates that compliance with the opinions of the jurisconsults was perfunctory and weak.

Those who were familiar with this art practiced it without restraint or fear, since their artistic productions met with the esteem they deserved on the part of the public, particularly the rulers. Indeed, many of the Muslim caliphs and princes gathered together artisans and artists to make representations and statues with which to decorate their

palaces, gardens, and places of amusement. If we adduce here examples of the representations and statues produced by Muslim artists at various periods and in various lands we do not intend this as an indication that the making of representations was lawful or permissible; we do it to demonstrate that the belief of the Muslims in the statements of the jurisconsults that the making of representations was tabu was never wholehearted, since such statements were not supported by any divine injunction or by any reasonable proof. We shall now give examples of work done either by Muslim artists or made for their masters and princes since the dawn of Islam:

1. It appears from the figures (*rusūm*) decorating Quṣayr ʿAmrah, which is attributed to Al-Walid I (A.H. 92-96) that the Muslims had no fear of representations. This is indicated by the fact that artists had decorated this small palace, which was a kind of desert rest house belonging to the caliph and certain of his courtiers, not only with representations of dancing-girls but also of nude women.

2. The designs on the façade of the palace of Mushatta, which is variously attributed to Yazīd II and the Umayyad Al-Walid II, include representations of human beings and animals. These representations either were done in violation of religion, which we consider unlikely on the part of the early Muslim caliphs, or they were made because there was no clear injunction against them on the grounds that they were abhorrent or prohibited. We believe that if there had been any dictum about their being prohibited, the overseers of this work would have prevented the artists from portraying any living being.

3. Abū Jaʿfar al-Manṣūr set up the image of a horseman holding a lance over the dome of his new palace in his capital city of Baghdād. Was Abū Jaʿfar, then, flaunting religion or had the story of its being prohibited not yet come into existence? We believe also that if Abū Jaʿfar had known of or discovered anything indicating so he would have prevented the use of this image and would have forbidden its use to ornament his palace, particularly since we know that many prominent jurisconsults, the most prominent of them being Abū Ḥanīfah, were flourishing in his time.

4. Anyone who reviews Taymūr Pasha's book *Al-Taṣwīr ʿind al-ʿArab* (edited by Dr. Zakī Muḥammad Ḥasan) will see that Muslims used representations and images to decorate carpets, furnishings, goblets, beakers, banners, and flags and that they applied them to wood, stone, glass, weapons, ivory, bronze, porcelain, plaster, and other materials. Space does not permit us to give in detail all or part of the representations and statues made for Muslim caliphs and princes and their subjects and which they used to embellish everything they used in their daily life. We refer the reader to historical and archaeological works from which he can discover what was made for the Umayyad caliphs in their Syrian desert palaces, the objets d'art and costly things made for the ʿAbbasid caliphs, what was made for the Fātimid

caliphs by their contemporary artists such as Al-Qaṣīr, Ibn ʿAzīz, Bani al-ʿAlam, etc., and things made for the Andalusian caliphs, such as the palace of the Alhambra and the statues of birds, elephants, and lions with which the palaces of their amirs were embellished. Indeed, the reader will discover from works of history and archaeology that Muslims, over many years and in various lands, practiced that which the jurisconsults say was *tabu*. Did all the Muslims, then, transgress against the fundamentals of their religion, or did they understand from existing injunctions something different from that which was understood in later times? It seems to me that the generality of Muslims lived in isolation from the dicta and commentaries of Muslim jurisconsults, for the latter were solely concerned with verbiage, while the Muslims were obliged to act in obedience to the general law of life which sweeps aside those who do not go along with it.

SHAIKH MUḤAMMAD ʿABDUH AND THE MAKING OF REPRESENTATIONS

We shall record here the opinion of the late Shaikh Muḥammad ʿAbduh, one of the outstanding men of Islam in modern times, a religious leader of learning and rectitude, an enlightened Azharite of broad culture, and a man who will always be remembered. This opinion of his was given with reference to his visit to a museum in Sicily:

"If you are aware of the reason why your forefathers preserved poetry, set it down in anthologies and gave such an inordinate amount of attention to editing it, particularly the poetry of the pre-Islamic period; and if you understand the care taken by your ancestors in collecting and arranging it, then you can comprehend the reason why people have preserved these artifacts and portraits (and statues). For portrayal is a kind of poetry which is seen but not heard, while poetry is a kind of portrayal which is heard but not seen. These portraits and statues have preserved the various aspects of the life of individuals and of societies in many places, what can be called an anthology of societies and of the state of mankind. The preservation of these remains is truly to the benefit of knowledge, and he who does it should be thanked for his initiative. If you understand any of this it is as I wish; but if you do not comprehend then I do not have the time for more words to make you understand. Perhaps as you read these words there will occur to you the question: "What is the judgment of Islamic law on these representations (*ṣuwar*) if they were intended, as has been said, to represent the human form in various emotional states and bodily positions? Is this *tabu*, permissible, disapproved, deplored, or enjoined?" I reply to you that portrayal (*rasm*) has already been practiced and that there is no disputing its usefulness. Any significance of worship or of veneration of statues or representations has disappeared from men's minds."

In this article, in which Muḥammad ʿAbduh declared his opinion on the subject of the making of representations, he likewise adduced some of the injunctions which exist on the subject of their being prohibited. He went on to explain and comment on the ḥadīth: "Those who will be most severely tormented on the Day of Judgment are the makers of representations," regarding which he said:

"This ḥadīth originated in the days when paganism was still alive. At that time representations were used for two purposes: 1) pleasure and 2) to gain the blessing of virtuous persons such as those who were portrayed by the repre-

sentations. The first is hateful to our religion and the second is one of those things which Islam arose to do away with. In both cases the maker of representations was concerned with something other than God or was paving the way for polytheism. When these two obstacles have been eliminated and utility becomes the objective, then the representation of persons assumes the same status as the representation of plants and trees. You cannot adduce the verdict that a representation, under all circumstances, is liable to be worshipped; for I think that one could say to you that your tongue also is liable to tell lies, but is it necessary to tie it up even though it may tell the truth as well as falsehood? I am convinced, in short, that Islamic law would never prohibit one of the most useful means to knowledge if it were certain that it contained no danger to religion, faith, or action."

This is the opinion of our master and leader, which is a clear understanding of the meaning of faith and a powerful perception of the demands of circumstances; this is also the opinion which was held by enlightened Muslim predecessors of his. There is no doubt that our worthy forerunner cannot be accused of taking the precepts of his religion lightly or of trifling with the doctrine of Islam when he refers to the making of representations and statues to adorn everything created by the hand of man. The illustrated Arabic manuscripts which abound in the world's libraries are still another indication, in addition to those we already have mentioned, that Muslims practiced this art without restraint or fear, that it did not enter their minds that they were imitating the creation of God out of perversity or self pride, or that with their hands they were making representations or statues to be worshipped in the place of God. They designed what they did since they knew that the Islamic state was seeking support from the field of art and craftsmanship to strengthen the foundations of its culture; so they raised up buildings, created objets d'art, and decorated books all in the service of the faith. Of what their hands created there has survived a great cultural inheritance which has become inseparable from the Islamic faith, and each has helped the other to broaden and expand. Is it right then, for any one of us now to question something the value of which has been established for centuries past and which has not manifested the least threat to the faith?

I believe that the Muslims of the past had a broader understanding of the meaning of Islam than did those who came after them and that their practical understanding of the logic of life was the secret of their success and ascendancy.

THE VIEWS OF THE TRADITIONISTS ON THE PROHIBITING OF REPRESENTATIONS

It was thus the opinion of Shaikh Muḥammad ʿAbduh that Islamic law has no objection to permitting the making of representations. The Al-Azhar Committee on Fatwas, however, which represents the views of those who concern themselves with the ḥadīth, has published in this journal (of Al-Azhar) views of the important ʿulamāʾ which on the whole are no different from those held by Al-Nawawī, Al-Shawkānī and other ʿulamāʾ of past centuries. They have taken no

account of the change of circumstances, conditions, times and place and have made no independent comparative study of the primary sources on the subject.

The Committee in its fatwas has not progressed beyond the view that the making of representations is absolutely prohibited, as held by its predecessors, even though some of the 'ulamā' have held that "photographic representations for use" are permitted. The significance of the reliance of these fatwas on repeating the opinions of practitioners of jurisprudence and ḥadīth as recorded in the works of old authors is that we still need a fatwa which in its essence relies on reason and not on tradition. This is especially so since the ḥadīths which we have on the making of representations contain many contradictions and differences which cause some people to hesitate to regard them as being explicit on the subject of the tabuing of representations.

People's minds are occupied with the seemingly complex question: "What is the position of the Muslim who wishes to feel assured of the precept of God on the problem of the making of representations? Shall he believe the opinion of the leader Shaikh Muḥammad 'Abduh, outstanding as he is in the world of Islamic legislation and fatwas, or shall he accept the views of the Committee?" In truth one can be perplexed over which of the two views he should choose.

There is no doubt that one can be satisfied with the stand taken by Muḥammad 'Abduh, for he did not conclude that the making of representations was permitted until he had studied, pondered, observed, and taken careful consideration. Those who are on a level similar to his in learning, status, and attachment to Al-Azhar are not unaware that he issued his fatwa on the basis of a firm faith that Islam was a deeply-rooted creed which could not be shaken by a representation or demolished by a statue.

I draw attention to an opinion on the problem which is published here for the first time and which was brought to my attention by my friend Fu'ād al-Sayyid of the Egyptian Library. This text is found in the second part of a manuscript of the *Kitāb al-Hujjah lil-Qurrā'* of Abū 'Alī ibn Aḥmad ibn 'Abd al-Ghaffār al-Fārisī, the grammarian, who died in A.H. 377.

The author says, à propos of the Quranic verse: "The people of Moses, after he was gone, made for themselves of their ornaments a corporeal calf which lowed" that the implication of this is that they took it as a god into themselves....³ However, he who cast the calf made it of wood, or fashioned it by whatever other means, does not deserve the anger of God or the threats of the Muslims ... If some people say that there are ḥadīths which say that "The makers of representations will be tormented on the Day of Judgment" and that "It will

³ Translator's note: A section of this discussion which is purely grammatical in character has been omitted from the translation since it is irrelevant to the main theme of this article.

be said of them, 'Give life to that which you have created,' " the reply can be made that those makers of representations who will be tormented are those who make corporeal representations of God. As for the others, they are attributed to sources which have transmitted only one ḥadīth and they are not authoritative."

This is an opinion on the subject by a learned man of the 4th century A.H. It is a sound one, for a prohibition against the corporeal representation of God is something which is acceptable to reason out of a desire to prevent God's sublime nature from being misrepresented by man. But there can be no rational acceptance of the dictum that there is a prohibition on making a representation of God's creation as an imitation and likeness of its perfect workmanship and beautiful mastery.

ISLAM AND THE FINE ARTS

No one doubts that poetry, singing, music, and the making of representations all belong to the fine arts. No one can deny that poetry, singing, and music flourished in the paeans of caliphs and sultans, while the practitioners of these arts attained much wealth and glory and enjoyed a great measure of honor and esteem among all classes. We all know that the Prophet made a companion of Ḥassān ibn Thābit, thus honoring poetry in his person, and that he turned to him to reply to the poets of the unbelievers. Indeed, the Prophet forgave Ka'b ibn Zuhayr, accepted his repentance, and in the mosque listened to his poetry which he enjoyed and admired. He also bestowed a robe of honor upon him. Likewise, the caliphs and princes after the Apostle used to reward poets according to their excellence and artistry. We have never heard that any of the jurisconsults ever became aroused against a poet, even though we know that the Qur'ān makes some oblique references to them, or against any particular type of poetry, despite the fact that in the categories of poetry dealing with satire, love, and wine there is more incitement to buffoonery and immorality than there is in a representation or a statue.

Islam, then, welcomed poetry and all it contained and did not sentence singers and musicians to hellfire and severe torment. The Prophet did not show his displeasure at a group he passed while they were dancing, but said to them: "Dance well, O Banū Arfidah, so that the Jews and Christians may know that there is latitude in our religion!" If all this was embraced by Islam and the Muslims, does the welcome wear thin when the making of representations wishes to join them and under Islam's protection serve and not compete with Islam?

I do not believe that Islam and the Muslims who protected the fine arts are unable to protect the making of representations also. I believe, too, that the danger of permitting representations and statues which was feared by the early Muslims has now disappeared from men's minds, as Muḥammad 'Abduh says.

CONCLUSION

Anyone who reviews the Quranic verses referring to idols and their worship will find that the prohibition is directed against worshipping idols and taking them as gods in the place of God. This is manifest in God's words: "And Abraham said to his father Āzat, 'Do you take for yourself idols as gods?'" and in His words in speaking of Abraham: "O my father, why do you worship that which cannot hear or see and which avails you nothing?" For Abraham was enjoining people to use their intelligence and was blaming them for the way in/which their minds had become depraved, which led them to venerate stones which could neither profit nor injure them and which could give them nothing of the truth. Statues themselves were not a factor in corrupting faith; the corruption and weakness of the mind was what turned these statues into idols which were worshipped in place of God.

Solomon, too, was a prophet and apostle who was sent with the creed that there was one God; he called men to it and reproved the sun-worshippers for their actions. Nevertheless, the *jinn* used to make statues for him, a divine favor for which he was required to thank God. It is not reported or related of Solomon that he thought these statues would be a cause of corrupting the faith and turning men from the veneration of God and the acknowledgement of His oneness. The corruption of the faith, then, was not the result of setting up statues or making representations but resulted solely from a corruption of the mind which caused the latter to imagine that divinity resided in tangible sources of good. Hence the sun was worshipped because it sent down light, the moon because it illuminated the night, water because it was the source of life, fire because it gave forth heat, etc.

The intelligence of man continued to deteriorate to the point where people worshipped idols in the erroneous belief that divine power resided in them and that if they flattered them they would bring the worshipper nearer to God. When God sent Muḥammad it became the latter's duty to put an end to idols and everything relating to them. This was not because they were representations and statues, but because they were an indication of the decline of the human mentality. He therefore anathematized many forms of worship since the worship of hard stones, planets, or an intercessory angel are equally manifestations of a decadent mentality.

The Prophet continued to combat this trend so as to restore men's minds to their natural character and rectify that which had become corrupted. Therefore, when he perceived that there was a tendency in the right direction he would relax some of the restrictions which he had placed on the making of representations and on statues; he permitted delineations on garments, along with children's playthings. Who knows but that if the problem of the making of representations had not been connected with the idols of the Ka'bah and the quarrel

between the Muslims and the polytheists which arose over them, the Prophet might have given his explicit consent to the making of representations and statues, which in his law would have occupied a position like that which they have in the law of Solomon. Furthermore, is it not accepted among the jurisconsults that many injunctions were designed for special circumstances and conditions and is it not therefore necessary to deal with the problem of the making of representations in the light of new considerations of time and place which differ from those prevailing in the past?

In view of all this, therefore, I have no doubt that representations and statues in themselves have nothing to do with the question of whether they are lawful or unlawful as debated by some jurisconsults. They represent one of the crafts which elevate the mind, an art which develops thought, and a need which men cannot dispense with in this day and age. No one should say that Islam opposes that which elevates the mind and develops thought, or that it desires to lead men away from the march of culture and civilization.

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AḤMAD MUḤAMMAD ʿĪSĀ
Translated by HAROLD W. GLIDDEN

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PILGRIMAGE PRAYERS

INTRODUCTION

Below is a complete translation of the devotions and rubrics in a small pilgrim's manual, with the title: *Manāsik al Hajj wa Adʿiyyat-al-Ṭawāf ʿalā-l-Madhāhib al-Arbaʿah*, printed in Cairo in 1357 A.H. or 1938 A.D. No attempt is made here to annotate the text, to indicate Quranic references in the prayers or to discuss the various rites of the pilgrimage. A useful brief discussion of the latter can be found in G. E. von Grünebaum: *Muhammadian Festivals*, New York, 1951, Chapter 11—'Pilgrimage' pp. 15-49. Fuller accounts may be consulted, for example, in R. F. Burton: *Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah*, 2 Vols. 1893 and C. Snouck Hurgronje: *Mekka in the latter part of the 19th century*, London, 1931.

The manual, after the Prayer at ʿArafah, turns, without special remark, to prayers of commemoration for use when visiting tombs and other sacred sites in the Meccan region. Al-Maʿlā referred to here as a place of visit on a Friday, is sometimes known as Jannat al-Maʿlā. It is the sacred cemetery of Mecca close to the city's western hills. Among the tombs it contains are those of the son of Abū Bakr, the first Caliph; Khadijah, the Prophet's wife and Āminah, the Prophet's mother. Between the cemetery and the city is the Mosque of the Jinn, on the traditional site of some of the Prophet's meetings with the Archangel Gabriel during the period of the descent of the Meccan parts of the Qurʾān. The Mount of Abū Qubais is a hill on the eastern side of Mecca, on the lower slopes of which the suburbs themselves extend. It commands an excellent view of the Great Mosque and the Kaʿba and is traditionally the burial place of Adam, Eve and Seth. Dār al-Khai-zarān is the place where the Prophet customarily prayed in secret prior to the conversion of ʿUmar, when the early Muslim worship became open. It is one of the sites at which Maulid celebrations are held. The mountain referred to here as Jabal al-Thaur (in some texts Jabal Saur) possesses the cave in which Muḥammad and Abū Bakr sheltered during the Hijra to Medina. Mashaqq al-Qamr, or "splitting of the moon," refers to the legend according to which Muḥammad, in an effort to convince the Quraish, divided the moon causing half of it to rise eastward behind Abū Qubais and the other westward over the hills beyond the Maʿlā burial area.

Except in the final memorial prayers, where the identical sentence is used in every case, the full text has been rendered, the repetitions and refrains being an important part of the pattern and feeling of the whole. It is hoped that the publication of this essay in translation may give readers at least some access into the inward Muslim meaning of the pilgrimage as it is mirrored in the aspirations of the pilgrim.

It may be unnecessary to add that the prayers here found are not the Ṣalāt, or ritual prayer, the content and phrases of which are wellknown. The word here rendered prayer, Du‘ā’, connotes the prayer of petition and intercession.

TRANSLATION

Prayers required of the pilgrim when he beholds the buildings at Mecca. Let him say: In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful. O God, let this become to me an abode and grant me herein a valid profit. *At the time of petitionary prayer he does not raise his hands.*

This is the prayer on entering into Holy Mecca: O God, this sanctuary is thine, the country is thine, the safe-keeping is thine and the worshipper is thine. I have come unto thee from a distant country, with many transgressions and evil deeds. I beseech thee, as one who is in deep need of thee, seeking the merciful relenting of thy punishment, to receive me in thy pure pardon and to bring me into thy spacious paradise, that gracious abode. O God, this is thy sanctuary and the sanctuary of thy Apostle. So keep me, flesh and blood and bone, inviolate from the fire. O God, preserve me from thy condemnation, in the day when thou dost raise up thy servants. I beseech thee, for thou art God, there is none other save thou, the Beneficent, the Merciful: blessing and peace be upon our Lord Muḥammad, upon his household and upon his companions. Let it be a great eternal peace.

This prayer shall be recited at the entering of the gate of peace. (Bāb al-Salām). O God, thou art peace. Peace comes from thee. Unto thee peace returns. Then make us alive, O our Lord, with peace. Bring us into paradise, thy abode, the abode of peace. Blessed art thou, O Lord and exalted, thou fount of majesty and honor. O God, open unto me the doors of thy mercy and forgiveness. Bring me into them. In the Name of God unto whom be praise and blessing, and peace upon the Apostle of God, with whom may God be gracious.

Upon beholding the noble sanctuary, let him bless God thrice and recite the Takbir (the ascription: God is most great), thrice and say: There is no god save God alone. He has no like and unto him is the power and unto him the praise. He is mighty over all things. I take refuge with the Lord of the house from unbelief and poverty, from the torment of the grave and from a narrow heart and an anguished bosom. May the blessing of God be upon our Lord Muḥammad, upon his people and his companions. Peace upon them all.

O God, let this house increase in honor, reverence, grandeur, awe, exaltedness and righteousness. Increase O Lord those who do it honor, who magnify and esteem it among those who have made pilgrimage hither and who resort hither in veneration, honor, worship, in awe, dignity and righteousness.

On coming to the gate of Banū Shaiba, let him say: O Lord, cause me to enter in with truth and to go forth with truth. Grant me power from thy presence to aid me. And say: The truth has come, falsehood has passed away. Verily falsehood is a thing that goeth away. We bring down of the Qurʾān that which is a healing and a mercy to the believers. It does not increase the wrongdoers save in loss.

This is the confession of intention to circumambulate the Kaʿba:

O God, I desire the circumambulation of thy holy house: enable me thereto and accept of me seven circuits, the circuits of the pilgrimage, of the holy visit, seeing it is performed unto God, the Exalted, to him be power and majesty.

Then he kisses the Black Stone and raises his hands, saying: In the Name of God; God is most great: unto God be praise.

Prayer of the first Circuit.

Praise be to God, glory to God. There is no god save God. God is most great. There is no might and no strength save in God most high, the great. Blessing and peace be upon the Apostle of God, may God send blessing and peace upon him. O God, I come unto thee out of faith in thee and belief in thy words, in reliance upon thy covenant and in obedience to thy law, the sunna of thy Prophet and thy beloved, Muḥammad, may peace and blessing be upon him. O God, I ask thee for pardon and favor and constant clemency in the things of religion, in this world and in the next, safety in paradise and escape from the fire.

And he says in every circuit: O our Lord, bring us good things in this world and in that which is to be. Keep us from the torment of the fire. Bring us into paradise with the righteous, O thou Mighty, thou Forgiver, thou Lord of the worlds.

Prayer of the Second Circuit.

O God, truly this house is thy house, the sanctuary is thy sanctuary, the security is thine. The servant is thy servant. I am thy servant and the son of thy servant. This is the doing of one seeking refuge with thee from the fire. Then make our flesh and our frame inviolate from the fire. O God, cause us to love faith and adorn it in our hearts. Cause us to detest unbelief, transgression and disobedience. Make us to be among the rightful. O God, defend us from thy punishment on the day when thou raisest thy servants. O God, cause me to inherit paradise without a reckoning.

Prayer of the Third Circuit.

O God, I take refuge with thee from doubt, from *shirk* (polytheism), separatism and hypocrisy, from evil character and evil outlook, from calamity of substance or kindred or child. O God, I ask thee thy favor and paradise. And I seek refuge with thee from thy wrath and the fire.

O God, I take refuge with thee from the terror of the grave and I take refuge with thee from danger in living and danger in dying.

Prayer of the Fourth Circuit.

O God, cause it to be a righteous pilgrimage and a grateful striving. Let guilt be forgiven. Let this be a righteous and accepted deed, a transaction that is never voided, O thou who knowest what is in the heart. Lead me forth, O God, from the shadows into the light. O God, I ask of thee the things that properly belong to thy mercy and the surenesses of thy forgiveness, security from all iniquity and a full share (booty) of righteousness, safety in the garden and escape from the fire. Lord, make me assured with that wherewith thou hast endowed me and bless me in thy gifts. Cause everything of which I am repentant to be retrieved by good from thee.

Prayer of the Fifth Circuit.

O God, shelter me under the shadow of thy throne on that day when there is no shelter save the shadow of thy throne, and nought abides save thy countenance. Give me water from the reservoir of thy Prophet, our Lord Muḥammad—may the blessing and peace of God be upon him—a joyous, health-giving draught, after which we shall never thirst again. O God, I ask of thee the good which thy Prophet our lord Muḥammad asked of thee—may the blessing and peace of God be upon him. I take refuge with thee from the evil from which he sought refuge with thee, he, thy Prophet our lord Muḥammad. O God, I ask of thee paradise and its favor and whatever will bring me nigh unto it—of word or deed or work. I take refuge with thee from the fire and from whatever, in word or deed or work, would bring me nigh to it.

Prayer of the Sixth Circuit.

O God, thou hast much against me in respect of my relation with thee and with thy creation. O God forgive me what is due unto thee and unto thy creation and take it off from me. By thy gracious glory make me well-satisfied without what thou hast disallowed. By obedience unto thee keep me from rebelliousness against thee and by thy goodness keep me from any save thee, O thou who art of wide forgiveness. O God, verily thy house is great and thy countenance is gracious. Thou, O God, art forbearing, gracious and great. Thou lovest to pardon: therefore, pardon me.

Prayer of the Seventh Circuit.

O God, I ask of thee a perfect faith and a true assurance, an ample income and a lowly heart, a remembering tongue and a good record in the things that are allowed, a true repentance, repentance before death, rest at death, forgiveness and mercy after death, pardon at the accounting, well-being in the garden and escape from the fire, by thy mercy O thou Mighty One, thou Forgiver. Lord, let me increase in knowledge and join me unto the godly.

*Prayer of the Multazam*¹

O God, Lord of the ancient house, set free our persons and the persons of our fathers, our mothers, our brethren and our children from the fire, O thou of all goodness and grace, kindliness, favor, bounty and beneficence. Let the issue in all things be good for us: protect us from shame in this world and punishment in the next. O God truly I am thy servant, the son of thy servant, standing beneath thy portal leaning hard upon thy favor, and humbled within thy hand. I crave thy mercy and dread thy fearful punishment, O thou of age-old goodness. O God I pray thee to lift up my remembrance of thee and to lay aside my fault, to prosper my affair, to cleanse my heart, to shine upon me in my tomb and to pardon my transgression. I ask of thee the high places of the garden.

The Prayer of the 'Standing' of Abraham, upon whom be peace.

O God, thou knowest my secret things and my open things. Receive, then, my petition. Thou knowest my need: grant me, then, that which I ask: thou knowest what is in my soul: forgive me my transgressions. O God, I ask of thee a faith to occupy my heart and a true assurance whereby I may know that nothing befalls me save what thou hast written. (And I ask) from thee satisfaction with what thou hast apportioned unto me. Thou art my protector in this world and the next. Let me die a Muslim and join me unto the godly. O God, do not allow any sin in this our standing which thou hast not forgiven, and nothing grievous which thou dost not relieve, nor any need thou hast not satisfied and turned to ease. Make our affairs prosperous and set our hearts at rest: illumine our souls and seal our doings with good things. O God, let us die as Muslims. Cause us to live as Muslims and join us unto the righteous, who are unashamed and not rebellious.

The Prayer of the Stone of Ismā'il, upon whom be peace.

O God, thou art my Lord. There is no god save thou. Thou hast fashioned me and I am thy servant. As far as I am able I rely upon thy covenant and thy promise. I seek refuge with thee from the evil of what I have done. I return unto thee by thy grace toward me and I return because of my sin. Therefore, forgive me. For there is none that forgivest sins save thou only. O God I ask of thee the good which thy righteous servants have asked of thee and I seek refuge with thee from the same evil from which thy righteous servants have sought refuge with thee. O God, by the dignity of thy chosen Prophet, thy blessed Apostle, cleanse our hearts from every characteristic which would separate us from the vision of thee and from the love of thee.

¹ The place where pilgrims press their breasts, with arms outstretched, against the wall of the Ka'ba, near the eastern corner and the door. *Baraka*, or blessing, is sought through this physical contact with the holy building. The prayer refers to this 'pressure' in one of its petitions.

Let us die in loyalty to the Sunna and the community and in longing to find thee, O thou Lord of majesty and honor. O God enlighten my heart with knowledge and employ my body in thy obedience. Save my secret thoughts from rebellion and my mind occupy with reverence. Protect me from evil and from the whisperings of Satan and save me from him, O thou most merciful, so that he may have no power over me. Our Lord, verily we have believed, so forgive us our trespasses and guard us from the torment of the fire.

Prayer to be recited at drinking the water of Zamzam.

O God, I ask of thee profitable knowledge and a plentiful weal, and healing from every disease and sickness, through thy mercy, O thou supreme among the merciful.

Prayer of Al-Şafā.

I begin as God and his Apostle began. Verily Al-Şafā and Al-Marwah are rites of God. He who makes a pilgrimage to the house, or performs the lesser pilgrimage (Al-ʿUmrah) it is no fault in him that he makes the circuit of them. He who volunteers a good thing, God is a receiver of thanks and he knows.

The Intention of the Running (Al-Saʿy).

O God, I desire to run between Al-Şafā and Al-Marwah, seven circuits (either the Ḥajj or the ʿUmrah) unto God, mighty and glorious, O thou Lord of the words. *Then he mounts the steps of Al-Şafā and says:* God is most great: God is most great: God is most great. Unto God be praise.

The Prayer of the Running.

God most great, God most great. Praise be to God indeed. Praised be God the mighty, in his excellent glory morning and evening. By night worship him and in the long night praise him. There is no god save God alone. He fulfils his promise and aids his servant. Alone he puts to flight the confederacies. There is nothing before him, nor anything after him. He brings to life and he brings to death. He lives for ever and dies not. Nor does he ever pass away. Good is in his hand; destiny is with him. He is mighty over all things. Lord, forgive and have mercy. Pardon and be gracious.

Do not require what thou knowest of, for thou knowest what we know not. Thou art God, most mighty, most gracious. O Lord, save us from the fire, as those who being preserved take the spoil and rejoice in gladness with thy righteous servants, with those upon whom God has been gracious of faithful prophets, martyrs and good men. Good companions indeed are these and that by the favor of God. God knoweth well. There is no god save God. In truth, in truth, no god save God for worship and for glory. There is no god save God and we worship none save him, being sincere unto him in our religion, despite the hatred of the unbelievers. There is no god except God, the One,

the Sole, the Eternal. He takes unto himself no companion and no child. There is no partner like him in authority, nor does he, out of weakness, need any patron. Then call him great in the Takbîr.

O God, verily thou hast said in thy descended book: 'Call unto me and I will answer you.' We have called unto thee our Lord. So forgive unto us as thou hast commanded us, for thou dost not break a promise. Our Lord, verily we have heard the caller calling us to faith: Believe in your Lord, And O Lord we have believed. Then forgive us our trespasses and rid us of our iniquities. Let us be called hence with the righteous. O our Lord bring us what thou hast promised by thy messenger. Let us not be confounded on the day of resurrection. Verily thou dost not break promise. O our Lord, in thee have we trusted. Unto thee have we returned. For unto thee is the ordering. O Lord, forgive us and our brethren who have preceded us in the faith. Let there be in our hearts no rancour towards those who have believed. For thou art kindly and merciful. O Lord, make our light complete. Forgive us, thou art powerful over all things.

O God I seek of thee the whole good, present good and future good. I seek refuge with thee from evil in its entirety, both present and to be. I crave of thee pardon for my guilt and ask of thee thy mercy. O God, O Lord, increase me in knowledge and lead not my heart astray any more, for thou hast mercifully granted me favor before thee. Verily thou art the Bestower. O God, I take refuge with thee from the torment of the grave. There is no god save thou. Praise be unto thee. Indeed I was among the wrongdoers. O God, I take refuge with thee from unbelief and poverty. O God, I take refuge with thy good pleasure from thine anger, and with thy pardoning grace from thy retribution. I take refuge with thee from thee. I will not withhold the praise of thee. Thou art as thine own praise sayeth. Glory then be unto thee until thou art wellpleased. O God, I ask the good which thou knowest and I take refuge with thee from the evil thou knowest. I pray forgiveness of thee for everything known to thee. Thou verily knowest the hidden things. There is no god except God, the King, the Truth, the Enlightener. Muḥammad is the messenger of God; the trustworthy, the faithful promise.

O God, I ask of thee that as thou hast given to me Islam so thou wilt not take it from me until thou dost call me hence as a Muslim. O God, let there be light in my grave and light in my hearing and light in my seeing. O God, enlarge my heart and facilitate for me what concerns me. I take refuge with thee from the evil of the whispers of my bosom and from distraction and from the ambush of the grave.

O God, I take refuge with thee from the evil that comes in the night and the evil that comes in the day, from the evil the winds blow upon (me). O thou most merciful of all, praise be to thee. We have not truly worshipped thee, O God. Praise be to thee. We have not recollected thee with a true recollection. Praise be to thee. We have not thanked

thee with a right thanksgiving, O God. Praise be to thee. We have not sought thee with true purpose, O God. O God make faith a thing we love and adorn it in our hearts. Let us truly hate unbelief and corruption and rebelliousness. Make us rightly guided. O God, guard me from thy punishment on the day thou raisest up thy servants. O God, guide me with guidance and cleanse me with piety. Forgive me the last and the first. O God, stretch forth upon us thy blessings and mercy, thy goodness and thy bounty: O God, I ask thee, the gracious One, the Establisher who never changes and never passes away. O God, I am refuging in thee from the evil thou sendest us and from the evil thou prohibitest to us. O God, call us hence as Muslims and join us to the good, neither shamed nor afflicted. O Lord, let things be easy not arduous. Fulfill what is good, O Lord. Verily Al-Şafâ and Al-Marwah are rites of God. He who performs the pilgrimage or the 'Umrah, there is no fault in him that he makes the circuit of them. He who volunteers a good deed, God is the receiver of thanks and he knows. O Lord, accept of us: preserve us and pardon us. Help us in our obedience unto thee and our gratitude towards thee. Let us all die in the faith, in complete Islam, thou being with us well-pleased. O God, have mercy upon me that I may evermore forsake misdeeds, as long as thou causest me to live. Have mercy upon me that I may expend wealth that belongs to me and of thy bounty grant me right insight into what on my part will please thee, O thou most merciful.

The Intention of the 'Umrah. (The Lesser Pilgrimage).

O God, I wish to perform the Umrah; so facilitate it unto me and receive it from me. I have intended the Umrah and I have become consecrated for it unto God, most high, to him be majesty and strength.

The Intention of the Pilgrimage.

O God, I wish to perform the pilgrimage, so make it a ready thing unto me and accept it from me. I have intended the pilgrimage. I have consecrated myself for it unto the Most High, unto him be strength and majesty. Here I am before thee O Lord, here before thee. Before thee who hast no partner unto thee. Here at thy service. Praise and grace are thine and power. There is no partner with thee. O God, I consecrate unto thee my hair, my manhood, my body and all my members. I withhold them from enjoyment, from women, from everything which thou hast made unlawful to whoever enters the sacred state. Thereby I seek thy gracious countenance, O thou Lord of the worlds.

The Prayer of the Farewell Circuit.

Verily he who enjoined upon thee the Qur'ân is he who bringeth thee back to a place of returning. O thou Bringer back (of men) cause me to return. O thou Hearer, hear me. O thou all powerful restore me. O thou who hidest (men), hide me. O thou merciful One, have mercy

upon me. O thou Bringer back let me return unto this house of thine. Be bountiful unto me in the returning unto it multiplied times thereafter, repentant, worshipping, wayfaring towards our Lord with praise. God fulfills his promise and prospers his servant and alone confounds the confederates. O God, write down for us peace and pardon and wealth and also for thy pilgrim servants, the guests, the victors, the travellers and all, who dwell in thy land and sea, of the nation of Muḥammad.

O God, preserve me on my right hand and on my left, from before and behind, from above and below, that thou mayest bring me unto my people and my country. When thou hast brought me unto my country and my people, I ask thee not to abandon me from thy mercy, not even for the twinkling of an eye, and there is nothing less than that.

O God, be a companion unto us in our journey and a 'Caliph' among our people. Blot out the faces of our enemies. Enfeeble their condition and they will be unable to pass and come upon us. O God, let it not be the last time for this house of thine. O God, have mercy upon me through my forsaking evil-doing as long as thou preservest me alive. Have mercy upon me that I may expend wealth that belongs to me and bestow on me a good insight into what is pleasing unto thee in me. O God, let me long enjoy my sight and let it last all my days.

Let me see my revenge upon mine enemy. Make me victorious over those who wrong me. O God, I seek refuge with thee from grief and sorrow: I seek refuge with thee from feebleness and sloth: I seek refuge with thee from faintheartedness and avarice. I seek refuge with thee from being overwhelmed with debt and from the spite of men.

O God, we ask of thee, in this our journey, righteousness and devotion and deeds that will please thee. O God make this our journey easy and shorten for us its distance. O God, thou art the companion of the way and the 'Caliph' among our people.

O God, I seek refuge with thee from the hardship of the journey from distress of prospect, from the evil of catastrophe to property or family or child. O God, accompany us with thy counsel and take us in safe conduct. O God, shorten before us the land and make the way easy for us and easy the tedium (or depression) of the return journey. O God, cause us to reach our journey's end by thy goodness and protection and by thy favor. For good is in thy hand and thou art mighty over all things. O God, make our journey easy for us and shorten the land for us. O God, accompany us in our journey and be in our stead among our people. O God, protect me from between my two hands, from behind me, on my right and on my left and above me. I seek refuge with thy greatness that I be not treacherously dealt with from below, O thou most merciful of all, thou Lord of the worlds.

The Prayer at 'Arafah'. (The place of the 'Standing' east of Mecca.)

Here I am before thee, O God, at thy service, doubly at thy service

and at thy pleasure. Good is in thy hands, is from thee and is thine. I have walked before thee according to all that I have said in word, or sworn in an oath, or vowed in a vow. What thou hast willed came to be: what thou willedst not will not be. There is neither strength nor power save in thee. Thou art almighty, O God. Whatever blessing I have called down it has been upon him whom thou blessest. Whatever curse I have cursed with it has been upon him whom thou cursest. Thou art my protector in this world and the next. Let me die as a Muslim and join me to the good.

The Friday Prayer and the Visit to Al-Maʿlā and the lady Khadijah, the lady ʿAminah and all the memorial places and visits.

Let him say: Peace be upon you, O people. There is no god save God: people of the house of a believing folk. You are those who have gone before: and we if God wills, are joined with you. Rejoice in that the hour of which there is no doubt is coming and that God doth bring back from the tombs. I confide with you the testimony that there is no god except God and that Muḥammad is his servant and his Apostle. (Then the Surat al-Fātiḥah.)

Prayer to be said at every saint's shrine if a visit is desired.

Peace be upon you, O friend of God. Peace upon you and the mercy of God and his blessings. We have come unto you as visitors and stand upon your place of life. Do not send us back disappointed. I entrust with you the testimony that there is no god except God and that Muḥammad is his servant and his Apostle. (The Fātiḥah.)

Prayer (to be said at the grave of) ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Abū Bakr the faithful.

Peace be upon you my lord ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, son of Abū Bakr the faithful. Peace be upon you, O son of the faithful (friend) of the Apostle of God. May God most high be pleased with you and make you glad with the best gladness. May he make the garden your abode and resting place. I entrust in you... (as above.)

Prayer to be said at the visit of the lady Khadijah the great.

Peace be upon you, lady Khadijah. Peace be upon you, wife of the blessed one. May God most high be pleased with you and make you glad with the best of gladness. And may he make the garden your abode and your resting place. I entrust in you... (as above.)

(Identical words are used for ʿAminah, substituting the title 'mother of the chosen.)

Prayer at the Mosque of the Jinn.

He shall say after two rakāʿ: O God, thou seest me and seest where I am. Nothing that concerns me is hidden from thee. I am the poor, unworthy servant who confesses and acknowledges evil and shortcoming. O God, I have entrusted in this honored place from this our

day to the day of resurrection, a pure and sincere friend. I confess that there is no god save God and that Muḥammad is his servant and his Apostle.

Saturday: Visit to the Mount of Abū Qubais.

Prayer of Dār al Khaizarān.

O God, I ask of thee a perfect faith, gladdening my heart, and a sincere assurance so that I may know that nought shall happen to me except what thou hast written for me. Thou art my protector in this world and the next. O God, I entrust in this honored place ... (as in the previous prayer.)

Prayer at the Memorial of our lord Bilāl.

O God, protect me from Satan, so that he may have no power over me. O God, I have entrusted etc.... (as in two previous prayers.)

Prayer of the Birth Celebration (Maulid) of the Prophet: may the peace and blessing of God be upon him.

O God, by the honor of thy chosen Prophet and thy blessed Apostle, the trustee of thy heavenly revelation, cleanse our hearts from every feature that would remove us far from the vision of thee and the love of thee. Let us die, O God, in loyalty to the Sunna and the community and in desire for meeting thee, O thou Lord of majesty and honor. O God, I have entrusted etc. (as in the three previous prayers).

Prayer at the Birth Celebration of our Lady Fāṭimah, may God be pleased with her.

O God, I ask thee by that fair one who is a part (of Muhammad) and her children, Al-Ḥasan and Al-Ḥusain, make our affairs easy: enlarge our bosoms and seal our deeds, O God, with good things. O God, I have entrusted etc. (as in the four previous prayers).

Prayer at the Memorial Place of Abū Bakr the faithful, may God be pleased with him. O God write for me thy servant a release from the fire and a reprieve from the fire, security from punishment and transit on the straight path, a portion in the garden and a blessed end. Call me hence as a Muslim, a believer and join me to the righteous. O God, I have entrusted etc.... (as in the five previous prayers.)

Prayer of the Memorial of Jabal al-Thaur.

O God, by the honor of Muḥammad and his intimate and friend, make our affairs easy, enlarge our bosoms and enlighten our hearts. Seal our deeds with good things. O God, thou knowest my secret and my open things. Receive my plea. Thou knowest my need. Thou knowest what is in my soul. Forgive me my sins. None forgiveth sins save thou. O God, I have entrusted etc.... (as in the six previous prayers.)

Prayer of the Memorial of Mashaqq al-Qamr.

O God, send thy blessing upon a Prophet who has repeated the

Shahādah and said the Takbīr and performed the pilgrimage and the °Umrah and for whom the moon was sundered, who commanded the recognition of the religion of God and prohibited what is immoral and illicit. O God I have entrusted etc.... (as in the seven previous prayers.)

Prayer of the Birth Celebration of °Alī. May God be pleased with him.

O God, illumine my heart with knowledge and let my body be used in thy obedience, save my inmost self from discordant things. Let my thoughts be occupied in reverence. Guard me from the evil whispers of Satan and protect me from him. O thou merciful one, seal our deeds with good things. O God, I have entrusted etc.... (as in the eight previous prayers.)

Prayer to be said in every memorial.

O God, our Lord, accept of us and be gracious unto us and pardon us. O God, call us hence as Muslims and bring us alive again Muslims and join us to the righteous. O God, I have entrusted in this honored place etc.... (as in the nine previous prayers.)

The Petitionary Prayers of the Pilgrimage and the Circumambulation are ended.

KENNETH CRAGG

HENRY MARTYN SCHOOL OF ISLAMIC STUDIES

ALIGARH, U.P., INDIA

This School serves the Churches of India and Pakistan and was established to provide training and facilities for research for missionaries and nationals in subjects related to Muslim evangelism.

In addition to courses in Islamic subjects, tuition is provided in Arabic, Persian and Urdu. Facilities are now available also to those working in East Pakistan, Bengal, Southern and Western India, for the study of Musalmani, Bengali, Musalmani Tamil and Musalmani Gujarati.

A limited amount of accommodation is provided for resident students during the winter. Extension courses are given in Northern and Southern hill stations during the summer.

The Rev. Harold Spencer, Principal

BOOK REVIEWS

Told in the Market Place: Forty Tales Translated and Set Down by C. G. Campbell. Ernest Benn, Ltd. London. 1954.

Here is the third, and unfortunately the last, of those delightful collections of Arab folk tales collected and translated by the late Major C. G. Campbell, a British officer with Middle Eastern experience. Taken together, his three volumes, though minus the connecting link of a Scheherazade, form a sort of latter-day *Arabian Nights*. The main purpose of these stories is to entertain the reader—"to provide the pleasure given by a good story" as the Preface puts it. One can only rejoice that they have been put down at this time, for no doubt, before the century is out, the more "advanced" forms of entertainment, such as the cinema, and other diversions which follow in the wake of the onrushing "gray" literacy, will overwhelm the whole Arab world, as they already have in many urban areas, and drive the living memory of Abū-Nuwās, Hārūn al-Rashīd, and Zubaidah from the minds of its sons. Major Campbell has at least assured the preservation of his stories in the collections of the Messrs. Dry-as-Dust.

Comparing the three volumes for a moment, one might note several progressions. In the first book, *Tales from the Arab Tribes*, all the stories come from the tribes of southern Iraq, and they average fourteen pages in length. In the second, *From Town and Tribe*, the sources are both tribal and sedentary, the area includes not only Iraq but also Musqat and Oman, and the average length is just under seven pages. In the present volume all the stories are from towns, the area is further widened to include Palestine (mostly via refugees in Lebanon the Preface indicates) and Libya, and the average length is down to less than five pages. Some in fact seem little more than expanded proverbs. One almost gets the impression that the collector did not think as highly of this collection as of the earlier two, for he says that "the Palestinian stories do not have the same wit and humor as those from further east" and that "many tales are found which lack the spicy wit which is the essence of the Arab story" (pp. 11-12).

The forty stories in this volume come from Iraq (20), Palestine (13), Oman (5), and Libya (2). They certainly argue in favor of the cultural unity of the Arabs. The advanced student of folklore might be able to make meaningful distinctions between those from different areas, but to this reviewer the motivations, the imagery, and the magical element all have enough in common to come from the same culture area.

For the most part these are pointed stories. They range from criticism of human weakness, such as avarice or susceptibility, to the charms of the other sex, to celebration of the clever word juggler (frequently Abū-Nuwās), to the frustration of a really wicked schemer. Some are pure high-jinks such as "The Story of the Witness Who Accepted a Bribe," in which a donkey is brought before a qāḍi to testify as to which of two claimants is its rightful owner. The donkey convicts the guilty man by means of sounds emitted from its mouth and rear!

Defects are minor. There are very few misprints, and the fact that the author does not know classical Arabic very well (as is shown on p. 28 where there is an inaccurate explanation of a pun in Arabic and on p. 161 where there is a mistranslation of one of the formulas for introducing a story in Arabic [*kān ma kān*]) does not detract from the book in any substantial way.

In short this little volume, though perhaps not quite up to the standards of its predecessors, should make delightful reading for all and sundry and will particularly edify students of folklore, cultural anthropology and general manners and customs. As a sample of the thought patterns and imagery of the Arabs, the stories will also prove a useful introduction to a considerable body of the Arabs' "high" literature. A final note might be injected. Should not all of us, and especially our Arab friends, emulate Major Campbell's endeavors (and similar ones such as Serjeant's *Prose and Poetry from the Ḥaḍramawt*) and collect more of such material when the opportunity presents itself?

Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.

R. BAYLY WINDER

Islamologia By Felix M. Pareja, Madrid (Editorial Razon y Fe), 1952, 1954, 2 volumes.

Felix M. Pareja, Professor for Islamics, Pontifical Gregorian University, Vatican City, former Professor of Arabic, St. Xavier's College, Bombay, has provided students, scholars and interested laymen in *Islamologia* with a comprehensive handbook of Islamic studies. *Islamologia* which was first published in Rome in 1951, has now been presented in a new, enlarged Spanish edition. Within the short period of three years this informative work has grown from a single paper-bound volume into a solidly bound two volume edition. The bibliographical sections have been enlarged, and a supplementary chapter on Spanish-Arab literature by Dr. Elias Terés Sadaba of the University of Madrid, has been added.

Islamologia, for which we might use the term Islamology, is in Prof. Pareja's definition that branch of Orientalism which concerns itself with the scientific study of Islam. Since, as Pareja clearly states in his introduction, it is impossible to understand Islam, the religion, adequately without at the same time understanding the civilization to which it has given birth, Islamology has to deal not only with Islam as a religion but with its history, sociology, geography, literature, and arts and sciences as well. Islamology as a descriptive science, records the growth, the development and the history of Islam, but it leaves a discussion of the transcendental values of Islam to the theological sciences as outside its orbit.

What Prof. Pareja promised in the introduction to his *Islamologia*, he more than fulfilled. *Islamologia* is a well written, comprehensive account of Islam and of the Islamic world from the North-African coast of the Atlantic to the island world of the Pacific. It will serve students of Islam as a valuable reference work and as a guide to further study; unfortunately, because of language difficulties, it will remain out of reach of the average American student.

The twenty two chapters of *Islamologia* are divided into four main sections: History, Muslim Institutions, Islamic Literature, Arts and Sciences. An introductory chapter "The Lands of Islam" by Prof. Ludwig von Hertling, Gregorian University, sets the stage by providing the necessary geographical and sociological background.

The ten chapters of Part I are devoted to the history of the Muslim world from Pre-Islamic Arabia to the present time, covering all parts of the globe where Islamic communities have led, or are leading, a political life.

Part II covers in seven chapters the religious aspects of Islam: Muḥammad, the Qur'ān, the Shari'ah, Tariqa, dogmatic differentiations, sectarianism, and mysticism.

Part III, for which Dr. Alessandro Bausani, lecturer for Persian Literature, the University of Rome, signs as author, discusses in two chapters the Arabic and Persian contributions to Islamic literature. A third chapter deals with Turkish, Urdu and minor Islamic literatures.

The two chapters of Part IV present in concise form the Muslim contributions to the Arts and Sciences.

The value of each of the twenty two chapters and of the supplement is greatly enhanced by charts, maps, and graphs, and by the addition of carefully selected, extensive bibliographies drawn from the major European languages.

Islamologia surpasses in scope and presentation the old reliable reference works of the student of Islam; Pfannmueller, *Handbuch der Islam-Literature*, Berlin, 1923; and Sauvaget, *Introduction à l'Histoire de l'Orient Musulman*, Paris, 1946. For those who read Spanish or Italian easily *Islamologia* will replace Sauvaget's work. Pfannmueller's bibliography, though badly in need of being brought up to date, will still remain a useful research instrument. An English version of *Islamologia* would fill a great need in English Islamic literature. Where language is no barrier *Islamologia* will find an honored place next to the Encyclopedia of Islam, or its abridgments, on the bookshelf of any earnest student of Islam.

Hoover Institute, California.

WERNER E. GOLDNER

Marxism or Islam? By Mazharuddin Siddiqi, Orientalia, Lahore (Pakistan), Second Edition, 1954, pp. 168. Price: Rs 7/8.

The book under review poses the problem "Marxism or Islam" with a big question mark which is perfectly justified in view of its seriousness and urgency in the present day. The importance of such a book as attempts to subject materialism to a critical examination, from the Islamic viewpoint, is clear. For Communism is often tabued in the Islamic countries on mere sentiments couched in platitudinous half-truths, for which the powers that be seek, for their own political ends, the support of such traditional repositories of knowledge as the 'Ulamā of Al-Azhar (Vide their *fatwa* published in *Al-Ahrām* dated 28/3/1948) than whom there can be few more ignorant of what Communism is. Mr. Mazharuddin Siddiqi is to be congratulated on having shown the way to a dispassionate and academic study of Marxism, and what it implies by a reasonable Muslim who is honest in his attempt

to understand what he believes and who recognises what the demands of the mid-twentieth century pattern of life are.

Without detracting from his merits, however, it must be said that the author appears to have concentrated more on a study of Marxism than on a study of Islam. In eight out of the eleven chapters of the book Marxism is examined in its various aspects.

The line of argument can be summed up as follows. The material conditions of life only *influence* but do not determine (as Marx says) the social, political and intellectual life processes. On the other hand, the religious, moral and ethical problems of life react vitally and purposefully on the economic situation. Given the same economic conditions and the same methods of production different individuals and communities will still develop in far different ways.

Possession of political authority is itself an advantage like wealth and property. Hence it is unconvincing that the state power will wither away after the seizure of the means of production in the name of society. The abolition of private property cannot level up the natural inequalities of men.

The personality of man has an equal claim with matter to be regarded as real. The external world of material objects furnishes the mind with stuff for thought but it is the mind which transforms the stuff into ideas.

The observation of general laws in Nature is a theme common to both Marxism and Islam. The existence of these laws presupposes the existence of a regulative intelligence. The Marxists invest matter with self-activity and allow no room for an outside creator. The conception of God in higher religions is characterised by Divine Immanence and thus the objection to the idea of an outside creator loses force. Moreover, ideas of 'outside' and 'inside' have no meaning in relation to the Absolute Being. God is also transcendent but this does not mean that He exists outside the world of matter.

The direction of human will is a determining factor in the deduction of conclusions from the data furnished by science and history. If knowledge of objective facts were sufficient to decide social issues there would be absolute unanimity of view in all parts of the world in regard to the ethics of social conduct. The activity of Nature in the realm of inanimate objects and the animals is patently non-moral. Islam does not deny the validity of natural laws; only it repudiates their exclusive title to the guidance of mankind. Moral laws are but another form of natural laws issuing at a higher level and providing correctives to the guidance furnished by natural laws. It is then a question of perceiving the moral law as it manifests itself in the history of mankind and of shaping our individual and social conduct accordingly. Both our intellectual and moral faculties are involved in the task.

If human morality were determined by the mode of production and if there were a physical force and a necessity behind it then the cruelty and the rapacity of the capitalist have nothing reprehensible about them. Morality presupposes freedom of choice and is an affair of the will; it is not cumulative like civilization.

According to Marxists, religion is nothing but the fantastic reflection in men's minds of those external forces which control their daily life. When all the means of production are taken over by society so as to free its members from the bondage in which they are now held then religion will vanish. It is a fact that the conception of God arose from man's being a dependent creature. The main root of social conflicts is man's own want of moral self-control and so long as social conflicts remain in any degree the idea of God cannot be displaced from man's mind.

The Marxists have ignored those historical periods in which religion appeared as a great revolutionary force working for human equality and social justice. There is no reference to Islam in Marxist literature, which seems to be deliberate and wilful. They had before them only Christianity, which suffered from many inherent weaknesses.

The above line of argument has been put forward cogently with rich explanations and examples. Only a few points call for comment:

(a) The attack of Marxism on religion in general can only be fully countered when it is appreciated that Islam in particular seeks to rid man of the bondage to external terrestrial and social forces. That is why Islam constituted a revolt and had to wage a war of self-preservation against the ancient religious practices which were undoubtedly a reflection of extraneous forces. *Shirk* is nothing but bondage to extraneous forces or allowing the faintest reflection of them to creep into the mind. It is one of the themes of Iqbāl and constitutes, according to him, the differentia between 'abd and 'abduh. A Muslim derives from his submission to Allah the confidence and the will to assert himself over everything else.

(b) The author seems to have taken some unnecessary pains to offset the Marxists' objection to an outside creator. He resorts to the talk of a Divine Essence and Divine Spirit immanent in every object of the universe. It would perhaps be better to recognise straightaway that the Marxist parts company with the Muslim when, both having observed regulated activity, the former attributes it to the object in which it is found while the latter traces it to an ultimate agency distinct from the object. The Marxists' objection to an agency distinct from the object of nature will in any case remain. Moreover, the talk of the immanence of Divine Essence or Spirit is beset with grave dangers. The orthodox position is that which the author mentions in the secondary place viz., 'outside' and 'inside' are attributes which do not apply to the Absolute.

(c) On page 99 the author says that Islam, as contrasted with Christianity, "provided equally well for both sets of men, for the passive type as well as for active natures, rather more for the latter than the former." Here perhaps the expression that Islam provided for the passive type is a bit loose, the tenor of the context being against it. In case it is really meant, the conclusion does not seem to be justified on the basis of the tradition cited because a Muslim is in any case expected to develop the necessary strength to eradicate an evil. It is noteworthy that even Muslim asceticism in its very first stage took the form of *jihād*.

(d) Though comparison with Islam runs throughout the book the only exception to it is the chapter on Nationalism. But the reader is left wondering what the author's judgment is on the Arabism of the Arabs in the history of Islam. The roots of the present-day nationalism which seeks to turn Muḥammad into an Arab national hero and Islam into an Arab commodity for export, go back to the haughtiness and the pride of the pre-Islamic beduin which the Prophet succeeded in suppressing just for two or three decades.

The next two of the three remaining chapters are devoted to Agreement Between Islam and Marxism and The Moral Basis of Islamic Ideology. At this point the reader is convinced of the high importance of morality which springs not from compulsion or logical necessity but from free choice and effort of the will and without which law can only yield superficial results. The last chapter on the Economic System of Islam shows neither an exhaustive study nor clarity of thought. It is not clear whether the author is trying to find a place for the economic system of Russia in Islam or is at all convinced of the possibility of working out an independent system. He seeks refuge in the fact that Islam did not proceed directly to improve the economic structure of society as it was found in its own day and that it was not faced with any of the economic problems which arose under feudalism, capitalism and Communism. He is even forced to examine the possibility of making a distinction between the actual achievements of Islam and its ideal objectives. Coming to the general principles the author is dismayed by the apparent contradictions in the Qur'ān and the Ḥadīth. He forgets that Islam represents the middle path with checks and balances on either side and that it was not expounded in the precise language of legal draftsmanship. It is only from such contradictions that a positive system is to be arrived at. It is astonishing how the author could omit to note that Arabia at the advent of Islam boasted a highly developed commercial activity. All the evil practices which tended to exploitation in the commercial field were found in forms not essentially different from those in our own day and Islam set about to ban, modify or legalise them one by one in quite unmistakable manner. Again how can such a sweeping socialistic principle be ignored as that all land, mines, forests and such things as are produced without human labour belong to Allah i.e., they are for the common use of society and their value is determined solely by the amount of labour and expense involved in making them ready for use. It is on this assumption that fallow land becomes the possession of the one who reclaims it. Many of the implications of this principle are available in *fiqh* books. The long and fluctuating history of the administration of *kharaḥ* has to be studied in relation to the growth of a Muslim peasantry. Daniel C. Dennett's *Poll Tax & Conversion in Early Islam* is of course a valuable aid. It is also of no little importance that Islam encourages spending on food, clothing, housing etc. (of course, in such ways as are permissible). What Islam condemns is hoarding and miserliness; the alternative is not charity alone. Liberal spending on one's daily needs also brings economic benefits to the whole community and Islam expressly recognises it.

One also wishes that references were furnished in conformity with the practice of modern research. The reader has the right to know what authority the author has relied upon in regard to such statements as that "there is no mention in the history of Arabia of a single rich landlord" and that the institution of slavery was introduced into Arabia through the indirect percolation of Roman influence via Abyssinia (p. 153). Transliteration of Arabic names is also unsatisfactory.

In short, the book is a definite NO to Communism. But the elimination of one of the two alternatives does not in itself suffice for the affirmation of the other. It has to be complemented with an intensive study of the economic principles of Islam before the question which forms the subject of the book is fully answered.

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S. M. YUSUF

The History of the Jewish Khazars. By D. M. Dunlop, Princeton Oriental Studies, Vol. 16, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1954, pp. XV + 293.

Mr. Dunlop's book on the Khazars deals with admittedly one of the most remarkable periods of the long history of the Turkic peoples on the Euroasian steppe. As he points out, the Khazar state played an important part as a great power in Eastern Europe between the 7th-9th centuries. It was able to check the Arab invasion of Europe in the Caucasus and consequently to create a balance of power between Christendom and rising Islam. Recent studies also emphasize the Khazar influence in the formation of the first Russian state in Kief. In addition, the Khazar Kagan's adoption of Judaism is viewed as a unique event in history. The Khazar achievement in securing trade relations between the northern countries on the one hand and the Islamic and Byzantine empires on the other as well as with Central Asia is no less significant. For the prosperity and power of the Khazar state was based on this international trade, and cities such as Balanjar, Samandar, Atil (Itil) which emerged on the lower Volga and in the northern Caucasus became important centres bringing different cultures and religions into contact. It is safe to say that the conditions created by the Khazars made it possible for the Kipchaks and the Djengizkhanids to found new centres of commerce and civilization in the same areas in later periods. We know that in the second half of the 6th century a new route through northern steppes for silk from China to the Mediterranean world was planned by the Kök-Türks, the suzerains of the Khazars. But the fur trade from the north to the Islamic countries attained significance especially during and after the Khazar period.

Mr. Dunlop's work covers the whole history of the Khazar state from beginning to end, and utilizes nearly all the important studies dealing with one or another aspect of this history. Perhaps I could add to this bibliography some Turkish works. For example Z. V. Togan's articles in *İslam Ansiklopedisi* the first of which is entitled *Hazarlar* (cüz 43-44, 1950) and summarizes his earlier studies with the addition of some new Russian works. The second, *Azerbaycan*, appeared in the same publication (cüz 12, 1942) Ş. Baştav also wrote

a long article on *Sabirs* (Belleten, vol. V, 1941, pp. 53-99) which was mainly based on Hungarian sources. It seems to me that the works of Nemeth, Gyöni and Moravcsik can not be left out of any study on the Khazars. A. N. Kurat's work on the Pechenegs (*Peçenek Tarihi*, Istanbul 1937) would also be useful for the late Khazar history. Mr. Dunlop does not make use of the Russian archaeological material on the Khazars, some of which is mentioned on page 236 of his book.

The author especially tries to determine the date of the Khazars' conversion to Judaism. But he, too, can not obtain a satisfactory final result. He goes to the original sources in Arabic which are surely the most important on the Khazars. He gives full translations of these with variant readings from manuscripts of Al-Istakhrī and Al-Mas'ūdī and brings forth new passages on the Khazars from Ya'qūbī and Al-Samarkandī. These translations with notes constitute indeed a very useful part of the book.

If one makes an attempt to write a "comprehensive work" on the Khazars one is destined to encounter almost insuperable obstacles in the present state of the materials. Mr. Dunlop had to deal with a number of controversial issues and to face arguments all through the work. I agree with him when he speaks in the introduction of the difficulty in handling the existing sources. These sources, of course, need to be tackled by specialists. For example P. Pelliot's remarks (*Notes sur la Horde d'Or*, Paris 1950, pp. 207-224) on the difficulty to adopt the form of *Khazar* or the identification of (Ak) Khazars with Akatziri (cf. Dunlop, p. 7) can be considered. The theory identifying the Khazars with the Ugurs of Central Asia, as suggested by Z. V. Togan, Turcologists find it impossible to accept on the basis that the Khazar language is known as a LIR Turkish whereas the Ugurs used SHAZ Turkish. Mr. Dunlop remarks that "the LIR Turkish at a remote period was widely spoken and if the Uigur/Khazar relationship was otherwise acceptable the linguistic argument would not be determinative against it." (pp. 39-40). In my opinion the linguistic argument has been a determinative one as the only reliable basis for classifying the Turkish peoples since Mahmūd Kashgari. In this connection the theory of Ogur Turkish which is supposed to represent the dialects of Bulgars, Chuwashes and Khazars must be considered likewise.

Another difficult problem is to determine when and how the Khazar rule was extended over the Crimea. Mr. Dunlop who is principally dependent on Bury and Vasiliev on Khazar-Byzantine relations indicates that the southern Crimea along with the cities Cherson and Bosphorus passed into Khazar hands at the beginning of the 8th century.

It is established that in 575 or 576 the city of Bosphorus was captured by the Kōk-Türk forces in co-operation with the Utigurs. The latter like the Khazars were vassals of the Kōk-Türk empire and had been masters of the steppe area of the Crimean peninsula from the downfall of Attila's empire. When the Khazars emerged as the leading power in succession to the Kōk-Türks in the region north of the Caucasus these Utigurs seem to have become Khazar vassals. On the basis of a Greek inscription of 859 A.D. which was discovered in Bosphorus and

is itself the subject of much controversy A. A. Vasiliev (*The Goths in the Crimea*, p. 75) thinks that Byzantine sovereignty was re-established there toward this time. There is indeed no record in Byzantine sources about the situation in Crimea during all this period until the end of the 7th century. Then we suddenly find Khazar governors in Bosphorus. If the Byzantines had ruled again in Bosphorus after the Kök-Türk conquest as Vasiliev thinks when did the Khazars capture it and why is there no indication whatever in the sources about the Byzantine restoration? In fact there is an interesting piece of information in a letter by Pope Martin VI who was banished to Cherson in 654 saying that "the inhabitants of this country are all pagans." Vasiliev (pp. 77-78) tries to identify these "pagans" in many ways, but never considers the possibility that they were Utigurs or Khazars. The presence of a Khazar *Tudun* at the beginning of the 8th century in Cherson which was always under Byzantine rule is also to be noted. Such an official with the same title *Tudun* is to be found in Genoese Kaffa in the 13th-15th centuries. I might add that not only did the Italians give the Crimea the name of *Gazaria* but also the Seldjukids of Anatolia called the straits of Bosphorus *ma'ber-i Khazar* (Ibn Bibi's Persian original).

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HALIL INALCIK

Œuvres philosophiques et mystiques de Shihabaddin Yahya Sohrawardi (Opera Metaphysica et Mystica II), 1. La Théosophie de l'Orient des Lumières (arabe). — 2. Le Symbole de Foi des Philosophes (arabe). — 3. Le Récit de l'Exil occidental (arabe et persan). Prolégomènes en français et Édition Critique par Henry Corbin. Publiée par Département d'Iranologie de l'Institut Franco-Iranien. Bibliothèque Iranienne 2. Tehran, 1952, pp. 104 + 350.

Seven hundred and sixty four years ago (A.D. 1191), at the age of thirty-six Shihāb al-Dīn Yahyā Sohrawardī was put to death because of his religious opinions. He was accused as a dangerous intriguer and an exponent of heretical doctrine. He was charged with atheism and believing in the ancient philosophers. But subsequently he was canonized by the Šūfis and was called the Shaikh al-Ishrāq.

This edition, containing one major and two minor works, has been designed as a companion volume to Henry Corbin's earlier edition of other works of Sohrawardī (*Bibliotheca Islamica*, vol. 16, Istanbul, 1945) and is a welcome addition to what the editor himself calls *Corpus Sohrawardien*.

The first volume on Sohrawardī by M. Corbin consisted of the annotated and edited texts of the *Majmu'a fī al-Ḥikmat al-Ilāhiyya* containing *Kitāb al-Talwihāt*, *Lamaḥāt*, *Muqāwamāt* and *Muṭāraḥāt*. The present volume, in addition to the major work *Kitāb Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*, contains the *Risāla fī I'tiqād al-Hukamā'* and the mystical recitation the *Qiṣṣat al-Ghurbat al-Gharbiyya* with Persian translation.

At the time of the organization of the Bibliothèque Iranienne in Teheran, it was deemed wise to pursue the work started on Sohrawardī in Istanbul as part of the activities of the Département d'Iranologie de l'Institut Franco-Iranien. The study of the philosophy of the

Ishrāqī school had gained momentum in Iran and research in this field had been going on for a number of years.¹

In 1938, Dr. Muḥammad Mahdī Bayānī published two small treatises in Persian by Sohrawardī: *Rūzī bā Jama'at-e Šūfiyān* and *Risāla fī Ḥālat al-Ṭufūliyya*. These were found in a unique manuscript, dated A.H. 659, in the National Library of Teheran. M. Corbin was able to locate a manuscript copy of the second treatise in the Şehit Ali Library (No. 2703) in Istanbul. Two years later, Dr. Bayānī published a third *risāla*² which was not only a new addition to Sohrawardī's philosophical works in Persian, but a notable specimen of his earlier discourses.

In the Prolégomènes to the first volume M. Corbin had discussed at length the doctrine of *Ishrāq* under three aspects: la connaissance orientale, la philosophie orientale and la tradition orientale.³ In Prolégomènes II to this volume he returns to the same subject. This time he draws a sharp distinction between the *Ḥikmat ishrāqiyya* and the *mashriqiyya* and enters into a detailed exposition of Ibn Sīnā's oriental philosophy, *Ḥikmat al-Mashriqiyya*, and the mystical terms *ishrāq* and *ishrāqiyyūn*. Sohrawardī's intimate knowledge of the works of Ibn Sīnā, particularly the *Kitāb al-Inṣāf*, *Kitāb al-Ishārāt* and *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, and his interpretation of their contents helped to restore effectively the so-called oriental philosophy, but it does not follow that Sohrawardī completely agreed with or fully accepted Ibn Sīnā's views.

M. Corbin states (p. 19) that Ibn Sīnā's works are devoid of the doctrines and symbols of ancient Iran whereas Sohrawardī's are based on them. He hopes that the publication of the *Kitāb Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq* will help us to understand the synthesis of the doctrine its author emulated and the spiritual emotions he experienced. He then analyses in detail (pp. 39-59) the relationship between the doctrines of *Ishrāq*, Zoroastrianism and Manichaenism.

Kitāb Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq was very close to Sohrawardī's heart. He constantly refers to it in his other works. It is divided into a prologue and two sections. The first part contains three books or *maqāla* and is devoted to the discussion of logic and treats certain problems in physics. The second part contains five books and gives a condensed but complete exposition of the *ishrāqī* doctrine.

At the turn of the century Baron Carra de Vaux wrote that the *Ishrāqī* philosophy formed an interesting chapter of the history of Neoplatonism. He went even so far as to say: "La philosophie de l'illumination est principalement le néoplatonisme, mais un néoplatonisme exprimé au moyen d'une nomenclature spéciale qui se fonde sur l'emploi des termes métaphoriques, *lumière-ténèbres*, symbolisant le haut et le bas métaphysiques, l'esprit de la matière, le bien et le mal.

¹ Among others see Mohammad Mo'īn, *Mazdayasnā va Ta'ṭhīr-e ān der Adabiyāt-e Pārsī* (University of Teheran Publication No. 9, Tehran, 1948), *Ḥikmat-e Ishrāq va Farhang-e Irān* (Amūzash va Parvarish xxiv, Tehran, 1951), *Ḥikmat-e Ilāhī* by Mohyiddin Mahdi Ilahi Qomshahi, and *Asās al-Tawḥīd* by Mahdi Ashtiyani (University of Teheran Publications Nos. 113 and 118, Teheran, 1951).

² *Risāla-ye Fārsī 'Aql-e Sorkh*, Isfahan, 1940.

³ Cf. *Bibliotheca Islamica* 16, Prolégomènes I, pp. xxv-lxii.

Les intelligences supérieures, issues de Dieu, sont appelées des *lumières*; Dieu lui même est la *lumière des lumières* et *l'illumination*, que le titre du système désigne, et la diffusion de ces lumières idéales, descendant et se répandant à partir de leur source première dans la monde des ténèbres. Plotin avait déjà appelé cette diffusion *irradiation*; c'est à ce mot que correspond l'arabe *ichrâq*." ⁴

This interpretation introduces a different nuance or pattern from the conventional black and white motif. The new symbolism of the white and the red, of the Beloved and the Lover, can be traced to the literature of Sassanian Iran of Wāmiq wa 'Aẓrā, to the romance of Wīs wa Rāmīn, and the influence of Manichaeism in general. It further shows that the Philosophy of Illumination is nothing but the Religion of Love.

The *Risāla fī I'tiqād al-Ḥukamā'*, one of the two minor works included in this volume, is written in a condensed style with the same clarity and vigor as other treatises on mysticism of the author. In this work Sohrawardī puts up a defense for the men of science, *aḥl al-'ilm* or *al-ḥukamā' al-muta'alliḥa* whom he calls *Arbāb al-Ḥaqīqa*.

The second minor work, *Qisṣat al-Ghurbat al-Gharbiyya*, is an important mystical treatise written in Arabic and Persian in a dialogue form. It is considered a masterpiece on the doctrine of *ta'wīl* and, by the application of the *ḥikāya* technique of composition elaborates on some of the Qurānic citations.

M. Corbin who is an outstanding *mustashriq*, has rendered great service to the field of oriental studies by devoting a number of years to the study of philosophical and mystical works of Sohrawardī. He is planning to add another volume to the opera metaphysica and to edit other works on physics. It is hoped that he will be successful in the completion of the *Corpus Sohrawardien*.

Washington, D.C.

MEHMED A. SIMSAR

Security and the Middle East. A Proposal to the President of the United States by Twenty Distinguished Americans. Anonymous. Ballentine Books. Undated.

This book consists of two parts: Part One, consisting of fourteen pages, is a series of very sweeping statements about the Middle East, Arabs, Israelis, the United Nations, and American policy in the area. It is signed by twenty Americans who deserve, individually, the title "distinguished" as given them on the cover of the book; but twenty persons who have little or no personal knowledge of the area under discussion, and have little to bind them into a group save their willingness to endorse the particular theses set forth in part One of this book.

Part Two, consisting of one hundred fifty four pages, is a collection of miscellaneous information about various aspects of life in the Middle East. The author is not named, nor are the signatories of Part One specifically stated as endorsing the material in Part Two of the book.

⁴ Cf. "La Philosophie Illumination (Hekmet El-Ichraq) D'après Suhrawardi Meqtoul", *Journal Asiatique Neuvième Série*, Tome XIX, Paris, Janvier-Février 1902, pp. 63-94.

Most of the material in the book is true. That fact, however, does not prevent its being a very misleading book. On five pages, chosen at random, there are eighty seven sentences. Of these eighty seven, eighty four are, in the opinion of the present reviewer, entirely accurate statements. Seventeen of these are, however, entirely irrelevant to the main point of the argument of the chapter in which they are found. Forty one sentences out of the eighty seven are set in a context that seems to make them say something more than they really mean. At least fifteen statements are true, but so highly selective, out of the total facts in the given situation, that they fairly cry out for their counterparts to balance up the picture. The three strictly inaccurate statements found in the particular five pages under analysis are all generalizations as to the mind, motivation or purposes of the Arab States in relation to the State of Israel.

One's evaluation of the book, in other words, must depend upon what the book is, in itself, assumed to be. If the main title be taken at face value, and this be a study of "Security and the Middle East," the book is superficial and biased.

If one thinks of the work as the sub-title states it—"A Personal Proposal to the President of the United States by Twenty Distinguished Americans"—the book is presumptuous and dangerous meddling in public affairs by a group of persons only imperfectly informed in serious matters concerning the Middle East.

If it be thought of, more modestly, as a limited effort at the statement of the pertinent facts in the immediate situation as between Israel and the Arab States, the effect is misleading by the inclusion of unsupported generalizations outside that immediate situation, and the inclusion of much material that is not directly pertinent to the question in hand.

If, however, the book be taken simply as a skillful political pamphlet, based entirely on the Israeli premises in the matter and slanted to the American reader, with a definite propagandist purpose, it then becomes a clear and effective document. Read from that point of view, it is a very informative book.

Boston, Massachusetts.

ALFORD CARLETON

A Villaga in Anatolia. By Mahmut Makal. Translated from the Turkish by Sir Wyndham Deedes, London, Vallentine, Mitchell, 1954, pp. 190, 18 shillings.

Bizim Köy (Our Village), a fifty page booklet first published early in 1950, caused a sensation in Turkey, partly it is said because it appeared just before the National Elections. According to Naşar Nabi, who edited the original work, Makal, a village schoolteacher, sent him day-by-day sketches describing an Anatolian village from within. These essays were edited and published as a small booklet which ran into several editions and broke publication records. In 1952 Makal wrote *Köyümden* (From My Village), a sequel to his first work. The book under review, translated by Sir Wyndham Deedes, a distinguished authority on Turkey, is a translation of these two booklets consolidated into one work with some re-arrangements aimed at obtaining greater clarity and coherence.

No two persons will translate a passage in exactly the same way. Also much that is picturesque in the vernacular does not survive in translation. However, the present work is a substantially faithful translation and has not lost much of the essence of the original. In addition to a foreword by Dr. Lewis V. Thomas of Princeton, there is a useful introduction by Dr. Paul Stirling, an English social anthropologist and author of an outstanding unpublished study entitled *Social Structure of Turkish Peasant Communities*.

Part One of *A Village in Anatolia* deals with the period 1948-50, and contains four chapters describing Makal's experiences as a village teacher. Part Two deals largely with the period after 1950 and includes five interesting chapters describing marriage customs, local affairs, health problems and village entertainment.

Those who have read the Turkish original may deplore some of Makal's exaggerations, but most of them will agree that he seems to have real literary ability and a most vivid and vital style. Despite some of its shortcomings, his contribution is significant because it is one of the few first hand accounts of the life and customs of Anatolian peasants written by one of them. It also has universal appeal at a time when land reforms and rural development are subjects of interest in Asia and other parts of the world.

Makal's book can be misleading to those who do not know Turkey. Land reforms were introduced early in the Kemalist period. There is no large landowner class in Turkey, and most peasants own their land. The Turkish peasant is better off today than ever before, and his economic and social status is superior to most peasants in the Middle East. The sturdy Turkish peasants, who constitute 80 percent of Turkey's 23 million people, are the backbone of the nation. The hardy Turkish peasant-soldier, fondly referred to as "Mehmetçik," has proved his worth, not only in the famous historical battles of Plevne, Gallipoli and Sakarya, but also more recently in Korea.

On the other hand, Makal's little book does show that although the Kemalist reforms were successful in the urban areas, some of the more remote rural regions were less affected by the modernization program. The lag in development in rural areas is normal and understandable. Makal's writings are important because they effectively dramatized this fact for the first time, and drew the attention of the authorities and the public to the necessity of increasing help to the more remote rural areas. It is believed that with the completion of the Road Program, and the building of new feeder roads, the Westernization reforms will soon reach even the most remote hamlet.

Makal was born in 1931 in a small village in the Aksaray-Nigde region, which is a most infertile part of Central Anatolia. His home was at Demirji village and he was a 1947 graduate of the Ivriz Village Institute. His first assignment was at the village of Nürgüz. It must be emphasized that the conditions described by Makal are not typical of Anatolia. The area he describes is in the poorest part of Central Anatolia, and the period he writes about was during a crop failure followed by a most severe winter of 1948-9. Makal is no doubt guilty of exaggeration, and this has been explained in many ways. Some

claim that he was not sincere. But others find him deeply sincere, and a keen observer. Imaginative and sensitive as he was, Makal was suffering at the time from poor health. At the time of his first writing he had not travelled beyond his own district. He was trained under the Kemalist ideals of progress and these led him to protest against the backwardness that existed in his community. He was especially disturbed by the fact that despite the abolition of the *medreses* and dervish orders and the secularization program, many of the villagers preferred to send their children secretly to schools run by these remnants of the old order. Even after allowing for Makal's exaggerations, it is rather surprising to see the survival of the sheikhs, hojas, and mullas. The bitterness of Makal's writings may also be explained in part by the frustration resulting from the delays and red-tape he encountered when he appealed to the educational authorities for help in his dealings with these groups.

Although it is true that in some instances Islam may take a fanatical form, as in the cases described by Makal, the revival of Islam in Turkey today is generally considered a positive factor. Turkey is a secular State and there is a separation of religious and state affairs. However, the Turkish people remain devout Muslims, especially in the rural areas. Even to the intellectual, Islam is important as a cultural heritage. It is an effective bulwark against such harmful ideologies as Communism, especially when reforms within Islam result in regeneration and modernization.

It is a well known fact that the Turkish authorities are always alert to any possible subversive movement. They were therefore quick in taking action to make sure that Communist influence was not involved in Makal's extremely critical account of village conditions. It is heartening to note that no injustice took place and that Makal was vindicated. It is also fortunate that this son of the soil has not been spoiled by all the publicity he received. Although he was offered good positions in some of the large cities, he preferred to marry a country girl and has settled down to teach in a rural district.

It is important to record that both high government officials as well as prominent citizens and the press came to Makal's defense and saw to it that he had a fair trial, thus demonstrating the Turkish spirit of fair play. The Soviet radio tried to exploit Makal's writings, but failed. The problem facing Turkey today is how to preserve the hard won liberties and at the same time maintain national security. The Makal incident shows clearly that democratic processes are well established in Turkey, and that the Turkish people are able to take a mature approach to public affairs.

The American University, Washington, D.C. KERIM K. KEY

Christians and Christianity in India and Pakistan. By P. Thomas, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London. pp. 260.

This book is written to meet the long-felt need of providing an authentic and historical account of Christianity in India from the time of St Thomas to the present day. In writing the book, the author has

undertaken a tremendous task, as he attempts to condense nineteen eventful centuries into two hundred and sixty pages. The first four chapters, however, can be regarded as the most valuable section of the book in which the author gives a connected account of Christianity in the country during the centuries between the advent of St Thomas and the arrival of the Portuguese—a period to which few other historians have done justice due to lack of authentic material. The author, who is a Syrian Christian of Malabar and can trace his family history to the Apostle, has the unique advantage of being able to supplement his research with the traditions and records of the oldest Christian community in India.

At the very outset the author attempts to prove what the Malabar Christians have long 'wished' to believe, that the Apostle Thomas came to India in the first century A.D. and established the Church in the Chera kingdom (Kerala). The author employs long cherished traditions and folklore of the Malabar Christians in support of his argument and makes a careful analysis of historical and archaeological evidence for and against this view. He arrives at the conclusion that "Thomas in India was an accepted fact." p. 19. In recent years much research has been done around the tradition regarding the advent, labors and martyrdom of Thomas Didymus in Malabar, and much evidence has been traced in favor of the Apostolic origin of Christianity in India, which is almost an article of faith with the Christians of Malabar.

An interesting point which strikes a student of Islam in the history of the Syrian Christians of Malabar is that their forefathers, the early settlers from Syria, brought with them, the same Nestorian and Monophysite doctrines for which they were disliked and persecuted by Muslims in the country of their origin. It is no wonder that with the rise of Islam in India, the Christians of Malabar were not looked upon with favor by the Muslims.

The advent of the Portuguese and the Mission of St Francis Xavier, along with its many blessings, marks the beginning of factions amongst the Christians in India; these factions exist to this day and tend to multiply. The author is right in his observation that Christian factions are more detrimental to the cause of the Gospel than the opposition of the non-Christian, for 'if a house be divided against itself, that house cannot stand.' With regard to the impact of a Christian's life on that of a non-Christian, the author gives a thought-provoking picture on pages 152-153 of his book, bringing to the forefront the challenge and responsibility of practical Christianity.

In chapters ten and eleven Mr Thomas gives a balanced view of the British-Indian relationship; a relationship on which few Indian historians are able to give an unbiased opinion. His appreciation of the difficulties confronting the Directors of the East India Company in allowing missionary activity in the country, during the first few years of the Company's life in India, is commendable (pp. 175 ff.). The account of India's long struggle for independence ends with a note of admiration for the British: "In the whole history of imperialism we look in vain for a precedent to the British granting of independence to India. The attachment to possessions is more developed in nations

than in individuals and no nation has ever voluntarily relinquished control over a vast land that yielded much profit and more prestige. Truly the granting of independence to India by Britain was renunciation on a national scale." (p. 203).

In these days when Christians are regarded as a denationalised community, unsympathetic with the national aspirations of the country and missionaries are looked upon with suspicion, it is encouraging to be reminded again of the contribution of Christianity to the national movement, "It is good to remember," says the author, "that democracy and political liberalism are essentially offshoots of Christianity." On page 202 the following words are ascribed to two hundred missionaries who signed a memorandum on the eve of the Round Table Conference: "We therefore urge that the principle should be fully and frankly recognised that the determining factor in laying down the lines of India's future constitution should be the wishes of the people of India. This principle ... is one that accords with our deepest Christian convictions."

The author has included an interesting chapter on the influence of Christianity on Hinduism, on the creeds of Shankara, Ramunaja, the Brahma Samaj, and the Arya Samaj. One of the dangers which Christianity faces today is absorption into the vast sea of progressive Hinduism. Buddhism met the same fate centuries ago and became almost extinct. Another danger of equal import is the eclectic character of modern Hinduism. Christian ethics is admired and accepted by many but allegiance to Christ is disregarded. The growth of the Church in India is definitely suffering as a result of this. Time has yet to prove whether partial acceptance of Christianity will develop into fuller loyalty to Christ or be a set back to the advancement of the Church.

The author does not do justice to the title of the book. He fails to give a complete picture of Christians and Christianity in India and Pakistan. In the entire book not more than two or three references are made to Pakistan and nothing is said beyond a brief survey of the early stages of Christianity in areas such as Bengal, Uttar Pradesh and Bombay. No effort is made to trace the development of Christianity and the Church in places other than the Malabar Coast. In recent years the different regional Christian Councils have done much to consolidate the Christian community in their particular areas, and the author could have dealt with the question in greater detail. Only four and a half pages are given, towards the end of the book, to Christianity in modern India and no mention is made of the problems and developments of the Church in Pakistan, since the inception of the new state. Pakistan is excluded from the purview of the book with the remark, "Pakistan had but a negligible percentage of Christians." p. 203. It is true that Christians in Pakistan are not many, only half a million in number (about 1½ percent of the entire population), yet they constitute the largest Christian body in any Muslim country, and since partition the Church in Pakistan has recorded five thousand baptisms.

The author deserves commendation for his exhaustive research into the religious and cultural background of the Syrian Christian community and the book should serve as an important source of in-

formation regarding the history of the main divisions of the Syrian Church: the Roman Catholics, the Jacobites and the Marthomites. Recent research into the history of the Syrian Church in India has helped towards the recognition of Christianity as an indigenous religion of India. This book has added much to the data regarding the origin of Christianity in India, for which we are greatly indebted to the author.

*Henry Martyn School of Islamic Studies,
Aligarh, India.*

K. D. W. ANAND

The Prophetic Faith of our Fathers. Vol. IV. By LeRoy Edwin Froom, Review and Herald, Washington D.C.

With this volume Dr. Froom concludes his tremendous work on prophetic interpretation and spontaneous prophetic gifts from N.T. times to the present day. The 4 volumes together run to nearly 4000 large pages. Such a work is bound to be standard, and is unlikely to be equalled. Readers of this journal will have a special interest in the historicist interpretation that finds the Muslim and Turkish powers in the trumpets and vials of the Book of the Revelation.

This final volume is more specialized, in that about 700 of its 1295 pages are devoted to the Millerite prediction of the Lord's Return in 1844, and the subsequent reinterpretation by the Seventh Day Adventists, at whose Seminary in Washington Dr. Froom is a professor. Consequently this volume is of greater interest for the study of Seventh Day Adventism than of prophetic interpretation in general. Orthodox Christians may compare the Adventist way-out of the 1844 failure with the explanation adopted by the Jehovah's Witnesses when the Lord failed to return in the 1914-1918 period.

The price of this volume is not stated. Previous volumes were \$ 7.50 for 800-900 pages.

Tyndale Hall, Bristol, England.

J. STAFFORD WRIGHT

Missionary Methods: St Paul's and Ours? By Roland Allen. Third Edition, World Dominion Press, London, 1953, pp. 230, 6/-.

"If we look over the mission field to-day we see that we have made most amazing progress, and that our labours have been more than abundantly blessed. We see that we have established all over the world missions through which great numbers of heathen have been brought into the fold of the Church, civilization has been introduced into barbarous countries, immoral customs have been abolished and education and culture have been extended far and wide. On all sides we see steady and increasing progress... Nevertheless, there are everywhere three very disquieting symptoms: (1) Everywhere Christianity is still an exotic... (2) Everywhere our missions are dependent... (3) Everywhere we see the same types... There has been no new discovery of new aspects of the Gospel, no new unfolding of new forms of Christian life."

Roland Allen's "to-day" was before the first World War. The first edition of his book was published in 1912. If in our day, after the

second World War, we look over the mission field, do we find a similar situation, or has it changed? Although the picture may vary greatly from country to country, it is possible that the general situation still fits Mr. Allen's analysis, depending upon the form of the evaluation. On the other hand missionary attitudes have probably changed considerably between the first and the third editions of this excellent book. Two World Wars and their effects upon the peoples of the world, the decline of colonialism and the emergence of new nations have brought about new thinking both about ourselves and others. A deeper awareness of Mr. Allen's concern is characteristic of missionary thinking, more than at the time of the first edition.

What before the first World War may have appeared to many as an academic question, today is a problem of existential nature. After China the concern is not so much how to maintain "missionary activities" in foreign countries, but how the "Indigenous Church" continues its witness to Christ and His Kingdom without the "Mission." This brings us, in a way, to the very heart of Mr. Allen's book. To St. Paul this would have been a false problem; for he knew nothing of the dichotomy "Church-Mission." To him the Church was the Church in all its aspects, and the Church was indigenous,—"rooted in Christ, but in the native soil," as some would like to express it today. St. Paul's churches were also independent and self-reliant, yet basically conscious of the oneness that the Apostle took for granted.

If this is not always so in modern times, the question is near at hand: Do we face problems that are essentially different from those of St. Paul's ministry? Or, were his methods better than ours, and why? The present volume is a careful analysis of Paul's work in the four provinces of Galatia, Macedonia, Achaia and Asia, over a period of ten years that the Apostle's three journeys covered. The headings of the five main parts are indicative of his general approach: I, "Antecedent Conditions," II, "The Presentation of the Gospel," III, "The Teaching of Converts," IV, "St. Paul's Method of Dealing with Organized Churches," and V, "Conclusions." As to circumstances and problems the author concludes that ours are not essentially different from the Apostle's. As to methods he sees in St. Paul the great model of all times: "It would be difficult to find any better model than the Apostle in the work of establishing Churches. At any rate this much is certain, that the Apostle's methods succeeded exactly where ours failed."

While this judgment may be true, it should not be forgotten that success and failure depend, not only upon methods, but upon the underlying attitudes, the guiding principles and the inspiring visions. Where these are given, different methods may lead to the same results.

Roland Allen's book has renewed value in a world of changing conditions, where the be or not to be of missions in general is seriously discussed by Church authorities. The questions he raises, and the answers he gives are worthy of reflexion and meditation.

Hartford, Conn.

HANS L. AURBAKKEN

NOTES OF THE QUARTER

Towards a Re-Orienta­tion of Islamic Thought. The Academy of Islamic Studies, Hyderabad, Deccan, India, has recently published a report of the answers to its questionnaire on a fresh examination of Ḥadīth literature (see *The Muslim World*, Jan. 1955, pp. 91-96). The Academy's exposition of the views expressed fully vindicates the timeliness of its enquiry and offers a interesting mirror of the various attitudes existing in Islam today. Those who replied to the questions raised came largely from India, Pakistan and Egypt.

Four correspondents favored no investigation of the Ḥadīth literature, preferring the persistence of the *status quo*. But these replies are not clear or explicit. They argue that the task of authoritative codification has already been attempted and that there could not be unanimity on what body could attempt it in this century. It should be noted, however, that the preservation of all Ḥadīths does not imply their freedom from *external* criticism, but merely recognises that an agreed and adequate *internal* editing is unattainable.

A second group wishes to jettison Tradition altogether relying upon the sufficiency of the Qur'ān alone. This attitude arises from a sense of frustration over the multiplicity of the Ḥadīth. At best the latter can only be of value to the historian in reconstructing the past. They are not relevant to the legist. "Ḥadīth constitutes the history of *Dīn* and not *Dīn* itself." To some it is a 'bee-hive' which will sting those who touch it curiously. The Academy comments on this general position vis-à-vis the Tradition by saying: "It creates a lacuna in our understanding of the Prophet's mind.... The Quranic plan was revealed piecemeal or disclosed in the circumstances of the Prophet's life as they developed from time to time. It was meant to be followed by him in the first instance.... Surely a knowledge of how the Prophet implemented the 'word' of the Qur'ān in the circumstances of his personal life and of the community... cannot be willingly or deliberately kept out of sight." In other words, the attitude that asserts the sole sufficiency of the Qur'ān needs the Tradition to have the sufficiency. Moreover, there is the obligation to sift and belie the apocryphal traditions which shroud or misrepresent the Prophet. And the truth which can and must be extracted is not to be neglected because recognition of it will be taken by some extremists as validating the indiscriminate whole.

Beside the thorough-going Quranicists and the thorough-going Traditionalists were the 'modernists' whose interest in a re-evaluation of Tradition is purely incidental to their general concern to spiritualize Islam and interpret the Shari'ah as relating only to inward religion. This the Academy regards as distressingly ominous. Islam, they feel, cannot be relegated to a 'purely religious' role, with the legal and constitutional systems modelled entirely on Western secular practice. Turkey is reproached for having been too hasty in this respect. Escape from medievalism does not require complete secularity. "The entire body of borrowings from Western law" must be "baptized with the Quranic touch and given currency in the name and with the seal of

Islam, for nothing from the West will be repugnant to Islam if moulded to fit into the ideology of the Qur'ān."

Insisting that Islam can never be 'secular' and remain Islam, the Academy betrays the familiar Muslim misunderstanding of the relation between 'Christian' and 'secular.' It supposes that, 'secularism' being opposed to 'clericalism,' and Islam having none of the latter, it cannot, therefore, have 'secularism.' It fails to appreciate that secularity, in the last analysis, means the recalcitrance, or insubordination, of man in his natural selfishness, to the standards of the Divine Law, and that all systems, whether they recognise the name or not, experience the thing. Human society may, politically and legally, organise itself for its protection and the continuity of public order and private property, and to these ends, acquire and enforce laws that approximate to the good. But it cannot, qua politics and law, achieve that quality of goodness, or even conceive of it, as goodness is demanded by the Divine Law and enjoined by religious belief. The disparity between what is demanded of the citizen, as citizen, and what is demanded of the Christian, as Christian, explains why those who do not admit the claims of the latter are content with the approximate 'goodness' satisfactory to the political order. It is here that the source and spring of secularity finally lies. Thinkers, however well-intentioned, who insist that there is no disparity between the legal and the religious, are either compromising the second or unrealistically exalting the first. Each course is ultimately disastrous either to the keen edge of religious meaning or the realistic honesty of bodies politic. How hard it is to bring the Muslim mind to the understanding of this fact.

The Academy returns to its plea for a careful re-examination of the Ḥadīth as necessary to the proper adjustment of the Muslim Sharī'ah to the modern scene. It notes, however, that no correspondents have been specific about what a re-examination of Traditions in the light of 'Quranic ideology' really means and involves. The suggestion is therefore made that 'Quranic ideology' needs to be spelled out in relation to doctrines of God, of man, of society and of life. At the present moment an attempt is being made to solicit the necessary financial support under governmental or educational auspices to make possible the establishment of a Board of Research to take up the issues. "No doubt" adds the President of the Academy, Syed 'Abdūl Latīf; a good deal of lip-loyalty to the Quranic ideology is expressed and even paraded in easy going circles everywhere, but the Islam which the Qur'ān stands for has yet to emerge and take shape on an agreed basis. In the meanwhile, things are left to drift.... Stability is possible only when (the Muslim world) is referred back to the universal norms of the Quranic ideology which... will not come into conflict with anything good that may come from anywhere."

Constitutional Impasse in Pakistan. It had been hoped in this issue to present an article setting forth some of the underlying issues in the intriguing story of Pakistani Constitution making, but events are in too fluid a condition for any proper conclusion to the article. The Governor General's assumption of special powers was invalidated by

legal opinion—a decision in part reversed at the end of March. The plan, originally announced in November, 1954, to proceed with the consolidation of the provinces of Western Pakistan into a single whole was thus taken out of legal suspense. But it is also difficult to see where the new Constituent Assembly can look for effective authority, when its legal basis has been so contested. Only the pressure of practical governmental necessity seems to have brought a measure of reversal in the legal ruling that the Governor's action in suspending the original Constituent Assembly had been *extra vires*. The firmness of the Court in devalidating the Governor's actions, despite the obvious confusion which the action would cause, speaks much for the independence of the judiciary. It is strange, and unhappy, that this new legal complication should have arisen in the path of a task already so fraught with problems and burdened with the lengthening incubus of six years un-success. In these throes of new nationhood and Islamic self-definition, all sane observers must feel an active sympathy as well as fascination at witnessing the tangle of creativity.

A New York Statue of the Prophet. An interesting commentary on the views expressed in our article on pp. 250-268 on the subject of *Taṣwīr*, suggesting that its views on the legitimacy of statuary are far from complete acceptance, came from New York recently. By plea from the embassies of several Muslim states a statute of Muḥammad was removed from the Madison Square Court House, where it had stood for some fifty years, with nine other famous 'lawgivers' of history. The attention of Muslim diplomats and correspondents was only drawn to the existence of the statue when newspapers printed an account of necessary, impending repairs. In response to Muslim intervention the authorities refrained from re-erecting the statue of Muhammad, leaving the pedestal vacant. Its final disposition has created a problem not yet solved. The statue, which was the work of a Mexican artist depicts Muḥammad with book and scimitar in either hand and a long flowing beard. The figure is of average proportions with powerful shoulders and strong hands.

Pilgrimage Transport 1955. Since 1947, a steady stream of crated American buses has been crossing the Atlantic for service on the pilgrim route between Jidda and Mecca. Several hundred have been shipped each year and are operated by six Saudi Arabian companies exclusively for pilgrim travel. They are also utilised for the pilgrim traffic, from Indonesia and Pakistan which approaches Arabia from the Persian Gulf. Each coach accommodates forty-five passengers and is specially equipped with large tanks, tyres and fans, for desert work. Meanwhile, an Arab Communications Conference, meeting in Cairo, has been urging implementation of plans for the repair and re-commissioning of the Hījāz railroad. King Saud has contributed two million Syrian pounds to this enterprise. A royal decree of February last in Riyād provides for the construction of an asphalt highway from Jiddah to Dammam, via, Mecca, Ṭā'if, Riyād and Hufūf. Preliminary studies are also in hand for a highway linking the north and south of the Saudi Kingdom.

Sarkhat al-‘Arab. A new illustrated monthly has begun to appear in Cairo with the title *The Cry of the Arabs*. It represents co-operative Saudi Arabian and Egyptian journalism, being owned by the publisher of *Al-Riyāḍ*, the illustrated journal at Jiddah. Its editor is Ismā‘īl Habrūk, a distinguished journalist. Aḥmad ‘Ubaid, the publisher, born in Medina, was prominent in the development of radio stations in the Saudi Arabian Kingdom and has held ministerial posts there. The monthly is reflecting the Cairo-Riyāḍ axis, as a better basis for coping with the menace of Zionism and fostering the general interests of Arab and Islamic states than the alignment of Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan.

Some of the strains involved in the tension between Egypt and Iraq over foreign policy are symbolised in a cable sent in March by a group of ‘Ulamā’ in Baghdad to the Rector of Al-Azhar: “The ‘Ulamā’ of Baghdad wish to remind the authorities in Egypt of the ḥadīth of the prophet that ‘For a Muslim to curse a Muslim is blasphemy and to fight him amounts to disbelief in God.’”

Muslims in China. It is reported from the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian nations, that the Egyptian Minister for Religious Affairs has been invited to go to Peking to study the situation of Muslims within the People’s Republic of China. There will be much interest in the findings and the outcome of Shaikh Aḥmad Ḥasan al-Bakhūrī’s mission.

Revolt in the Yaman. The ill-starred and short-lived revolt in April last in the Yaman had no opportunity to reveal its long-range intentions. The re-instatement of the deposed Imām Aḥmad and the execution of Saif-al-Islām ‘Abdallāh and Saif al-Islām ‘Abbās have precluded any knowledge of potential consequences. The rebels were accused by the loyalists of personal ambition. But some observers have conjectured that under new leadership the Yaman might have been on the verge of internal reforms, now forestalled. The unsuccessful aspirant had considerable gifts of statesmanship and was widely acquainted with the western world. With his experience of the United Nations he might have terminated the isolation of his country. He was committed to the initiation of reforms in the judiciary and in social and economic realms. If these estimates are sound the failure of his bid for power represents a setback for constructive changes. ‘Abdallāh, the sixth son of the late Imām Yaḥyā, whom Imām Aḥmad succeeded in 1947, had often been under house arrest since that date. He was known to be the most liberal member of the ruling family. His effort to unseat his brother, Imām Aḥmad, marks the second occasion that the latter has forestalled a rival. In 1948 he defeated and hanged the advisor of his father, ‘Abdallāh al-Wazīr, who had attempted a plot against him.

Miscellanea. The Syrian Chamber of deputies has had under study a proposal to grant to Palestinians resident in Syria full civil rights as enjoyed by Syrian nationals. Such a measure would give to refugees

in Syria from Palestine the privileges they were accorded by Jordan soon after the exodus in 1948.

The Egyptian Government has appropriated fifty thousand Egyptian pounds for a program of translation into Arabic, of leading books of the world. Dr. Ṭaha Ḥusain has been invited by the Prime Minister to supervise the enterprise.

Extensive repairs to the Prophet's mosque in Medina have now been completed. A new modern Library has been established on the south side of the mosque. It is under the supervision of the Director General of Waqfs, with technical experts from Pakistan.

The Lower Sind Barrage dam was inaugurated in March by the Governor General of Pakistan. It is one of the most extensive irrigation projects in the world and has taken seven years to complete. The dam is three quarters of a mile in length and will conserve water for the irrigation of two and three quarter million feddans, only a million and a half of which had been cultivated prior to its construction.

An Egyptian jurist, ʿAbdūl-Ḥamīd Badawī, has been appointed Vice President of the International Court of Justice at the Hague.

A new Turkish University, to be known as Atatürk University, is to be constructed at Erzurum in eastern Turkey. It will concentrate particularly on agriculture, veterinary science, forestry and home economics. Consultants from the University of Nebraska, U.S.A. have collaborated in the planning of the new center of professional education.

Plans are being actively developed for a further Islamic Conference at Mecca during the 1955 pilgrimage. Anwar al-Sadat, Acting Secretary of the Conference, visited Riyāḍ for discussions in January last.

Legal experts of the Arab League and states have conferred on the establishment of a unified system of legal terms in Arabic.

Three institutions have been set up in Saudi Arabia, at Mecca, Medina and Al-Hasa, under the Ministry of Education, to encourage the memorising of the Qurʾān. They will also offer instruction in Islam in general. This follows an order from King Saud for the stimulation of Quranic memoriter, through prizes and scholarships.

Iraq appears likely to be the first country in the Middle East to acquire direct television. An English TV station on exhibit at the Baghdad Fair in October, 1954, has been purchased by Iraq and will be in operation early in 1956 after Iraqi technicians have studied abroad.

It is reported that a group of Muslims in Argentina have projected an Institute of Arab-Hispanic Studies and are negotiating with University authorities in Buenos Aires on the matter. The proposed Institute would foster Islamic studies, historical and contemporary, and strive to bring together the Spanish and Muslim peoples.

A group of school girls recently participated in a discussion session in Al-Azhar University, Cairo. The Rector of Al-Azhar signaled the occasion by referring to plans which would admit women for the first time to some of the studies of the University.

SURVEY OF PERIODICALS

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I. GENERAL

- ABSTRACTA ISLAMICA. *Revue des Études Islamiques*, Paris. 1953. pp. 107-211. Lists the literature of the fifties.
- CRUSADER LANDS REVISITED. Harold Lamb. *The National Geographic Magazine*, Washington, D.C. December, 1954. pp. 815-852. Superbly illustrated description.
- DE LA MÉTHODE EN ÉPIGRAPHIE À PROPOS D'UN LIVRE RÉCENT. G. Ryckmans. *Syria*, Paris. 1953, part 3-4. pp. 278-295. Discusses the contribution of the R. P. A. Jammes to deciphering the inscriptions uncovered at Heïd bin 'Aqîl.
- UN ESSAI D'ANALYSE FONCTIONNELLE. J. Lecerf. *Studia Islamica*, Paris. 1954, part 2. Concludes a study of the poet Jibrân.
- UNE ÉTAPE IMPORTANTE DE LA CULTURE ISLAMIQUE. A. Demeerseman. *IBLA*, Tunis. 1953, part 4. pp. 347-385. Deals with the reasons for the long popularity of lithography in the Near East as a bridge manuscripts and printing by type.
- IQBAL, POÈTE ET PHILOSOPHE. Eva Meyerovitch. *Église Vivante*, Paris. 1954, part 4. pp. 218-224. The author illustrates her thought with extensive quotations from Iqbal's poems.
- LE MILLENAIRE D'AVICENNE ET SES REPERCUSSIONS SUR L'HISTOIRE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE. P. Mesnard. *Annales de l'Institut d'Études Orientales de la Faculté des Lettres d'Alger*, Algiers. 1953. pp. 41-59. Surveys numerous recent publications on the subject.
- THE MUSEUM OF ISLAMIC ART AT CAIRO, EGYPT. Muhammad Mustafa. *Islamic Review*, Woking. April, 1954. pp. 19-22. An illustrated description of the main collections by the director of the Museum.
- SAFARI FROM CONGO TO CAIRO. Elsie M. B. Grosvenor. *The National Geographic Magazine*, Washington, D.C. December, 1954. pp. 721-771. Describes many races and customs.
- SOIXANTE ANS DE PENSÉE TUNISIENNE À TRAVERS LES REVUES DE LANGUE ARABE. A. Demeerseman. *IBLA*, Tunis. 1953, part 2. pp. 113-201. Analyses the thought expressed in the main Arabic magazines covering many subjects.
- STUDIES IN ARABIC LEXICOGRAPHY. A. K. J. Germanus. *Islamic Quarterly*, London. Spring, 1954. pp. 12-28. Includes the plans of the Arab Academy.
- TRAVAUX DE LA MISSION ARCHÉOLOGIQUE EN SUSIANE EN HIVER 1952-1953. Roman Ghirshman. *Syria*, Paris. 1953, part 3-4. pp. 222-233. Detailed illustrated description of the Ziggurat de Tchoga-Zanbil built by King Untâs-Huban.
- LE VOILE DE LA KA'BA. M. Gaudefroy-Demombynes. *Studia Islamica*, Paris. 1954, part 2. pp. 5-22. An historical sketch.
- ZIYA GÖKALP: HIS CONTRIBUTION TO TURKISH NATIONALISM. Niyazi Berkes. *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, D.C. Autumn,

1954. pp. 375-390. The author believes Gökalp rendered great service in helping the Turks to analyse their division between Eastern and Western thought.

II. ARABIA

DATE CULTURE IN THE OASIS OF AL-HASA. F. S. Vidal. *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, D.C. Autumn, 1954. pp. 417-428. Although dates are no longer so essential to the section's economy, the ownership of a date garden still gives prestige.

SAUDI ARABIA'S NEW RULER. *Asian Review*, London. October, 1954. pp. 305-306. A sketch of the king's life, emphasising particularly his wide travels and the progressive ideas he has gained from them.

STAR-CALENDARS AND AN ALMANAC FROM SOUTH-WEST ARABIA. R. B. Serjeant. *Anthropos*, Freiburg-Schweiz, 1954, part 3-4. pp. 433-459. Based on research by Carlo von Landberg, the author has tabulated material for actual field-work, as it may have been used by cultivators as early as the 10th century.

III. HISTORY OF ISLAM

AL-BARQ AL-SHĀMĪ: THE HISTORY OF SALADIN. H. A. R. Gibb. *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlands*. 1953, part 1-2. pp. 93-115. A study of the work of ʿImād al-Dīn al-İşfahānī provides further insight into the history of the Crusades.

AL-MASʿŪDĪ'S CONTRIBUTION TO MEDIEVAL ARAB GEOGRAPHY. S. Maqbul Ahmed. *Islamic Culture*, Hyderabad. January, 1954. pp. 275-286. Describes sources of Al-Masʿūdī's work in Greek and Muslim books and in ancient tales.

A BRIEF SURVEY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THEORIES OF STATE IN ISLAM. Qumarmudin Khan. *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*, Karachi. January, 1954. pp. 78-86. April, 1954. pp. 164-174. A study to show that religion and politics in Islam have really progressed together as claimed.

DEVELOPMENTS OF THE QUARTER: COMMENT AND CHRONOLOGY. *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, D.C. Autumn, 1954. pp. 445-460. Covers June 1 to August 31, 1954 with special notes on the Iranian oil agreement and the Suez pact.

LA DEVIATION DE LA 4^e CROISADE VERS CONSTANTINOPLE. A. Frolow. *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, Paris. Juillet-Septembre, 1954. pp. 67-89. The second part of this study.

HELLENISTISCHES DENKEN IM ISLAM. Bertold Spuler. *Saeculum*. Freiburg. 1954. part 2. pp. 179-193. Discusses Greek influence on Islamic theology and Philosophy following the Arab conquest of North Africa and the Levant.

OBSERVATIONS SOCIOLOGUES SUR LES ORIGINES DE L'ISLAM. G.-H. Bousquet. *Studia Islamica*, Paris. 1953, part 2. pp. 61-88. A provocative article comparing Islam with other religious movements.

OTTOMAN METHODS OF CONQUEST. H. Inalcik. *Studia Islamica*, Paris. 1953, part 2. pp. 103-130. Discusses the value of peaceful penetration and assimilation as contrasted with war and mass deportations.

SOURCES OF MUSLIM HISTORIES OF SPAIN. S. M. Imamuddin. *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*, Karachi. October, 1953. pp. 357-379. An annotated list.

SUPPLÉMENT À L'ESSAI SUR L'ISLAM EN U.S.S.R.. V. Monteil. *Revue des Études Islamiques*, Paris. 1953. pp. 1-37. Valuable bibliographical material.

TOWN ADMINISTRATION IN SYRIA UNDER THE EARLY MAMLUKS. Nicola A. Ziadeh. *Islamic Literature*, Lahore Pakistan. August, 1954. pp. 335-355. Describes in detail the work of the various officials.

THE TURKOMEN POPULATION OF THE KHOREZM OASIS. G. E. Martov. *Asian Review*, London. October, 1954. pp. 307-316. Traces the phases of migrations from the Middle Ages to about 1873 when stability began to emerge. The present population is nearly 100,000.

IV. QUR'ĀN. TRADITION. THEOLOGY

ARABISCHE BESTATTUNGSBRÄUCHE IN FRÜHISLAMISCHER ZEIT. Irene Grütter. *Der Islam*, Berlin. 1954, part 2-3. Tells of customs in Mecca and Medina, drawing on the work of Bukhārī and Ibn Sa'd.

THE BIOGRAPHY OF THE PROPHET IN RECENT RESEARCH. A. Guillaume. *Islamic Quarterly*, London. Spring, 1954. pp. 5-11. Reports work being done at the London School of Oriental and African Studies.

DIE BEGRÜNDUNG DER ISLAMISCHEN VÖLKERRECHTSLEHRE. Hans Kruse. *Saeculum*, Freiburg. 1954. pp. 221-241. Deals with the teachings of Muḥammad al-Shaybānī, the great jurist.

DOCUMENTS SUR CERTAINS WAQFS DES LIEUX SAINTS DE L'ISLAM. L. Massignon. *Revue des Études Islamiques*, Paris. 1953. pp. 39-42.

IBN TAIMIYAH'S CONCEPTION OF THE STATE. H. K. Sherwani. *Islamic Literature*, Lahore. January, 1954. pp. 5-16. Gives the theologian's views on the "Imamate" and its powers.

THE KHARIJITE IDEAL OF ISLAMIC SOCIETY. M. A. Muid Khan. *Islamic Literature*, Lahore, February, 1954. pp. 85-90. The sect advocates close adherence to the Qur'ān and to tradition.

DIE LANDWIRTSCHAFT AEGYPTENS IN DIE FRÜHEN 'ABBĀSIDENZEIT. Dieter Müllerwodarg. *Der Islam*, Berlin. 1954, part 2-3. pp. 174-227. Covers the years 750 to 969 A.D. and is the first installment of a study largely based on the "Khitāṭ" of Maqrīzī.

LE LIVRE DE "RÈGLES DE CONDUITE DES MAÎTRES D'ÉCOLE" d'Ibn Sahnun. G. Lecomte. *Revue des Études Islamiques*, Paris. 1953. pp. 77-105. Analysis and translation of this 9th century work.

THE THEORY OF KINGSHIP IN THE "NASĪḤAT UL-MŪLŪK" OF GHAZĀLĪ. A. K. S. Lambton. *Islamic Quarterly*, London. Spring, 1954. pp. 47-55. The author believes the work deals with Sassanian practice in statecraft rather than Islamic.

V. RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL LIFE

Â NABOUL, LES NATTIERS ET LES NATTES. A. Lisse and A. Louis. *IBLA*, Tunis. 1954, part 1. pp. 49-92. A study of Tunisian handicraft.

- THE ARAB REFUGEE DILEMMA. Don Peretz. *Foreign Affairs*, New York. October, 1954. pp. 134-149. The author believes the problem may be solved by the steady pursuit of many small-scale operations.
- LES COÖPERATIVES, PEUVENT-ELLES PROSPERER PARMI LES POPULATIONS D'OUTRE-MER? Charles Ruet. *L'Afrique et l'Asie*, Paris. 1954, part 2. pp. 47-53. Shows that the best results have come from European-Muslim efforts.
- THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF THE JORDAN. S. Van Valkenburg. *Economic Geography*, Concord, N.H. April, 1954. pp. 102-116. A study in economic geography.
- ISLAM AND ARAB NATIONALISM. A. R. Al-Bazzaz. *Die Welt des Islams*, Leiden. 1954, part 3-4. pp. 201-218. In an article translated by S. G. Haim, the author presents a case for being a sincere Muslim and also a true nationalist.
- ISRAEL'S DISTORTED ECONOMY. Jenny Nasmyth. *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, D.C. Autumn, 1954. pp. 391-402. Analyses the aims of the Zionist "Idealists" and the present-day/Palestinian "Economists," believing that latter promise the best future for Israel.
- LA POLITESSE BÉDOUINE DANS LES CAMPAGNES DU NORD DE LA TUNISIE. P. Dornier, *IBLA*, Tunis. 1954, part 1. pp. 99-109. Describes death customs and funeral ceremonies.
- POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN, 1951-1954. Henry C. Atyeo. *Middle Eastern Affairs*, New York. August-September, 1954. pp. 249-259. Gives chronology and some analysis.
- THE PRIME MINISTERS' CONFERENCE AT COLOMBO. *India Quarterly*, Oxford. April-June, 1954. pp. 144-155. Describes the problems before the Conference and is accompanied by statistical tables of wholesale commodity prices and trends in foreign trade.
- PROBLEMS OF ARAB REFUGEE COMPENSATION. Don Peretz. *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, D.C. Autumn, 1954. pp. 403-416. Gives data on absentee property values and tells of the difficulties encountered in attempts to solve the problem of compensation because of politics, etc.
- RELOCATION OF A PUNJAB PAKISTAN COMMUNITY. John J. Honigman. *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, D.C. Autumn, 1954. pp. 429-444. Treats of the work of the Thal Development Authority for the reclamation of the Thal Desert, which already has brought thousands of acres under cultivation and created nearly 200 new villages.
- A SELECTIVE SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND RELATED FIELDS IN MODERN NORTH AFRICA. B. Rivlin. *American Political Science Review*, Washington, D.C. September, 1954. pp. 826-848. The survey excludes Egypt, but gives valuable information.
- TÜRKISCHE GESETZSAMMLUNGEN. G. Jäschke. *Die Welt des Islams*, Leiden. 1954, part 3-4. pp. 225-234. Deals with Codes published since 1839.
- UTILISATION DE LA TERRE ET PRODUCTION DANS LE SUD TUNISIEN. M. Prost. *Cahiers de Tunisie*, Tunis. 1954, part 1. pp. 28-66. An economic-geographic study of Matmata and Ouderna supporting a population of 70,000.

VI. POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS

- EGYPT. Colin Wells. *African Affairs*, London. October, 1954. pp. 311-318. Discusses the political situation, stressing confidence in the sincerity of the present government and its lack of corruption.
- ISRAEL'S NEW TRAP. *The Islamic Review*, Woking. December, 1954. pp. 13-15. Explains the Israeli offer to release £ 8,500,000 to Arab refugees in lieu of the £ 1,933,000,000 actually owed them.
- MIDDLE EAST DEFENCE: A NEW APPROACH. James W. Spain. *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, D.C. Summer, 1954. pp. 251-266. It may prove better to base Middle Eastern defence on the countries themselves rather than on Suez.
- LE NÉO-DESTOUR. Hedi Nouira. *Politique Etrangère*, Paris. Juin-Juillet, 1954. pp. 317-334. Analyses the party's political aims and achievements and shows it to be ardently nationalistic.
- PAKISTAN AND MIDDLE EAST DEFENCE. Sir William Barton. *The Quarterly Review*, London. October, 1954. pp. 488-496. Treats the whole question of defence and the coöperation to be expected from each of the countries involved.
- THE PERSIAN GULF STATES AND THEIR BOUNDARY PROBLEMS. Sir Rupert Hay. *The Geographical Journal*, London. December, 1954. pp. 433-445. Deals with the Shaikhdoms from Kuwait to Muscat, now so important because of their oil resources.
- RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SUDAN. D. K. Sen. *India Quarterly*, Oxford. July-September, 1954. pp. 225-247. A detailed survey of conditions with the text of the agreement of February 12, 1953, between Great Britain and Egypt.
- TURKEY AND HER DEFENCE PROBLEMS. Sir Knox Helm. *International Affairs*, London. October, 1954. pp. 434-439. The author believes the country will be a good ally, but will be able to do little beyond defending her own territory.
- VARIATIONS OF ARAB NATIONAL FEELING IN FRENCH NORTH AFRICA. Nevill Barbour. *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, D.C. Summer, 1954. pp. 308-320. Due to differences in historial backgrounds, geographic position and French methods of administration, Morocco, Algeria and Tunis all have distinct national patterns.
- LES WAKFS DANS L'ISLAM CONTEMPORAIN. G. Busson de Janssen. *Revue des Études Islamiques*, Paris. 1953. pp. 43-76. An analytical study.

VII. MISSIONS TO MUSLIMS

- Arabia Calling*, New York. Autumn, 1954. Whole number. Reports encouraging progress throughout the area.
- THE MOSLEM CHALLENGE IN THE CAPE. J. K. Leslie. Cape to Zambesi, London. November, 1954. pp. 135-138. A cheerful article telling of Christian advances even in the face of active, expanding Islam.
- MUHAMMAD ET S. FRANÇOIS. Giulio Basetti-Sani, O.F.M. *Neue Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft*, Berkenried, Suisse. 1954, part 3. pp. 180-193. Describes the Saint's encounter with Islam at Damietta and his counsel to his disciples in their work with Muslims.