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“THERE IS NO GOD BUT GOD”

To borrow the first half of the Muslim *Shahadah* as a valid summary of the deep significance of the Christian drama of Good Friday and Easter may seem at first glance an unusual proceeding. But reflection confirms that it is none the less fitting for being unfamiliar. For what happened in the Cross of Christ vindicates God's being God as nothing else can. With the Resurrection it is the supreme manifestation of the truth that God reigns in the invincible ultimacy of love; that, however crucially He may be challenged, there is, in the issue, none other than He.

To affirm that there is no God save God is, of course, to imply that His being God alone has been disputed. As the Prophet saw with fervent conviction, that sole Lordship was challenged by idolatry and *shirk*, on many sides. But God's supremacy meant the nothingness of all rivals. To make that nothingness a fact of belief was the iconoclastic purpose of original Islam. To destroy the fictitious and to bring the things believed as to God into conformity to the truth that was as to God—this was the Prophet's mission in Mecca and beyond. Since there *is* no other save He, none other than He must be worshipped.

Yet there are other ways, more serious than paganism, in which God's being God alone is flouted. In its earliest expression, paganism is a product of ignorance rather than of rebellion. It represents a numerical error rather than a moral revolt. Many a simple pagan—albeit ignorantly—is fulfilling a true instinct, the instinct of worship. St. Paul warned the Romans and Muḥammad the Meccans that such ignorance is reprehensible and if persistent becomes wilfully sinful. Even then, however, it remains true that idolatry is neither the only, nor the greatest, form of human misguidedness about God.

Deeper and more tragic than a simple paganism, which may multiply but still worships, is the self-assertion which makes other gods by the subtraction of God's glory and for worship substitutes rebellion. To mistake the unity of God numerically is one thing: to shatter it by conscious usurpation is another. In this sense there are worse things than *shirk*, or 'association' with God. There is, perhaps it might be called, 'dissociation,' by which man arrogates to himself the prerogatives of Divinity and denies to God His inalienable right.

Sin is the supreme, the inclusive, invasion of God's Lordship; and sin is having other Gods than Him, not by ignorance but by design. Whatever, therefore, sets out to vindicate that God is One involves more than the refutation of multiplied idolatry. It demands the conquest of usurping sin.

It is for precisely this reason that Christianity has always believed that a theology of unity must be a theology of redemption. Or to put it more truly—only God's Grace, redeeming sinful man from all his usurpation of what is God's, finally and concretely demonstrates that God is God alone. Here lies the deep and wondrous relevance of the Cross. For, on the human side, that Cross was the worst revelation of human challenge to the reign of goodness and the claim of truth. It was a dark, symbolic coalition of human evil against incarnate God. It was a representative human verdict against the ultimacy of that truth and love which were in Christ, an assertion that there are other gods than God. "Not this man, but Barabbas,"—not the God in Christ, but the gods in us, race, pride, ease, apathy, force.

But on the Divine side, the Cross meets that evil coalition with the inward resources of Divine compassion and mercy active in the sufferings of the Saviour. It does more than refute the wilful blindness, it redeems the wilful blind. It re-affirms that God is God alone in that He forgives, redeems and saves. When the encounter is complete, it is seen at Easter that only God remains. This is the Divine Lordship and Unity, not merely as something affirmed, but as something manifested, not as a proposition, as a fact. The Cross is God's own re-assertion of His Sovereignty. He overcomes the hostility of sin to His Godness by demonstrating that He has resources of love which are unconquered. Thus our human awareness that there is no God save God becomes more than a tenet. Since it is a redeemed awareness, sealed in forgiveness, it is also a fellowship, which cries: "Whom have I in Heaven but Thee: there is none upon earth that I desire beside Thee."

So to know God in Christ, God the One, the Great, the Merciful, the Loving, is to be oneself made whole. For the redemptive Love which is in Christ not only gives us to know that He is all in all: it gives us back to ourselves made free from the waywardness which is the foe of our own peace as well as of God's Glory. We come to know God as God alone, because He subdues all things unto Himself in a Lordship which, through the Cross, brings our rebellion into pardon and our self-will under sovereignty. That He alone is worthy becomes the witness both of creed and of experience. "Blessed be God" we cry with Donne—"only and divinely like Himself."

“EASTER”

“When there was nothing left of Jesus Christ then it was seen that there was nothing left but Jesus Christ, risen in the new day of the sovereignty of God.”

(from a French Sermon, Easter 1943.)

Nought left of Christ: a few short-lived Hosannas,
That owned and yet betrayed the Son of Man,
Then quickly ceased within the hostile city,
While for the Victim's death men shaped their plan.

Nought left but Christ: alive beyond His passion,
He came again the King that none could stay,
To win the hearts of grateful generations,
And still pursues His sure redeeming way.

Nought left of Christ: the folk prefer Barabbas,
In cunning, priestly hands the careless pawns,
And greet with cries of bitter, loud rejection,
His gracious bleeding sovereignty of thorns.

Nought left but Christ: the Master of those sorrows
Outdid their choice of hate with choice of loss,
And with forgiveness wreathed His brow with glory,
A Kingly Sufferer reigning from a cross.

Nought left of Christ: by Judas' heartless treachery,
And Pilate's base injustice doubly sold,
Abandoned by His craven hearted comrades
To seeming failure and to grief untold.

Nought left but Christ: outloving and outmatching,
With mightier force of grace those deeds of shame,
O'er every foe triumphantly arisen,
He to His endless Easter splendour came.

Nought left of Christ: by wood and nails men answer.
And when, upon the awful Cross, exposed
To taunts and gibes, He died with malefactors,
On His short day the tomb's night darkly closed.

Nought left but Christ: the Christ of Resurrection,
Come victor from the pains His love had scorned:
And as He stood beside His empty sepulchre,
On man's long night Life's Day resplendent dawned.

MUSLIM EDUCATION IN THE MIDDLE AGES

(CIRCA 600-800 A.H.)

(A valuable study of Muslim Education appears in the Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics by I. Goldziher. Professor A. S. Tritton, who is at work on a book with this theme, here discusses some further aspects and offers additional data.)

The respect due to learning is a frequent topic of Muslim Tradition. All creatures lament the death of a scholar, the birds in the air and the fish in the sea, because they profited by his exposition of the law concerning them and his knowledge saved them from ill-treatment. The scholar should not be satisfied in his acts and thoughts with what the law allows: he should aim at the highest. An ignorant teacher is a mockery of religion and to say: 'I do not know' is half of knowledge. (Examiners might disagree.) To cease learning is to be ignorant.

Ibn al-Hājj († 737/1336) an educated Muslim, who was not a specialist, propounded a theory of education which gives a general basis for the present study. The mind of a boy is a *tabula rasa*, he taught, receptive of any impression. If he grows up accustomed to do what is right, he will be fortunate in this world and the next while his parents and teachers will share in his reward. The father has the duty of training him in upright ways and saving him from bad companions; he must not let him grow fond of show and luxury lest he waste his life in seeking them. The wet nurse must be a pious woman who eats only what is clean, for there is no blessing on milk from unclean sources. As soon as the child begins to observe, greater watchfulness is needed for then is the beginning of modesty and a sense of shame as the child sees that some acts are improper, unlike others. This is a sign of purity of mind and in an adult is accompanied by full understanding. At first the child is greedy and has to be taught when to eat, to eat slowly and masticate well, not to dirty his hands and clothes, and at times to be content with bread alone. He must learn to prefer white clothes to silk or coloured garments for these are only for women and effeminate men. He should go to school when he is seven (another writer says four years, four months and four days). There he will learn the Qur'ān, traditions and lives of the saints, but not poetry about love; he must not meet those who think love-poetry elegant and refined. He should be rewarded publicly for what he has done well and his naughtiness should be overlooked and he should not be put to shame for it, because this is often the best treatment. If he repeats the offense, he should be punished in private but without nagging, for familiarity with reproof breeds contempt. There must be no sleeping in the daytime for this begets laziness. The boy must sleep at night but on

a hard bed. He must accustom himself to walking and exercise, though he must not walk fast nor swing his arms but hold them close to his sides. He should not boast about his father's wealth, but be polite and attentive to all, and should not accept presents from other boys, knowing that a gentleman gives but does not receive. A poor boy has to learn that it is a disgrace to accept gifts—a dog wags its tail in hope of a reward. The boy should be taught not to love money, for love of it is a deadly poison. He must not spit nor clean his nose in public. He must learn how to sit, not put one foot on the other, not turn his back on others, nor prop his head on his hand—a sign of laziness. He must not talk much, which is impudence, not begin a conversation but answer when spoken to, avoid swearing, and listen to his elders. Foul and lewd talk is to be avoided. If his teacher beats him, he must not scream nor ask the intercession of others but control himself like a brave boy. After school hours comes refined play that he may recover from the labor of learning, yet not such as to exhaust the body. He must learn to obey and respect his parents, teachers and elders. As he grows older he must observe the laws of cleanness, fast a few days in Ramaḍān, learn the prescriptions of the sacred law, fear thieving, wealth from unclean sources, lying, treachery, vice and violent language.

The views of Avicenna at this point form an interesting contrast. He says that education begins after the child is weaned before it has the chance to develop bad habits; good habits are to be encouraged and bad discouraged. If a whipping is necessary, of course proportioned to the tender age, it must hurt so that the child does not despise chastisement. At school the boy will learn the Qur'ān, be shown the forms of the letters and taught the primary duties of religion. He will learn poetry, beginning with *rajaz* for this is easier to remember than odes; the subjects must be moral and improving. The teacher should be intelligent, religious, understanding the training of character, approachable, but not too familiar with the boys and not austere. He should have served the upper classes and know the manners they approve. A boy should not be educated alone but with others of good family for they learn from each other as each talks of what he most likes and admires. "One boy one tutor" leads to boredom but when the tutor can pass from one boy to another there is relief. Rivalry incites the boys to learn.

When he has learnt the Qur'ān and the rules of grammar and speech, it is time to prepare for a craft or profession. If he aims at government service, he will study dispatches, speeches, accounts and then is put into a ministry. A boy may be fit for one profession but not for others. Some are antagonistic to all refining influences and cannot be educated. When a young man has some skill in his craft or profession he should begin to earn his living. When he knows the

pleasure of earning, he will put up with the drudgery of his work and will become accustomed to earning before he can keep himself, for few sons of rich fathers fail to trust to their father's wealth.

Ibn al-Ḥājj has much to say about the school. It should be in the bazar or a busy street, not in a secluded place. The emphasis on publicity is strong; two boys are not to go to the latrine together, the master must not send an elder boy to his house with a message lest rumor should start about the relations of the boy with the women-folk. The mosque is no place for a school for some people send little boys to school to get them out of the way and such children defile their clothes and the place where the Qur'ān is taught. The school is a place for teaching, not an eating house, so the boys should not bring food or money to buy it, but should go home for meals. A check should be kept on the time taken for the trip to prevent idleness. One reason for this ruling is respect for the feelings of poor boys who might be jealous of the food brought by the well-to-do. If food had to be brought, the master might not share it with the boys nor send any of it to his house. He might take their leavings or, if a boy ate none of his food, he might have it all but, in either case, he must tell the parents.

The master should do all the teaching himself; if necessary, he might have an assistant, paid or unpaid, or he might employ the elder boys to teach the younger. If a pupil were so employed, he might not always be set to teach the same youngsters for this leads to mischief; there must be constant change. The teacher must attend to his work and not gossip with passers-by nor leave school to follow a funeral for attendance at a funeral is no more than commendable whereas teaching is a fundamental duty. Not long ago a village teacher in Morocco closed school when visitors came from a distance because "beards came before boys." The master should be married and must not use the boys as servants. He must not laugh with them, not be too familiar with them and not lose their respect. He must be impartial, paying no more attention to the children of the rich than to those of the poor. He must not lose his temper nor punish in anger. The qualifications of a teacher might be meagre for "it is better if he knows grammar." There were things he should not do. He should not write petitions but might write charms though not in Hebrew; he should not read the Qur'ān in the bazar or the street. He should not ask money from the boys on the festivals of the "people of the book" nor accept from them the special foods prepared for these festivals. Advertisement was forbidden for "if a man opens a new school or pupils are few, he should not write papers and fix them to the building." It was wrong to decorate the walls and floor with cloth which bore figures of living creatures or with silk at the festivals. Payment was a problem. At first there was a strong

feeling that the teaching of religion was its own reward; on the other hand it is recorded that God said, "World, serve him who serves me." It was ruled that one who taught for God's sake should get no pay while a paid teacher should not try to get more from the children.

Punishment will vary with the child; for one a frown is enough, for another a rebuke, while a third needs a whipping. Boys under ten should not be beaten; at ten three strokes is the custom but anything up to ten is allowed. A big boy employed as teacher may not beat the younger. The time-table of classes should be fixed. The subjects were writing, arithmetic and memorising the Qur'ān which is the chief aid to the study of books. Although a knowledge of literature is necessary to the understanding of the Qur'ān, yet boys must begin with it; otherwise their characters will be moulded on love songs and poems. Reading in chorus was a bad practice. Writing lessons consisted in copying verses of the Qur'ān; wooden boards were used from which the writing could be washed. The text of the Qur'ān is holy so there had to be a clean place, not trodden by feet, where this washing could be done. A hole should be dug there into which the water could be poured, or it might be thrown into the river, or poured into a clean pot for those who wished to use it as medicine, either externally or internally. In the same way, the rags used in washing the slates had to be clean. If possible, the water should not be brackish so that it might be drunk by those who wished to do so. One founder of a school directed in his will that this water should be emptied on his grave. A benefactor of Al-Azhar gave instructions that this water should be led to his grave through a pipe. Naturally, boys were forbidden to spit on their slates or to clean them with their feet. There was always a store of drinking water and the boys could be asked to contribute to the cost of it though orphans should be excused. There should be two days' holiday every week and one, two or three days before and after a festival. Boys of bad character should not be admitted for they gave the school and the master a bad name and also lost him money.

Parents also had their duties. They should not remove a boy from one school to another when he had almost finished learning the Qur'ān. The end of learning the Qur'ān was marked by a celebration. Hence it was not fair that the teacher, who had done most of the work, should lose the reward, both in money and food. They should not send their children to Christian schools to learn arithmetic and geometry, since this would be an insult to Islam and an encouragement to Christianity, although it was a common belief that Christians were more expert in mathematics. Jews and Christians should not be taught Arabic. It is a well-known tale that a scholar was asked to read Sībawaihi's grammar with one of the people of the book at a fee of one hundred dinars. He refused because the

book contained verses of the Qur'ān. Not long after he solved a problem for the Caliph who gave him a thousand dinars. He said, "I gave God a hundred dinars and He gave me a thousand." Muslims should not learn from Christians nor Christians from Muslims. It is to be noticed that Ibn al-Ḥājj never mentions Jewish schools. These sayings are worth noting. After faith knowledge is the best of works. Knowledge will not profit the upper classes if withheld from the lower. To study one problem with a scholar is better than seventy pilgrimages.

Here is a description of teaching in Damascus. Every evening the Qur'ān from Surah Kawthar to the end is read in the Umayyad mosque and those attend who do not know the book well. Stipends are given to more than five hundred for this purpose. There are also classes and the teachers are paid well. A *waqf* is attached to one pillar and the emoluments are given to him who sits by it to preach and teach. Every morning after the reading of the seventh part of the Qur'ān men teach it to boys. The boys obtain scholarships which only the poor utilise, since the rich folk do not let their children take the money. There is an orphanage where children live receiving food and clothing. Children are taught to read the Qur'ān by one man while another teaches them writing, using poetry for this purpose, to preserve the dignity of the Qur'ān. Thus handwriting excelled in Syria, because the teacher of it did nothing else.

Ḥarīrī says, Teaching is the most noble profession, the most profitable trade; its intercession is most effective and its excellence beyond compare. The authority of the teacher is obeyed, respect for him is wide spread and his subjects are obedient. He rules like a prince, he controls like a minister of state; his decisions are those of a man of might, he is like a mighty king. But in a short space he grows old, is branded with patent folly, his conduct betrays a small mind and he cannot speak to you as one who truly knows. The last phrase is said to mean that he cannot tell you of your faults.

Ibn al-Ḥājj affirms that it is better to study in a mosque, a madrasa and a house, in that order of precedence and that students should not use fans in a mosque though they are allowed in a madrasa. The teacher should not be raised above his hearers, not even by a carpet, and should not lean on a cushion. Some were frightened away from instruction because they saw mules and servants waiting at the gate which was guarded by porters and footmen who had to be bribed before the great man could be approached. A teacher should not leave his teaching to pay court to one who might take his post from him or promote him to a better. No one should move from one school to another unless some special advantage other than money was expected. If a man were paid a fixed salary for teaching a defined subject, he should not ask for more; but if the salary and the subject

were not defined, he might ask for more though it were better not to do so. Should he ask, he had to regard the extra as a help to his study and teaching, not as pay. If he got his salary without having to ask for it, he should take it; but sometimes it was delayed and this meant that God tested his sincerity. Did this happen, he should not publish abroad his misfortune for it might be that God's plan was better for him than his own. The writer adds, "Payment for teaching is the most lawful livelihood." A good teacher is one who knows his subject, can communicate his knowledge and keep the attention of his hearers.

At first teachers of language, like those of Tradition, dictated to their classes. As far as al-Suyūṭī could discover the last teacher of language to dictate died in 339/950. In 796/1393 a man dictated Tradition, reviving a custom which had died out. Al-Suyūṭī began to teach Tradition in 872/1467, when dictation had been dropped for twenty years, he tried to dictate on language but delivered only one lecture as nobody would listen. The practice was for a student to read a passage from the book which was being studied and then the teacher commented on it. The task of reading was coveted and statements like "he studied the book, reading part himself and hearing others read the rest" are common. It happened that a man memorised a book before studying it in class. The following story is probably not historical. Mālik had a secretary who read to the class. Hārūn al-Rashīd asked Mālik to read to his sons but he refused saying, "It is long since I read to others; they have always read with me." Hārūn said, "Send away the class and I will read with you." Mālik replied, "If the crowd are kept out for the sake of the few, the few get no benefit."

A teacher must have a deputy to set the class in their places, also visitors according to their rank, to awaken the sleepers, to warn those who do what they ought not or omit what they ought to do, and bid them listen to the instruction. In class conversation, laughing and jokes are forbidden. A ruler of Egypt attended a class and talked with his brother; the teacher said, "It is not for this that we read Tradition while you talk." The assistant of the teacher was called *mustamlī*; he is mentioned by this name in the time of 'Abdullah ibn Ṭāhir and perhaps earlier. It is said that his duty was to repeat the words of the teacher for the benefit of those who could not hear him. But this view seems ill-founded. Rather it would seem that the *mustamlī* was a tutor. Al-Jubbā'ī had a *mustamlī* who helped him and answered questions for him. In other instances this assistant corrected the master's mistakes. A professor gave a name as Ḥabbān when it should have been Ḥayyān. Dāraquṭnī saw the mistake, waited till the class had dispersed and then told the teacher. Out of curiosity

he attended the class on the following Friday and heard the teacher tell the *mustamlī* to inform the class about the mistake in the name. It was also his function to call the class to order after the opening reading and the prayer. The *mustamlī* might be an important person. In 284/897, for example a *mustamlī* was known as "the traditionalist of Nisapur." The name survived, but about the end of the twelfth century A.D., a new title appears, *mu'īd*; to the best of my knowledge it is not earlier. There was one in a school built by Saladin; a little later a school had two for each professor; about 680/1281 we find one professor with one *mu'īd*. A professor in the Mustanṣiriya had two, one on each side of him repeating all he said. Obviously the *mu'īd* was the *mustamlī* but the description is not to be taken literally. At Aden 691/1291 one man was both professor and *mu'īd*; another was judge and *mu'īd*; another stayed in this post a long time; though it might happen that the professor was a poor man and the *mu'īd* well-to-do. A man might be professor in one school and *mu'īd* in another. A teacher vacated his chair in favour of his son and acted as *mu'īd* for him. A *mu'īd* stayed four years in the Niẓāmīya though the professors changed. A theorist says that the *mu'īd* must put his college duties first; other tasks are extras and supererogatory. The students must show him what they have remembered—in homely language, repeat their lessons—and he must go over with them what they have been slow of understanding in the professor's teaching. This is an intelligible account of the position. The assistant, by whatever name he was called, was a tutor who took more interest in individuals than was possible for the lecturer. It is natural that his work for the dunces was more often mentioned. The method of one man is thus described. He went several times over the passage from the law book; revised it with the students after they had committed it to memory; called attention to the divergent rulings of Mālik and Abū Ḥanīfa in particular and sometimes of others and to the reservations of the text; he then quoted the proof texts; then he set forth analogous cases in very clear language, repeating them in different words till they sank into the students' minds. An abstract description of the good teacher is almost a paraphrase of the above.

A teacher must speak loud enough to be heard by the whole class but no louder and not too fast. After every section he should pause to allow question or comment for it is not fitting for a student to interrupt him. He should not withhold any knowledge from a keen and clever student but should not try to teach anyone beyond his capacity. If the teacher makes a mistake, a student should frame his correction respectfully. Irrelevant talk is bad, also talk about a past or future lesson. If a student deserves rebuke, it is the teacher who

should call him to order. The whole class should protest against rudeness to the teacher. Students must keep to their turn in reading and a register should be kept. The early students of Tradition went on their travels to cut themselves loose from home and kindred and so have more time for study. For the same reason students ought not to marry till their studies are finished. They are advised to wear dyed clothes so as not to waste time in washing them as happens when the garments are white. A student should not listen to a speech or a book unless a teacher is present to explain difficulties.

Detail enough is recorded to give a lively picture of instruction. Some lectures were not dull because of the lecturer's wide and varied knowledge. Another spent most of the time with tales and stories; his pupils learnt from him but did not call themselves his disciples. The chief teacher of Arabic in Aleppo had a limited range and lectured only on the *Hajibīyā*. A visitor lectured on a commentary to *Sībawaihi* with asides at the local man. A man went to Medina to hear a teacher but could not get near him because of the crowd of townfolk. He procured an introduction to the teacher who told him to spend the night in the mosque. In the morning the class assembled and the teacher asked for the stranger. He reported himself as having spent the night in the mosque. The teacher said, "You are the first comer so you have the right to read." He read thirty verses of the *Qur'ān*, the usual quantity and then a *Muhājir* rose and said, "He is a stranger, I will give him ten of my verses." An *Anṣārī* said the same so the stranger went on to read fifty verses till the course ended. In another *Qur'ān* class, when a new-comer was a weaver, he was told to read the *Surah* of *Yusuf* and if a sailor, then *TH*. When one such reader came to the word for wolf, he read it without *hamza*. When corrected he asked if he ought to sound *hamza* in the word for fish and was told, "No." The class was invited to discuss the point but could give no reason. The visitor gave his view; "If you say that a man is like a wolf, you say *istadh'aba* for *istadhāba* means 'melt' but, if you compare a man to a fish, you say *istahāta* meaning that he eats much, for a fish is a glutton. So there is a *hamza* in wolf but not in fish." A student asked to have the difference between *man*, *mā* and *mimmā* explained. The teacher gave a long reply, explaining, dividing, sub-dividing, limiting and giving examples. The questioner did not understand and asked for a repetition several times till the teacher lost patience and said, "I have to explain to men and those who are not asleep but I cannot make the deaf understand. Men like you cannot comprehend even after these illustrations. If you will relieve us of your presence, please do so; if not, we shall all perish. Go to some other class." The man abused him. Where-upon the class wanted to beat him but the teacher forbade this and sent him off.

A teacher said, "Do not pay too much attention to what you hear from me in discussion for in it our argument is to deceive our opponent and overcome him. We do not speak solely in the cause of truth; for that, silence would be better than much of our talk. As it is, we are in danger of God's wrath but we hope for his mercy."

A teacher came to Aden accompanied by a band of scholars. Another lost much of his property at the sack of Zabid but saved enough to buy a ship which traded to Abyssinia and India, bringing him in a good income. He withdrew to the island of Kamaran and students followed him there and he maintained them. We read often of men who spent their salaries on their students. As examples of zeal these stories will serve. A man was put in prison, in an oubliette, so his students sat round the mouth while he dictated to them from below. Of another it is said that men crowded round him in the great mosque to read the Qur'ān under his tuition but they had to wait some time till their turn came. He rode away accompanied by two or three men, all reading their lessons to him at the same time, each in a different part of the book, while he gave his comments first to one and then to another.

In most places the *ṭaylasān* was the mark of the scholar; the Ṣāhib Ibn 'Abbād put it on when he prepared to dictate. In Shirāz everybody wore it so scholars wore the *durrā'ah* which was elsewhere worn by civil servants only. It was thought worthy of note that a traditionist wore the dress of the military (*jundī*) and that a boy wore this till he was sixteen when he adopted the scholar's dress.

In early times it was thought wrong to take pay for teaching, especially the Qur'ān and religion. This was carried to extremes; a man fell into a well and would not let a pupil help in pulling him out lest this help should be considered payment for his teaching. A scholar bought some things at a shop, more than he could comfortably carry, so the shop-keeper offered to carry some for him. On the way the shop-keeper asked a question. Before he would answer it, the scholar took from him what he was carrying. The voluntary help would have become payment. It is said that the Nizāmīya was the first school in which the professor received payment. In one founded by Saladin in Egypt the professor of law was paid 40 dinars at 13 $\frac{1}{3}$ dirhams to the dinar as teacher, 10 dinars for managing the property besides 60 *roṭls* of bread and two supplies of water daily. Salaries were monthly unless the contrary is stated. For thirty years before 678/1279 there was no professor in that school but a succession of ten *mu'ids*. In that year a man was appointed professor at half the salary after being dismissed from the office of chief judge. His successor got only a quarter of the salary though the next holder of the post got the full amount. In another school in Egypt the professor got 60 dirhams and the *mu'id* 40. In Ta'izz the salary was 30 dinars

and elsewhere 1000 dirhams is mentioned. Ibn Jamā'ah was dismissed from the post of judge but went on teaching and received 1000 dirhams. A youth studied Tradition without fee but, when he asked to read al-Mutanabbī with the commentary of Abū Zakarīyā, his teacher demanded a fee because it was poetry. The boy's father paid 5 dinars in advance. A man took a *mithqal* of silver a day for teaching some one the Qur'ān; the instruction lasted for five or six months but at the end the money was returned to the student because the payment had been only a test of his zeal.

For the madrasa in general one can only refer to what is said in the *Encyclopedia of Islam*; here some supplementary details are added. It has been suggested that the madrasa was the answer to the organised Ismā'īlī propaganda. The founder might impose conditions, even about the times of teaching. One laid it down that the teacher must be learned in the differences of the legal schools; a man was appointed to that school but resigned because he did not fulfil that condition. Another insisted that the teacher must know the *Ṣiḥāḥ* of Jawharī. In one school the descendants of an early teacher held office with only one interruption for more than two hundred years. In another for one hundred and sixty years all teachers were the offspring of the founder. The state exercised some supervision over teaching. Al-Azhar was under a superintendent who was not a teacher. The permission of the Caliph was needed before anyone could teach in the Niẓāmīya. The Sulṭān Mas'ūd commanded a man to teach there but first had to extort the permission from the Caliph. Before al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī could lecture in the mosque of Maṣṣūr he had to get the permission of the supreme *naqīb* (*naqīb al-naḡabā'*), and the Caliph obtained this for him. Saladin gave to one man a salary from the revenues of the mosque in Damascus and to another a salary from those of a mosque in Cairo. Orders were not always obeyed. It did happen that the state dismissed a teacher but he appealed to the compassion of his successor and was allowed to continue at his work. A man came to Aleppo and taught in two schools there. Some accused him of incompetence and lodged a complaint with Nūr al-dīn ibn Zangī so the man was dismissed and another appointed. A man was dismissed from the Niẓāmīya because he belonged to the Shī'ah. His students came to his house expecting to be taught. He met them with, "My bread is bought and my house rented." In the school he had had free quarters and rations but after his dismissal he could not afford to teach. A man was appointed to teach Tradition but was not popular. A visiting scholar found disparaging remarks about the prophet's favourite wife in one of his books. This was reported so the man was punished and put in prison.

Though theorists laid it down that a Muslim might not teach Christians and unbelievers nor should a Muslim child learn reading

from a Jew or Christian, in practice it was different. A Rāfiḍī Muslim had Muslim, heretic, Jewish, Christian and Samaritan pupils. In Fez Jews had Muslim pupils. When the Spaniards conquered Murcia the king built a school for a Muslim master, where he taught Muslims, Jews and Christians what they wanted to learn, each in his own language. A teacher in Cairo had pupils from the three religions.

The custom of travelling in search of Tradition continued but it became a gathering of teachers rather than of traditions. Now one could claim a scholar as one's teacher if one had read his work and been given a certificate to that effect. One man claimed 1300 men teachers and 80 women; another claimed to have heard 2000 and to have received certificates from 1000 more while a third boasted of 7000. One claimed to have heard traditions in a hundred and twenty towns. Another sold all that he had inherited from his merchant family and spent the money in search of learning; so that he had to travel on foot to Isfahan and Baghdad, carrying his book on his back. Another boasted that he had never ridden an animal in his search for traditions, he carried his books on his back, never begged during the period of his studies and lived on what came to him. Young children, sometimes not a year old, were taken to hear famous teachers so as to be able to claim the distinction of having heard them. Though great scholars still arose, much of the study of Tradition was dilettante. At an early date a collection of *thulāthiyāt*, traditions reported by three persons, was made and later it was followed by *subā'iyāt*, *thumāniyāt* and others. There were collections called *buldāniyāt*, connected with special places. It was the duty of a Muslim to know forty traditions so countless collections of forty were made. *Juz'* (part) seems to have been a recognised size for a book and *al-durar al-kāmina* mentions parts by some sixty men, many of which are recorded by Ḥajjī Khalfa. One man heard the part of Ibn 'Arafa from eighty teachers; this book was also used in Spain.

It was an advantage if a teacher could show that his explanation of a book was derived from the author by an unbroken chain of transmitters. This was true of all studies. Thus one proudly gives the list of twelve scholars between Sībawaihi and himself as confirmation of the validity of his understanding of the book. As early as 330/941 a man had to defend himself because he quoted from books as well as from his teachers. "His teachers were books" was not a compliment. On the other side, a teacher said to a pupil, "You have no need of my teaching; study my books and watch me; consult me if you are in any difficulty."

Opinions differed about the value of the license to teach or quote an authority. Some held that it was not as valuable as direct oral knowledge; others made no distinction between them. Some took the license seriously. When the validity of those granted to one

scholar was questioned, a decision was taken to the effect that as the recipient agreed that some were false and had delayed in producing the evidence for others, anyone who had relied on them in his studies had wasted his time. Another wrote the names of his authorities on his texts but would not write that of any man unless he took an oath that he had heard the book from a teacher. Others were less strict. A scholar from Spain travelling in the east asked the license of his teacher for two of his own pupils. This seems to be the meaning of the expression "license upon license"; that if A gave a license to B, B could give C the right to call himself the pupil of A. Some did not allow this. A man asked the license of scholars in the east and the west to be given to his boy. It seems that a teacher gave to all his hearers license for all his works, prose and verse, during a visit to Aden which lasted one month. License was given for the *ṣaḥīḥ* of Muslim, after it had been read in six sessions, one third of it being read at the last sitting.

Classes usually began at dawn and ended at noon, though earlier or later hours were sometimes kept, if demanded by the founder of the school. A teacher does not deserve his pay unless he starts with the sun. There are in fact many instances of diligence beyond the normal limits. One taught Tradition all day. From dawn he lectured on a section of 'purity' till the students were exhausted and went away. Another had nineteen classes a week, morning, afternoon or evening, teaching all day and between the evening prayers. Others were more sparing. One master lectured on literature in the mosque on Fridays only. Another lectured only on Wednesdays; once he said, "I can give you no profit to-day." Or classes might be arranged every day except Friday but for single subjects only, with two days for dictation, one for discussion, two for the Qur'ān and one for theology. At an earlier date the mosque in Cairo was crowded between the evening prayers with a hundred and ten classes in law, Qur'ān, literature and philosophy. After the afternoon prayer a teacher took his pupils into the country and made them run races and jump.

Trades and professions were usually organised in guilds. There was a shaiikh of the bazar of booksellers and in another town they banned a book *Martyrs for Love* by refusing to sell it. There was a shaiikh of the doctors, a *ra'īs* of the exhorters and Aleppo had a shaiikh of the shaiikhs but this may refer to Sūfīs. Herat had a *ra'īs* of the scholars and heads of the schools of law are often mentioned. But normally there is no mention of a guild of scholars with formal initiation of a novice. Sometimes a scholar was accepted at his own valuation as happened with the man dismissed from Aleppo by Nūr al-dīn ibn Zangī. Men earned a reputation in one or more subjects. A man was told in a dream to study grammar with a certain scholar;

this surprised him as the man had no fame as a grammarian. He obeyed the dream and was given a license to teach grammar with the result that "I went home and never read any book on grammar without understanding its contents." A miracle! A scholar was known by his teachers not by his college. It is recorded that a man became head of a college after beginning his education in the orphanage attached to it.

Scores of women scholars, twenty-three named Zainab, are mentioned in *al-durar al-kāmina*, all of them traditionists; though Ibn al-Ḥājj says that women were usually not masters of their subject. One was specially summoned to Egypt. One woman, it is said, learned law from her father, married a lawyer and set him right when he went wrong. Of another we read that she heard the teachers of Hamadhan and strangers and became an exhorter (*wā'izah*), paying attention to the interpretation of the Qur'ān, literature and writing. Later she retired into private life. A woman doctor lived in Spain where a woman lectured on the letters of the alphabet.

As the day's work began with the study of the Qur'ān and continued through law to literature so students were advised to arrange their books in accordance with the importance of the subject and the distinction of the author with the Qur'ān at the top. Where so much was memory work, the causes of forgetfulness received attention. It might be due to excess of phlegm in the constitution; this came from drinking too much water which in its turn was due to over-eating. Let the student beware of this and also of eating sour apples and woundwort. Other causes are reading epitaphs on tombstones, seeing the bodies of those who had been impaled and immoral acts. A moral life and prayer were the best aids to a good memory.

A. S. TRITTON

*School of Oriental and African Studies,
University of London*

SOME PARADOXICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE MU'TAZILITE VIEW OF FREE WILL

The generally accepted view is that the Mu'tazila were the exponents of free will in Islam. This teaching of the 'Rationalists of Islam' is sometimes found a little incongruous with the fundamental theodicy of Islam, and is sharply contrasted on that account with the harsh pre-destinarian ethics of the Qur'an, in which God appears as an Absolute Sovereign to Whose unfettered will, His fiat, everything is subjected,—on the one hand, or with the official teaching of Ash'arism which, endorsing the Quranic world-view, found it impossible to assign to man any but a nominal role¹ in the ethical drama, on the other. Yet it is not sufficiently realized how complex was the teaching of the representatives of the Mu'tazilite school on the question of free will and free activity and how paradoxical were the implications of their ethics, when viewed in the perspective of their general conception of man and the world.

It is perhaps worth noting at the outset that it is an illusion to speak as though there existed a Mu'tazilite consensus of opinion on the question of moral freedom. The views of the Mu'tazila on this baffling question, with its two poles of free will and free activity, present a striking measure of divergence, which in many cases amounts to virtual incompatibility. It is indeed a little disconcerting to note that the ethical theory of some representatives of the Mu'tazilite school² surpasses in its extremeness the teaching of their avowed antagonists, the Ash'arites, and is inspired by precisely the same theological motive: namely, the safeguarding of the absolute and unqualified omnipotence of God.

It might contribute to the understanding of the ethical dilemma in which the Mu'tazila were involved, if we remember a fact on which our Islamic authorities are all agreed: namely, that the Mu'tazilite teaching centered round the two concepts of divine justice and divine unity.³ The Mu'tazila were certainly not mere 'Freethinkers,'⁴ who were interested in ethical and philosophical speculation on its own

¹ In its notion of *Kasb* (or acquisition).

² That of Šāliḥ Qubba.

³ Cf., e.g., Shahrastānī, *Al Milal Wal-Nihal*, Ed. Cureton, London 1846. pp. 28-9; Al-Khayyāt, *K. Al-Intiṣar*, Ed. Nyberg, Cairo 1925 p. 5; Al-Murtaḍa, *K. al-Munia wal-Amal*, Ed. Arnold, Leipzig, 1902, p. 2, etc.

⁴ 'Freidinker' as Steiner calls them in his study on the Mu'tazila, Leipzig, 1865.

Nyberg has recently championed the opposite view in E.I., etc. We shall see how, in regard to our present problem at least, the theological factor predominates and how their so-called rationalism is completely out of joint. Prof Nyberg has tended to put greater stress on the political implications of Mu'tazilite teaching than, I believe, is warranted.

account. From the sense of pride which they took in calling themselves the "people of Justice and Unity," as well as from the manner in which they sought to defend Islam against its adversaries⁵ it is clear how strongly attached to Islam they remained. Beyond doubt the starting-point of their ethical speculation was theological. Their vindication of the freedom of man (*ikhṭiyār*) and his efficacy (*qadar; istiṭā'a*) was intended to relieve God of the responsibility for the evil deeds of man, and consequently, to safeguard His justice. But, as genuine heirs of the Islamic heritage, they were as keenly interested in safeguarding His unity, against the Dualists (Manichaeans) and the exponents of a positive theory of Divine attributes (*the Ṣifātiya*). It was this latter circumstance which led them logically to reject the notion of a series of divine attributes distinct from the essence of God (which the language of the Qur'ān strongly suggested), because it endangered God's uniqueness and transcendence; and to propound a "negative theology" which the Ash'arites unjustly interpreted as tantamount to stripping God of His attributes.⁶ These two distinct theological motives, however, were destined to clash in the teaching of some of the more astute among the Mu'tazilites, because of their inherent incompatibility. For whereas the vindication of God's uniqueness was bound to lead inevitably to the vindication of His unlimited sovereignty in the world, the assertion that 'man was the creator of his deeds' was conceived precisely with a view to limiting this sovereignty in a manner which would safeguard His justice. Thus, naturally enough, the Mu'tazilite inconsistency in theology reflected itself in their ethics; so that their profession of human freedom appeared soon to violate one of their major, initial assumptions in theology. It is not surprising, then, to find that their profession of human freedom was no more than a verbal avowal of man's right to exercise an ineffective freedom in the domain of consciousness and will only. This right the majority of the Mu'tazilite doctors conceded, yet when it came to the question of outward activity many of them denied man's right to exercise any jurisdiction on the outward deed, which they referred mediately or immediately, to the initiative of God. The Ash'arites, dazzled by the vision of the unmitigated might of the God-Despot of the Qur'ān, escaped this predicament by investing Him with absolute sovereignty over man and nature alike and artfully rebutted the charge of implicating God

⁵ Especially the Materialists (*Ahl al-Dahr*) and the Manichaeans. Al-Khayyāt cites among those polemicists Al-Nazzām, Abu-l Hudhail and Mu'ammār, cf. *Op. Cit.* p. 17.

⁶ Cf., e.g., *Milal*, p. 30. On this 'negative theology' of the Mu'tazila cf., Wensinck, *The Muslim Creed*, Cambridge, 1932, pp. 74 et seq.

in man's evil deeds by consigning Him to a sphere in which the concepts of justice and injustice are without significance.⁷

In order to give point to the ethical question at issue, it might be fitting to examine the Mu'tazilite reply to the question: 'What can be imputed to man in moral activity?'—against the background of the parallel replies of other Islamic sects. To begin with, the reply of one extreme sect, the Determinists,⁸ to this question was: simply nothing. Despite its harshness such a reply had the merit of being straightforward and direct, and in fact, of squaring with the grand Quranic theme of an omnipotent and omniscient creator of the universe. Yet this very straightforwardness could not fail to arouse misgiving, because it swept away too readily a whole host of Quranic notions which pre-supposed human responsibility and made a mockery of God's justice. The Ash'arite school, on the other hand, gave qualified approval to this deterministic solution and assigned to man a certain share in the divinely-ordained act, which it called Acquisition (or *Kasb*).⁹

The Mu'tazilite doctors, however, were not content with the admission of such an ineffective role to the human agent, but sought with great earnestness to reconcile the two apparently contradictory concepts of human responsibility and Divine omnipotence, without sacrificing either. Nor were they willing to empty the concept of injustice of any positive content, in order to accommodate it to their theological needs, as the Ash'arites did in pursuance of an agnostic line of thought which seems to ante-date the Mu'tazilite movement.¹⁰ They rather sought to insert into one formula all those conflicting elements. Therein lay their merit as genuine, ethical theorists:—that

⁷ Al-Ghazālī sums up this Ash'arite rebuttal very succinctly in this statement: "We hold that injustice (*zulm*) is negated from God, *simpliciter*; . . . for injustice is conceivable either in the case of one who infringes the domain of another . . . or one who disobeys the command of a superior; and this is inconceivable with regard to God"—Cf. *Iqtisād*, Cairo, p. 83.

⁸ The most important representative of this sect being Jahm b. Šafwān (d. 475) and his school—Cf. *Milal*, p. 60. and Baghdādī, *Al-Farq bain al-Firaq*, Cairo, 1910, p. 199, and *Uṣūl al Dīn*, Stambul, 1928, p. 134, etc.

⁹ On this question of *Kasb* Cf. Juwaynī, *El-Irchād*, Ed. Luciani, Paris, 1938, pp. 108 et sq.; Al-Ghazālī, *Iqtisād*, pp. 44 et sq.; *Ihyā'*, IV, 219 sq.; Al-Shahrastānī, *Nihāyat al Iqdām*, London, 1931, pp. 72 sq.; and *Milal*, pp. 68-9, etc. That 'Kasb' implied no more than a nominal admission of freedom, as we have hinted, appears from the statement of Shahrastānī that it stipulated a mere relation (ta'alluq) of the act to the agent. This is also confirmed by Maimonides, *Guide of the Perplexed*, Ed. Munk, Paris, 1856, Cf. Arabic text in Vo. I, p. 110 overleaf.

¹⁰ Al-Ash'arī's conception of attributes, predicable of God unknowably (*bila kaif*) is affiliated to the teaching of Mālik b. Anas (d. 795) who summed up the 'traditionalist' view thus: "God's sitting on the throne is known, its modality is unknown; belief in it is a duty and questioning it is a heresy"—Cf. *Milal*, p. 65 & 76.

despite the fact that their starting-point was theological, they did not shirk the task of facing the problem of human responsibility squarely. Yet it is a misconception to imagine that they found a ready exit out of the ethical dilemma. Their solution to the problem of freedom was in fact much more complex and paradoxical than is generally realized.

It is fairly clear from the study of our sources that there existed a measure of agreement over the question of free choice (*ikhhtiyār*) among the representatives of the schools of Baghdad and Baṣrah, alike. In addition to free choice those representatives admitted *in principle* that man was endowed with a certain moral efficacy (*qudra* or *Istiṭā'a*) whereby he could execute the decrees of his own will.¹¹ But when they proceeded to corroborate these two admissions philosophically they involved themselves in a number of grievous paradoxes which endangered the very foundations of their ethics.

The credit for formulating a fairly consistent position on the question of moral freedom, as indeed on many another question, seems to belong to Abū-l-Hudhail al-'Allāf (d. 841?), the greatest representative of the school of Baṣrah. Our most important authority on the early dogmatic systems, Al-Ash'arī (d. 935), tells us in his *Maqālāt* that Abu-l Hudhail and his followers held that the acts 'generated' by man can be divided into those of which he knows the modality (*kaifiyya*) and those he does not. An example of the former is the flight of the arrow or the sound caused by the impact of two things when brought together. An example of the latter is pleasure, hunger, knowledge, smell, etc. Man, he argued, can rightly be said to be the author of those acts of which he knows the modality; whereas acts which he cannot scrutinize must be attributed to God.¹² In this manner he seems to have departed from the teaching of Bishr b. al-Mu'tamir (d. 825), head of the rival school of Baghdād, who inaugurated this decisive doctrine of 'generation' (or *tawallud*)¹³ and held that "whatever is 'generated' through our deeds is of our doing"¹⁴—irrespective of whether we can scrutinize it or not. Abu-l Hudhail's motive in making this subtle distinction is not clear; but it is very

¹¹ This is the generally accepted account. Cf. *Milal*, p. 30, where Shahrastānī writes that the "Mu'tazila (generally) concur that man is endowed with power (*qādir*), is the creator of his deeds both good and evil and is deserving of reward or punishment thereon in the life-to-come; and that evil, injustice and acts of vileness cannot be predicated of God; for were He to create injustice He would be guilty of injustice." Al-Baghdādī reports the same view on the authority of a Mu'tazilite author, al-Ka'bī, Cf. *Farq*, p. 94, etc.

¹² Cf. *Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn*, Stambul, 1930, p. 402.

¹³ As Shahrastānī relates, *Milal*, p. 44—who aptly remarks that Bishr took his doctrine over from the "physical philosophers." Cf. also *K. al Intiṣār*, p. 76 & p. 171.

¹⁴ *Maq.* p. 401 and 403; *Farq*, p. 143.

likely that he sought thereby to ward off one of the charges which the anti-Mu'tazilite polemicists directed against their notion of man "as the creator of his deeds." For according to those polemicists—to whom Al-Shahrestānī refers as the 'Orthodox'—the notion of creation implies knowledge of the effects of creation, 'in every respect,' on the part of the Creator—and is consequently not predicable of man who has none but a 'general' knowledge of the effects of his actions only.¹⁵

Despite this minor disagreement, Bishr and Abu-l Hudhail seem to have agreed on two points which are central to any effective belief in moral freedom:

- a. First, that in the inward domain of willing and choosing man exercises a definite freedom of initiative.¹⁶
- b. Secondly, that man can effect, through his will, certain deeds, in the outward sphere of nature by causing (or generating) such effects. In this way, the concept of a causal connection between the will as cause and the event as effect is tacitly pre-supposed¹⁷ and a certain measure of consistency achieved.

Now it would be a grave illusion to imagine that the Mu'tazila generally concurred in these two elemental propositions, much as it would appear that they constitute the irreducible minimum of any effective belief in moral freedom. It is true that the Mu'tazila generally concur in conceding the reality of free will; that is, of man's initiative in the inward world of volition, as we have seen. But when it comes to the second proposition, their teaching reveals a wide measure of divergence, which, in certain cases endangers their whole ethical structure and militates against their initial desire to safeguard the justice of God.

¹⁵ Cf. *N. al Iqdām*, pp. 68 sq. Cf. also Ghazālī, *Iqtisād*, p. 42. What gave point to this highly speculative matter seems to have been a purely legal consideration, namely: Whether a man was responsible for deeds caused (or generated) posthumously by his action. The classical instance is that of a man who is killed by an arrow which had been shot by an archer who had died in the interval. Cf. *Maq.* p. 403 and *Uṣūl*, p. 137.

¹⁶ Cf. *Maq.* 403. Abu-l Hudhail distinguishes between "what man causes or effects in himself (*yaf 'alu fi nafsihī*)" "and what he causes in other things." The former, he held, is the *cause* of the latter. He names will among the things man "causes in himself." Recognizing the role of the will as the 'principia prima' of action, the majority of the Mu'tazilites (with the notable exception of Jubā'ī) denied that 'the will has a will'—p. 419—or 'that it is generated'—p. 414—avoiding thus the '*regressus ad infinitum*.' It is worth noting here that the Ash'arites disputed the reality of the self-determination of the will itself and referred this to God. Al-Ghazālī, who exemplifies their teaching, relates the notion of choosing (*Ikhtiyār*) to that of good (*Khayr*) and this he ascribes to the agency of God. Cf. *Ihyā'*, IV, p. 219 f.

¹⁷ This is what Al-Ghazālī observes in criticising the doctrine of generation "which is identical with the philosophers' thesis of a necessary causal nexus," *Tahāfut*, p. 377, Cf. also *Maq.* p. 412, where a necessary causal connection is stated to have been admitted by "the majority of the M. who believed in Tawal-lud". Also *Uṣūl* p. 137. On p. 415 of *Maq.*, Al-Ash'arī lists those who held that the "will necessitates its object," of whom he mentions Abu-l Hudhail, al-Nazzām, Mu'ammār, and Ja'far b. Ḥarb.

Perhaps the most striking example of the paradox we wish to outline is that of a curious thinker about whom very little is known: Ṣāliḥ Qubba.¹⁸ This Ṣāliḥ is reported by Ash'arī as saying that "man acts only in himself," so that "whatever comes about through his action is of God's doing initially (*ibtidā'an*)."¹⁹ Compelled like the Ash'arite doctors by the desire to safeguard the fundamentally Islamic notion of the absolute omnipotence of God, he denied that there existed any necessary correlation between the phenomena of nature; because, according to him, in every such phenomenon we must seek the direct working of God. Thus, he argued "it is possible that fire be brought into contact with wood many times and yet God create no burning in it"; "that God might cause a man to burn in fire, and still not experience any pain but instead pleasure"—if God so willed—; that "He might create (in man) perception (*idrāk*) alongside blindness and knowledge alongside death."²⁰ When asked: "Would you deny that you are at the present moment in Mecca sitting under a tent, but are unaware of it because God has not created in you the knowledge thereof?"—he replied: "I would not deny it." Where upon he was aptly nicknamed: Qubba (or tent).²¹ The only other Mu'tazilite whose teaching on this question came close to the position of Ṣāliḥ was Abu-l Husain al Ṣāliḥī, a contemporary of Al Khayyāt (end of 9th cent.). Like Ṣāliḥ, this Ṣāliḥī did not recognize any limitation on God's power, short of infringing the law of contradiction. Consequently, he argued that God could create death and knowledge in the same subject, as He can in fact create life and ignorance together in it.²²

The paradoxical character of this teaching might strike one as too stark. Yet other representatives of this Mu'tazilite section, while endorsing this proposition in principle, seem to have sought to rationalize it in various ways. The great thinker Al-Nazzām (d. 835 or 845), for instance, introduced the notion of nature (*ṭaba'*) and simultaneous creation, as a means of rendering this teaching more credible. In this he was certainly influenced by the Greek philosophers, especially Anaxagoras and Aristotle. His central argument was that "whatever happens outside the sphere of (man's) power is caused by God through an act of creative necessity (*bi ijāb al khalq*) or by necessity of nature (*ṭab'an*)."²³ Thus when a stone is propelled it is made

¹⁸ Ibn Ṣabīḥ b. 'Amr. Shahrastānī reckons him among the later Kharijites (*Milal*, 103) and the Murji'a, who were also Qadaris (Sc. Mu'tazila)—Ib. p. 107.

¹⁹ *Maq.* p. 406 Cf. also *Munia*, p. 41.

²⁰ *Maq.* pp. 406 & 568-9.

²¹ *Maq.* p. 407.

²² *Maq.* pp. 309-11 Cf. also *Mun.* p. 40.

²³ *Milal*, p. 38.

to travel, neither through the power of its propeller nor through the direct action of God, as the Ash‘arites held—, but rather through the nature (ṭaba‘) imprinted on it by God since the beginning of creation. For in the beginning, he argued, God created everything at once (daf‘atan wāḥidah). This, however, did not exclude development altogether; because God, he added, made certain things to be latent (*act: Kumūn*) in other things which in the course of time become manifest (*act: Zuhūr*); so that whatever happens in nature is caused indirectly by God’s initial act.²⁴

We might stop here to consider this ingenious doctrine of “concealment and manifestation.” Al-Shahraṣṭānī, on the authority of Porphyry, ascribes it to Anaxagoras.²⁵ In its application, however, it resembles the Stoic doctrine of the ‘*λογοι σπερματικοι*’ and the Medieval doctrine of the ‘*rationes semineles*’ which St. Augustine himself employed in his theory of creation, as well as the Aristotelian doctrine of ‘*potentiality and actuality*.’²⁶ But there are certain aspects of this theory which would suggest a Manichaean influence—such as the interest in accounting for the emergence of fire from the wood, in which it is said to be latent (kāmin).²⁷ Nevertheless the theory seems to have been later generalized, both by al Nazzām and his followers, to account for the ‘*inherence*’ of any latent property or element in another substance; such as “oil in the olive and fat in the sesame seed,” “sweetness in honey and bitterness in gall.”²⁸

The exponents of this theory of Kumūn, which was never in vogue among the Ash‘arites, seem to have propounded it with a view

²⁴ *Milal*, p. 39. and *Farq.* p. 129 & *Intiṣār*, p. 51.

²⁵ *Milal*, p. 257. Cf. also Al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm (d. 860)—*La Lotta tra l’Islam e il Manicheismo*, Ed. M. Guidi, Rome, 1927, p. 45., which implies the view of Anaxagoras although he is not mentioned by name.

²⁶ M. Horten accepts the account of Shahraṣṭānī and identifies al-Nazzām’s view with Anaxagoras’s view of the ‘*σπερματα*’ or ‘*χρήματα*’—which represent the original stuff of the universe (Cf. Aristotle; *Met.* IV, 1007b-26, etc.) out of which everything else emerged. Cf. *ZDMG*, LXIII, 1909, pp. 774 et seq. S. Horowitz, however, opts for the stoic doctrine of the ‘*λογοι σπερματικοι*.’ Cf. *Einfluss der Griechischen Phil. auf die Entwicklung des Kalam*, Breslau, 1909, 21-24. Pines, in *Beitrage zu Atomenlehre*, Berlin, 1936, p. 100, assimilates the notion of Kumūn to that of Lactantius (d. 325), one of the early church Fathers Cf. W. Smith, *Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography* vol. II, p. 701.

²⁷ Cf. especially Jāhiz’s account of al-Nazzām’s teaching on this question in *K. Al-Hayawān*, Cairo, 1906, V, pp. 2 et sq. Also *Maqālāt*, 327; and Jābir b. Hayyān, *Epistles* Ed. Kraus, Egypt, 1354 A.H. p. 243. The latter speaks of a Manichaean theory of ‘*Kumūn*’ opposing it to the Islamic doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*.

²⁸ Jāhiz, *op. cit.*, p. 3. Among the exponents of ‘*Kumūn*’ Al-Ash‘arī mentions Abu-l Hudhail, Al-Nazzām, Mu‘ammar, Hishām b. Al-Ḥakam, and Bishr b. Al-Mu‘tamir. Dirar b. ‘Amr is cited as holding a modified version of this theory—Cf. *Maq.* 329 & 328. Cf. also on this question: Al Nisabūrī, *K. Al-Masā’il*, Leiden 1902, pp. 36-7.

to relieving God from the cumbrous task of continuous intervention in the course of natural events (as Ṣāliḥ Qubba had done); without however compromising His *indirect* sovereignty in the world. But this modified version of determinism did not satisfy either the protagonists of divine omnipotence, like the Ash'arites, or the advocates of man's effective right to act freely in the domain of nature, like Bishr and Abu-l Hudhail. No wonder Al-Nazzām was assailed with great bitterness by the Mu'tazila and the Ash'arites alike.²⁹

With regard to the former notion of nature (*ṭaba'*), as the decisive principle of activity inhering in things, Al-Nazzām seems to have followed the lead of Mu'ammār b. 'Abbād, teacher of Bishr b. Al-Mu'tamir.³⁰

This Mu'ammār, who pushed this notion of *Ṭaba'* to its logical limit, argued that the existence of bodies is to be ascribed to God; whereas the existence of accidents must be ascribed to the 'action' of bodies themselves, either by way of natural necessity (*ṭab'an*), as in the case of inanimate things such as fire; or in a voluntary manner (*ikhtiyāran*) as in the case of animate beings such as man.³¹ This he proved by involving his opponents in the following dilemma. A body might be susceptible of a given accident (e.g. colour) or it might not be. In the first case colour would belong to it by nature and is of its 'doing' (*min fi'lihi*); since what is natural to a thing cannot be said to be the action of another agent. In the second case, God might decide to colour the body, and yet the body might not receive the colour of which it is not susceptible.³² Consequently, God cannot be said to cause the accidents, except indirectly; that is through the agency of the body which causes its own accidents naturally.³³

The motive of Mu'ammār in following this notion of *Ṭaba'* to its logical consequence was obviously the desire to relieve God completely of any responsibility for evil in the world.³⁴ But the Ash'arites not unnaturally interpreted this as tantamount to ascribing impotency to God, which made mockery, they held, of God's title as author of life and death, etc. in the Qur'ān.³⁵

²⁹ Abul-Hudhail, Ja'far b. Harb, Al-Iskāfī and al-Jubā'ī are reported to have written polemics against him—Cf. *Farq*, p. 115. Of the Ash'ariya, Baghdādī mentions Ash'arī, Baqitānī and Qalānisi.

³⁰ Contemporary of Al-Nazzām and of Abu-l Hudhail and of Hārūn (786-809) Cf. *Munia*, p. 31-2.

³¹ Cf. *Milal*, p. 46. Cf. also *K. Al-Intiṣār*, p. 54; *Farq* p. 137 and *Maq.* p. 548.

³² *Maq.* p. 406. and *Intiṣār*, loc. cit.

³³ This is actually the point of Al-Khayyāt's defence of Mu'ammār against the allegations of Ibn Rāwandī—Cf. loc. cit.

³⁴ Shahrastānī pays Mu'ammār the compliment of being the 'foremost heretic' in repudiating the thesis "that Qadar, whether good or evil, is from God"—*Milal*, p. 46.

³⁵ Cf. *Farq*, p. 137 and *Maq.* p. 548 & *Milal*, p. 46.

On the question of human action, Mu'ammār's teaching was very akin to that of Al-Nazzām. "Man," according to him, is a "substance or a notion (*ma'nā*) distinct from the body and is endowed with power, initiative (*mukhtār*) and knowledge, unsusceptible of movement, rest, development or spatiality and is invisible, untouchable and imperceptible." It is free from the conditions of space and time and exercises over the body the role of 'guardian' (*tadbir*) only,—Al-Shahrastānī reports.³⁶ Al-Ash'arī adds a further note to this account: the statement that man, according to Mu'ammār, was defined as an "indivisible particle" or atom, directing the body which is its instrument through will, without contact with it.³⁷ As to what man can effect in the external world, Mu'ammār, like Al-Nazzām whose view differed only in one particular from his conception of the nature of man,³⁸ held that man acts only in the inward world of the will (*fī nafsihi*). Thus he is capable of knowledge, will, hate and representation; but is incapable of effecting anything at all in the outward world. Whatever is generated in the world of nature, therefore, and whatever inheres in bodies—such as motion and rest, colour and taste, heat or cold, etc.—is the work of the body in which it inheres, through a necessity of nature.³⁹

It is difficult to see what positive advantage to his view of freedom Mu'ammār could have gained from this extraordinary conception of man as an Intellectual Substance, like that of the Neo-Platonists.⁴⁰ Al-Nazzām, whose view of man resembled that of Mu'ammār to a considerable degree was able, however, to ensure the partial unity of man by his notion of man's spirit as commingled with his body in its entirety.⁴¹ The fact is that this complete cleavage between man's soul and his body, on the one hand, and his will and the external world, on the other, can scarcely be said to have left any sense in the conception of moral activity or that of moral freedom at all.

³⁶ *Milal*, p. 47 and *Farq*, p. 140.

³⁷ *Maq.* p. 331-2.

³⁸ Namely that of its intermingling with the body. Al-Nazzām defines man as "a spirit which is interpenetrant with the body and is commingled with it as the whole in the whole; the body however being a mere infirmity (*āfah*) and constraint thereto"—*Maq.* p. 331. From Shahrastānī's account it appears that this conception of spirit in relation to body differs little from Aristotle's conception of 'soul' as the 'form' of body.

³⁹ Cf. *Maq.* p. 405 & p. 332 & *Farq*, loc. cit.

⁴⁰ Shahrastānī actually states that Mu'ammār "took this over from the 'philosophers' who held that the soul was a self-subsisting essence which is neither in space nor in time"—*Milal*, p. 47. Baghdādī more aptly remarks that he had in fact ascribed to man the traits proper to the Deity—*Farq*, p. 140.

⁴¹ Cf. note 3 supra. Al-Nazzām's view was not altogether free from paradox since he ascribed "power, capacity, life and will" to the spirit alone. Cf. *Milal*, p. 38.

Nor can it be said to have left any sense in the conception of divine power. Thus Mu'ammār's solution of the ethical dilemma which split the Muslim world into the advocates of divine power and the advocates of human freedom amounted in fact to a rejection of either alternative.

The example of Mu'ammār was followed by another leading representative of the school of Baghdād, Thumāma b. Ashras (d. 828). Starting from the same viewpoint of man and the world, Thumāma was so baffled by the inscrutable character of the dilemma of moral action that he surrendered it altogether as insoluble and relapsed into a position of complete agnosticism. Like the rest of the Mu'tazila, he was committed to the vindication of God's justice and the consequent necessity of imputing responsibility to man. Man, he argued, 'acts' only in the domain of the will;⁴² but outside this domain he cannot do anything. To whom then ought we to assign the effects of man's wilful action? Bishr, as we have seen, had assigned the consequences of his decisions in the external world to man; and so had Abu-l-Hudhail, with certain qualifications. Mu'ammār and Al-Nazzām, on the other hand, had ascribed these consequences to nature, in which Al-Nazzām at least saw the invisible tool of God. Thumāma's solution, if solution it could be called, differed radically from all these answers. To ascribe the 'generated act' to man, he reasoned, would involve us in the paradox of Bishr and his followers, that a given act of a man which resulted in a given effect (such as the death of another man) after his death would have to be imputed to him. And consequently we would be imputing activity to the dead.⁴³ If, on the other hand, such an effect is imputed to God, then He will be responsible for the evil deeds of man. The only alternative, he argued, is to say that generated effects (al-mutawallidāt) have no author at all.⁴⁴ At one stroke, Thumāma has relieved both God and man from moral responsibility, without advancing us a single step towards a rational solution of the ethical dilemma. Unfortunately our information on Thumāma's teachings is so scanty that it is difficult to determine how seriously one should take him. A number of anecdotes, reported by both Ibn Al-Murtaḍa and al-Baghdādī,⁴⁵ show the extent of his cynicism and his vileness of character and give point to Shahrastānī's remark that Thumāma "combined levity of religion with vileness of character."⁴⁶

⁴² *Maq.* p. 407.

⁴³ Cf. *Milal*, p. 49.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, also *Maq.* p. 407 & *Farq.* p. 157, etc.

⁴⁵ *K. al-Munia*, p. 36 & 37 & *Al-Farq*, p. 158.

⁴⁶ *Milal*, p. 49.

From this survey it appears how idle was the Mu'tazilite admission of free will and how misleading it is to speak as though the Mu'tazila were the exponents of a genuine ethics of freedom. In fact, with the exception of Bishr and his followers, the Mu'tazila did not proceed beyond the *verbal* assertion that "man was the creator (*khāliq*) of his deeds," since otherwise the justice of God would be jeopardized. The serious cleavage between the world of the will and that of nature which,—with the exception of Bishr—they introduced was fatal to any prospect of an adequate solution of the problem of freedom. For what it amounted to, in fact, was that man was free to decide for himself; yet was powerless to execute his decisions. The resort of Mu'ammār and his followers to the notion of nature (*Ṭaba'*) did not heal the cleavage at all. It simply placed the effect a further stage beyond the reach of the will of man; without ensuring any advantage to the Almighty who had no sway over nature either. The solution of Ṣāliḥ Qubba, who recognized the prerogative of the Almighty to act on behalf of man at every stage, has the merit of expediency despite the miraculous character it ascribed to activity. One wonders how the idea of a pre-established harmony between the parallel spheres of willing and doing, similar to that of Leibnitz, did not dawn upon those acute thinkers.

Now the clue to this curious paradox is obviously the view of man to which this section of the Mu'tazila subscribed. But it is really striking that they should not have perceived its incongruity with their ethics. We submit that the Mu'tazila did not involve themselves in such inextricable difficulties of their own free accord. Starting from the theological notion of Divine justice, they sought to rationalize the problem of human action in a manner which would safeguard the reality of that notion. To do this it was sufficient to postulate a man capable of self-determination; of action in the inward world of will (*fī nafsihi*). But when they proceeded to rationalize the parallel problem of action in the outward world of nature they found themselves faced with a metaphysics of atoms and accidents, which they could not reject because of the prospects of safeguarding the omnipotence and uniqueness of God it afforded. And this they were as keenly interested in safeguarding as in the parallel notion of Divine justice.

Our authorities report a fact which Maimonides rendered classical in his account of *Kalām* in the *Guide of the Perplexed*: the fact namely that the Muslim Mutakallims generally subscribed to a metaphysics of atoms and accidents, which resulted in the negation of causality and the consequent reference of every mode of activity in

the universe to the direct initiative of God.⁴⁷ In thus divesting the creature of the capacity to act, they sought—as Al-Ghazālī puts it in the *Tahāfut*, to vindicate the power of God to do everything—“in accordance with the general belief of all Muslims” and to render the Quranic account of miracles credible.⁴⁸

Now despite their assumption that man was the creator of his deeds, the Mu'tazila as much as the Ash'ariya, posited a contingent metaphysics of atoms and accidents, generally designated as occasionalism. This is clear from the general Islamic account which confirms Maimonides' statement fully. The cardinal tenet of this metaphysics was that everything in the universe (defined as everything other than God) consisted of two distinct elements: atoms (or indivisible particles: sing. *juz' la yatajazza'*) and accidents (*'arad*). The Muslim authorities report that this “atomistic metaphysics” was accepted by all Muslims, with the exception of Al-Nazzām,⁴⁹ who seems to have adhered to the Aristotelian thesis of the divisibility of substance *ad infinitum*. Although Al-Nazzām can rightly be reckoned as the only serious dissident, his was by no means a solitary example. Ḍirār b. 'Amr, a contemporary of Wāṣil (d. 748) rejected the whole notion of atom (or substance) and reduced the body to an “aggregate of accidents, which (once constituted) becomes the bearer (or substratum) of other accidents.”⁵⁰ Hishām b. Al-Ḥakam (end of 8th ct. or beginning of 9th ct.) and Al-Aṣam, his contemporary, disputed likewise the orthodox dualism of substance and accident and reduced everything to the one notion of body.⁵¹ Yet over the question of accidents there seems to have been very little disagreement, outside the limited following of Al-Aṣam.⁵² Al-Nazzām himself, while denying the existence of substance, reduced all the accidents to the one accident of motion.⁵³ Within the Ash'arite school, however, there was no disagreement on this question whatsoever, so much so that Al-Bagh-dādī equates belief in accidents with orthodoxy.⁵⁴ Thus the Ash'arites taught that a body cannot be divested of positive or negative accidents, such as colour, smell, life, knowledge or their opposites.⁵⁵

⁴⁷ Cf. *Guide*, pt. I, ch. 73—cf. prop. 6, especially.

⁴⁸ Cf. *Tahāfut*, Ed. Bouyges, Beyrout, 1927, p. 276.

⁴⁹ Cf. *Uṣūl*, p. 36; *Milal*, p. 38; *Fīṣal*, V, p. 92; *Maq.* p. 308 f. and K. Al *Masā'il*, p. 2ff., etc.

⁵⁰ *Maq.* p. 305 and p. 345; Cf. *Fīṣal*, V, p. 66.

⁵¹ Cf. *Maq.* p. 343 & *Fīṣal*, V, p. 66 & *Milal*, p. 38 & *Farq*, p. 114. Hishām, according to one account reported in *Maq.* p. 345, conceded the existence of notions (sing. *Ma'nā*) in addition to body.

⁵² Among the notable representatives of this school of negators of accidents, we ought to mention Al-Jāhiz (d. 868)—Cf. *Milal*, p. 53.

⁵³ Cf. *Uṣūl*, p. 46-7 & *Farq*, p. 114 & 131.

⁵⁴ Cf. *Uṣūl*, p. 36 et. seq. Cf. also *Farq*, p. 316.

⁵⁵ *Uṣūl*, p. 56.

This view was accepted by the majority of the Mu'tazilite doctors, but was disputed by Šālih Qubba and Al-Šāliḥī, who, consistently with their notion of God's absolute power, held that He could create an 'atom' devoid of any accidents.⁵⁶ Abu-Hāshim, son of Al-Jubā'ī (d. 933), and Al-Ka'bī both agreed partially with this view holding that a body could be stripped of all accidents save the accident of colour and that of being (*kawn*).⁵⁷

The most important characteristic of those accidents, from our standpoint, was their perishable nature. The Mutakallims, as a whole, held that accidents do not endure for two moments. Al-Baqilānī (d. 1013), who is credited with refining the atomism of Islam, defines the accident "as that which cannot endure . . . but perishes in the second instant of its coming-to-be"⁵⁸ and finds a scriptural basis for this definition in Qur'ān, following in this the lead of his master, Al-Ash'arī.⁵⁹

As one might expect the Mu'tazila, notably those who believed in generation, found this teaching inimical to their doctrine of freedom. Consequently many of them disputed this thesis and assigned a certain durability to some accidents. Abu-l Hudhail, for instance, assigned to the category of perishable accidents the accidents of will and motion; to the category of durable accidents a number of other accidents, such as colour, life, knowledge, etc. And so did Bishr b. Al-Mu'tamir, Al-Jubā'ī (d. 915), his son Abu Hāshim, Al-Najjār, Dirār and others. Al-Nazzām who reduced all the accidents to that of motion, as we have seen, held that it was impossible for motion to endure.⁶⁰

Now the interest of the Mutakallims (especially the Ash'arites) in this contingent metaphysic of atoms and accidents (as Maimonides aptly remarks)⁶¹ was simply the desire to vindicate the absolute power of God and to ascribe to His direct intervention not only the coming of things into being, but likewise their persistence in being from one instant into another. Consequently, they argued, things would cease to exist the minute God ceases to create in them the accidents which constitute them into being, and which include, in the first

⁵⁶ Cf. *Maq.* p. 570; also pp. 307 & 310; and *Uṣūl*, p. 56-7; and *Irshād*, p. 14.

⁵⁷ Cf. *Uṣūl*, p. 56—the former being the view of Ka'bī, the latter that of Abu-Hāshim. From Al-Baghdādī's statement it appears that they both had their following.

⁵⁸ *Tamhīd*, Cairo, 1947, p. 42—Cf. Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddīma*, Cairo, n.d. p. 326 & Gardet & Anawātī, *Introduction à la Théologie Musulman*, Paris, 1948, p. 62 et. seq.

⁵⁹ Cf. *Maq.* p. 370; the Quranic passages invoked are 8:67 & 47:24; which speak of the 'transient things' of the world (a'rād).

⁶⁰ Cf. *Maq.* p. 358-9 & *Uṣūl*, p. 50-1.

⁶¹ *Guide*, 6th proposition.

instance, the accident of being (*kawn*) itself.⁶² This in itself is sufficient to explain why the Ash'arite doctors adhered solidly to this particular view of the universe, in preference to any other. The Mu'tazila, however, could not without self-contradiction subscribe wholly to such a world-view. That is why many of them, as we have seen, endeavored to modify it in a manner which would safeguard their notion of man as "the creator of his deeds."

But it is a further token of their paradoxical belief in moral freedom that despite all these considerations they failed to realize its utter incompatibility with their ethical teaching. For this world of atoms, which endured by virtue of the accident of duration created in it by God, but was itself incapable of enduring for a single moment, could hardly be said to allow for the effective intervention of man. The will of man, which some Mu'tazilite doctors described as the cause of the "generated act" as we have seen, could not effect anything in this fleeting world.⁶³ The Ash'arite doctors were consequently much more consistent in their repudiation of causality in any conceivable form; not least the "causality of the will." Any correlation between events, they argued, could be one of contemporaneity or succession, but never of causality.⁶⁴ The course of events in nature is not a necessary course either; it is simply the outcome of a habit (*'adah*) which God could very well alter; as He actually does in miracles.⁶⁵

To sum up, our analysis has shown that the general belief that the Mu'tazila were the proponents of an ethical view radically different from the Traditionalist and Ash'arite views is without foundation. We have seen how the majority of the Mu'tazila failed to give any adequate account of moral freedom, especially as regards the outward deed; so that their profession of belief in free will remains an empty, and in any case, contradictory profession. Some of them, Şālih Qubba, for instance, outstrip the Ash'arites in their emphasis on divine power. If there is any respect in which they differed radically from the Ash'arites and the Traditionalists, it was their belief in man's prerogative to choose freely. But this prerogative, as we have seen, was

⁶² This being the official, Ash'arite view according to which "Everything in the world comes-to-be through God's Fiat . . . and ceases through His commanding it to cease"—(*Kun or ifna*)—*Uşûl*, p. 50. However the duration (*baqâ*) of a body is the result of God creating in it the accident of duration. If God were to withhold from it this accident it would cease to exist. Some Mu'tazila (notably Al-Jubā'i and his son, Abu Hāshim)—however, disputed this thesis and argued that God would have to create the accident of extinction (*fanā*) in no *substratum*, if He wishes to annihilate the universe. *Ibid*, p. 45 & 67, etc.

⁶³ This was further obviated by the fact that the accidents were said to be incapable of transition (*intiḡāl*) from one subject to another—Cf. *Uşûl*, p. 38.

⁶⁴ Cf. *Iqtisād*, p. 100 & *Tahāfut*, p. 277 & 279.

⁶⁵ Cf. *Uşûl*, p. 137.

emptied of any content through their adherence to an occasionalist metaphysics of atoms and accidents, and likewise their interest in safeguarding the unity of God and His transcendance. And in this latter respect they could hardly be said to differ from the Ash'arites.

This conclusion need not arouse any surprise. As genuine heirs of Islam the Mu'tazila could not surrender the notion of God's omnipotence, much as they sought to assign some positive meaning to His justice. In fact they seem to have embarked upon this task without suspecting the radical antithesis between a theology grounded in divine unity and transcendance and one grounded in divine justice. Consequently their ethics was bound to crumble under the weight of this radical antithesis. This consideration would seem to strengthen the view expressed by Wensinck and others,⁶⁶ that an ethics of liberty was not indigenous to Islam; especially when tradition endorses so unqualifiably a fatalistic, predestinarian ethics.

MAJID FAKHRY

*School of Oriental and African Studies,
University of London*

⁶⁶ *Muslim Creed*, p. 51 et. seq. & Macdonald, *Development*, p. 132.

HIS NAME IS AḤMAD

A recent article in *The Muslim World*¹ makes the suggestion that the words in Surah lxi, 6 *ismu-hu aḥmadu*, commonly taken to mean "his (or whose) name is Aḥmad," were interpolated into the text of the Qur'ān some time after the death of Muḥammad. The following notes call attention to certain points which tend to suggest that *aḥmadu* must be taken in an adjectival sense rather than regarded as an interpolation. They offer evidence on the single point of the currency and significance of Aḥmad as a name, after the Prophet's death and do not broach the larger field of Muslim New Testament interpretation. Comment from Muslim scholars on the point at issue will be welcomed.

§1. *The use of the name "Aḥmad."*

As soon as one starts to inquire into the use of the name "Aḥmad" in the early centuries of Islam, a striking fact emerges. Muslim children were practically never called Aḥmad before about the year 125 A.H. Indeed, the point may be put even more strongly: *it is impossible to prove that any Muslim child was called Aḥmad after the Prophet before about the year 125*. On the other hand, there are many instances prior to this date of boys called Muḥammad after the Prophet; some of these had apparently received that name during the Prophet's lifetime. Some of the evidence for these statements may be briefly set out as follows.

(a) A rough indication is given by the indices of the names occurring in books written at an early date or dealing only with early events. Thus, if we look at the French translation of *Kitāb al-Kharāj* by Abū Yūsuf, which must be prior to his death in 182/798, we find that the index contains the names of 29 persons called Muḥammad, other than the Prophet, but does not mention anyone called Aḥmad. Again, in Wellhausen's version of *al-Wāqidī* (who died in 207/823), the index of those who transmitted material contains 36 Muḥammads but no Aḥmad. Likewise, the index to Wellhausen's *Arab Kingdom and its Fall* (Eng. tr.), a history of the Umayyad period which ended in 132/750, has 14 Muḥammads but no Aḥmad. If in the fields and periods covered by these indices there is no one at all called Aḥmad, there is a strong presumption that the same is true in all spheres.

(b) Biographical dictionaries such as the *Ṭabaqāt* of Ibn Sa'd contain many Muḥammads who died before 200 A.H. but hardly any Aḥmads. Some of the Muḥammads died in the first century, but the

¹ A Guthrie and E. F. F. Bishop, *The Paraclete, Almunhamanna and Aḥmad*, xli, 251-6 (Oct. 1951), esp. 255.

earliest Aḥmads are only a few years before 200. I have made a detailed examination of *Tahdhīb al-Tahdhīb* by Ibn Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī which contains 160 entries for Aḥmad and 888 for Muḥammad. Some of the entries are cross-references, and others concern names about which little is known; but for 103 of the Aḥmads a date of death is given. Of this hundred only one, no. 16, died before 200; and his *obiit* was 197. It is also clear that none of the undated persons could have been much earlier. In order, however, to ensure that the impression given by these facts is not a distortion of reality owing to the specialized character of the dictionary, I also examined the first 25 Muḥammads whose death-date was given (omitting those whose father was Aḥmad and who would therefore be late in date)—this covered nos. 1-27 and 39-57. Seven had died before 200, namely in the years 63, 119-21, 125-6, 151, 182, 182, 193-4 (the hyphens indicate the limits where more than one version of the figure is given). If this is a fair sample of the Muḥammads, then 28% of them died before 200, as against 1% of the Aḥmads. Moreover it is clear that, while the *Tahdhīb* deals mainly with persons who died during the third Islamic century, it has a sprinkling of names from the earlier centuries. The absence of Aḥmads during the early period thus gives rise to a strong presumption that there were none or practically none, and that the name was not in use. From death-dates a little before 200 we may assume births between 120 and 140, and may therefore argue that Muslim boys did not begin to receive the name of Aḥmad (as commemorating the Prophet) until about 125 A.H.

(c) The name Aḥmad, like Muḥammad, occurred in the Jāhiliyah.² The solitary instance in Ibn al-Athīr's *Uṣd al-Ghābah* is one Aḥmad b. Ḥafṣ b. al-Mughīrah al-Makhzūmī, a cousin of Khālid b. al-Walīd and Abū Jahl, whose age and family make it impossible for him to have been called after Muḥammad. There is also the blind Abū Aḥmad b. Jaḥsh, but his *kunya*, by which he is commonly known, cannot have any reference to the Prophet, since, had there been such a reference, the fact would have been commented on in our sources. This use of Aḥmad in the Jāhiliyah means that any isolated instances of Aḥmads earlier than those in Ibn Ḥajar's *Tahdhīb* would not necessarily refer to the Prophet. Thus in order to refute the point being made in these notes an opponent would not merely have to produce some Aḥmads in the first and early second century, but would have to show, or at least make it seem probable, that in each case the name was given with reference to the Prophet and was not just a continuation of pre-Islamic usage.

(d) It is now generally recognized that the name Muḥammad was

² Cf. A. Fischer, *Muḥammad und Aḥmad*, *Sächsische Akademie d. Wissenschaften*, Leipzig, 1932, pp. 19, 25.

in common use in the Jāhiliyah. The Prophet sometimes changed names; he would substitute 'Abdallāh, "servant of God," for a name meaning a servant of some pagan deity. But in the case of the prominent Companion, Muḥammad b. Maslamah al-Anṣārī, for instance, there is nothing to suggest any change of name. The report, that in the sixth century A.D. a number of boys were given the name Muḥammad because men had heard that there was to be a prophet of that name, need not be taken seriously.³ Even during the Prophet's lifetime, however, some of his devoted followers called their children after him, as the pages of Ibn Sa'd show. In the first *ṭabaqah* or class of Followers in Medina there are several Muḥammads. In connection with one of them, Muḥammad b. 'Amr b. Ḥazm al-Anṣārī, who is said to have been born in 10 A.H. and to have been given the name by express permission of the Prophet, a story is told; at some time during his caliphate 'Umar gathered together all those called Muḥammad and told them to change their name, but they managed to prove they were entitled to use it, and the matter was dropped.⁴ This indicates opposition to the use of the Prophet's name, but not necessarily at the ostensible date. Tor Andrae mentions the belief that angels pray in every house where there is an Aḥmad or a Muḥammad;⁵ and it may be that the opposition to the use of the Prophet's name (and especially to the union of his name and *kunyah*) is due to superstitions attached to the practice. There was a general movement, however, for the use of specifically Islamic names—names of Qur'anic prophets, prominent Companions, and the like—and the many Muḥammads met with in history during the first and second centuries show that the opposition was unavailing.

(e) The fact that Ibn Sa'd thinks it worth including three traditions to the effect that the Prophet's name was Aḥmad is an indication that this had not always been obvious; there are no similar traditions about his name being Muḥammad.⁶ Of these traditions the second and third are as follows: "Āminah, when pregnant with the Messenger of God, was told to call his name Aḥmad"; "the Messenger of God said, I was called Aḥmad." Immediately after this Ibn Sa'd places seven traditions about the "names" of the Messenger of God, each of which has about half a dozen "names." There are variations of detail in the lists, but each begins with "Muḥammad, Aḥmad, . . ." Even if the traditions contain ancient material, the name Aḥmad could easily have been added at a later time.

All these points together make a strong case for holding that the

³ *Uṣd al-Ghābah*, iv, 310, s.v. Muḥammad b. Uḥayḥah.

⁴ Ibn Sa'd, v, 50; cp. iii, 1, 66f.; 'Umar is also said to have asked those called after prophets to change their names, ib. v, 2, 2.

⁵ *Die Person Muhammads*, 273.

⁶ Ibn Sa'd, i, 1, 64.

name Aḥmad was not given to Muslim children as an alternative to Muḥammad until about 125 A.H. It remains to consider possible explanations of this fact.

§ 2. *The Interpretation of Surah lxi, 6.*

The article in *The Muslim World* from which these notes took their origin suggested that the words *ismu-hu aḥmadu* were a later interpolation. Such a view has its attraction, but it is also not without difficulty; for example, the more obvious interpolation would have been Muḥammad. What the authors of the article were contending for could perhaps be secured by a simpler supposition, namely, that for the first century or so of Islam the word *aḥmadu* was regarded not as a proper name but as a simple adjective. This is quite possible. Lane discusses an Arab proverb containing the word as an adjective, and gives as possible meanings: more attributive of praise (to a thing); gaining more praise for oneself; more deserving of being praised. The clause in question can then be translated "announcing the good tidings of a messenger who will come after me whose name is more worthy of praise." It is just conceivable that this might be a confused reference to the words "greater works than these shall he do" (Jn xiv.12). Alternatively, if *aḥmadu* is taken to mean more attributive of praise, there might be a reference to the words "He shall glorify me" (Jn xvi.14).

Whether we adopt the interpolation hypothesis, or suppose *aḥmadu* to have been interpreted as a simple adjective, there are strong grounds for holding that the standard interpretation of the words *ismu-hu aḥmadu* was not commonly accepted by Muslims until after the first half of the second century. Messrs. Guthrie and Bishop founded their case largely on the absence of any mention of Aḥmad in Ibn Ishāq (d. 151/767) although he has a passage about the Paraclete⁷ in which he might have been expected to mention this had he known it. Confirmation of the point is found in the fact that al-Ṭabarī in his Commentary on lxi, 6, though himself giving the orthodox interpretation, is unable to quote any earlier commentator as authority for it. As he is in the habit of giving strings of authorities for very slight matters, it is reasonable to suppose that he knew of no reputable exegete who had held what was in his time the standard and obvious view.

On the other hand, the passage in the *Sīrah* shows that the New Testament prediction of the Paraclete had been applied to Muḥammad before the middle of the second century. Moreover, if we assume (as we ought), that Ibn Ishāq is the author of the closing

⁷ P. 150 (ed. Wüstenfeld).

comment, then by his time the confusion of *paraklētōs* with *periklutos* had taken place, for he notes that *muḥammad* is linguistically equivalent to the "Syrian" *manḥamannā* and the Greek *baraqlītis*. With this must be compared, however, the first of Ibn Sa'd's traditions about the name Aḥmad, which he has from Muḥammad b. Ismā'il b. Abī Fudayk al-Madanī (d. 199-201), who had it from Mūsā b. Ya'qūb az-Zam'ī (d. c. 153-8), who had it from Sahl, the *mawlā* of 'Uthaymah (about neither of whom have I discovered anything):⁸

. . . he was a Christian of the people of Maris and used to read the Gospel; and he mentioned that the description of the Prophet (God bless and preserve him) was in the Gospel; he was of the seed of Ishmael, his name Aḥmad.

This is an abbreviated version of a tradition⁹ belonging to a group dealing with the description of Muḥammad in the Torah and the Gospel, and too much weight should not be attached to it. Yet it is by no means impossible that Mūsā b. Ya'qūb did in fact pass on this information which he alleged he had received from a convert from Christianity. If that is so, then we may infer that the use of the name of Aḥmad in connection with the Gospel predictions was known in Ibn Ishāq's time, since Mūsā was roughly his contemporary. It is therefore conceivable that Ibn Ishāq omitted a reference to the name of Aḥmad not because he was ignorant, but because he disapproved of this interpretation of the Qur'anic verse. 'Alī b. Rabbān al-Ṭabarī in *Kitāb al-Dīn wa-l-Dawlah* (232-247 A.H.) refers to certain of the passages about the Paraclete as predictions of Muḥammad, and remarks: "the Messiah was never called Fāraqlīt, but Muḥammad was called by this name."¹⁰ Once again Aḥmad is not mentioned, but that may be because he is basing his argument on Christian sources. (The passage about the Paraclete in *The Apology of Timothy*,¹¹ which is dated 165/781, also omits all mention of Aḥmad.)

The conclusion to which this points is that the identification of Muḥammad with the Paraclete may be historically independent of any use of the name Aḥmad. The argument may run: Jesus foretold the coming of the Paraclete, and Paraclete and Muḥammad are the same in meaning. After all, Muḥammad is just as good a translation of *periklutos* as Aḥmad.

The course of events may now be reconstructed somewhat as follows. In order to meet Christian criticisms of Islam some Muslims were looking for predictions of Muḥammad in the Christian scriptures, and noticed the passages about the Paraclete in Jn xiv-xvi. One of the arguments they adduced to support the identification of Mu-

⁸ Ibn Sa'd, i. 1, 64; cp. *ibid.* i. 2, 89, where 'Utaybah occurs instead.

⁹ Ibn Sa'd, i. 2, 89.

¹⁰ P. 119.

¹¹ *Woodbrooke Studies*, ii, 33ff.

ḥammad with the Paraclete was that of the similarity of meaning (which is based on the confusion of *paraklētōs* with *periklutos*). When Sūrah lxi, 6, was read with such a view in mind, the connection between Muḥammad and Aḥmad would readily be seen, even though *aḥmadu* at this time was normally taken as an adjective. It would be specially easy for anyone familiar with the pre-Islamic name of Aḥmad to make the connection. In this way a new link would be added which would make the argument particularly convincing for Muslims, for they would naturally be much more familiar with their own Scriptures than those of any other religion. The argument, with the reference to Aḥmad included, would therefore be prominent in anti-Christian polemics directed chiefly to Muslims and designed to protect their beliefs from Christian attacks. This would account for the popularity of the name Aḥmad soon after its introduction. On the other hand, the conservatism of the exegetes would explain, for example, the absence in al-Ṭabarī's Commentary of early authorities for the connection of the name Aḥmad with the Paraclete.

Since the evidence for the identification of Muḥammad with the Paraclete is prior to and independent of any reference to Aḥmad, careful scholarship is not justified in going beyond the statements of the previous paragraph. Yet it is tempting to suppose—and by no means impossible—that it was reflection on Sūrah lxi, 6 that first set a convert from Christianity, with a slight knowledge of Greek, on the track of the argument about similarity of meaning.

APPENDIX A. OTHER NAMES FROM THE ROOT ḤMD

Among the pre-Islamic Arabs it was common for brothers to have variants of the same name, such as 'Utbaḥ and 'Utaḃbaḥ, Munabbih and Nubayḥ. The name "Maḥmūd" was known as a variant of "Muḥammad," since Muḥammad b. Maslamah had a brother called Maḥmūd, and a sister of his called her sons Muḥammad and Maḥmūd, presumably because of family tradition and not with reference to the Prophet.¹² Ḥumayd also seems to have been pre-Islamic, but it was doubtless in honour of Muḥammad that 'Abd al-Raḥmān called a son Ḥumayd.¹³ There is sometimes a certain confusion between the various names from the root. The two instances of Ḥamdān and one of Ḥamdūn in Ibn Ḥajar's *Tahdhīb* are said to stand for Aḥmad and Muḥammad respectively, and the solitary man called Ḥammād in Ibn al-Athīr's *Uṣd al-Ghābah* is also spoken of as Muḥammad.

The following table shows the relative frequency of the various

¹² Ibn Sa'd, iii (2). 23, 25.

¹³ Ibn Sa'd, iii (1). 90, 5.

names. The gross number of entries is given in the case of the biographical dictionaries—Ibn Ḥajar's *Tahdhīb (Tah.)* and Ibn al-Athīr's *Uṣd al-Ghābah (Uṣd)*. The number of distinct persons mentioned in the index is given for the other works: Abū Yūsuf's *K. al-Kharāj* (ed. Fagnan) (=AY), Wellhausen's *Arab Kingdom and its Fall* (AKF), al-Wāqidī, ed. Wellhausen, *Actors* (WWA) and *Transmitters* (WWT), Ibn Hishām (IH), and Ibn Sa'd, index to the *Matn*, ix(3) (IS). Where "Abū" is neglected in the index, it is included in the count (apart from Abū Muḥammad in IS); thus the single occurrence of Aḥmad in Ibn Hishām is Abū Aḥmad b. Jaḥsh.

Name	AY	AKF	WWA	WWT	IH	Uṣd	IS	Tah
Aḥmad	—	—	—	—	1	1	8	164
Ḥāmid	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	2
Ḥammād	1	—	—	—	—	1	7	26
Ḥamdān, Ḥamdūn	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3
Ḥumayd	3	1	2	1	—	5	14	35
Maḥmūd	1	—	1	2	2	6	3	12
Muḥammad	29	14	1	36	6	73	c.100	888

When the instances in Ibn Ḥajar are further analysed, interesting results are obtained. The following table gives (a) the total number of persons whose *obiit* is explicitly stated by Ibn Ḥajar, (b) the number whose *obiit* is before 200 A.H., and (c) the actual dates of the latter group. For 'Muḥammad' the figures are those of the sample examined.

Name	Total	1-200		Actual Dates
	(a)	(b)		(c)
Aḥmad	103	1	197	
Ḥāmid	2	0	—	
Ḥammād	8	3	119-20, 168, 179	
Ḥumayd	9	6	95-105, 130-6, 142, 142-3, 189-92(2)	
Maḥmūd	6	2	96, 99	
Muḥammad	(25)	(7)	(63, 119-21, 125-6, 151, 182(2), 193-4)	

These two tables, especially the second, make it quite clear that Ḥammād, Ḥumayd and Maḥmūd were in use in the first and early second century, at a time when Aḥmad was not being used. The use of Ḥumayd and Maḥmūd may owe something to pre-Islamic us-

age, but cannot be entirely attributed to this, as the case of 'Abd al-Raḥmān's son shows. The use of Ḥammād is almost certainly purely Islamic; the occurrence of the name in Ibn al-Athīr is based on a tradition which seems to have been invented to justify using Ḥammād as a variant for Muḥammad. This serves to heighten the mystery surrounding the name 'Aḥmad.'

B. POSSIBLE EARLY INSTANCES OF THE USE OF "AḤMAD"

There is an early instance of a person apparently called Aḥmad in Ibn Sa'd, i(2). 139,7, where Abū Ṣakhr is addressed by Ibn Qusayṭ as 'Aḥmad.' It is clear, however, from Ibn Ḥajar's article on Yazīd b. 'Abdallāh b. Qusayṭ that the proper name of the Abū Ṣakhr whom he knew was Ḥumayd b. Ziyād al-Kharrāt, who died 189-92. Hence we may either suppose that the text has been corrupted, or that by 160 or 170 Aḥmad had become a recognized variant of Ḥumayd. This latter would be analogous to addressing as 'Bess' a girl commonly known as 'Betty.'

In Ibn Hishām there are two instances that I have noticed of apparently contemporary references to Muḥammad as Aḥmad, viz. 799, 6 from foot, and 995, 10.¹⁴ The former is in a poem attributed to Ḥassān b. Thābit commemorating those who fell at Mu'tah. The poem can hardly be authentic, however; Muḥammad is given an undignified position as merely one of a row of members of the house of Hāshim; and al-'Abbās and 'Aqīl are praised although at the date of the battle they were still in Mecca. This is therefore presumably 'Abbāsīd propaganda of the late first or early second century.

On the other hand, there are no obvious reasons for considering the other instance unauthentic. An obscure poetess speaks of a man counting false the religion of God and "the man Aḥmad." It looks then, as if we should have to admit an occasional reference to the Prophet as Aḥmad *in poetry*, for the sake of the metre, from his own life-time onwards. A little reflection shows that this is not inconsistent with the main thesis of the article. Aḥmad means 'more or most praised' whereas Muḥammad merely means 'praised.' There would be nothing improper in a poet calling the Prophet 'most praised,' but, so long as Aḥmad was not commonly recognized as the Prophet's name outside poetry, to give an ordinary Muslim the name Aḥmad would have the appearance of setting him above the Prophet.

W. MONTGOMERY WATT

University of Edinburgh

¹⁴I have subsequently seen the much fuller list given by Omar A. Farrukh, *Das Bild des Frühislam in der arabischen Dichtung*, Leipzig, 1937, pp. 45f. Several of his examples appear to be authentic.

“THE SOMEHOW MAY BE THIS-HOW”

A PLEA FOR CONSTRUCTIVE MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN THEOLOGICAL RELATIONS TODAY

Somehow, all Christians with a Muslim concern are agreed, somehow, the misunderstandings which have so long insulated the Muslim mind from the full apprehension of Christ in His Church must be dissolved. The pre-judgements by which the relevance of Christ crucified to their deepest needs and aspirations is withheld must be patiently overcome. Communication in the fullest sense, *from the heart of the faith that is in Christ to the heart of the allegiance in which Islam consists*, must somehow be attained. To actualise these ‘musts’ the Holy Spirit within the Christian community calls us to initiative, enterprise, venture, which He will enable, whereby on the Christian side everything will be attempted both to elicit and deserve on the part of Muslims a parallel readiness for those attitudes of mind without which communication is impossible. What is here in mind may well be by its very nature selective on both sides, in that it will enlist only those who interpret their respective loyalty as warranting and involving the endeavor which it proposes. As such it may only concern a small number of both Christians and Muslims, but its limited numerical incidence need not in any way disqualify either its ambition or its effectiveness. It is a plea for a Muslim-Christian theology within a Muslim-Christian fellowship. All that is here said for it is that, in the poet’s words, “the somehow may be this-how,” that maybe within such an effort after fellowship the witness which is the age-long trust of the Church may most appropriately be borne.

Though the idea is emphatically a missionary conception, for no genuinely Christian relationship could be otherwise, and though it is in no sense a plea for syncretism, its missionary quality could not expect to command assent everywhere. No suggestions as to missionary approach are likely to commend themselves to the entire Christian missionary body with all its theological and administrative variety. Nor is it right that they should. What is sound and desirable, however, is that in all parts of it there should be vigorous and constant re-examination of how the trust is being discharged. To venture, as here, to do that is not to pass judgment on the continuing activity of the total mission which is too diverse to be amenable to persuasion from any one source. The relation of the parts to the whole is that of any healthy community. A plea in one quarter must submit to scrutiny as to its merits in every other quarter, while the whole goes diversely on. Furthermore, our concern is with the theological heart of the Christian task in the Muslim world, with

the making articulate in word and in idea of that Gospel which many an institution expresses in deed. The task of the theologian-interpreter would be insuperably harder without the active ministry of the hospital, the rural centre, the agricultural mission or welfare service. But these, in turn, are inarticulate without him and without the evangelist and preacher through whom he gains the ears of men. What follows, then, concerns more of the missionary enterprise than it might appear to include or could persuade into approval. For it relates to the essential business of interpretation and suggests that perhaps it may best be achieved in a companionship of discovery rather than in a contrast of claims.

If there is to be constructive mutual theological activity between Muslims and Christians in various centres, there must first of all be an achievement of fellowship. Such fellowship is capable of achievement only on a personal basis and must, therefore, be local and intensive in character. By its very nature it will be unobtrusive and unpublicised. Happily in certain centres it has already been sought and won. The need is for a great multiplication of such 'cells of meeting' where Muslims and Christians of goodwill and theological sensitivity can build deep relationships within which true communication can arise. The wide fields of secular perplexity within the territories of both faiths ensure that there need be no lack of points of contact, of themes of fellowship, to which alertness and humility can respond. In proportion, too, in which the Western Christian in the Muslim world can demonstrate that the capacity in which he is present there is truly religious, the political recession of the West from Asia will be pure gain. Should it not be possible then for Christian to meet Muslim, as theists in a distracted world, grow into mutual trust, establish mutual confidence and so enable a real communication of Christ? If an adequate sense of vocation to such a discharge of Christian trust arises, both to take and to make the opportunity, then it may well become the most hopeful element in contemporary Muslim-Christian relationships.

It need hardly be added that this is by no means the task only of the Western Christian. The Orthodox Church and other Eastern Christian communions have a unique contribution to make, with the help of Western Christians, to the attainment of theological fellowship with Islam. Traditions of isolation and a minority mentality may still hamper and fear still enervate. But their continuing disabilities are not insuperable. Political tensions and communal suspicions being what they are, the vital role in theological enterprise will likely be the activity of a minority. Oftentimes, however, it is precisely minorities which perceive and do creative things.

Furthermore it is clear that whether or not theologians face it at a deep level, the question of inter-communal relations has already

become an active one in more superficial fields. Politicians at least have realised that they could not ignore it. "Maulid" articles, for example, have often been contributed by Christian dignitaries to the Muslim press on the occasion of the Prophet's birthday, and Muslim leaders have reciprocated at Christmas and Easter. These gestures may not go very far but they have sometimes carried Christian priests into the pulpits of mosques. Political factors in many quarters are tending to minimise the divisiveness of religion. The children of this world are not seldom more discerning than the children of light! It may well be, of course, that a recrudescence of fanaticism, either political or religious, will check the process, but it is widely felt, especially among younger intellectuals, that religious differences in politics are archaic and mischievous. The principle of the "millet" division by religious creed no doubt dies hard but it is widely blamed as the cause of many weaknesses. If then in thinking circles, religious distinctions are tending to be politically discounted, should not that both serve and stimulate closer theological relations? It should facilitate a drawing together of those who care religiously and should tend to eliminate those animosities traceable to politics. If the sharpness of religious difference is being politically softened in the interests of nationalism, may it not also be intellectually surmounted in the interests of religion?

Such tendencies in the political realm are both a parable and an opportunity for the theologians. If solidarity of a political origin motivates mutual celebration of Christmas and of the Prophet's birthday, it should be possible for a nucleus of thoughtful people to venture on mutual study of what underlies the festivals. So much can be suggested without laying undue stress on these political factors. In some areas like Egypt where the Christian element is greatly outnumbered and the will to dominate persists in the majority, the feasibility of a Muslim-Christian meeting of minds will depend to a much greater extent upon Muslim goodwill. Outside the Middle East where-ever the Church is of Western planting, the political may well disserve the cause. In any event political factors are changing and precarious. At best they only illustrate and facilitate the religious possibilities. They can never of themselves actualise our hopes. The initiative must be spiritual and it must learn to bring all the winds into its sails, whether they be fair or foul. Yet everywhere, as the experience of independence becomes less of a novelty and more of a burden, the demands of national problems in every sphere may well dispose the better types of mind to repudiate religious separatism and seek a pooling of all the talents. In such an exterior closing of the ranks will lie a summons to religious leadership for new interior ventures in interpretation.

A further illustration of the conception under discussion may be found, and is here suggested in parenthesis, by the unique position of the Lebanon in the Muslim world, as understood and proclaimed by its own spokesmen.¹ With its population almost equally divided between the two faiths, it has a long tradition as a Christian centre in a Muslim context. It can thus be the geographical symbol, and may be in part the locus, of a truly spiritual meeting between faiths. Such an active interpretation of its significance has appealed to not a few of Lebanon's thinkers, who, incidentally are among the ablest and most penetrating assessors of Islam and things Arab today. It is perhaps not a co-incidence that the only two serious analyses of the Arab situation since the Palestine tragedy have been published in Beirut.² If Cairo is the intellectual centre of the Arab world, Beirut would seem to be the hearth of its best critics.

The urgency of radical theological relations between the faiths of Christ and of Islam is further underlined by the fact that there are other incentives to co-operation which leave the ultimate nature of Christianity out of the reckoning. If the theologian tarries, the humanist is active. It happens that this aspect of the situation can be conveniently illustrated in a work of Lebanese origin. Dr. Karīm 'Azqūl published a treatise in 1946, entitled "al 'Aql fi-l-Islām." It dealt mainly with al-Ghazālī, but in an introduction developed the view that Islam and Christianity should come together as legatees of a common cultural inheritance so as to give a cultural unity to undergird Arab nationalism. It argued the role of Lebanon in serving a unification of culture and offered the study of al-Ghazālī as a contribution to this purpose. The reader senses an inclination to discount the supra-natural claims of both faiths, in the interests of a rational synthesis of a rationally interpreted Islam and Christianity. The tendency seemed to be to regard the two as common products of one 'Semitic' genius which could now contrive their fusion. This is by no means an isolated instance of the view that approaches religion as something within the conscious manipulation of its adherents, who adapt it the more readily to fulfill the functions for which they regard it as necessary in the society to which it relates. But this approach is in danger of losing the whole given-ness of faith, upon which those very functions depend. For what religion means in and for society turns upon what it means within itself and

¹ cf. particularly the privately published speeches of Dr. Charles Malik, Minister of the Lebanon in Washington and Chairman of the U.N. Committee on Human Rights.

² Musa Alamy: *Ibrat Falastin*, Beirut, 1949, and Constantine Zurayk: *Ma'na al-Nakbat*, Beirut, 1948.

for its faithful, beyond any utilitarian assessment. It is not for such pragmatic approximation of religious loyalties, bringing truth within the conscious aegis of sociology, for which we are contending. On the contrary such approximations challenge those theologians who stand under revelation, considered, not as what man has arranged but what God has vouchsafed, to a more thorough, a more vital, and, incidentally, a more effective, task, namely, the attempt to mediate their knowledge of God on the basis of their knowledge of each other.

But if points of deep theological meeting within a personal fellowship, are to be fostered and multiplied where-ever Muslims and Christians find themselves in contact, it may be well to ask: On what basis can they each establish that 'meeting.' There will no doubt be haunting feelings that such an enterprise is somehow invalid or impossible. How can they be dissipated? Many arguments may be and have been suggested—the Quranic reverence for Jesus, the essential theism of Islam, the Muslim claim to tolerance, common philosophical attitudes in the Middle Ages, and not least, the general pressure of contemporary irreligion. But the enterprise of fellowship must be founded in a realm less assailable than these. It will probably be found that these various points are rather tasks for the fellowship than incentives to it. We must look not so much to the outside relations as to the internal quality of the respective faiths for the impulses we are seeking.

THE INNER INCENTIVE TO THEOLOGICAL 'MEETING.'

On the Christian side it is simply that the Christian has a trust of belief and experience which he desires to share. He has, in other words an apostolic, or missionary, relationship towards all men—a relationship of sentness and of witness, within which it is an integral part of his own faith that he believe in its relevance to all other men and in his obligation to bring that relevance and all other men together. Precisely! some may reply. But is it not just this relationship of witness which requires that the Christian address himself solely to his task of proclamation, on the assumption that there can hardly be 'fellowship' until it is received? Will not this quality of the witness as the bearer of a Word of salvation be somehow compromised if he offers himself as one who desires genuinely to meet, to understand and to be understood? That has been, of course, the classic fear. But has it been a sound fear and should it persist? Is there any final reason why the bearer of a given Word should not also be a partner in a fellowship not only inclusive of its hearers? We are not speaking of any tactical conception, for 'tactics' are destructive of fellowship. We are thinking of a real exchange of thought and aspiration and a sharing as far as possible in worship. Is not such an

attitude perhaps the truest and most discerning loyalty to the Word itself? For the Word exists to be communicated: whatever, therefore, enables interpretation is not only loyal, it is imperative. Can the Church ever be safer theologically—in the sense, that is, in which it is good to be safe—than when she is striving to convey Christ? There can be no risk in that whose motive is to bring Christ within the ken of others. Nor, given the Holy Spirit, will such a motive disqualify the fellowship proposed. For it is never suggested that its participants will enter it with vacant minds. Nor let it be feared that the conception is impracticable because ‘the other fellow’ will not seriously respond. Our business is to deserve that he should—to offer our part, and to cast out the paralysis of suspicion. Since the Church and the New Testament Scriptures alike came into existence to pursue and in pursuit of the missionary vocation, loyalty to both demands a creative will to make that vocation effective in our own time.

If the Christian can approach a ‘meeting’ with Muslims in this deeply grounded confidence, what shall sustain the Muslim on his side? Is there no ground in Islam on which a Muslim may relate himself positively towards Christians? May he not participate in religious fellowship outside historic Islam, with some self-consistency? It must perhaps be admitted that Muslim orthodoxy is heavily weighted with elements that suggest emphatically the answer No! But there are others that point in the direction of the open mind. “Our God and your God is one and to Him we are self-surrendered.” (Surah, xxix, 46.) Need a Muslim be afraid of investigating what self-surrender to the Christian God might mean?

Here the significance of Abraham comes to our rescue. Perhaps the most appropriate way of expressing how the Muslim share might be inspired lies—since it must always be a personal vocation—in the tremendous figure of the patriarch whose is the religion of Islam as Muslims understand it.

“Let Thy patriarchs’ desire . . .
Be satisfied, and fructify in me,”

prayed John Donne. It is a prayer which might have a Muslim ring. For can “the religion of Abraham” ever condemn the abandonment of safe securities—even though they be in dogma—and the urge to find and follow the Divine call? It was to the figure of Abraham that the Prophet appealed, especially after the Hijra, as the true *hanif*, whose relationship with God ante-dated the Mosaic Law and whose purity of faith the followers of Moses and Jesus had allegedly forsaken. The very appearance of the Prophet in Arabia was understood as implementing the Divine Covenant with Abraham. To Abraham’s *ka’ba*, in Muslim belief, the *qibla* is directed. He is recorded as having prayed that he would never lack worthy followers, sons preserved

from idols. (Surah xiv, 39).

Yet the idols whom sons worthy of Abraham forsake are not merely wood and stone. The very claim to Abrahamic community may be one of them, if it is falsely held. As Iqbal saw, it is possible to be asleep in the mosque which would scorn to contain an idol and yet have an idol in one's heart. Abraham's faith was the repudiation of timidity, the rejection of safe inertia, the refusal of a communal complacency. It was conversely a seeking of the pure, and readiness for costly change, the abandonment of safe and vested interest, the becoming of a fugitive with God. To fear change, therefore, and to conceive of faith as a comfortable haven not a questing obedience is no part of sonship to Abraham. Is it fair to assume that there are no Muslims ready for a creative understanding of what it means to lay claim to company with Abraham? Surely not. We cannot tell each other how Abraham should be followed or lay down what the faith of Abraham should mean to any religion having a faith *about* him. But surely it is not difficult to see that it might well include a more positive and hospitable reckoning with the faith of Christ, and so, with those Christians ready to reciprocate. At least, the place of Abraham in Islam may be the clearest symbol of the validity of the fellowship we are seeking between his Muslim legatees and ourselves.

SOME OBSTACLES TO SURMOUNT.

But given the necessary attitudes of mind on the part of individuals there are certain general difficulties which need to be faced. One is the static quality, in some senses even stagnant quality, of theological education in Islam. In the second volume of his autobiography, *al-Ayyām*, Dr. Ṭaha Ḥusain describes the sense of release and liberation which he experienced after ten years in al-Azhar, when he first encountered the modern forms of liberal scholarship, which he has since done so much to foster. That, it is true, was in the first decade of the century. But if literary and scientific scholarship has progressed enormously since then in the Muslim world, the al-Azhar stream of educational influence has been relatively unchanged. Its reforms have been only partial and tentative. Thus theology remains the most illiberal of studies in Islam today and has not experienced the emancipation rightly claimed and largely enjoyed by other disciplines.

This relative imperviousness of Islamic theology today to scholarly influences making for freedom and enterprise in its pursuit not only impedes the development of a theological liberalism, especially in the Arabic speaking world: it also accentuates the problems facing the education which proceeds outside its aegis. The spirit of scientific

and technical studies, pursued in State and other centres of learning, seeks a counterpart in the deeper realms of moral and religious belief. Yet orthodoxy fails to satisfy its demands, leaving it, unguided, to one of two choices. Either religion is to be jettisoned for all save political purposes, as something irretrievably medieval, or it is sustained only through a conspiracy of silence about the relatedness of what it teaches to the beliefs and habits of mind of the scientific scholar. Neither choice is desirable. It is a dereliction of duty on the part of theology that the modern mind should be left with no other choice. The tardiness of theological reform is reflected in the religious tensions of the modern institutions, where formal loyalty is uneasy or there is a convenient emphasis on moral and cultural aspects with theology in abeyance. On the common ground of arts and sciences Arab and Pakistani scholars can meet with their Western counterparts in mutual recognition and respect. Why cannot theologians do the same? Not only because the issues there are sterner and more exacting, but also because theologians East and West still move, for the most part, in different mental worlds. Surely this situation urgently demands to be set right. Dogmatic belief in Islam needs to get abreast of its educational responsibilities in a modern age or face the danger of losing its educated classes, its technicians, officials, engineers and professional men, to secularity or a merely nominal allegiance. There is far too little contact or colloquy between technical experts of the modern vintage in Muslim areas and the trustees of Muslim doctrine and philosophy.³ This educational dichotomy in contemporary Islam—a dichotomy often reproduced within those individuals who try to embrace both camps—is serious and formidable. Until it is resolved in a measure a genuine theological exchange will be slow to fructify. But to seek for the latter might be one of the best ways of meeting it—in so far as outsiders can. The lay monopoly of progressive scholarship must be terminated by a new spirit in orthodoxy on the part of the 'ulemā.'

The delicate nature of the problem is accentuated by the fact that Christian institutions of higher education in the Muslim world have often failed to face it. Their influence has often been proportionately greater than their size or numbers and has stimulated the revival of Arabic in the Near East, as well as serving and diffusing a general scholarship. But their influence in the specifically theological realm has been in no sense comparable. While fitting their students for professional life, they have tended to ignore the basic issues of theology. Thus they have contributed in part to a conspiracy of silence by which religion is left in a state of insulation from the pro-

³ See, for example, Aḥmad Amīn: *Faiḍ al-Khātir*, Vol. 1, p. 30-34 "The Missing Link."

voking and searching elements of a modern education.

The reasons for this attitude are not far to seek. The tendency to contract out of the distinctively theological obligations of the educator is readily understandable—given the difficulties under which such institutions have operated and given too the very sound desire to avoid any misappropriation of the educational trust. But in the end it is that trust itself which requires that the ultimate duties to the mind and spirit be faced and fulfilled. The very advance of education on one side deepens the danger of its poverty on the other. To turn out hosts of excellent surgeons, physicists, surveyors, architects, and the like—perhaps by their very training detached from traditional beliefs—without enabling them to find the spiritual convictions within which to pursue their professions is to fail them crucially. Nor does moral training alone make up the deficiency: for unless the faith on which behavior is based is articulate behavior itself lacks sinew and sanction. For behavior can in the end only be inculcated by explaining itself, and that means theology. We should not condone the illusion that Christianity has nothing to share with Muslims except general comradeship in moral uplift and social service, desirable as these are. Only when the admitted difficulties of the theological side of Christian education are faced will it be possible to expect a valid intellectual and spiritual leadership to arise in Islam and take up fruitfully its own internal problems. We must do everything possible to foster within the younger Muslims of intellectual capacity a burning sense of the importance of theology. The urgency and primacy of religious thinking must be brought home to those in Islam who can respond to the vocation to theological leadership. To this all Christian educators should be resolutely and patiently consecrated despite a host of deterrents and in resistance to the temptation of the easier way of concentrating on the science out of which the students hope to make a living, but with which alone they cannot hope to make a life.⁴

Another obstacle to be surmounted in the development of Muslim-Christian theological 'meeting' is the forbidding character of

⁴It is interesting to note in this connection the Report of the President of the American University of Beirut, 1951-52, p. 10, where he discusses the place of theology in the curriculum. After dealing with local problems of arrangement, he remarks: "It is a matter of great regret that the University does not possess its own academic department of religion. We are failing to provide in actuality even the courses which are optimistically carried in the catalogue and we are failing even more markedly to encourage qualified students to enter the Christian ministry." He adds: "There is no richer laboratory for religious enquiry anywhere than exists in the Middle East itself, and it is an important part of the University's opportunity to develop the investigative aspect of this essential phase of human experience."

communal religious solidarity in the Middle East. For all the tendency referred to earlier for communities to draw together loosely within a political nationalism, there is still the rooted idea that there should be no inter-change of thought, still less of persons, between the communities. Social friendships, to a degree, may be made across them. But the average Muslim and Christian has little or no feeling that he has any religious 'notes' to compare, any exchange of what is meaningful to him in his allegiance. Rather for centuries toleration has meant the right to remain what you are and he who tries to leave the dominant loyalty—however sound in his view his motive may be—will find that there are formidable legal, social and economic sanctions against his doing so. Indeed he may come to the conclusion that his community is also in effect his prison, since he has no freedom to leave it. A faith which the adherent is not at full liberty to compare with another is not, when it comes to the test, the faith of free men, whether or not the option is ever claimed. But the point of immediate importance here is the unfortunate habit of regarding convictions as the business, the perquisite, of the community. Nomocracy, the worship of the community, surely inhibits a true exercise of mental privilege. We need pioneers ready to conceive of their loyalties in more creative and adventurous fashion and to bring a new hospitality of mind into the communal relations in which they are set. As it is, legal and other sanctions behind religious communal rights mean that they are only safeguarded by being introverted. To enjoy legal status is to be bound to mental and spiritual self-sufficiency.⁵ This can have tragic consequences both for the community in particular and for the larger national society of which it is part. Is it reasonable to be living in the same world, in every sense but the theological? At least for purposes of atomic destruction all are identical: Communist penetration refuses to discriminate except perhaps in the temporising realm of the tactical. But theology is condemned to remain in the holes of pigeons who are not even doves of peace. In so far as pioneers here and there can successfully rebel against this folly, they will be asserting both a vital principle and a policy of hope. Everything surely spurs us to endeavor to present Christianity, not as a sect one has to shift to, but as a truth and a fellowship one is invited to explore. Too often believing is only belonging, when belonging should be first believing.

⁵ See Lootfi Levonian: *The Millet System in the Middle East*. *The Muslim World*, Vol. xlii. No. 2, April, 1952, pp. 90-96.

THE GRAND "PERHAPS."

It may be objected of course that theological discussion between Muslim and Christian has often occurred in the past and that it has never been singularly fruitful. Are we merely arguing for another instalment of "the great debate?" Names like al-Kindi, John of Damascus, Hieronymo Xavier at the Moghul court, Gottfried Pfander and others, come at once to mind. Controversy conscious of itself as such is not, however, the concept here in mind. Polemics is one thing and theological 'meeting' another. We are thinking not of defence but of witness, not of contrasts but of mediation. It may be that the approach which meets with the reaction of self-justification can give way to one which evokes self-disclosure, that the instinct to resist can be displaced by the impulse to understand. This at least is that for which we must labor and any caveats against it, based on experience of debate alone, are disqualified. Nor should it be urged that the hope is too sanguine. "As things have been they remain" is not the language of the authentic Church. Rather "expectans expectavi" is its cry. The time is ripe for some new creativeness to break forth in the long history of Muslim-Christian relations, enriched by the devotion of many generations and yet carrying their mission into a new fulfillment. The very circumstances of our modern world have broken down and shattered many of the old barriers and the old sufficiencies. If they have also created new difficulties and tensions even these can become themes of interpretation and occasions of truth. The grand "Perhaps" waits upon vision and resource.

In short, then, may there not be a way in numerous localities and centres for Muslims and Christians with the willing mind to come together, impelled by what is common in their situation, to establish across all that divides a mutual relationship where mind can speak to mind and heart to heart? Is there not opportunity for the discovery of common devotional ground where worship, in some sense, can be offered together? The Christian, of course, cannot participate in the distinctively Muslim *ṣalāt*, but Muslim prayer and *du'ā'* outside *ṣalāt* can provide occasions of spiritual togetherness even if different conceptions both of God and of prayer remain. Devotional response can be made to those truths of theology which are shared—God's Oneness, Sovereignty, creative Will and Mercy. In terms of petition and the offering of need and perplexity to God, the themes and occasions are legion. In so relating their common life to the One God, Christians and Muslims, particularly where they are fellow-nationals, will be giving a religious recognition to their mutual needs. Surely the atmosphere generated by such mutuality will be the likeliest setting for growth into awareness of those aspects of

the faith of Christ which could not at first be articulated within it. On this basis of at least a partially mutual, devotional, recognition of truth, this practice of God's presence in relative association, it should be possible for a steady growth of open-minded theological thought, study and comparison, leading inward from more peripheral subjects towards the central sanctuaries of belief. Space here allows no elaboration of how such themes might be broached and pursued. The argument is content to make the plea. “The Somehow may be This-How.” It may be that the Christian missionary obligation to Islam in terms of our time best fulfills itself in the ambition to find within Islam, and to stimulate where it cannot yet find, a will to admit the Christian into partnership. But the ambition to find means also the ambition to merit, in sincerity and humility, the trust of such a partnership. It is a partnership we repeat not to synthesize but to communicate, not for goodwill as a goal but as a beginning.

‘ABD AL-TAFĀHUM

A MUSLIM'S PRAYER: A CHRISTIAN PETITION

O God, Who hast made the tongue of the morning to utter its splendors and divinest the watches of the night with its intense and stilly darkness, and hast set in order the works of the rolling universe in all the potentialities of its array, and hast made the light of the sun with its fierce beams; O Thou Who hast revealed Thyself by Thyself and transcendest the likeness of Thy creatures and art exalted above all matching of Thy nature, Who are near to our musing thoughts but far from the apprehension of our eyes, Who knowest what is, before it comes to be; O Thou Who hast made us to find rest in Thy faithfulness and security and hast awakened us to the favors and goodnesses Thou hast granted us, and hast by Thy mighty hand preserved us from the hand of wickedness, let Thy blessing be upon the guide unto Thee in the long, dark night, upon him who lays hold of Thy counsel with unceasing reverence.

THE RELIGIOUS LIFE OF THE TZIGANES

(Dr. Munir 'Abdullah Moyal, a native of Jaffa and of Turkish descent, is a widely travelled student of men and of the current scene. He has presented in our pages several colorful glimpses of peoples and countries he has visited. Here is his interesting study of Gipsy life and thought, gathered in France but relevant over a much wider field).

In the course of the centuries several theories have been put forward about the origin of the Tziganes or Gipsies. Some writers have claimed them to be Egyptians, some others, Jews, some others, of Hamitic stock. Philologists have recognized since the late 18th century that there is a link between the Gipsy dialects and the Indian tongues. It is not very many years since a theological student of Leyden, born in Hungary, meeting at the university three students hailing from Malabar, recognized analogies between the language that they spoke among themselves and the idiom of the Tziganes of his country. He established a vocabulary of a thousand words which were understood in a general way by the Tziganes.

As a student of comparative religions, I cultivated the company of some "*Romanichels*" of Southern France, curious to learn whether this Indian descent had impressed its mark upon their religion. No Brahmanic influences could be traced but some faint marks of Mithra's cult are still recognizable. But these people are so lacking in the propensity toward mysticism shared by nearly all matriarchal tribes like theirs that some writers have denied their having any religious inclinations at all.

Their language has a word, of Indian origin: "*O Dewell*" (*Devla*) or "*O Del*," which can be translated by God, or Good or Great Spirit, something akin to the great Manitou of the Indians of America. They oppose to this the "*Beng*," or "*Bang*," the impure Principle who tempts their people. O Del is the Lord of thunder, lightning, rain and snow. As he sends the Tziganes good or permits the Beng to harm them, one can blame him when a prayer is not fulfilled or when a death occurs in the tribe. He is represented as a being of this world and yet beyond it. O Del is respected and feared; his name is invoked in every plight. He is not figured under any material form.

Phuv, or Earth, is that which endures when things mortal

wither and pass away. She has not been created, existing from all eternity. This Earth upon which the Tzigane wanders brings him all good but is not adored by him.

The Tziganes feel some bonds between them and the stars. They feel themselves to be in communion with the stars when they drink rain water and the dew. When a new member is admitted to the tribe, his oath establishes between him and his new brothers the same bonds that exist between the stars and the *phuri dai* or the tribe's mother. Some tribes not yet settled down and influenced by contact with the towns hold the Moon in special reverence. My friend Jean Bazal, Editor of the magazine *V* and a great friend of the Tziganes, has told me that he had observed, when sojourning with them, that the men took off their caps and recited some prayers when the moon appeared from behind the clouds. Of course, he did not ask the reason, for these people are very defiant about all matters concerning their religion.

For the Tziganes all kinds of fairies and spirits dwell upon the earth. They live like mortal beings but in far-away palaces of gold and silver where there is no admittance to men of flesh and blood. All these fairies are young and beautiful so long as they are virgins (compare the cult of Vesta). Over each group of good or evil spirits (numbering always 3 or 9 or another multiple of 3—the lucky numbers of the Tziganes) reigns a *mataya*. Not all stones and trees are inhabited by these spirits but they may at any time enter one of them. When a Tzigane woman is quarrelsome, she is held to be possessed by an evil spirit. These spirits are wont to play tricks upon mankind. When a child is born hunchbacked or his growth is arrested after birth, a black hen is said to have laid an egg in his mother's bosom. But a good fairy appears after birth and protects the child throughout his life. There are also male spirits, the dreaded Kobolds, dwelling in holes. For thwarting these evil influences the Tzigane woman has always some exorcism in stock to practice. She does not understand the meaning of the words but believes in their potency. For instance, the conjuration for driving away the demon of erysipelas is uttered in the Sumerian language: "*Hilka, hilka, beska, beska!*" (Out with you, out with you, evil, evil!) These words have been handed down from mother to daughter for nearly 6,000 years.

These people believe in the evil eye. I can never persuade a vagrant Tzigane to let me take his picture.

One is confronted with complete illogic when studying the Tziganes' tenets. For them there is no difference between miracles and reality, between an object and its attributes. O Del and the fairies are all on the same level. The Tzigane is not very articulate. He feels that on this earth there are beings stronger than he which influence him for good or evil. The fairies accompany him in every walk of life. On the one side we find a unique Del opposed to a Beng without material form; on the other side, the fairies of wind, water, earth and destiny.

At the world's end there is a hereafter. Its entrance is a big hole through which one may enter the earth. If one always follows the setting sun he may reach this point, but he must travel in a carriage drawn by 2 white cocks. He who speaks about this hereafter must die. After entering the hole one must walk two months in obscurity before seeing any light and coming to the black cannibal Emperor. There is no judgment, no reward, no punishment. Certain tribes hold that the world of the dead is on top of a certain mountain, watched by 9 white dogs. One must enter through a cavern. The souls of dead children are carried up this mountain by an old woman. Every Tzigane, on his death, enters this kingdom of his ancestors' souls that bring an influence to bear upon this world. The revenge of the dead is to be dreaded. They are carefully watching over the old customs and the tribe. One must revere them. When a Tzigane takes a solemn oath by the dead he is believed by his fellow tribesman. According to the law, if this oath turns out to be false, he must be put to death. He may lie to a *gadzo*—a non-Tzigane—but not to his brothers.

There is no speculation about the hereafter; the Tzigane is convinced that he will spend there much the same kind of life as in this world. This life is acted upon an undying and never-changing stage; after their worldly vesture is decayed, they will go on living. In the hereafter, they will remain forever young and strong. So for them the dead are still living. The soul that had dwelt in a corpse tarries for a long time around its earthly abode, its kith and kin. One must not make it too difficult for the soul to depart; on the contrary, it must

be persuaded to rejoice that it has left the body. For the Tzigane, therefore, funerals are occasions for merry-making. Certain tribes put a little coin in the mouth of the dead; I could not find out why.

If the dead is feared to be a *tsohano* (a vampire), the corpse is cut to pieces lest the vampire suck the blood of those left behind him and so draw them into the hereafter. Death cuts off the Tzigane from the community of the living. If a member of the tribe grows very old, they see in that longevity the hand of the fairies who have permitted him to triumph over the schemes of the evil spirits. Therefore the old are held in reverence. An old woman is deemed to be in touch with the spirits. She is clairvoyant and can foretell the future. This *phuri dai* is the chief of the tribe, its counsellor, its physician, its warden of the law, all rolled in one. She believes in the magical virtue of her incantations. In tearing or piercing some object that has been in contact with the being it is desired to harm, she believes that these acts will have the same effect on the being himself; it is a practice of sorcery. This *phuri dai* believes the more in her mumbo-jumbo when invoking her God, but it is far more potent when done in a church where her incantation is "charged" with strong currents. But she may act beneficially; she may restore alienated affection, put an end to quarrels or law-suits and so on. These women dread to meet any kind of priests, for they are bearers of evil forces, though harmless for themselves.

The Tziganes live only for the present moment; they do not care about the future. They do not discuss what happens; they do not seek for causes; something can be at the same time something else. Dominated by the impression of the moment they do not enjoy any inner life.

When passing through a country, they adopt its religion for convenience sake. They are Lutherans in Germany but on crossing the Rhine they will become Catholics. They prefer Catholicism for the pompous ceremonies and the stately robes of the priests of this religion take their fancy. They like to go to the Catholic churches; it is for them like going to the theatre. There they cross themselves, listen to mass and even receive the communion. But all these denominational rites are of no importance to them. In their eyes the only marriage is the tribal one celebrated by the *phuri dai* and the elders of

the tribe; after that the young couple may or may not seek the church's consecration. If they call a priest at their funerals it is only for the magical character attributed to him. Their children are often baptized and re-baptized in different towns only for the *gadzo's* gifts, but a Tzigane will never stand as godfather or godmother.

The Tziganes deem themselves virtuous so long as they observe their ancestral customs which contain for them all the religious and moral values of life. They do not feel themselves at all bound by any ethical or religious code other than their tribal customs. For them it is no sin to lie to or steal from a *gadzo*, but, as said, it is a sin to lie to or steal from a fellow-tribesman. Their moral code can be summed up as "to be true and honest between ourselves and false to the whole world." In certain respects the Tziganes have a very strict code. He who commits adultery, who visits a woman in childbirth, who has intercourse with a woman during her period of purification or who eats dog or horseflesh is declared *melalo*, impure. The Tzigane who has sinned against their law must be brought to judgment before the court of elders who may banish him from the tribe, and that is no light punishment, for these nomads love their kith and kin. When they have committed such a sin or when they want to give a solemn oath, they must fast for a certain period or not eat any flesh. Outside this tribal restraint, they have no sense whatever of sin or of constraint. In a church they may pray to God or Jesus to bless their robberies. They have no intercourse with the outside world other than that which their own interest dictates.

M. A. MOYAL

BOOK REVIEWS

The Ethical Philosophy of Al-Ghazali. By M. Umaruddin, Aligarh, 1949, pp. 465, Rs. 18.

The present discussion of Al-Ghazālī's ethics consists of four parts: The background of Al-Ghazālī's ethical thought, its basis, its principle, and its practical aspects. This classification, which is a little haphazard, is typical of the author's general treatment of his material. Even a cursory perusal of the four volumes of this work is sufficient to show how wide is the scope of the author's reading, but the exposition is neither lucid nor systematic. Perhaps the weakest part of the book is the one devoted to the background of Al-Ghazālī's ethics; a sort of general survey of Islamic political, religious and philosophical history from the time of Muḥammad to that of Al-Ghazālī. In addition to being a little irrelevant to the study of Al-Ghazālī's ethics and being of disproportionate length, this survey, though amply documented, is full of inaccuracies in matters of detail. For instance, the Agent Intellect is stated to be the first emanation from God (p. 61); whereas in the Neo-Platonic system it is the last of 10 such "Separate Intellects" which are said to *emanate* (and not to be *created*, as the author states) from God or the One, according to the Neo-Platonists. Similarly the discovery of this Agent Intellect is ascribed to Alexander of Aphrodisias; whereas it is a well-known fact that Aristotle himself was responsible for this notion, as can be seen from *De Anima III, 430a, 10ff.* The author's list of the questions discussed by Al-Ghazālī in the *Tahāfut* reflects his superficial acquaintance with such matters. For instance, questions 1 & 2 which are directed against the "Philosophers'" thesis that the universe is eternal (*qadīm*) and perpetual (*abadī*) are referred to as the "refutation of the doctrine that the universe exists from the beginning" and "the doctrine that the universe is eternal" respectively. Al-Ghazālī's repudiation of causality is referred to as the "doctrine that the laws of nature are inviolable." As a further instance of this rather misleading inaccuracy, the orthodox theology of Al-Ash'arī is called (p. 85) "a system of metaphysical theology" despite its avowed agnosticism and its emphasis on the literal aspect of Islamic teaching. Al-Ash'arī's compilation of the teachings of the various sects and heresies, *Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn*, is said to correspond to Al-Ghazālī's statement of the Credo in *Ihyā', I, pp. 79ff*; whereas one who has the barest acquaintance with this heresiography of Al-Ash'arī's would notice that he hardly ever makes a personal profession of belief there.

The more pertinent exposition of the ethics of Al-Ghazālī is equally vitiated by lack of a systematic approach. When one has read the three parts devoted to the ethics, one does not feel that his understanding of Al-Ghazālī's ethics has deepened. The author would have rendered the student of Al-Ghazālī a greater service if he had simply made some of the ethical material here discussed accessible to the English reader and had left out the discussion of general ethical views, such as the analogies between Al-Ghazālī and Descartes, St. Augustine, Hume and others. The issue he joins with Iqbāl over the attitude of Al-Ghazālī to thought and intuition (p. 237ff.) reflects his failure to appreciate the full significance of the

problem involved. On the whole, this book does not add much to our understanding of Al-Ghazālī's thought.

MAJID FAKHRY

*School of Oriental and African Studies,
University of London*

Readings from the Mystics of Islam: Translations from the Arabic and Persian, together with a short Account of the History of Sufism, and brief biographical Notes on each Šūfī Writer, by Margaret Smith, London, 1950, 8 vo. pp. vi, 144, Luzac & Co. 12s.6d.

This little book is certain of a warm welcome and a wide use, for there are goodly numbers of people interested in mysticism, and in Islamic mysticism in particular, who must perforce be content to read the mystics in translation. Margaret Smith has here presented them with a wide survey. Her selections range from the very earliest Šūfī treatises right up to the mid-nineteenth century. To cover such a period of some thousand years in a small book means that the selections have to be for the most part quite brief passages. In such a book there is always the subjective element of choice, the author having to choose passages which seem to be representative. Thus in this book there are several passages which to this reviewer seem to be quite un-mystical, and which could have been penned by any pious Muslim, even by one dogmatically opposed to Šūfism. The selections have been arranged in chronological order, so that some elements of development of thought appear. It was a happy idea to place at the head of each group of selections a brief statement of who the writer was, where and when he lived, and what his Šūfī connections were. An Appendix indicates the original sources from which the passages have been translated. One very curious fact strikes the reader of these selections, namely, that in Islamic mysticism Muḥammad himself counts for little or nothing, and the Qur'ān for less than nothing. There is very very little here to which a non-Muslim mystic could not give unqualified assent. How strongly this is contrasted with other aspects of Islamic culture need hardly be stressed.

ARTHUR JEFFERY

Columbia University, New York

Persecution and the Art of Writing. By Leo Strauss, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1952, pp. 204, \$4.00.

The five papers which constitute Professor Strauss's *Persecution and the Art of Writing*, though each one is devoted to a particular philosophic topic, all have in common the same outlook of philosophical speculation which the author characterizes as writing under persecution. The second paper, whose title the author has borrowed for his book, treats the problem of persecution and its impact on writing by analyzing the techniques which medieval and pre-modern writers had adopted in order to communicate their unorthodox ideas, for fear of persecution, to the intelligent reader. Such esoteric writing has often confused and baffled critics because of the apparent inconsistencies of its materials, but Professor Strauss has no illusion that the writer's main purpose, in order to escape persecution, was to emphasize certain hidden meanings notwithstanding conflicting views and materials on matters of no importance to the author.

Strauss says that this type of writing contains two teachings: "a popular teaching of an edifying character, which is in the foreground; and a philosophic teaching concerning the most important subject, which is indicated only between the lines." These philosophic views have often been expressed "by using as mouthpiece some disreputable character;" thus the writer stated openly what he wanted though giving the apparent impression of dis-approving them.

One of Professor Strauss's purposes in publishing this volume is to call the attention of writers to a new approach in philosophical study which he calls the sociology of philosophy. He wonders why in the study of the sociology of knowledge, which aims at showing the relations between the different types of thought to different types of society, no attempt has yet been made to consider the possibility of philosophers forming a class by themselves. Professor Strauss contends that what unites all genuine philosophers is more important than what unites a given philosopher with a particular group of non-philosophers. In his study of Islamic and Jewish philosophy, Strauss was struck by a common phenomenon which characterized the philosophers' thinking, an understanding of which calls for a sociology of philosophy. This is a pioneering approach which may help to explain many complexities as well as ambiguities for students of Islamics.

There is no more striking example to show how similar was the phenomenon which conditioned the Islamic and Jewish writers than the three studies which Professor Strauss has presented on the Muslim philosopher al-Fārābī, and the Jewish philosophers, Maimonides and Halevi, in his first, third and fourth papers. Not only is the method of writing in these three philosophers most interesting, for they presented unorthodox views while pretending orthodoxy, but also the similarity of outlook among Jewish writers and their Muslim predecessors. The third and fourth papers indicate that the conflict between theology and philosophy in Judaism was not unlike that which existed in Islam; in both the theologians triumphed over the philosophers. The writings of Halevi, who defended religion, not as a theologian but as one who had studied philosophy, is not unlike al-Ghazālī who, after he had studied philosophy and mastered it, came back to defend orthodoxy against *falsafa* (philosophy).

If Professor Strauss had expanded his studies to include al-Ash'arī and the Mu'tazilites, al-Ghazālī and Ibn-Rushd (Averroes) he would have found that this conflict between orthodoxy and *falsafa* was in itself a determining factor alienating philosophers from orthodoxy. At the same time, as Professor Strauss has stated, it helped to keep philosophy pure and uncompromised by the science of *kalām*.

In his study of al-Fārābī, Professor Strauss departs from the commonly accepted view that he (as well as other Muslim thinkers) was influenced by Greek thought as it filtered to him from Hellenistic sources. Strauss compares the ideas of al-Fārābī with Aristotle and came to the conclusion that unless al-Fārābī ascribed to Aristotle ideas he himself wanted to express, under the guise of Aristotle, the views of al-Fārābī which he derived from Aristotle were genuinely Aristotelian. This is a new interpretation which may not be consistent with the fact that only fragments of Aristotle were translated into Arabic and that even when such translators were made they were

translations from Hellenistic sources ascribed to Aristotle or Plato (see T. J. de Boer, *The History of Philosophy in Islam*, translated by E. R. Jones [London, 1933], pp. 108-110).

Space does not permit the reviewer to summarize a number of other views expressed in this little but exceedingly provocative volume; students of Oriental philosophy will find in it not only a fresh approach to their study but also a number of points brilliantly explained.

MAJID KHADDURI

*School of Advanced International Studies,
The Johns Hopkins University,
Washington, D. C.*

The Middle East in World Affairs. By George Lenczowski. Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1952, pp. 459. \$6.00.

This book fills an important gap in Middle Eastern Studies, intended as it is primarily for college students interested in current affairs. It will be most welcome to teachers, who have been at a loss for textbooks in this area, since it gives the necessary historical background of the Ottoman and Persian Empires as a prelude to more recent developments which are the prime concern of the book. The work discusses each country of the Middle East from 1919 to the present, while the final portion is concerned with special problems—the Dardanelles, the Suez Canal, the Arab League, and aims of the great powers. Seven appendix tables and a lengthy bibliography complete the volume.

Lenczowski has written a detailed and clear account of the political events in Egypt, Turkey, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iran, and Afghanistan. While his emphasis is always political, he has included much of economic and social importance, usually with a minimum of interpretation. It is perhaps here that the author is weakest, though in his defense one must remember that the work is a textbook. Some of the up-to-date developments are treated hurriedly, but this is inevitable too in any book which seeks to follow the news of yesterday. Although the book is concerned with politics and international affairs one would have liked to see more on the important social and religious developments in the Middle East, as, for example, the growth of secret societies and the dervish revival in Iran. There are eight maps in the book which is well printed on good paper.

The following remarks are not necessarily criticisms or corrections, but mostly observations after reading the text. A paragraph on the changing of geographical names, of Constantinople to Istanbul, Izmir for Smyrna, etc. gives the impression that the Turkish names were not used before 1930, which the author, of course, does not mean (p. 122). The mixture of Turkish and Arabic (or European) spellings of Turkish names may cause confusion. Is, *Cumhuriyet*, *Aksam*, Halidah Adib, Sarajoglu, if one tries to approximate English, might be Ish, *Jumhuriyet*, *Aksham*, Halide Edip, and Sarajoghlu; or in Turkish Is, Cümhuriyet, Aksam, Halide Edib, Saracoglu. If diacritical marks cannot be used a consistent system is advisable.

It is interesting to note that quite a number of Kurds have been

made officers in the Turkish army, perhaps in accordance with a government policy to conciliate the young Kurds and secure their loyalty to the Turkish state. The eastern vilayets have been visited by Americans in the last few years though they are by no means open. (p. 126). Is "Mohammedojik" the American GI expression for "Mehmetcik," the "Turkish private" at least as early as Gallipoli? (p. 150). In *Russia and the West in Iran* the author gives 1944 as the correct date for the death of Reza Shah; here it is given as 1943 (p. 169). Hussein Ala resigned on April 27, before the Shah signed the nationalization law (p. 185). Nadir Shah of Afghanistan was assassinated by a young student of the German school in Kabul; the student was related to the prominent Ghulam Nabi who had been executed by Nadir Shah (p. 202). Afghanistan did not expel the Axis legations as Iran during the war, and Italian, German, and Japanese legation personnel continued to intrigue against the Allies to the end. There was even a radio transmitter in the German legation. Two girls' schools existed in Kabul before the war; they were only enlarged after the war (p. 204). The only regular airlines which served Afghanistan after the war were the weekly Soviet plane from Tashkent to Kabul and the recent Himalaya (Indian) Air Lines plane from Bombay to Zahidan to Kandahar to Kabul. This latter started in 1952 but may not prove profitable. It is possible that Trans World Airways even began service, but if so it must have been very short-lived (p. 205).

The author says that improved conditions in Russian Central Asia had no effect on the population of Afghan Turkistan. This is contrary to the experience of the reviewer who met both Uzbeks and Tajiks who spoke wistfully of the better lot of their compatriots across the frontier. Soviet infiltration and propaganda in Afghan Turkistan should not be dismissed or underrated. I believe there is a potential fifth column there, but the feelings of the population of Afghan Turkistan are directed against the Afghan (Pathan) ruling group in anger at unfair treatment rather than in support of Soviet propaganda. In the last century, Afghans were transferred from the south to Turkistan—an old policy of shifting peoples in Middle Eastern states. The Afghans in the north do not endear themselves to the Uzbeks or Tajiks and there is constant friction. The Afghan Government tried to impose the Pushtu language on Persian and Turkish speaking peoples before and during the late war but this policy has been abandoned. One hopes that the Government will continue and expand the participation of all citizens of Afghanistan—Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkomans, Hazara, Baluchis, Brahuis, and Nuristanis, as well as Pushtu speaking Afghans,—in the Government and in the benefits of education and development of the country (p. 205).

One would have liked a brief discussion of the place of the Druzes in Lebanon since they have assumed importance under the recent government of Camille Shamoun. It is most probable that the Muslim population of Lebanon now outnumbers the Christian. This may be the most important reason why the Lebanese Government does not wish to redistrict the Lebanon or take a census for elections. It is no secret that Adib al-Shishakli was the strong man behind the Zaim coup as well as the Hinnawi seizure of power. The surrender of the Syrian National Party's chief, Anton Saadeh, to the Lebanese Government may have been a mistake. More likely it was

deliberate (pp. 248-252).

A more detailed analysis of Iraqi politics would have been desirable, discussing, for example, the place of the Kurds. Jemal Baban, the influential Kurdish leader who supports Nuri al-Said Pasha, the greatest power in Iraqi politics, is considered pro-British, but he has managed to keep Kurdish support of the Government in spite of strong Communist activities among the young Kurds as well as Kurdish nationalism. Muḥammad al-Ṣadr is perhaps the most important Shi'a leader in Iraq, both religious and political. The book is handicapped by lack of first hand information about the personalities and the deals behind-the-scenes which do not appear in the newspapers.

The author's treatment of Israel will not find favor with Israelis, but on the delicate subject of Palestine one cannot expect to escape criticism. South Africans would also object to the sentence on p. 369, "In rather mysterious circumstances 25,000 South African troops quickly surrendered to him (Rommel) in Tobruk." Actually the South Africans were very bitter against the British Command for allegedly deserting their troops and leaving them to be captured. During 1942 they observed several minutes of silence every day throughout the Union in honor of their troops who had fallen or who were captured at Tobruk. Surely by now one could obtain the truth about the matter.

The amassing of a great number of facts and arranging them in order was a tremendous task and the author is to be congratulated for his valuable contribution which will be a standard work on the subject for some time.

RICHARD N. FRYE

Harvard University

Background of the Middle East. Ernest Jackh, Advisory Editor, Cornell University Press, 1952, pp. viii + 236, 3 maps. \$3.50.

This symposium on the Near (or Middle) East consists of 22 short articles by a distinguished panel of scholars on various aspects of the area. Some of the aspects treated are historical, some contemporary. Some articles are informative, others interpretative. The only unity is that they all concern one area. Each article must, therefore, be judged on its separate merits. Here are the contents and the reviewer's impressions in brief:

I Delimitation of the Middle East (Jackh)—useful, little discussion of definitions. II Statistical highlights (Hazard)—useful facts. III The geostrategic uniqueness of the Middle East (Jackh)—interesting and significant. IV Center of creation, radiation and mediation (Hass)—conventional. V Hebrew civilization (Baron)—broad, interesting. VI Influence of Hellenism on the Middle East (Michalopoulos)—conventional. VII Rome and Eastern Christianity (Alexander)—broad generalization in the Germanic manner; interesting, provocative, sometimes questionable. VIII Oriental Christianity (Alexander)—a good general view. IX Byzantium and Eastern Christianity (Alexander)—good general view. X The birthplace of Islamic civilization (Jeffery)—informative. XI The Arab Caliphate: its rise and decline (Hitti)—a summary. XII Rise of the Turkish Empire (Togan)—informative. XIII European imperialism in the Middle East

(Thomas)—a neat conspectus. XIV Russian Messianism and the Middle East (Alexander)—brilliant and intemperate polemic. XV Nationalism (Kohn)—a summary. XVI Social and economic problems (Hakim)—outspoken. XVII Petroleum (U.N. report)—informative. XVIII The United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East (Howard)—a summary. XIX The importance of the Mediterranean (Reitzel)—illuminating. XX The Law of the Near and Middle East (Schacht)—a summary. XXI The arts: reaction against Hellenism (Dimand)—a glance at the decorative arts of Iran. XXII American archaeology in the Near and Middle East (Perkins)—catalogue of excavations.

While all the articles are competently executed, it is difficult to see what class of readers will be served by those which are primarily factual: summaries of 10 pages average length, on such broad topics, can hardly help either the beginner or the more professional reader. But many of the interpretative articles will be highly suggestive and stimulating to those who are already sufficiently informed, and herein lies the book's chief value. A short biographical note on each writer might well have been provided.

GEORGE F. HOURANI

University of Michigan

Al-Qadā' al-'Ashā'irī (Tribal Judiciary Practices). By Farīq al-Muzhir al-Fir'awn. Baghdad, al-Najāh Press, 1941, pp. 216.

Abū Najāh Farīq al-Muzhir al-Fir'awn, the author of this work, is the head of an important Iraqi tribe, *al-Fatla*, and for sometime a Representative of the Diwaniyya district in the Iraqi House of Representatives. His knowledge of tribal judiciary practices is the result of life-long experience as a respected arbiter among the Iraqi tribes of southern Iraq as well as of his studies and observation of tribal practices in other parts of Iraq. A self-educated man, the author has been very active in the last two decades, and his works are conspicuous among the meager products of historical and literary scholarship that have come from the presses of Baghdad. This may serve as an apology for taking notice of a book more than a decade after its publication.

When the British forces occupied Iraq during World War I, they found the Iraqi tribes (due partly to their traditions and social life and partly to the collapse of the authority of the Ottoman Turks) practising their own system of customary retribution and settlement of claims. They knew further that these tribes would resist any drastic change in these practices, and that forcing them to subject themselves to the regular civil law would not be practical. Hence they attempted to collect and organize a body of regulations based on the existing practices, with the hope that it would be respected by the tribes and be an adequate basis for the settlement of civil and criminal cases arising among them. These regulations, known in Arabic as *Nizām Da'āwī al-'Ashā'ir*, were subsequently modified and finally codified in 1924, to be enforced by local administrators, given authority as Administrative Judges for that purpose. Criticisms of these regulations have been coming mainly from two sources: the Iraqi tribes have been criticising them as inadequate and rigid; while the intelligentsia have criticized the very concept of a separate tribal law and of a dual legal system.

Fariq al-Muzhir's book does not contribute to this controversy; rather, it is a convenient handbook that covers a wide area in the practice of tribal justice giving sufficient background material on the history, customs and economic and social conditions of the Iraqi tribes to render the whole subject meaningful in addition to supplying the reader with the main body of recognized precedents that form the bases of tribal judiciary practices. In few passages (e.g. pp. 123-4; 142-6) an attempt is made to grasp the philosophic bases and the social and economic justifications of these practices (the book was originally to be called *al-Fikh al-'Ashā'irī* [Tribal Jurisprudence]), but this end is clearly subordinated to the factual information about how disputes and crimes are settled among tribes in practice. Thus the complex task of writing a *fiqh* of these practices still awaits its author.

MUHSIN MAHDI

Chicago, The Oriental Institute

Al-Haqā'iq al-Nāsi'a fi-l-Thawra al-'Irāqiyya 1920 wa Natā'ijuhā (Salient Facts on the Iraqi Revolution of 1920 and its Results). By Fariq al-Muzhir al-Fir'awn. Vol. I, Parts I and II, Baghdad, al-Najāh Press, 1952, pp. 642.

The Iraqi revolution of 1920 against the British occupation and military rule of the country originated and spread throughout the middle and lower regions of the Euphrates valley. It was probably the most important single fact leading to the speedy creation of Iraq as an independent state. Although thirty years have passed, the work under review is the first detailed account of the origins of that revolution, its leadership and its course as conceived and carried out by those who took part in it. Numerous accounts of British officials, both military and civil, have been available ever since the early twenties. According to these, the revolution was no more than a local uprising led by a minority of tribal chiefs, fanatics, trouble makers and highway gangsters. There have also been some accounts by Iraqi and Egyptian writers who had neither participated in the revolution nor possessed an intimate knowledge of its inner dynamics. They misread the whole event by supposing that Baghdad supplied the ideas and leadership and Syria the financial resources and crediting the ruling classes with the main role in the revolution.

Like all these accounts, the work under review is not an objective treatment of the subject; but unlike many of them it does not pretend to be so. Its author is openly partisan, but he is a partisan of the revolution itself, not of the British official policies or of the present ruling class. He is unusually qualified for this task, having been one of the major leaders of the revolution and personally acquainted with all who have actively participated in it. He was an eye-witness of its important events; furthermore he has spent the last thirty years collecting documents and reports on the event through interviews and questionnaires. The author's care in providing maps, illustrations and extensive indexes is also noteworthy. His book, as a finished work of historical scholarship may have many shortcomings, repetitions, an emotional style and lack of orderly presentation. In spite of these deficiencies, it is a source book of first importance. Here for the first time we have a record of the causes of the revolution as conceived by those who executed it, of the role of the religious leaders

who supported it, the role of the tribal chiefs who provided the man power; and finally the negotiations between the two sides. The material gathered by the author will have to be subjected to further critical study. It is regrettable that, for various reasons, he has not been able to publish many of the relevant documents in his possession. In its present form the documentary evidence is marshalled to establish the following "clear" facts:

(1) That the immediate causes of the revolution are to be sought in the British policy in Iraq after World War I. So far as the Iraqis could see, the British were not planning to fulfil any of their promises concerning the independence of Iraq, making it more urgent that the Iraqis show their dissatisfaction.

(2) That the revolution was preceded by a genuine and patient effort on the part of the Iraqis to solve their differences with the occupying power by peaceful means. The religious leaders, in particular, exercised their spiritual power to foster and encourage this peaceful effort.

(3) That the revolution centered mainly on the middle and lower Euphrates. Other regions did participate, but only in a secondary way. There is no indication of any outside help whatsoever.

The impact of the book, however, is more powerful than the intended conclusions. As one ploughs through the description of the personalities who took part in the revolution, reads their letters, proclamations, promises and threats; as one reads the description of the battles, of the heroes and traitors involved; and finally as one considers the outcome of it all—the particulars of the story fade away giving place to a greater human drama in which the lust for power of the powerful meets the love of freedom of the weak. As the curtain falls at the end of the first act, the giant retires wounded by his own clumsiness and the little victor is disarmed in ways more subtle than he could as yet cope with.

MUHSIN MAHDI

Chicago, The Oriental Institute

Blood, Oil and Sand. By Ray Brock. Cleveland. The World Publishing Company, 1952, pp. 256. \$3.50.

In offering this as a "thumbnail background to the current emergency" (p. 51), the author is over-confident. The reader is given almost no understanding of the real roots of Middle East restlessness and the "background" consists of those snatches of general knowledge that even a journalist can gather in his usual three-day stay. To weaken the book further, the author is preoccupied with the "snick of cocked revolvers," has an irritating air of inside information unsupported by his diagnosis and writes with a particularly atrocious set of headline phrases.

Even the journeyman reporter should know better than to refer to King 'Abd al-'Azīz Ibn Sa'ūd of Arabia throughout an entire chapter as "Ibn" or dismiss Cairo's mass demonstrations as merely "hashished street mobs" (p. 88). Hajji Amīn, the Grand Mufti, has indeed played a sinister role in Arab affairs, but he is hardly the superman of ubiquitous murder that Mr. Brock portrays; nor is it correct to describe the ex-Secretary of the Arab League, 'Abd al Raḥmān 'Azzām, as his "henchman."

If the reader can insulate himself against such irritating inaccuracies, he will get a timely and useful survey of the immediate defense situation in the area. Otherwise, the book has little to offer the serious student of the Middle East. As the author frankly admits, "any writer on the subject of the Middle East has a constant struggle with himself and most of us are perennial losers" (p. 109). This book is a prime illustration of that observation.

JOHN S. BADEAU

The American University, Cairo

From Town and Tribe. By C. G. Campbell. Ernest Benn, London, 1952, pp. 217, \$2.25.

"The material in this book," writes the author in his Preface, "comes in the main from two areas, Southern Iraq and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. I have done long periods both in Bahrain and in Qatar, in the centre of the Gulf, but I never got a good story from either place, though not for want of trying. It may be that I never met the right people or I never struck the right note, or the atmosphere was wrong, or possibly the influence of oil-field and cinema had killed off the best stories." If the last of those conjectures is the right one, it is well that the stories here set down have been rescued before they also succumb.

For this is indeed a fascinating and delightful publication, which intrigues both for its contents and for the evident skill and pains with which they have been culled from the tented conversation and storing memories of the local Arab tribes. The author confesses that he is also a hunter of big game, but he has never captured anything more effectively than the quaint narratives here for the first time recorded. Readers of his early *Tales from the Arab Tribes* will know what to expect. This new book transports us as effectively as its predecessor into a world where maidens are curiously wooed and won, where the kingdoms of animals and men are not scientific domains that exclude each other but realms where trespassers pass to and fro to beguile alike their foes and our imagination. Yet for all the cheerful fantasy there is a directness, an ingenuous simplicity and openness, about the world within the tales. Mischief may be rampant but is mostly without malice: power and justice know how to be magnanimous: if youth is lusty it is also patient and resourceful. There is no high moralism—indeed no purpose but to charm the time and regale the hearer with suspense and humor, but at least the wind that blows through the pages is fresh and keen.

The reader is left wondering which to admire most—the flavour of the stories themselves, the enterprise which brings them to him, the sensitive skill with which they are rendered into English, or the access he enjoys into the storied past, into a world where the bazar and the encampment live anew in their story-tellers, a world all the more fascinating because technology has a conspiracy against it. And if he has a Christian concern for men, the reader will fulfill it all the more effectively for having met them in their stories.

A. K. C.

Aramco and World Oil. Roy Leblicher. Russell F. Moore Co. Inc. New York.

ARAMCO is the Arabian American Oil Company, and this book is an account of the Company by the Company for the Company. It is in two parts, making up the first volume: another volume in three parts has now followed. They are rather inaccurately described as handbooks, being in fact a large quarto—11 x 8½". But the large size has made possible excellent illustrations, some good maps of Arabia, and some telling diagrams.

Being what it is, it inevitably smacks somewhat of propaganda. But it is a right kind of propaganda—not advertisement so much as instruction: it is, and says it is, a book "for American employees." The present edition dates from 1952, but the book was originally written in 1950—the same year as Sir Olaf Carøe's "Wells of Power." The latter is an important, almost a great, book for the general public, and though there is no evidence that the author of "Aramco and World Oil" had read it, it is clear that he has grasped some of its principles—the obligation of Oil Companies and their staffs towards the countries in which they work, and towards the nationals of those countries whom they must train, even, it may be, to replace themselves. There is much good advice to 'oil boys' as to their duty to their Arab neighbours—one wishes that other and older Companies had had the wisdom and courage to take the same line twenty and thirty years ago. The atmosphere of the Middle East might have been rather different if they had.

And yet even in this present book one feels that lines of good conduct are laid down, not because they are right but because they are expedient. The book is essentially the Company's book, and if it does sometimes look beyond the Company's objective, it does not get further than American interests, combating Communism, and preserving world peace. These are all good things: expediency itself is not a bad thing so long as it does not conflict with better things. But from a Christian point of view it is not enough.

Sir Olaf Carøe's book boldly bears a subtitle, "The Challenge to Islam." Clearly an Oil Company working in a rigidly Muslim country and in close co-operation with a rigidly Muslim sovereign, cannot say that. But after many years' experience of the Muslim one may hazard the opinion that an insistence on the right of Christian employees to freedom of worship for themselves would have won instant respect and acquiescence. The book emphasizes the "amenities" provided for workers—hospitals, schools, recreation centres, and so forth. But it is markedly silent as to facilities for worship.

Fortunately the actual facts are better than the book reveals. Slowly, patiently, and quietly, the difficulty is being overcome. There were American missionaries of the Reformed Church all down the Persian Gulf before the Oil Companies came into being: there are now four resident Episcopalian clergy in the Gulf where ten years ago there was only one. Several have been allowed, and encouraged by the Company, to pay visits: some even do so regularly.

It is one of the main themes of this book that for good or evil the oil employee is taken as a sample of America: it is no less true that for good or evil he is taken as a sample of Christianity.

WESTON, BISHOP IN JERUSALEM

St. George's Close

The Arabia of Ibn Saud. By Roy Lebkicher, George Rentz and Max Steineke. Russell F. Moore Co., New York, 1952. pp. 179.

"The business of America", ran a Presidential aphorism in the nineteen-twenties, "is business." This volume is an effective recognition that it is much more, at least when it is business having to do with the development and sale of Saudi Arabian oil. Perhaps it is a measure of the inclusiveness of Islam that commercial enterprises which otherwise and elsewhere might have been a law unto themselves have perforce to come to terms with their context in more senses than the commercial.

Not that this volume or its companion, *Arabia and World Oil*, reviewed on page 145, is grudging or perfunctory in its treatment of the local and Muslim relations of Aramco. On the contrary it is lavish, careful, painstaking and sincere. Indeed it is fascinating to turn the pages of this book and to sense, beyond the fine illustrations and the impressive maps, the effort of a great business enterprise to grapple with some of the intangibles of its operation. This book is a silent witness to the truth that has always in some form been assumed by the Christian mission, namely that relations with any part of the world, however activated, are necessarily also religious relationships, and that as such they deserve to be explicit.

Aramco, naturally enough, does not get that far. It thinks of Islam—and here expounds it for its people—as something not to be ignored but understood, as a call for intelligent respect and sensitive awareness. One has only to pass beyond this cultivation of forbearance into the ambition for communion and interpretation to be on Christian, and missionary, ground. That "only" is, of course, a large step and one that business as such could not take. But at least this exposition of what is involved in forbearance and accommodation is of no little value to those who aspire beyond those attitudes.

This second volume comprises three parts—the History of Arabia from the earliest times to the present, the Kingdom of Ibn Saud and the Religion of Islam. It is profusely illustrated, though the treatment is necessarily brief—the pun being permitted—since it is the briefing of Aramco personnel. That purpose makes for a popular summary, but one that is sober and competent. (Is there perhaps a touch of gentle anticipation in the notion of "the Prophet's secretary" on page 156? Outside Aramco, he might have been called a "scribe"—assuming there was only one.) With all the careful deference the authors are anxious to show and inculcate towards things Arabic and Islamic, it is a pity they did not get away from those obstinate mis-spellings: 'Koran' and 'Moslem'. It was a good idea to include a working Bibliography in keeping with the aim of the volume to foster an informed understanding of Islam. Altogether an efficient book and significant for its inspiration as well as for its contents.

A. K. C.

Arabia Reborn. By George Kheirallah. University of Mexico Press, 1952, pp. 307.

"Through the blackness of the desert midnight, forty men trudged silently towards destiny." So opens this account of the re-birth of Arabia under the leadership of King Ibn Saud. Well produced and printed, though without maps, the book gives itself up to

adventure, hyperbole and the zest of a story. It is not therefore a serious, critical study, but an indulgence of romance—"history surpassing fable set in the land of fantasy." It is a narrative of genius and oil in partnership to transform the past and exalt the present. The author spent some time in the area and regales the reader with anecdotes of his experiences. But the main theme is the rise to power of Ibn Saud, his pacification of his country, the rise and progress of the oil concession and its technicological and social impact upon Arabian life and society. There are aspects into which the author does not venture and over-simplifications to which romances are prone. George Kheirallah may have felt that Aramco told its own story too modestly and objectively in the two books reviewed above. Hence maybe the resolve to write it up more garishly. Though the temptation is understandable, the story being what it is, many readers will prefer the sober version.

A. K. C.

The Struggle for Transcaucasia, 1917-1921. By Firuz Kazemzadeh, Ph.D., California, 1950, pp. 356.

This work is a valuable contribution to a neglected field of study. The author, of Stanford University, is the son of an Iranian father and a Russian mother and has studied in Moscow. Prior to the treaty of Turkomanchai in 1828, a great portion of Transcaucasia, including Nakhjivan and the oil producing Baku, constituted an integral part of the old Persian province of Azerbaijan where Iranian civilization flourished and where, incidentally, Zarathrustra, the ancient prophet of Iran, was born. The Iranian inhabitants of this region, together with Georgians and Armenians, hoped for freedom from the Tsarist régime after the First World War. The Bolshevik leaders themselves encouraged these aspirations by promises at the time of the revolution in 1917. The Declaration of the Rights of Peoples signed by Lenin and by Stalin in November 1917 openly proclaimed "the equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia, the right of the people to free self-determination, including separation from Russia, and the free development of the national minorities and racial groups inhabiting the territory of Russia."

The incentive of this hope begat a general uprising on the part of the national groups of Transcaucasia, as a result of which three independent states, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, came into existence. But unhappily the Bolshevik régime proved as oppressive as the Tsarist and still more brutal. Intrigue, massacre and invasion crushed the incipient independence and before the end of 1921 Transcaucasia ceased to be a territory of free states and was firmly subjugated beneath the Soviet yoke. The gallant and bitter story of this vain struggle is told by Dr. Kazemzadeh in a sequence of 22 chapters. After tracing early history he writes of the 1917-21 struggle from immediate sources. He presents a clear and moving picture of the phases of the revolution, the hopes, frustration and despair of the peoples of Azerbaijan. Here is a mine of information on a little known but tragically revealing piece of history.

S. R. SHAFAG

*Institute of Islamic Studies
Montreal*

The process of Constitution-making in Pakistan reached an important stage in December last when the Basic Principles Committee presented its Report to the Constituent Assembly after nearly four years' work. In his speech commending the Report, the Prime Minister, Al-Hajj Khwaja Nazimuddin explained that the Committee's activities had been prolonged by the difficulty of the task laid upon it by the terms of reference of the Constituent Assembly. "The principles enunciated by Islam had to be interpreted in terms of democratic constitutional practice in the 20th century. Such a course," he went on, "needed careful thinking, discussion and deliberation so that we could bring about a synthesis not only of the fundamental teachings of our faith and the requirements of progressive democracy, but also the requirements of the 20th century and the best elements of our tradition and history." The reconciliation of traditional values with modern needs has proved complex. Nor has copious advice been lacking from many quarters. Among the proposals and controversies attracting special attention in the Pakistan press are the following.

That Pakistan should be a federation of provinces has been criticised by leading conservatives and others as liable to encourage separatism. It is argued by some that the ideological unity in terms of which Pakistan was achieved should dictate a unitary rather than a federal state structure.

The issue of provincialism is particularly delicate as relates to East and West Pakistan. The former represents one unit but includes 56% of the population, while West Pakistan comprises nine units, with 44% of the population. The Committee elected for parity between the two in the two Houses of the Federal Legislature—120 members in the House of Units and 400 in the House of the People, divided equally between East and West. Advocates of parity point out that it is the only way to prevent domination of the West by the East (which the population criterion would give). Critics argue that it departs from the Islamic principle of representation by population and that in suspecting provincialism within the Muslim fellowship it serves to foster it. It is worthy of note that election to the House of the People is by universal adult suffrage and that all the real authority would be vested in the House of the People, the House of Units having only a revising function in respect of hasty legislation and no power over money bills.

The provision that the Head of the State should be a Muslim has been much criticised in the Indian press. Representatives of minority groups, while admitting that a Muslim as Head of the State is readily to be expected, protest that it is undemocratic that it should be exclusively laid down. Social justice and equality require that the highest office should be open to any citizen. The Prime Minister defended the principle as in keeping with Islamic usage.

The Report provides that no legislature should enact any law repugnant to the Qur'an and the Sunnah. The Head of State would set up a board of not more than five persons, well-versed in Islamic

laws, to advise him regarding such repugnancy of new laws. The Board would function in this way. In the event of a unanimous decision by the Board that a new law is repugnant to the Qur'an and the Sunnah, the Head of State will refer the law back to Legislature for reconsideration. The final passage of the bill will require not only a majority vote but also a majority vote of the Muslim members of the Legislature. In enlarging on this point the Prime Minister said, "The possibilities of wrong decision on account of ignorance having thus been eliminated, the only doubt that may arise in the mind can be that the majority of the Muslim members themselves may be hostile to the teachings of Islam. Such a contingency, in my opinion, cannot arise, but if, God forbid, this country can return at any stage of its history a majority of Muslims as members who, not out of ignorance, but deliberately in open revolt against Islam, legislate on Islamic laws, then no constitutional safeguards can save the country from deviation from the Islamic faith." (*Civil and Military Gazette*, 23 Dec. 1952).

To many this provision appears to be appeasement of the conservatives. Chief Minister Daultana stated that an Islamic Constitution did not necessarily mean that this type of "rule by mullahs" should be instituted. In an Editorial on 24 December the *Civil and Military Gazette* expressed the fears of the Muslim liberals. "The only provision whose wisdom will be doubted is that for the Ulema to act as advisers to the Head of the State . . . as to the Islamic character or otherwise of a legislation. This, to our mind, impinges upon the right of every Muslim to interpret the Qur'an and Sunna for himself. Besides it will lead to the creation of the obnoxious class of "Court Mullahs" who under certain Muslim rulers in the past served as tools to give religious sanction to all official whims and vagaries. The very fact that these Ulema would be in Government's pay will rob their verdict of all value." Other liberals fear that the Board will be a kind of super-legislature of a sinister character since its membership would be appointed, not elected.

There has been a suggestion in some quarters that the Supreme Court, to be set up under the Constitution, should pass upon the Islamic character of particular laws, with the 'ulemā' appearing, if necessary, as witnesses. The Shī'ah communities have expressed concern about the application of Quranic tests to legislation, demanding interpretations which they would consider authentic and authoritative. The whole issue is a highly interesting form of the age-long problem of the tests of institutional loyalty and the criteria of valid change. Is the community of Islam as a whole to be trusted or only within the veto of an élite?

Though Headship of the State is reserved for Muslims it should be noted that all other high positions, including that of Commander-in-chief of the Services and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, are open, in law, to all citizens. The franchise also admits of no disabilities by dint of religion. The Report recommends that minorities safeguard their own interests by forming separate electorates.

No mention is made in the Report of a State language. The earlier suggestion that Urdu should be so designated has been omitted. Bengalis feel that Bengali should be a second official language.

The presentation of the Committee's Report does not, of course, end the business of Constitution-writing. But it is likely to follow these broad lines. The Pakistan conception, prior to its attainment, was a banner which gathered many diverse elements into a single purpose. It is this very diversity which has made the subsequent tasks of definition and fulfilment so prolonged and delicate. But much has been accomplished. The economy is to avoid the concentration of wealth in the hands of the few, safeguard the workers from exploitation and provide for the aged, the infirm and the unemployed. Educational opportunities are to be available for every citizen. Structurally the State will have many features made familiar in Western experience and already incorporated with profit into the Indian Constitution.

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Significant, though indirect and also somewhat inconclusive, comment on the issue of Constitution making in Islam comes from the pen of a former Prime Minister of Indonesia, Mr. Muḥammad Natsir, leader of the Indonesian Masjumi Party. In *Pakistan Horizon*, the Journal of the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, he writes:

"Pakistan is an Islamic country. So is my country, Indonesia. But though we recognise Islam to be the faith of the Indonesian people, we have not made an express mention of it in our Constitution. . . . You are resolved to make a constitution that will conform to the precepts of Islam. This will be epoch-making work. The result of your endeavours will be for the whole world a test of what we Muslims mean by Islamic government and its laws can be compatible with freedom of religion and worship for everyone and with equality before the law." He goes on to add that this does not mean "going theocratic," and dissociates himself from those zealots who teach that an Islamic state is a copy of the society of the Prophet's time. Neither is it right, however, on the other hand, simply to follow the patterns of Western political life. "To find out what is right, a profound and thorough study of the Qur'ān and of the history of the foundation of Islam and the early Islamic State is needed. This study should be of a more scientific character than has been attempted in the past." Islam is on the verge of another great chance in history—one chance more. Constitution writing is not all, writes this exponent. Faith and love cannot be legislated. "Islam is not the dust of *sajadah*, clinging to the forehead. . . . Islam is the secret covenant between God and whomsoever praises and glorifies God. Islam is good, accomplished in anonymity, for the sake of our brotherhood. . . ." He concludes: "Our land areas are a key, but whether to damnation or glory it is up to us to determine."

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Meanwhile constitutional issues of great future importance are developing in the Sudan. The Sudan Government's Draft Constitution, accepted in October last by the British Government, lays down, inter alia, that no disability shall attach to Sudanese by reason of sex and that all persons shall enjoy freedom of conscience and the

right freely to profess their religion. While expressing its hope for a liberal interpretation of the second of these points, the British Government has not insisted upon its meaning the right to change one's religion. Much concern is felt that this basic right of man shall be safeguarded in the future constitutional law of the Sudan. Egypt has not accepted Article 13 of the Draft Covenant of Human Rights of the United Nations, which provides for the liberty of the individual in respect of a new, as well as an old, religious loyalty. Freedom of movement of conscience is manifestly basic to any genuine tolerance. It must remain an urgent Christian duty to bear witness to the truth that freedom to leave a religion is part of the very dignity in which alone religious faith can properly be held, and to press by every means for the active recognition of this truth by Muslims.

Meanwhile the political agreement between Cairo and London on the Sudan opens the way for rapid advance towards self-government for the Sudanese and adds yet another to the 20th Century stages in Muslim self-responsibility. In terms of the farther future it may be the most important of them all. For the Sudan has no parallel either in the Arab States or Pakistan. It holds the trust of some two and a half million southern non-Muslims, more than a quarter of the total population, overwhelmingly illiterate and scarcely yet politically articulate. It remains to be seen whether their constitutional representation in one quarter of the seats in the Sudanese legislature will conduce to their best interests and whether the deep concern felt for their future—a concern which has protracted the recent negotiations—will be allayed. Another chapter in the recession of the West in Asia and Africa brings a new and testing day for Sudanese Christianity as well as a searching newness of responsibility to Sudanese Islam. It must be our prayer and hope that neither the one, as Christ's minority, nor the other, as the Sudan's majority, will fail to recognise the shape of its duty.

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In October last an Islamic Cultural Conference was held in Dacca, East Pakistan, under the auspices of the *Pakistan Tamaddum Majlis*. There were papers on Muslim sociology and philosophy and on the impact of Marxism, copies of which have been sent to this Quarterly. In a paper on *Islamic Movement*, Professor Muhammad Azraf, discussing the "post-Pakistan period" declared: "Our aim was said to be the creation of an Islamic State in India, but our method was un-Islamic. . . . There was no cultural program of the (Muslim) League to clarify its ideology. The only ideology that League leaders successfully put before the masses was the establishment of Pakistan or creation of an Islamic State in the sub-continent. But how it could be achieved could be clarified by very few among them. As a result, with the establishment of Pakistan the issue of Pakistan was practically over for League leaders." The Conference was clearly part of the process of self-definition still proceeding in Pakistan, and of wrestling with the "What?" lying beyond the settled "Whether?"

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The Jibraïl Rural Fellowship Center in the Lebanon was the subject of a special discussion in the Near East Committee of the N.C.C. in New York. Dr. S. Neale Alter explained its purpose of rural service in things economic, educational and spiritual and analysed some of the factors making such rural projects a Christian contribution of great urgency and promise in the Near East today. The Center promotes the study of health, hygiene, family relations, child development, occupational skills, home industry and handicraft. It is meant to present a pattern of living, to stimulate comparable schemes elsewhere and to give practical expression to the way and power of Christ.

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Majallat al-Azhar, the monthly journal of Al-Azhar in its issue of Rabia al-Awwal, (December 1952) describes a visit by General Naguib to the University in the previous month. In the course of his speech of reply to addresses of welcome the General congratulated al-Azhar on its role in the teaching and defence of Islam—the religion of freedom and justice. In the same issue, *Majallat al-Azhar* criticises the Ministry of Education as over pre-occupied with questions of school accommodation and other material concerns and deplores its silence on the deeper questions of moral and religious instruction. State education it complains makes of its schools factories for the production of citizens, not institutions developing persons of culture and religion. It demands that the schools under the new régime be brought into closer conformity to the spirit of the new régime, thus obliquely combining criticism of the one with deference to the other.

The article referred to is in fact a sequel to an earlier one in Safar (October) deploring the relative decay of Qur'anic schools and the neglect of Muslim teaching in State education. The writer foresees a day when the stream of recruits to al-Azhar, with years of Qur'ân memoriter behind them in the *katatib*, will dry up—with the consequence that al-Azhar itself will be enfeebled in its task of supplying Muslim teachers well-versed in Islam. From this vicious circle the University looks to the new régime for deliverance, with some misgiving.

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Elaborate plans are in hand in Istanbul for the celebration of the capture of the city by the Turks five hundred years ago in May. We plan to take note of this occasion by an extensive article, to appear in the July issue, written by a noted Turkish architect and scholar, Ekrem Hakki Ayverdi, and translated into English by Mr. Lyman MacCallum. The article deals with the actual siege and conquest of the city, its subsequent career under the Turks and the architectural achievements of Muhammad Fatih, the conquering leader of the Turks. Another article of Turkish authorship is also promised for the anniversary.

SURVEY OF PERIODICALS

BY SUE MOLLESON FOSTER
Union Theological Seminary Library

I. GENERAL

EXCAVATIONS AT JERICHO, 1952. Kathleen M. Kenyon. (In the *Palestine Exploration Quarterly*, London. May-October, 1952. pp. 62-82).

A detailed account of the activities of the British School of Archaeology—giving plans, drawings and photographs.

THE MYSTERY MAN OF ISLAM SPEAKS. James Bell. (In *Life*, New York. October 27, 1952. pp. 145-152).

Tells of an interview with the Mufti of Jerusalem, who finds it hard to understand why British and Americans favor Jews rather than Arabs. Distorted.

NOTES SUR LA "GESCHICHTE DER ARABISCHEN LITTERATUR" DE C. BROCKELMANN. Georges Vajda. (In *Journal Asiatique*, Paris. Part 1, 1952. pp. 1-36).

Continues a critique begun in 1950. This article deals with grammar, philology and rhetoric.

THE POETRY OF ABĀN AL-LĀHIQĪ. K. A. Fariq. (In the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, London. No. 1-2, 1952. pp. 46-59).

A study of the life and work of a dweller in Basra and Baghdad, who lived at the time of the great Caliph Rashid.

POSTWAR BOOKS ON THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN. Grant V. McClanahan. (In *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, D.C. Summer, 1952. pp. 341-346).

An annotated article.

LA TOPOGRAPHIE DE CONSTANTINOPLE BYZANTIN. R. Janin. (In *Études Byzantines*, Paris. Vol. 8, pp. 197-214).

Describes studies and discoveries made from 1938 to 1950.

II. ARABIA

DID ROMAN COMMERCIAL COMPETITION RUIN SOUTHERN ARABIA? George F. Hourani. (In the *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, Chicago. October, 1952. pp. 291-295).

The author believes the decline of Arab importance in trade began in the third century A.D. and was not caused by Graeco-Roman pressure.

OLD SOUTH ARABIAN ANTIQUITIES. A. F. L. Beeston. (In the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, London. No. 3-4, 1952. pp. 20-23).

Discusses finds made at Seilan in the area of Qatabanian culture.

III. HISTORY OF ISLAM

LES JUIFS D'ALGER SOUS LA DOMINATION TURQUE. Ernest Mainz. (In *Journal Asiatique*, Paris. Part 2, 1952. pp. 197-217).

Depicts the social and economic condition of Jews during the period and finds that despite considerable persecution they were really prosperous.

NOTES POUR L'HISTOIRE DES TURCOMANS D'ASIA MINEURE AU XIII SIÈCLE. Claude Cahan. (In *Journal Asiatique*, Paris. Part 3, 1951. pp. 335-354).

A well-documented historical article.

THE SOURCES FOR THE HISTORY OF THE SYRIAN ASSASSINS. Bernard Lewis. (In *Speculum*, Cambridge, Mass. October, 1952. pp. 475-489).

From Crusader times the "Old Man of the Mountain" and his terrifying associates were known in Europe and Mr. Lewis presents a detailed account with copious notes.

IL "TRADIMENTO" DI WĀSIT. Sabatino Moscati. (In *Muséon*, Louvain. No. 1-2, 1951. pp. 176-189).

Recounts the capture, through treachery, of the last Umayyad city falling to Abbasid forces.

IV. QUR'AN. TRADITION. THEOLOGY

THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE WORKS ATTRIBUTED TO AL-GHAZĀLĪ. W. Montgomery Watt. (In the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, London. No. 3-4, 1952. pp. 24-45).

Offers three criteria as tests and on that basis examines a considerable number of the great thinker's works, thus adding to the researches of Goldziher and Asin.

AVICENNA'S RISĀLA FĪ L'ISQ AND COURTLY LOVE. G. E. von Grunebaum. (In the *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, Chicago. October, 1952; pp. 233-238).

Indicates the possible influence of Avicenna's "Treatise on Love" on the medieval lyrics of the troubadours and cites the ideas of Fr. Alexander Denomy on the subject.

THE EXPLOITATION OF LAND AND ISLAMIC LAW. Mahmoud Abu al-Sa'ud. (In *The Islamic Review*, Woking. October, 1952. pp. 5-10).

Concludes a study begun in the August, 1952, issue and deals with leasing land under the Shari'a.

ISLAM, THE KORAN AND HISTORY. Jean Abd-El-Jalil. (In *Cross Currents*, New York. Fall, 1952. pp. 36-55).

A Franciscan priest, born in Morocco and now Professor of Arabic and of Islamic History at the Institut Catholique in Paris, gives a sympathetic portrayal of the immense influence of the Qur'an.

DIE KREUZFAHRERGEBIETE SUEDPALAESTINAS. Gustav Beyer. (In *Beitraege zur Biblischen Landes-und Altertums Kunde*, Stuttgart. Vol. 68, 1951. pp. 148-192; 249-281).

A thoroughly documented historical article.

THE RELIGIOUS MUSIC OF ISLAM. Henry George Farmer. (In the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, London. No. 1-2, 1952. pp. 60-65).

The author points out that in Arabic there is a rather close connection between *music* and *magic* and that the humming of the pagan magician in his incantations is not far removed from the cantillation of the Qur'an.

V. RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL LIFE

ARAB REFUGEES, 1948-1952. Georgiana G. Stevens. (In *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, D.C. Summer, 1952. pp. 281-298).

Explains the need for creative statesmanship to deal with this tragic situation and to restore Arab confidence in the good faith of the Western powers. Includes a map and detailed statistics.

LA CONDITION DES NORD-AFRICAINS EN FRANCE. André Rétif. (In *Études*, Paris. Octobre, 1952. pp. 56-72).

Tells of the pitiful plight of immigrants from Algiers, Tunis and Morocco and pleads for improved legislation to aid the 350,000 trying to live and work in France.

COTTON AND THE MIDDLE EAST. Paul F. Craig-Martin. (In *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, D.C. Summer, 1952. pp. 299-314).

Team work among farmer, processor, merchant and government is necessary for the profit of all concerned.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF JORDAN. E. T. Moganam. (In *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, D.C. Spring, 1952. pp. 194-206).

Praises the outstanding growth in democratic principles embodied in the new Constitution and discusses the New Court Establishment Law enacted in 1951.

DICTATORSHIP IN EGYPT. Mark Alexander. (In *The Twentieth Century*, London. October, 1952. pp. 308-314).

Despite Wafdist and Communist intrigue against the Naguib régime, the hope for social change and land reform rally the people to the General's rule.

ECONOMIC REVIEW. (In *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, D.C. Summer, 1952. pp. 336-340).

Ömer Celâl Sarc writes an International Bank Report on Turkey.

HE SAID FORWARD TO THE BACKWARD. James Bell. (In *Life*, New York. November 17, 1952. pp. 154-174).

Describes the plans and accomplishments of Sir Charles Belgrave, who has worked in Bahrain since 1926 and who has been content to do "one thing at a time."

KUWAIT. G. H. Neville-Bagot. (In *The Islamic Review*, Woking. October, 1952. pp. 22-26).

Sketches the history of the country, tells of its ruling family and stresses its enormous economic development since the discovery of oil.

THE MIDDLE EAST SUPPLY CENTER. Martin W. Wilmington. (In *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, D.C. Spring, 1952. pp. 144-166).

Set up in 1941 as an Anglo-American clearing house for military supplies for the African theatre of war, the Center was al-

lowed to lapse in 1945, thus losing an important point of influence in the area.

THE SOCIAL SUPPORT OF CURRENT IRANIAN POLICY. T. C. Young. (In *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, D.C. Spring, 1952. pp. 125-143).

Comments on the various strata of society underlying Prime Minister's Mosaddeq's government—from the peasant masses to the Shah.

VI. POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS

COMMUNISM AND DEMOCRACY. Hazrat Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmud Ahmad. (In *The Muslim Sunrise*, Washington, D.C. 1952, No. 3. pp. 2-12).

The head of the Ahmadiyya Movement completes a study begun in an earlier issue showing the gains of Communism among the young.

CROSS-TIDES OF NORTH AFRICAN REVOLT. Herbert Luethy. (In *Commentary*, New York. November, 1952. pp. 433-449).

A detailed analysis, with high praise for the French, of the results and menaces of what the author calls "private and purely economic colonization."

THE ESSENTIAL UNITY OF THE NILE VALLEY AND THE NEW SUDAN CONSTITUTION. G. H. Neville-Bagot. (In *The Islamic Review*, Woking. December, 1952. pp. 37-39).

The author argues for an independent Sudan and considers the Sudanese fully capable of self-government.

ISLAM AND THE MIDDLE EAST. Sir William Barton. (In *The Quarterly Review*, London. January, 1953. pp. 56-67).

Suggestions for solving the three major East-West problems—Egypt, Iran, and India and Pakistan.

LEBANON: ISRAEL'S FRIENDLIEST NEIGHBOR. Ray Alan. (In *Commentary*, New York. June, 1952. pp. 551-559).

The realistic Lebanese believe it is to their advantage economically to border on prosperous Palestine.

OIL AND THE MUSLIM WORLD. Sir William Barton. (In *The Quarterly Review*, London. October, 1952. pp. 553-564).

A compelling presentation of the paramount need for the West to win the confidence and respect of Islam.

PAKISTAN, NEW NATION IN AN OLD LAND. Jean and Franc Shor. (In *The National Geographic Magazine*, Washington, D.C. November, 1952. pp. 637-678).

A beautifully illustrated description of the Pakistanis' accomplishments in five years.

THE TUNISIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT. Benjamin Rivlin. (In *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, D.C. Spring, 1952. pp. 167-193).

Discusses France's methods of dealing with the rise of nationalism for the past forty years and praises the present moderation and reasonableness of the Tunisians.