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The Rev. Samuel M. Zwemer, D.D., LL.D., the founder and first editor of this QUARTERLY, which he called THE MOSLEM WORLD, died on April 2, 1952. On the 12th he would have been eighty-five years old.

A valiant evangelist of God's grace, a mighty missionary to all mankind and especially to Muslims everywhere, an indefatigable author and editor, a superb preacher and personal worker, he has gone to greet the Lord he loved and served whole-heartedly, ably and fruitfully. His voice and words, his zeal and devotion, his strong faith and marshalling of facts have, for over half a century, enthralled, inspired and decided thousands of persons to devote themselves and their means to the service of God.

During his lifetime Dr. Zwemer's influence as a missionary leader was extraordinarily great. There is reason to believe that the organizations and activities he started, the fifty books and the uncounted pamphlets and articles he published for Muslims and for Christians will have permanent influence that will become ever wider and greater.

Dr. Zwemer's writings on Islam were based on first-hand research in the Arabic sources and on first-hand investigations of Muslim beliefs and practices. The results are true and real descriptions of Muslim life and thought. His descriptions of popular Islam, dealing with wide-spread customs often not approved by Muslim religious leaders, since they were true, have tended to start actions that will change conditions and make his descriptions of historical rather than social interest.

Dr. Zwemer's biography is being written by another friend of his and will contain full data about his life and works. Here there will be only a few impressions about him

from a colleague and successor in the conduct of this QUARTERLY.

It was always Dr. Zwemer's practice to equip himself as thoroughly as possible for any service he undertook. For his missionary work in Arabia he built up a large library of books in European languages. He made himself a master of the Arabic language, both the classical and the colloquials of Eastern Arabia and Egypt. His copy of Ibn Hishām's *Life of Muḥammad* has numerous underscorings and marginal comments. Al-Ghazālī's work on the *Ninety-nine Most Beautiful Names of Allah,* which he used when teaching new missionaries at the Cairo Study Center, is interleaved for remarks all the way through. When he wrote his first book, *Arabia, the Cradle of Islam* (New York, 1900), he arranged his authorities on two long tables and walked up and down between them, comparing and selecting the statements of facts he wished to use for his own volume. Lord Curzon, making a trip up the Persian Gulf in 1903, complimented the author on the accuracy of the work and said, "The only things wrong in it are your statistics." Zwemer replied, "For them I relied on your Government of India publications."

Throughout his career Dr. Zwemer showed notable ability in using the work of other authors, quoting, with acknowledgment, their most striking statements, to strengthen the impressions he wished to enforce upon the attention of his audience and readers. It was for the same purpose that he tried out various ways of saying the same thing until he found the best way of expressing his idea and then he practised saying that phrase or sentence until it was fixed in his mind. These were methods he used to make his writings easy to read and understand and his addresses interesting and forceful. What he said and wrote was never prosaic or dull.

Another of Dr. Zwemer's qualities was tremendous energy. He was mentally alert, quick in his grasp of ideas, fast in his reaction and response. . . . When he approved a proposal or movement he supported it zealously and sought to strengthen it. When he disapproved he opposed with all his might, no matter how that would affect his personal relation-

ships or popularity. His book, *Rethinking Missions With Christ,* is the outstanding example of that characteristic.

Dr. Zwemer was always a pioneer and leader. He could propose new objectives, plan new organizations and stimulate others to share in new activities. This QUARTERLY is itself one result of this inborn nature. The (British) Fellowship of Faith for the Moslems and the American Christian Literature Society for Moslems are two more of the many products of this trait. But it was not with the idea of being first or foremost that Dr. Zwemer initiated movements, convened conferences, became the chairman of committees and the main speaker at conventions. The supreme desire of his whole life, the dominant motive of all his activity, and the guiding principle of all his thought combined to drive him to seek the most of what he believed to be the best service of Christ as Savior.

Not only committees, conventions and societies received Dr. Zwemer's attention and service. He was interested in individuals. On a trip to the Scandinavian countries he looked in the local telephone book for Muslim residents, recognizing them as such by their Arabic names. Calling upon them he delighted them by addressing them in Arabic and went on to speak to them of Christ. In India he lectured to large Muslim audiences with Jesus Christ the Savior as his theme. In Indonesia he saw tooth-sticks offered for sale in the bazar and asked the shop-keeper where he could find the Muslims of the town. In Cairo he stopped at a carpenter's shop and used the fact that Jesus was a carpenter to catch the interest of the workmen in what he had to say about Christ the Savior. In New York he bought a paper at a news-stand and handed the dealer a Christian tract with the money.

Wherever he went, over all the world, Dr. Zwemer served his Lord. He had received many talents and he used them to the full. Now he has entered into the joy of his Lord. Many there are that thank the Lord for Dr. Samuel M. Zwemer and what God has done for them through him.

EDWIN E. CALVERLEY

THE CONDEMNATION OF THE JEWS OF BANŪ QURAYẒAH

A STUDY IN THE SOURCES OF THE *SĪRAH*

1. *The Material.* One of the well-known incidents in the life of Muḥammad is the judgment pronounced on the Jews of the tribe of Qurayẓah after their unconditional surrender to the Muslims in A.H.5. The men of military age were condemned to death, and the women and children to enslavement. According to the standard account the sentence was pronounced not by Muḥammad himself but by the leading man among the Arab confederates of the Qurayẓah, Sa'd b. Mu'ādh. This account, however, has been questioned by one of the foremost writers on these matters.

By this version the tradition has tried to remove from Muḥammad the direct responsibility for the inhuman massacre of about 900 innocent persons; the artifice of the traditionists is so transparent that it is hardly necessary to set it in relief. The sentence of Sa'd was in any case dictated and inspired by the Prophet, who certainly made him understand what was the decision required of him. The responsibility for the slaughter falls entirely on the Prophet (Caetani, *Annali dell' Islam,* I, p. 632).

In the present article the sources for this incident are examined in detail, partly in order to refute this suggestion of Caetani's about their unreliability, but more particularly for the light thrown on the sources for the life of Muḥammad in general. The question of the morality of the sentence is a separate one which may be left aside here. It will be convenient to start by tabulating the material. (The biographical notes added to the names in the *isnād* or chain of authorities are mostly taken from *Tahdhīb al-Tahdhīb* by Ibn Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī.)

IBN SA'D (d.230), *Ṭabaqāt,* III,2,pp.3ff., article on Sa'd b. Mu'ādh.

A. (pp.3f.)

c. Yazīd b. Hārūn: d.206; lived in Wāsiṭ; mawla.
b. Muḥammad b. 'Amr b. 'Alqamah: d.144-5; in Medina; connected with B. Zuhrah.
b? 'Amr b. 'Alqamah: in Medina.
a. 'Alqamah (b.Waqqās al-Laythī): d.c.70; in Medina.
a. 'Ā'ishah: d.58; in Medina.

(Part of a long story.) On being wounded during the siege of Medina by the Meccans Sa'd b. Mu'ādh prayed that God would not bring his life to an end until he had seen vengeance on the Banū Qurayẓah. Subsequently, when the Jewish tribe was hard pressed by the Muslim besiegers, they asked for Sa'd and surrendered only when

it was agreed that he should decide their fate. When Sa'd came to Muḥammad, the latter told those present to stand in honor of their *sayyid* or chief; 'Umar said, Our *sayyid* is God; at that Muḥammad only said, Help him down. Sa'd then gave his judgment: their fighting men were to be put to death, their women and children enslaved, and their property divided. Muḥammad remarked, You have judged their case with the judgment of God and of His Messenger *(la-qad ḥakamta fī-him bi-ḥukm Allāh wa-ḥukm rasūlihi).* Sa'd prayed.

B. (p.5,5)

c. Wakī' b. al-Jarrāh: d.196; in Kūfah; Ru' āsī.
c. Isrā'īl (b.Yūnus): d.160-2; in Kūfah; Sabī'ī; Hamdānī.
b. Abū Isḥāq ('Amr b. 'Abdallāh): d.126-9; Kūfah; Sabī'ī.
a. Abū Maysarah: d.63; Kūfah; Hamdānī.

(Similar to A but much shorter.) Sa'd prayed for vengeance but there is no mention of the B.Qurayẓah asking that he should pronounce their sentence. When Muḥammad asked him to judge, he said he was afraid he might not hit upon God's judgment about them; Muḥammad simply replied, Judge. Sa'd gave the first two parts of the sentence as in A, and Muḥammad remarked, You have indeed hit upon God's judgment in respect of them. (No mention of *sayyid.)*

C. (p.5,12)

c. 'Ubaidallāh b. Mūsā: d.213-4; Kūfah; Shī'ī.
c. Isrā'īl: d.160-2; Kūfah.
b. Jābir (al-Ju'fī): d.127-32; Kūfah; Shī'ī.
b. 'Amīr (al-Sha'bī): d.103-10; Kūfah.
a. 'Abdallāh b. Yazīd al-Anṣārī: d.c.70?; Kūfah; Khaṭmī (of Aws); for 'Alī at Camel, later for Ibn al-Zubayr.

(Even shorter than B.) Similar to B, except that in sending for Sa'd Muḥammad says to men of his clan, Call your *sayyid.*

D. (p.5,16)

c. { Yaḥyā b. 'Abbād: d.198; Baṣrah; of B.Ḍubay'ah of Aws.
'Affān b. Muslim: d.219-20; Baṣrah; held Qur'ān uncreated.
Abū 'l-Walīd al-Ṭayālisī: d.227; Baṣrah. All from
c. Shu'bah: d.160; Baṣrah.
b. Sa'd b. Ibrāhīm: d.125-8; Wāsiṭ, etc.; of B. Zuhrah of Quraysh anti-Umayyad.
a. Abū Umāmah b. Sahl b. Hunayf: d.100; of B.Aws; father fought for 'Alī at Ṣiffīn.
a. Abū Sa'īd al-Khudrī: d.74; of B.Khazraj.

Only the story of the judgment. When Sa'd arrived, Muḥammad said, Stand for your *sayyid* or the best of you. His final remark is, You have judged their case with the judgment of the angel (v.1, king) *(malak, malik).* 'Affān said *malik,* but Yaḥyā and Abū'l-Walīd said *malak.* Ibn Sa'd thinks the former more correct.

E. (p.5,24)

c. { Yaḥyā b. 'Abbād: d.198; Baṣrah.
{ Sulaymān b. Ḥarb: d.224; Baṣrah; said to report according to the sense, not the letter.
c. Ḥammād b. Salamah: d.168; Baṣrah.
b. Muḥammad b. Ziyād: d.?; Medina, later Baṣrah; of B.Jumaḥ of Quraysh.
a. 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Amr: grandson of Sa'd b. Mu'ādh.

Muḥammad asked Sa'd for advice. Sa'd replied, I know God has given you a command about them, and you will fulfil it. Muḥammad said, Yet counsel me. Sa'd said, If I were in charge of their case, I would put to death, etc. Muḥammad said, You have counselled me to do what God commanded.

F. (p.6,12)

c. 'Abdallāh b. Numayr: d.169; Kūfah.
b. Hishām b. 'Urwah: d.145-7; of B. Asad of Quraysh.
b. 'Urwah: d.91-4; Medina; brother of 'Abdallāh b. al-Zubayr.

('Urwah had previous part of story from 'Ā'ishah, but not this.) It was (apparently) Muḥammad's own decision to give the responsibility to Sa'd. No mention of *sayyid*. The final remark is given as a separate item (*F**) introduced by the words of 'Urwah, I was informed that Muḥammad . . . said, You have judged their case with the judgment of God.

G. (p.6,17)

c. Khālid b. Makhlad al-Bajalī: d.213-4; Kūfah; Shī'ī.
c. Muḥammad b. Ṣāliḥ al-Tammār: d.168; Medina; mawla of Anṣār.
b. Sa'd b. Ibrāhīm b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān: d.125-8; (see D).
a. 'Āmir b. Sa'd:Of B.Zuhrah of Quraysh; son of following.
a. Sa'd b. Abī Waqqāṣ: d.50 or 55; "brother" of Sa'd b. Mu'ādh.

Very brief. Instead of "fighting men" Sa'd says "those on whom the razors have gone," and Muḥammad's remark runs: He has judged their case with the judgment of God which He gave above seven heavens.
AL-WĀQIDI (d.207), tr.Wellhausen, 215f.

H.

c. Khārijah b. 'Abdallāh: d.165; Medina: of B. Najjār of Khazraj; had Zubayrid sympathies.
b. Dā'ūd b. al-Ḥuṣayn: d.135; Medina; Khārijī.
a. Abū Sufyān: d.? 90; friend of B. 'Abd al-Ashhal of Aws.
a. Muḥammad b. Maslamah: d.46; Ashhalī; neutral in civil wars.

Similar to G in both Sa'd's judgment and Muḥammad's, Muḥam-

mad appointed Sa'd judge at the request of Aws. The source is uncertain whether Muḥammad told all or only the Medinans to rise in honor of Sa'd.

IBN HISHĀM (d.218 or 213), Sīrah, based on Ibn Isḥāq (d.151).

I. (688f)

c. Ibn Isḥāq.
b. Al-Zuhrī: d.123-5; of B. Zuhrah of Quraysh; friend of 'Urwah. (general source for story of B. Qurayẓah—p.684).

Muḥammad entrusts judgment to Sa'd because Aws claim equal treatment with Khazraj. The words "Stand for your *sayyid*" are said by the Muhājirūn to mean the Anṣār, but the latter say they referred to all Muslims. (Ibn Hishām mentions as a variant that it was the Jews who asked for Sa'd.)

I*. (689)

c. Ibn Isḥāq.
b. 'Āṣim b. 'Umar b. Qatādah: d. 120-29; Medina; of B. Ẓafar of Aws 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Amr: grandson of Sa'd b. Mu'ādh.
a. 'Alqamah b. Waqqāṣ: d.c.70.

Muḥammad said, You have judged their case with the judgment of God from above seven heavens.

AL-ṬABARI (d.310), *Annales*, I, 1492f.

Repeats Ibn Isḥāq's account with the addition:

J.

c. Ibn Wakī': d.247; Kūfah.
c. Muḥammad b. Bishr: d.203; Kūfah.
b. Muḥammad b. 'Amr: d.144-5; (see A).
b? 'Amr: "
a. 'Alqamah: d.c.70; "
a. Abū Sa'īd al-Khudrī: d.74; (see D).

Muḥammad said, Stand for your *sayyid* (or "for the best of you"). No comment on this. The sentence and Muḥammad's remark are as in A.

K. With the same *isnād* as J, except that Abū Sa'īd is replaced by 'Ā'ishah, al-Ṭabarī (1486,15-1487,12) gives an abbreviated version of A.

2. *The Contents of the Traditions.* The variants in the story can be explained as modifications of a basic account from political and theological motives. The basic account would run somewhat as follows: The Jews surrendered unconditionally to Muḥammad. The Aws, or some of them, pleaded for their Jewish confederates (or at least were discontented at their probable fate); Muḥammad therefore appointed Sa'd judge of the case, and when he came made a remark

applying the words "your *sayyid*" to Sa'd. After Sa'd had passed judgment, Muḥammad said, You have judged their case with the judgment of God.

The reason for the appointment of Sa'd must have been the interest of the Aws in the case. Some of the Aws probably felt that they had to support their confederates, the B. Qurayẓah, right or wrong, against Muḥammad, who was by no means the unquestioned ruler of Medina at this period, but primarily the chief of the "tribe" of Muhājirūn from Mecca. Whether the Aws fully expressed their feelings to Muḥammad or not, his motive would be the same, to avoid dissension between the Meccan Muslims and the Aws.

The suggestion that the request for Sa'd came from the Jews (A,K) may simply be to make a good story; they hoped for a more lenient judgment but did not get it. Alternatively, the true account of the mysterious incident of Abū Lubābah (which cannot be discussed fully here) may be that he undertook to use the influence of the Aws to secure lenient terms for the B. Qurayẓah. In the latter case the variant in A and K is not contrary to the other account but complementary.

The variant in E, that Muḥammad merely asked Sa'd for advice, is doubtless a later modification intended to magnify the position of the Prophet and his successors. The point was to give full responsibility to a man who was a confederate of those to be punished.

The phrase "Stand in honor of your *sayyid*" had uncomfortable implications, for the Anṣār could and did take it to mean that one of them was worthy and capable of having authority over Quraysh. Muḥammad probably did use it; it would help to impress recalcitrants among the Aws that Sa'd's judgment had to be accepted. Later especially in the period between Muḥammad's death and the murder of 'Uthmān, those of the Anṣār who objected to a caliph from Quraysh would remember it and exaggerate its importance. The versions in H and I record the disputes about the interpretation. The remark of 'Umar in A is lofty in sentiment, but certainly a pure invention. The alternative phrase given in D and J is much less objectionable and removes the sting. The form in C is ingenious, for there, while the word *sayyid* is kept, the remark is so changed that it would normally be addressed only to men of Sa'd's clan, and thereby it becomes harmless. This form might conceivably be a genuine historical reminiscence; but the saying is so trivial that it would not have been recorded unless the standard version had been already in circulation. This would not be until at least six years after the event (and might have been much longer), and it is improbable that anyone would remember the precise form of a trivial remark for that

length of time. The form in C is therefore almost certainly an invention.

The alteration of "God" to "angel" or "king" in D is doubtless due to the desire to avoid the appearance of attributing to Sa'd something akin to prophethood. The same desire is responsible for the addition in B and C of a remark by Sa'd, which has the effect of making Sa'd responsible for the phrasing of Muḥammad's comment (which is also less objectionable theologically). The form in D read with "king" is the only one of all the versions which does not imply that Muḥammad approved of Sa'd's judgment.

The use of a picturesque phrase instead of "fighters" in G and H, and of an unusual word for "heavens" in I*, may be taken as an indication that these are the original forms of the sayings. But it is possible that, as people became aware that traditions were being forged, the more subtle forgers introduced archaic expressions to conceal their forgeries. It seems unlikely, however, that this has happened here.

This examination could be continued through other variations from the basic account, but these are the main ones, at least in the present connection. The basic account must have become quite firmly established, for this examination of the variants has made it clear that the *sayyid* incident and the final comment, despite the difficulties they caused, could neither be entirely ignored nor directly denied. Further discussion of the basic account may be deferred until the *isnāds* have been examined.

3. *The Authorities for the Traditions.* The various scraps of material, or "traditions", are all provided with an *isnād*, that is, a chain of authorities, each of whom heard the anecdote personally from the person whose name follows. The practice of giving such *isnāds*, however, was probably not common until the beginning of the second century.[1] Indeed, Ibn Isḥāq (d.151) sometimes gives no authority, and frequently names only his immediate informant (as in I); in not a few cases, on the other hand, he has a complete chain going back to an eye-witness of the event. Al-Wāqidī (d.207) is similar, for in the case of events like the battle of Uḥud he names several general authorities without specifying the precise contribution of each. His percentage of complete *isnāds* is perhaps slightly higher than that of Ibn Isḥāq. In Ibn Sa'd (d.230), on the contrary, it is the rule to find complete *isnāds*. This greater attention to sources is in keeping with general intellectual changes, but it may be specially connected with the insistence of al-Shāfi'ī (d.204) that the basis of

[1] cf., Schacht, *Origins of Muḥammadan Jurisprudence*, p. 40f. This present article is in part an attempt to consider how his methods and conclusions affect the study of historical traditions.

law ought to be traditions going back to Muḥammad with an unbroken *isnād.*[2]

The corollary of this desire for a complete chain of authorities is that the *isnād,* as it were, grew backward. The generation whose date of death falls between A.H. 100 and 150 handed on its anecdotes, we may suppose, with only slight indications of their sources in many cases—sometimes perhaps none at all. It was therefore left to later scholars to complete the *isnād.* This does not necessarily mean that the earlier part of the *isnād* is sheer invention, though the most recent student of legal traditions, Dr. Schacht, assigns a large role to such invention. In the more purely historical sphere *isnāds* may rather be said to have grown by a process of "hypothetical reconstruction." In other words the later scholars set down the sources from which they supposed—perhaps not altogether without justification —that their informant had got his material. Even if the persons named were not the real sources, such hypothetical *isnāds* may still give an indication of the sort of milieu from which the information came. One of the differences between legal doctrine and historical material of the types under consideration is that, while the former may have originated in the second century, the latter if genuine must have come from someone in contact with the actual events.

Another line of thought also points to the importance of the generation which died between 100 and 150. During the first century there were current romanticized tales of the *maghāzī* or expeditions of Muḥammad; we may also assume that individuals, families and other groups treasured and handed on isolated memories of the Prophet. It was not till toward the end of the first century that we find the first scholarly attempts to produce an orderly and tolerably complete account of the *Maghāzī,* those of 'Urwah b. al-Zubayr (d. 91-4) and Wahb b. Munabbih (d.110-16). Following on these two was a series of men learned in the biography of the Prophet. Since *isnāds* were only coming into fashion, these men were presumably more interested in the historical facts than in the sources of their knowledge of the facts, though they doubtless mentioned their authorities sporadically. In respect of this relative unconcern for authorities the first "collectors" of the life and expeditions of Muḥammad may be called unscientific. Ibn Isḥāq may be regarded as the first of the succeeding group of "scientific" transmitters of biographical material; and therefore the first or unscientific collectors come to an end with those whose death-date is 150. It may further be noticed that the study of the biographies of the transmitters commenced about 150; Shu'bah (d.160) was one of the first noted for this study (Ibn Ḥajar, *Tahdhīb,* IV, no. 580; cf., Goldziher, *M.S.,* II, index).

[2] ib. p. 57, etc.

The scientific biographers may be further divided. The first section—from Ibn Isḥāq to al-Wāqidī—consists of those who generally give authorities for their statements but do not merely repeat the exact words they have heard and do not always give a complete chain of authorities back to the Prophet. With Ibn Sa'd commences the second section, those who attempt to give complete chains for all statements. This latter subdivision, however, is not important for the special question under discussion, and it will be sufficient to classify the persons mentioned in the *isnāds* under three heads:

a. Informal transmitters	d. up to 100.
b. Early or unscientific collectors	d. 100-150.
c. Scientific scholars	d. 150 on.

The names in the material in § 1 have been marked with the appropriate letter. The divisions, of course, are not hard and fast, for the classes merge into one another, but the classification is a useful working guide as we turn from general considerations to an examination of the special material.

In confirmation of some of the above remarks it may be noticed that the shortest and most incomplete *isnād* is found in the earliest writer, namely in I where Ibn Isḥāq refers only to al-Zuhrī. This incomplete character of many of the chains in Ibn Isḥāq, together with the similarity of the *isnāds* in the two independent recensions of Ibn Hishām and al-Ṭabarī, justifies us in thinking that the editors have generally left the *isnāds* in the form given to them by Ibn Isḥāq himself. It is also noteworthy that 'Urwah, the earliest of the unscientific biographers, in some cases at least, apparently gave no references (F and F*).

The first collectors and transmitters of material, those of class B, are tolerably definite figures about whom we have some biographical details, and of whose tendencies we can learn something by studying the traditions they handed on. Thus Jābir al-Ju'fī (d.127-32) is known to have been an ardent partisan of the Shī'ah,[3] and is also reported by Wakī' to have been the first to disseminate traditions in Kūfah.[4] Sa'd b. Ibrāhīm, a grandson of 'Abd ar-Raḥmān b. 'Awf, one of the earliest Muslims, held the doctrine of Qadar (or free will) and had friends among the sect of Khawārij; these facts show that he was inclined to be an opponent of the Umayyads. One of these Khārijī friends was Dā'ūd b. al-Ḥuṣayn (in H). He appears to have given some information about his sources; at least most of the scanty biographical details about Abū Sufyān in Ibn Sa'd[5] come by way of Dā'ūd. The similarity of the earlier part of the *isnāds* in A and K

[3] cf., Goldziher, *Muhammedanische Studien*, II, 112, etc.
[4] ib., II, 140 quoting from al-Tirmidhī, I, p. 44, 8 and II, 333.
[5] *Ṭabaqāt*, V, 226.

suggests that the early collector there, Muḥammad b. 'Amr, must himself have stated his sources in full; this is quite in keeping with the fact that his death-date is only about half a dozen years before that of Ibn Isḥāq.

From these early collectors the material was handed on by a succession of scholars, and, apart from deliberate forgeries, the *isnād* is a record of this process of handing on. Prior to the early collectors, however, the *isnād* has a different character; it is a statement of how second-century scholars imagined the material came to the early collectors, and was probably added to the material in the middle and later part of that century. Thus in E the *isnād* ends with 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Amr, whereas in I* it is taken beyond him to 'Alqamah. 'Abd al-Raḥmān, indeed, like others of the later first-century figures such as 'Amr b. 'Alqamah and Abū Sufyān, is very shadowy and does not receive an article in Ibn Ḥajar's *Tahdhīb*.[6] The earlier first-century authorities, on the other hand, are often well-known worthies, like Abū Sa'īd al-Khudrī, but their connection with specific traditions may well be doubted. By contrasting A and F we get some light on the use made of the name of 'Ā'ishah. In A the whole long story is ascribed to her, but in F a clear break is made just before the part we are specially concerned with, and Sa'd's appointment and judgment are given on 'Urwah's authority alone, and Muḥammad's final comment on the authority of an unnamed informant of 'Urwah. These distinctions may be due to the careful scholarship of Ibn Hishām or —perhaps more likely—to that of 'Abdallāh b. Numayr who may have noticed that 'Ā'ishah could not have been an eye-witness of the last part of the story and may therefore have deleted her name. A comparison of A with I* and J, in all of which the name of 'Alqamah appears, further suggests that the name of 'Ā'ishah may have been added to an *isnād* which previously ended with 'Alqamah, and similarly in J that of Abū Sa'īd. Before the biographical study of the authorities was far advanced it seems to have been believed that 'Alqamah was a primary witness of events about this period. Ibn Ḥajar quotes at second hand a report from Yazīd b. Hārūn from Muḥammad b. 'Amr from 'Amr—the same chain as in A—that 'Alqamah said he had been at the siege of Medina just before the attack on the B. Qurayẓah; this is probably a later attempt to vindicate the soundness of *isnāds* which stop at 'Alqamah; but the more reliable biographers tended to hold that, though born during the Prophet's lifetime, he had not been a Companion capable of reporting his sayings.[7]

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[6] There is some doubt whether two other alleged grandsons of Sa'd b. Mu'ādh, Wāqid b. 'Abd al-Raḥmān and Wāqid b. 'Amr. are distinct persons *(Tahdhīb,* XI. nos. 183, 184; so there may be a mistake in the name here.

[7] Ibn Ḥajar, *Tahdhīb,* VII, no. 488; cp. Ibn Athīr, *Usd,* IV, p. 15.

If despite these indications of later fabrication we suppose that the *isnāds* give hints of the sort of milieu in which the informal transmission took place, the material before us gives examples of at least two types, the family or clan group and the political group. Thus we have 'Alqamah with his son and grandson (A, J, K); Abū Isḥāq hands on from a fellow tribesman of Hamdān (and at the scientific stage is reported by his grandson, Isrā'īl) (B); in G, Sa'd got his information from members of his own clan of Zuhrah, while the early part of the *isnād* of H suggests that H represents the clan tradition of the B. 'Abd al-Ashhal. The best example of a political group is in C, where al-Sha'bī was secretary to 'Abdallāh b. Yazīd, governor of Kūfah for Ibn al-Zubayr. In the sphere of legal traditions Dr. Schacht considers transmission within a family generally suspect.[8] But the fact that forgers chose this method of trying to secure an appearance of authenticity seems to presuppose that there were genuine traditions with authentication of this type. Indeed among the more purely historical traditions included in the biography of Muḥammad there is a very large number which are handed down in a family or clan and which have every appearance of being genuine. It is only natural that the clan should remember those of its members who were honorably connected with the great events at the beginning of Islam. It is of course also natural that there should be some exaggeration of ancestral exploits, but allowance can be made for that. The main work of the first biographers of Muḥammad was the collection of such family memories from members of the families concerned. Family traditions were probably also the most reliable, since traditions handed down in a political group would tend to have a political twist given to them.

The political affinities of the later scholars, especially those of group C, are matters of great interest, but too far-reaching to be dealt with here. The most that can be done is to see whether anything can be said about the origin of the chief variants from the basic account.

In D and G the name of Sa'd b. Ibrāhīm occurs, and, as it is improbable that a scholar of Sa'd's period would hand on two divergent accounts, there is a strong presumption that Shu'bah is responsible for the *malak* variation in D; *Malik* is almost certainly a conjectural emendation of *malak* by 'Affān or by some unnamed person between Shu'bah and him. On the other hand, Isrā'īl, the common transmitter in B and C, is a little later, and might have handed on two variants. Actually the difference of the two versions is slight; B alone has the prayer for vengeance, and C alone the *sayyid* incident. We seem to have a choice between (a) holding that Isrā'īl handed on the *sayyid*

[8] op. cit. 170.

incident from Jābir and that Wakī' omitted it, and (b) holding that 'Ubayd-allāh was the author of this transformed version of the *sayyid* incident and ascribed the whole to a man of similar political views known to have been in contact with Isrā'īl. The latter possibly seems more likely.

In view of the similarity of part of the *isnād* in A and K it is practically certain that Yazīd b. Hārūn (or someone unnamed between him and Muḥammad b. 'Amr) introduced the remark of 'Umar about God being their *sayyid* which occurs only in A. In D and E one of Ibn Sa'd's informants is the same, Yaḥyā b. 'Abbād, and he must therefore have handed on two versions; thus the variants must have originated not later than Shu'bah and Ḥammād. A separate line of thought has already led us to suspect Shu'bah in D. In E suspicion tends to fall, therefore, on Ḥammād, though his immediate source is a possible alternative. Thus in most cases the variations seem to have come into being during the second century.

4. *Conclusions.* For the Western scholar the results of the examination of *isnāds* are more conjectural and less satisfying than those of the examination of contents, yet the former study is a necessary complement of the latter. If we come back to the basic account that we assumed, the *isnāds* (especially F and F*) seem to show that Muḥammad's final word of praise was originally handed down separately from the rest of the story. The omission of the *sayyid* incident in some accounts suggests that it may also have been separate, though added to the story at an earlier time than the final comment.

Several of the facts we have been considering point to the conclusion that the final comment was circulated by 'Alqamah, or perhaps even by a member of Sa'd's family in the name of 'Alqamah. That would be in the second half of the first century. The most plausible motive for so doing would be the desire to defend Sa'd from a charge of inhumanity. It is impossible to know whether there is any historical basis for the anecdote. The most likely time for the *sayyid* incident to have been put into circulation is soon after 11 and certainly before 36. It does not appear in our material without some addition or modification which reduces the objectionable character of its implications.

It is further worthy of note that the alleged first-century authorities mostly belong to the clan of Sa'd b. Mu'ādh, the B. 'Abd al-Ashhal, to the clan of his "brother" in Islam, Sa'd b. Abī Waqqāṣ, the B. Zuhrah, or to the family of al-Zubayr with which the B. Zuhrah were on good terms, or else had some special connection with one of these. The *isnāds* of B and C are Kufan throughout, those of H and I (with I*) are Medinan; those of D and E begin in Medina and finish up in Baṣrah; and so on.

It should be quite clear by this time that Caetani's suggestion that the judgment was attributed to Sa'd in order to avoid making Muḥammad directly responsible for the "inhuman massacre" is completely baseless. In the earliest period his family and their friends remembered his appointment as judge as an honor and glory, and it appears to have been they who later made Muḥammad a bulwark for Sa'd, not Sa'd a scapegoat for Muḥammad. Caetani's alternative suggestion that Sa'd pursued not the course that he thought best but that dictated to him by Muḥammad is more difficult to dispose of. The prayer of Sa'd for vengeance might have been introduced to defend him from a charge of subservience. On the whole, however, it seems unlikely that a man who had been one of the foremost supporters of Muḥammad from the time of his earliest contacts with the Anṣār should not have been in general agreement with Muḥammad's policy, of which this was an integral part. Allegiance to Islam involved readiness to sacrifice or disavow old clan attachments where these were contrary to the good of the *ummah* or Islamic community.

Finally, let us try to see this discussion in true perspective. The matters which caused difficulty to the Muslim scholars, notably the *sayyid* incident and the closing comment, are in a sense secondary matters. About the primary matters, the broad outlines of events, there is practically no doubt. The B. Qurayẓah were besieged and eventually surrendered; their fate was decided by Sa'd; nearly all the men were executed; Muḥammad did not disapprove. About all that, there is, *pace* Caetani, no controversy. The Western scholar of *sīrah* must therefore beware of paying so much attention to the debates to be traced in his sources that he forgets the solid core of undisputed fact. This solid core is probably more extensive than is usually realized; in the special material examined in this article the percentage of solid core, so to speak, seems to be below average. The presence of this core of fact is the distinctive feature of the historical element in the traditions about Muḥammad, as contrasted, for example, with the legal element. Any theory, therefore, about the sources for the biography of the Prophet must account somehow or other for the transmission of this solid core of undisputed material. This study in detail of the sources for a single incident is an attempt to make a contribution towards such a theory.

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THE CLIMAX OF A PHILOSOPHICAL CONFLICT IN ISLAM[1]

Arabic philosophy has been stigmatized as non-original, non-creative and imitative. It is recognized that the Arabs have at best, played a role in transmitting some Greek philosophical texts to the Western world; and this somewhat lifeless transmission has become a sort of a slogan associated with most evaluations of Arabic thought. It must be remembered, however, that such judgments are still due to a partial and incomplete knowledge of all Arabic philosophical texts. As a result we are now groping in the dark as to the real contribution of the Arabs to pure philosophy. Such a work will have to be awaited; and when done it will itself take its place as a contribution to the general history of philosophy.

On the other hand, there are many recent indications of a new trend. From various and far removed intellectual quarters come similar warnings of the necessity for a fresh approach towards the work of Muslim philosophers. John Wild of Harvard speaks of the stir which the introduction of the Arab philosophical texts of Avicenna and Averroës produced in the Christian culture of the Middle Ages.[2] Etienne Gilson of the Sorbonne describes Averroës' treatises *Agreement of Philosophy and Religion* as "a landmark in the history of Western civilization."[3] He also urges the study of the philosophical Arabic texts as the indispensable condition for every interpretation of the Aristotelian movement of the thirteenth century.[4] The revival in the Latin world of Thomist philosophy, in its modern garb of Neo-Thom-

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[1] This article is based on a section from the doctoral thesis of the writer entitled: "Reason and Revelation in Islam with Particular Reference to Ghazali and Averroës," June, 1951.

[2] John Wild, *Introduction to Realistic Philosophy,* New York, 1948, p. 24.

[3] Etienne Gilson, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages,* New York, 1938, p. 40.

[4] E. Gilson, *Etudes de philosophie médiévale,* Strassbourg, 1921, p. 51. In this connection, two recent books ought to be mentioned: G. Quadri, *La philosophie arabe dans l'europe médiévale,* French trans. by Roland Huret, Paris, 1947, and Léon Gautheir: *Ibn Rochd,* Paris, 1948.

ism, is bringing to the fore the realization that there is a missing link in the general history of philosophy which should be discovered. Might not this missing link be Arabic philosophy?

The *Tahafot.* Our immediate and direct concern turns towards two classical texts in Arabic: *Tahafot al-Falasifat*[5] of al-Ghazālī (1095) and *Tahafot al-Tahafot* of Averroës (1180), both known to Latin Christendom as *Destructio Philosophorum* and *Destructio Destructionis.*[6] Very inadequate study has hitherto been made of them in English. Yet very few Arabic books display as much unity of purpose and composition and embrace in a unified whole the wide range of philosophical and theological problems which upset the heart and mind of Islam.

Background. The first contact of Islam with Greek philosophy and Christian and Jewish theology produced the rational school of the Mu'tazilah as well as the anti-rational school of al-Ash'ari. From the time of al-Ash'ari (888-951) to that of al-Ghazālī (1050-1111), the Arabs assimilated the essentials of Hellenism, and Arab culture produced a vigorous philosophical renaissance chiefly represented by al-Fārābī (d. 950) and Avicenna (980-1037). Under the impact of their great philosophical systems, theology felt itself shaken once more as it did when it confronted the daring thought of the Mu'tazilah, and perhaps even more strongly than before. Men thoroughly acquainted with the refinements of philosophical speculation and the intricacies of metaphysical abstractions were needed in order to support the dogmas of

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[5] The Arabic word "Tahafot" *(tahāfut)* has been the subject of controversy among scholars. On the views regarding its translation into European languages see Miguel Asín y Palacios: "Sens du mot Tahafot dans les oeuvres d'al-Ghazzali et d'Averroës," *Revue Africaine,* Nos. 261 and 262; Alger, 1906. For a compilation of the various translations of this Arabic word, see the introduction of Father M. Bouyges, S. J., to his edition of "Tahāfot al-Falāsifat" Beirut, 1927, which has been used throughout this study. Father Bouyges favors the French word "Incoherence" but contends that it does not reproduce exactly the meaning of *tahāfut* which is used by al-Ghazālī sometimes with reference to philosophers and sometimes to their doctrines. He therefore suggests the adoption of the Arabic word "Tahafot" since it does not offer any difficulty to Europeans.

[6] Mentioned by Raymond Martin (1230-1284), by Raymond Lull (1235-1315) and later by Cajetan (1468-1534).

Islam[7] and discredit the conclusions of philosophy inconsistent with it. Islam found its man in al-Ghazālī who was able to withstand Hellenism and attack its great ancient masters and the then modern Muslim representatives.

The *Tahafot* represents the culmination of the philosophical task of al-Ghazālī and belongs to the period of maturity in his life. To us today the *Tahafot,* besides its philosophical value, has a double interest: First, in a world torn by ideologies, such as we are now witnessing in the conflict between East and West, the two *Tahafots* of al-Ghazālī and Averroës constitute a microcosm of a similar past conflict which upset the world of Islam. In a way it was a conflict between East and West: the East as represented by the religious mystical trend culminating in al-Ghazālī, and the West as represented by the philosophical rational trend culminating in Averroës. The stage of the conflict was, however, narrower since it was then confined to the Mediterranean world.[8]

Secondly, the two trends are still at work in present day Islam. For that reason, in any new approach to the understanding of its modernist and progressive schools, we are bound to study them in the light of those great Muslim predecessors, who in their way were the modernists of their own times: The Falāsifa, the Peripatetics, the Platonists and Neo-Platonists, al-Fārābī, Avicenna and Averroës.[9]

But above all, the *Tahafot,* as well as all Muslim philosophy, ought to be viewed from within. For at the basis of Muslim philosophy there was a *real* problem, real in the sense which Existentialism today attaches to the meaning of reality. That problem was the conflict between faith and reason, or Islam versus Hellenism.[10] The Arabs did not only

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[7] G. Quadri, op. cit., p. 122.

[8] See George Sarton, "Unity and Diversity of Mediterranean Culture," *Osiris,* Bruges, 1936, Vol. II, pp. 407-408. Also M. Meyerhof, "Von Alexandrien nach Baghdad," Sitzungsberichte d. preuss, AK.d. Wissench, *Phil. Hist. Klasse,* 1930, XXXIII.

[9] Louis Gardet, "Raison et Foi en Islam," *Revue Thomiste,* November-December, 1937, p. 442.

[10] On the attitude taken by conservatives and masses against philosophers, see:

"think" that problem, they also "lived in" it fully and deeply. It divided Muslim society, aroused caliphs and masses, and inflamed men with love and hatred. And while beset by that problem the Muslim soul raised fearlessly the eternal ultimate questions of God, man, freedom, and immortality. As Father Bouyges said in his introduction: "The Tahafot will remain, as I hope, a useful instrument in the study of the most passionate of philosophical speculations—those which endeavour to know God."[11]

Al-Ghazālī's Objectives. Al-Ghazālī's main philosophic objective was to prove the insufficiency of reason as a guide to the truth.[12] This he endeavours to achieve by invalidating the conclusions of reason in the field of philosophy.[13] Many critics have remarked that al-Ghazālī's *Tahafot* dealt a deathblow to philosophy in the world of Islam. This view can hardly be appreciated before al-Ghazālī's criticism is fully grasped.

The *Tahafot* contains an introduction and twenty "questions" or "disputations."

In the introduction al-Ghazālī remarks that there are some thinkers who, in their pride, have rejected religious authority merely on the basis of the authority of certain grandiose names such as Socrates, Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle and others. Bewildered by the vast knowledge attributed to those geniuses, they only desire to elevate themselves above the mass of the people by disdaining religious admonitions.

Ignaz Goldziher: "Stellung der altenislam-ischen Orthodox zu den antiken Wissenschaften," *Abhandlungen der Königl.* Preuss, Academie der Wissenchaften, 1915.

[11] *Tahafot,* op. cit., p. viii.

[12] G. Quadri: op. cit., p. 123.

[13] Prior to al-Tahafot, al-Ghazālī wrote *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa,* "The Aims of Philosophers," in which he reproduces objectively Aristotelianism in order to prepare for the attack which was to appear later in the Tahafot. This, as he explains in the preface, he conceives as a pre-requisite for refutation. The book, translated into Latin towards the end of the 12th century, was mistakenly considered as a statement of al-Ghazālī's philosophy because the preface was omitted from the Latin translation. Thus St. Thomas Aquinas in his *Summa Theologica,* q. 45, Art. 5 (note 6) refers to al-Ghazālī's Metaphysics. See. S. Munk: *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe.* Paris, 1927, p. 370. The Latin text of al-Ghazālī's book was edited in 1933 by the Rev. A. T. Muckle under the title, *Algazel Metaphysics—A Medieval Translation,* Toronto, 1933.

It is to eradicate this evil by its roots that al-Ghazālī wants to demolish the entire philosophical systems. He goes on to explain in detail four basic principles upon which his criticism is based and which may be briefly summarized as follows:

1. Since it is not in his power to discuss the doctrines of all ancient philosophers—for each of them contradicted his predecessors, including Aristotle, who criticized his teacher Plato most bitterly—al-Ghazālī concentrates on Aristotle.

Aristotle is regarded as the greatest philosopher who refuted a number of their doctrines and established the best. This proves that metaphysics, far from being founded on certain and irrefutable axioms, such as mathematics and logic, is built on guesses and unproved hypotheses. Later on the interpreters and commentators of Aristotle differed among themselves; al-Ghazālī confines himself to the two best Muslim representatives: al-Fārābī and Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā).

2. Philosophers and sects differ. First, on the use of certain terms, such as "substance," which lead to controversies which are not deemed the subject of his inquiry. For this belongs rather to philosophy and casuistry than to his field of inquiry. Secondly, they differ on the mathematics, astronomical and geometrical sciences, which are wrongly rejected by some thinkers on religious grounds, but which do not really contradict the fundamentals of religion. He who imagines that it is a religious duty to refute such sciences as mathematics will in fact injure religion. Thirdly, they differ on metaphysical doctrines, such as creation *ex nihilo,* the attributes of God, the resurrection of bodies, in all of which the philosophers negate the fundamentals of religion. His struggle will consist in refuting them.

3. He would turn against the philosophers who grant them confidence and think that they are immune from contradictions, by indicating their incoherences and inconsistencies *(tahāfut).* It is for the express purpose of "destruction" that al-Ghazālī delves in the works of philosophers. For this purpose, he would welcome the aid of the various sects (Mu'tazilah, Karramites and others) though he disagrees

with them on certain details, since they do not deny the basic religious principles.

4. The philosophers in order to confuse people claim that metaphysics is a difficult and complicated science whose understanding requires a good knowledge of mathematics and logic. But, says al-Ghazālī, mathematics is necessary to metaphysics no less than to medicine or grammar. Logic, on the other hand, is undoubtedly needed; but it is by no means confined to the philosophers. The theologians consider it to be a basic element in their preparation. The philosophers, however, give it a different name and use other terminology. In order to destroy their false presumption, al-Ghazālī meets the philosophers on their own ground by using their own terminology.[14]

Having thus laid the foundation, al-Ghazālī continues his work. He does not state a given doctrine in its entirety, but he takes specific points, one by one, and then attacks and refutes each in a vigorous manner. This method which gives the *Tahafot* a scholastic form was the same which St. Thomas used in the West later.[15] It is our purpose to present the argument of al-Ghazālī as much in its entirety as possible.

The Eternity of the World. It forms the subject matter of the first disputation of the *Tahafot*. It is a question which had a long history in Greek and Christian thought before al-Ghazālī.[16] The forces of the Church, both Eastern and Western, had already met the Hellenists on this same issue; and Proclus in particular presented a synthesis of the rational arguments to prove the eternity of the world. In Islam Mutakallimun and Falāsifa have equally been preoccupied with it.[17] Al-Ghazālī says that in proving the eternity of the world the philosophers offer their strongest arguments and

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[14] *Tahafot*, pp. 3-17.

[15] Carra de Vaux: *Ghazzali*. Paris, 1902, p. 61. Carra de Vaux concludes, "Le Tahafot marque le summum de l'art de la dispute scholastique; il en est le premier chef d'oeuvre."

[16] See I. F. Burns: "Cosmology and Cosmogony." *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. IV, pp. 141-151.

[17] M. Worms: *Die Lehre von der Anfangslosigkeit der Welt bei den mittelalterlichen Philosophen des Orients und ihre Bekampfung durch die Arabischen Theologen (Mutakallimun)*. Münster, 1900.

display a considerable amount of subtlety. The majority of ancient and modern philosophers, agree that the world is eternal, continuously co-existing with God, but never coming later than He in time, in exactly the same way as the effect co-exists with the cause, or the light with the sun.[18]

The first argument of the philosophers may be summarized by this question: Why is it that the world was not created before the time in which it was? Was God at that time incapable of creating it, or was creation then impossible? To answer these questions in the affirmative would amount to ascertaining that the Eternal passed from having no power at all at one time, to having power at another, and the existence of the world became possible after having been impossible. Obviously these are absurd inferences. The nearest hypothesis is therefore to say that creation had been willed by God. Thus, the will has been introduced. But the introduction of will in the essence of the Eternal is impossible because the Eternal cannot be the place of things created, and this creation outside His essence would deprive Him of a free will. Let us, however, put aside the place of creation and concentrate on its principle which raises all the difficulties. Where was that Will produced? How did it come into existence? And what is it that was lacking in it? Was it an instrument, a power to create, or an end? Was it primary matter or was it a first Will? These questions cannot go on *ad infinitum*. Therefore since it is impossible, nay absurd, for a created world to be produced by an Eternal Agent, without any change in Him, and since the world exists, it is impossible that it had been created and it cannot be anything else but eternal.[19]

Al-Ghazālī in his turn asks the philosophers, Why should they deny that the world has been created by an eternal will which decreed its existence at the time it existed? And on what grounds should they reject that at the time the world was created it was willed by that eternal will, and because of this it came into existence?

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[18] *Tahafot,* op. cit., p. 21.

[19] *ibid.,* p. 23-25. On the other hand, Averroës questions al-Ghazālī's honesty in presenting the philosophers' doctrines, *Tahafot,* pp. 146 and 366.

It is to be noted that the dialectics of this argument evolves around three terms: God, the universe and man. One should not expect that the opponents remain on solid grounds; the dialectics goes downwards to man, upwards to God and sometimes to the universe which becomes a sort of a middle term.

The philosophers reply that it is absurd to suppose an eternal creator in whom all conditions for creation are fulfilled, and yet creation lags behind during a time which may stretch over a thousand years, after which God suddenly creates. This impossibility, i.e., of the cause lagging behind the effect, is not confined only to the Divine Will but applies to the human will as well. If, for instance, a man pronounces his wife to be divorced, and if the separation between the man and his wife does not take place immediately, one cannot imagine that it will take place later. For if this man made his pronunciation a complete and immediate cause,[20] it is hard to conceive that the consequence should be delayed, unless it has been made conditional upon the coming of the next day, or the return of his wife to the house, which is impossible. It would seem in this case that personal human desire is incapable of delaying the effect. If we cannot understand the possibility of delay in this instance, how can we conceive of it in the case of essential, rational and necessary conditions?[21]

Here the dialectic reaches a middle term between God and man, namely, the universe. The doctrine of the Eternity of the World is absurd, says al-Ghazālī, because it leads to the affirmation of the view that the celestial spheres have an indefinite number of rotations whose units are impossible to count, although they have among them definite proportions and a well-calculated number.[22] "This number must be

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[20] In Muslim law the separation becomes effective upon the pronunciation of the man that his wife is divorced.

[21] ibid., pp. 26-29.

[22] al Ghazālī goes on to describe in detail those proportions. "Indeed," he says, "the sphere of the sun makes a circle in one year; and the sphere of Ṣaturn in thirty years. . . ." See Algazel: *Tahāfot*, pp. 31-32. The development of this argument has an interest only in so far as it shows the astronomical and mathematical knowledge at the time of al-Ghazālī and the way in which the infinite was conceived.

either odd or even, or both, or neither the one nor the other. If you say that it is odd and even at the same time, or that it is neither the one nor the other, the error of such a claim is quite evident. If you say it is even, the even becomes odd by adding one unit to it. But how is it possible to add one unit to that which is indefinite? If you say it is odd—the odd becomes even also by adding one unit. But how could this indefinite number lack one unit which would make it odd? Thus you are obliged to conclude that it is neither odd nor even."[23]

The philosophers object that odd and even cannot describe adequately the infinite since such an explanation would necessarily imply that it is composed of present existing units. Al-Ghazālī replies that, in the case of the universe, we are actually facing a "whole" made out of component units which constitute the rotations of the celestial spheres. Their number must necessarily be either odd or even. He summarizes the argument: "Our aim is to prove that the philosophers cannot refute their opponents on the relationship between an eternal will and creation except by resorting to rational evidence; at the same time they cannot prevent that this same evidence may be invoked against them."[24]

Choice between Similar and Pure Will. The philosophers now take a new approach: Moments of time are all similar and stand equally in relation to the Eternal Will. What is it therefore that distinguishes a specific moment from that which is precedent or antecedent to it since either could have been willed? Similarly, the place which is capable of receiving white is also capable of receiving black. What are the reasons that made eternal will prefer white to black? If there has been no specific reason for creation, the world which had the possibility to exist as well as not to exist, would have been chosen arbitrarily since existence and non-existence are equally possible. Thus the question arises: How can the will *choose* between two possibles absolutely similar. The philosophers deny that such a choice is possible.

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[23] ibid., p. 32.
[24] ibid., p. 33.

The world, says al-Ghazālī, did not exist, when it existed in the way and the place where it did, except by an eternal will. The will is a faculty whose essence is to distinguish one thing from another similar to it. To ask why the will can distinguish one thing from another similar to it is equivalent to asking why science comprehends its known object as that object is. Such is the essence of science. In the same way the will is a faculty whose essence is to distinguish one thing from another similar to it.

It might be objected that such a faculty is unintelligible and contradictory. For to say that a thing is similar to another means that one cannot distinguish between them. To affirm that they can be distinguished is to say that they are not absolutely similar. Furthermore, this will in the last analysis is similar to the will in man which always presupposes a choice; if a thirsty man finds himself near two glasses of water, similar from every point of view in their relation to his desire, it is not possible for him just to take either one of the two. He cannot take except that which seems to him more beautiful, lighter, or nearer to his right hand if he is accustomed to use his right hand. Outside this, it is impossible to conceive a distinction between one thing from another similar to it when all conditions are equivalent.[25]

Al-Ghazālī argues that it is wrong to compare the Divine Will with human will in the same way as it is wrong to compare human knowledge with God's knowledge. "If the term 'will' is not fit for the Divine, let us call it another name, for words have no importance. And if I use it, it is only because the Divine law has permitted its use. Otherwise the will indicates in language merely a desire. *But the Divine Will is above and beyond any desire.* We stick to the sense and not to the word."[26]

Even if we were to take the inner sense, the meaning re-

[25] The argument on the freedom of indifference occurs first in Aristotle when he says that according to Anaximander the earth keeps its place because of its indifference. See Aristotle: *On the Heavens,* 295b 10-35. Trans. by J. L. Stocke. *The Basic Works of Aristotle,* New York, 1941. See also L. Gauthier, op. cit., pp. 199-224.

[26] *Tahafot,* op. cit., p. 40.

mains correct; and it can easily be proved that although there might exist a choice between two unequal things, yet nothing prevents the existence of a choice between two absolutely similar and equal things in relation to desire. Suppose, for instance, that there are two similar dates placed equally near the hand of a man who desires them both, but who cannot obtain them. This man would evidently take one of them in virtue of a faculty whose essence is to differentiate one thing from another similar to it. All attributes such as beauty, proximity and facility to take disappear and the possibility to choose remains. You have therefore the choice between two propositions; either you would say that it is not possible to imagine the equality of both dates in relation to the desire of man, which is absurd, for such a possibility exists; or to say that, in admitting the absolute equality of both, man remains in a continuous state of hesitation, looking at the two dates and not taking any in virtue of his *pure will* and *free choice* both detached from desire. Such a supposition is also absurd and its absurdity is proved by facts and evidence.

It is thus inevitable for every thinking man, present or absent, who exercises a free act in virtue of pure will, not to accept the faculty whose essence is to distinguish between a thing and its similar or equal. It is precisely when the will acts without motive that its pure nature is discovered. Such is God's will. God does not create or will under any determination. And since everything exists because willed by Him, it follows that everything is possible, nothing is necessary. The act of God is that which is possible in an absolute sense, in virtue of pure will.[27]

It is to be noted that religious thought, on the whole, has emphasized Divine Will in an absolute sense. St. Thomas Aquinas held a similar theory on God's Will. According to him nothing except God can be eternal and His Will is the only cause of things. Therefore things are necessary insofar as it is necessary for God to will them. Supposing an eternal

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[27] *Tahafot,* pp. 41-46.

world exists, it does so only to the extent that God wills, since the being of the world depends on the will of God as its cause.[28]

Second Argument of the Philosophers: Time and Space. This argument stems from the idea of time and space consecutively. The philosophers ask: "Has God been unable to create the world one or two years earlier than He did?"[29] They maintain that God precedes the world, *per se,* not in *time,* in the same way as 1 precedes 2; it is a precedence which flows from the nature of things since both may exist simultaneously in time. The same can be said of cause and effect, such as the movement of a person in relation to the movement of his shadow, or the movement of water in relation to the hand that moves it. If, on the contrary, God precedes the world and time, not *per se* but in time, then there existed a time, in which the world did not exist. Before time there thus was an indefinite time, which is contradictory. That is why it cannot be said that time was created but is eternal.

To this al-Ghazālī replies that time was created with the world. And when it is stated that God is prior to the world and to time it means that: (1) God existed while the world did not exist, and (2) that afterwards He existed and the world existed with Him. The first premise posits the existence of the essence of God, and the non-existence of the essence of the world. The second premise posits the existence of the two essences only. By precedence it is meant that God alone did possess existence. "Afterwards" does not imply a chronological order. If nevertheless we infer from it a sequence and thus introduce a *third element,* which is time, it is our imagination which does so and not reason.[30]

The Hellenists reply, Suppose the world will disappear and God alone exists, it would be incorrect then to say, God *existed;* but rather God *shall* exist. There is then a basic dis-

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[28] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica.* Q. 46. Art. 1. "On the Beginning of the Duration of Creatures."

[29] *Tahafot,* p. 35.

[30] ibid., p. 51-52.

tinction between the two forms, since one cannot take the place of the other. This distinction does not consist in the existence of an essence and the non-existence of another, but in the existence of a third meaning, i.e., the element *past*. The *past* is *time*. The *past* is a movement which passes and thus *time* passes away. There ought, therefore, to have existed a "Time" before the world itself came into existence.

The fundamental meaning of the two premises, 1 and 2, insists al-Ghazālī, is the existence of an essence and the non-existence of the other. The introduction of the element of time is a subjective addition which has a relative, not an absolute value. In fact, if we suppose the world never to exist in future, and then we suppose it to exist afterwards, it would still be correct to say: God existed and not the world, and that would apply to the non-existence of the world in the two cases: before the world comes into existence and after it goes out of existence. The future itself may become a past, and would be referred to in the past form. All this is due to the utter inability of our imagination to comprehend a starting point without something prior to it. This "something prior to it" which our imagination pictures as real and existing is Time,"[31] which in fact does not exist.

Here again al-Ghazālī's doctrine of time is a reminder of another Christian philosopher, St. Augustine, who denied time and made it a subjective principle while discussing the question of creation. Neither past nor future have a real existence, according to him, but only the present is. "Who shall lay hold upon the mind of man, that it may stand and see that time with its past and future must be determined by eternity which stands and does not pass, which in itself, has no past or future."[32]

This resemblance is not a mere coincidence but springs from a deeper cause. A mark of almost all mystical metaphysics is the denial of the reality of time. This in turn is an outcome of the denial of division; if all is one, the distinction

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[31] ibid., p. 54-55.

[32] St. Augustine, *Confessions*. Bk XI. 11. See also, John F. Callahan: *Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy*, Cambridge, 1948.

of past and future must be illusory; and this certainty is born in the moment of mystic insight which comprehends reality as an undivided whole.[33] A Persian Ṣūfī poet says:

> Past and future are what veil God from our sight
> Burn up both of them with fire! How long
> Wilt thou be partitioned by these segments as a reed.[34]

Space. As in the case of time, imagination cannot but suppose that beyond the world there is an indefinite space which is either full or vacuum. The error of imagination in this instance is proved by the fact that vacuum as such is incomprehensible: for distance is inherent to the body which has dimensions and extension; and since the body is finite, distance is also finite. It is therefore certain that beyond the world there is neither a vacuum nor a full space. Furthermore, as the "spatial distance" is inherent to the body, the "time-length" is inherent to movement. But as it has just been established that the body is finite in space, so movement is finite at the two ends of the world and consequently time, too. There is no difference between the "time length" which is relatively described by "before" and "after," and the "spatial-distance" which is relatively described by "above" and "below." And since it is established that there is an "above" beyond which there is nothing, it necessarily follows that there was a first movement before which no time existed.[35]

The philosophers object to the comparison between time and space. The world, they say, being spherical, has neither an "above" nor a "below." These are subjective terms which can be changed in relation to man. Those parts of the sky which you suppose to be above during daytime, themselves take a position below at night. On the contrary, it is not possible to suppose that that which is first in the existence of the world becomes last and vice versa. The future non-existence of the world and its first moment of existence are essential,

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[33] B. Russell, *Mysticism and Logic,* London, 1918, p. 10. Also pp. 21-26.

[34] *Masnawi,* Whinfield's translation, Trübner, 1887, p. 34. Quoted by B. Russell; ibid., p. 21.

[35] *Tahāfot,* p. 56.

and it is impossible to suppose that this first moment changes and becomes last. Time consists in that which we understand by "before" and "after."[36]

To this al-Ghazālī emphatically objects that when we say, "God exists and not the world," we mean just this and nothing else. Imagination by its own nature cannot but comprehend everything in time and space, whereas reason, which takes little notice of the workings of imagination, does not reject either the existence of a limited body, nor the coming into being of a world preceded by nothing.[37]

The controversy is by no means ended. The philosophers claim that there are many *possible worlds* which God was capable of creating at various intervals of time. There was therefore before the first moment to mark the beginning of the world, possible intervals of time which vary from each other as, for instance, the figures 1, 100, 1000 vary. The possible duration, which serves as a necessary basis to measure these various intervals, is nothing else but time eternal. It could not be *non-being,* because non-being cannot be the measure of being.

Al-Ghazālī refutes this argument by resorting again to the comparison between time and space: God was capable of creating the world greater or smaller from what it is now by an arm-length or two or three. There must therefore exist, beyond the world an indefinite space to serve as the basis for measure since two arm-lengths do not have the same measures as three or four; and this indefinite space must be either full or vacuum. But the vacuum cannot be measured; and the philosophers themselves reject the existence of an indefinite space.

Third and Fourth Arguments. The *possible,* the *impossible* and the *necessary.* The philosophers maintain that the world existed as a possibility long before it actually came into existence. This possibility has no beginning, is continuous, and does not cease at any time. If then the existence of the world is always possible, it would be absurd to maintain the

[36] ibid., pp. 64-66.
[37] ibid., pp. 59-60.

contrary, namely, that existence is impossible at any time, or that it had a beginning. To this al-Ghazālī opposes the view that creation of the world is always possible and that there is no time in which the world could not have been created. Its creation has been decreed from all eternity but achieved in time. Thus, creation is not concomitant with possibility as such. The possibility for creation and the principles of existence cannot be determined by "sooner or later." That which can be ascertained is the principle that the world was created. This is the only real possibility.

But is it not evident, replies al-Ghazālī's opponent, that every created being is preceded by its constituent matter? For such a being cannot exist without matter. Matter then is not created. Forms, accidents and modes are the only things created. The existence of every created being is, before its creation, *possible, impossible* or *necessary*. It cannot be *impossible,* for the *impossible* in essence does not exist. It cannot be *necessary* either, for the *necessary* never vanishes away. This leaves us with the *possible.* The *possible,* however, does not exist separately or in the mind of man. It needs matter in which to inhere. The black and the white are not possible by themselves. They are impossible without a body. The change of color is only possible in a body. *Possibility* must therefore be added to matter.[38]

This possibility, answers al-Ghazālī, is in the last analysis a rational judgment. "Everything which reason supposes to exist—without anything preventing such a supposition—we call it possible. If anything prevents this supposition, we call it impossible. And if reason is incapable of supposing it not to exist, we call it necessary. These are rational judgments which do not need any real being to be predicated of."[39] Thus, reason supposes black and white as possible by themselves and existing outside of a body. But when they are referred to, as possible in a body which they describe, the possibility in this case is no more theirs, but that of the body. It is true that science and knowledge require a thing to be

[38] ibid., pp. 66-69.
[39] ibid., p. 70. Quoted by Carra de Vaux, op. cit., p. 63.

known. But science deals with universals and the philosophers themselves recognize that universals are in reason, not in things. Color as such is a general idea which transcends white or black and which exists in reason without any specifications. Minds might altogether disappear, but not the possible as such, which remains in the mind of God.[40]

This is only a gist of an argument which both al-Ghazālī and his opponents discuss from various angles.[41] In fact, the problem at issue, in the opposition of nominalism and realism, or al-Ghazālī versus the philosophers, was that of the objective significance of universals which occupies a cardinal place in Muslim and Christian scholasticism. The problem arose when an unanswered question about the ultimate nature of universal concepts was found in Porphory's *Isagoge,* "Are universals themselves realities existing in things, or apart from them, or are they merely mental products?" The medievals found it impossible to discuss this problem except within a total and comprehensive metaphysics.[42]

In what remains we can only give a simple enumeration of the other nineteen disputations:

Disputation II: "On the perpetuity of the world."
" III: "On the artificiality of the philosophers' claim that God is the Creator of the world."
" IV: "On their inability to prove the existence of God."
" V: "On their inability to prove the unity of God."
" VI: "On their denial of the Divine attributes."
" VII: "On their inability to prove that God is above definition."
" VIII: "On their doctrine that God is a simple being without essence."
" IX: "On their inability to prove that God is bodiless."
" X: "On their identification of God and the world."
" XI: "On their inability to prove that God knows beings outside of Him."

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[40] ibid., pp. 71-77.

[41] In the Tahafot itself this problem is taken up by al-Ghazālī in Question XVIII. See in particular *Tahafot,* pp. 328-332.

[42] D. J. B. Hawkins, *A Sketch of Medieval Philosophy,* New York, 1949, p. 12.

Disputation XII: "On their inability to prove that God knows himself."
" XIII: "Refutation of their doctrine that God does not know particulars."
" XIV: "On their doctrine that heaven is an animal moved by will."
" XV: "Refutation of what they described as the purpose that moves heaven."
" XVI: "Refutation of their doctrine that the souls of heavens know particulars."
" XVII: "Refutation of their denial of miracles."[43]
" XVIII: "On their doctrine that the human soul is a separate substance, neither a body nor an accident."
" XIX: "On their denial of the immortality of the soul."
" XX: "On their denial of bodily resurrection."

This is undoubtedly an imposing bill of complaints against philosophy. One remark, however, seems to be necessary. After refuting every philosophical doctrine known to the world of Islam and after proving the utter powerlessness of reason to reach the truth by itself, al-Ghazālī has this to say: "Reason may affirm the existence of a being, who has nothing similar to him nor position limiting him, such as the existence of the Creator of the universe."[44] He has thus implicitly assigned to pure reason, a power which he denied to it at the beginning. This is unlike Kant, who left not to pure reason but to practical reason the competence to affirm the existence of God through the inner moral law of man. After all, it was by the help of reason itself, that al-Ghazālī was able to dethrone it from where the philosophers have placed it. But we should go no further. This was to be the task of Averroës in his *Tahafot al-Tahafot*.

George J. Tomeh

Washington, D. C.

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[43] It is in this disputation that al-Ghazālī gives a full statement of his denial of causality. Al-Ghazālī in his introduction (see above, p. 7) does not mention this problem among the basic ones. Causality, the attributes of God, the soul, universals and particulars, and resurrection, have been discussed at length in the writer's thesis.

[44] *Tahafot*, p. 332.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SHARĪ'A LAW VIII

THE JORDANIAN LAW OF FAMILY RIGHTS, 1951

It seems best to interrupt the sequence of this series of articles at this point—before, that is, proceeding to the consideration of recent reforms regarding *awqāf*—to review a very interesting piece of legislation of which I have only recently received a copy. This is the new Law of Family Rights which was brought into force in the Hāshimite Kingdom of Jordan on 15th August, 1951, and represents the most recent of any legislation on this subject. It seems unlikely, moreover, that it will soon be ousted from this pride of place, since there appears to be little prospect that the draft codes of family law which have been under study and preparation for some time in Syria and Iraq, as well as Egypt, will be promulgated for some years to come.

The Jordanian Law consists of one hundred and thirty-two articles divided into sixteen chapters, and covers the whole law of personal status and family relations, with the exception of testate and intestate succession, in a tolerably comprehensive manner. In parts, indeed, it is both detailed and virtually self-sufficient: but elsewhere it is by no means exhaustive, so the "authoritative Ḥanafī opinion" previously applicable must still be sought and applied, as expressly provided by article 130.[1] Again, the Law was plainly modelled on the Ottoman Law of Family Rights, 1917, as previously applied in Jordan, for it follows this Law not only in its general structure and arrangement but in the detailed provisions of many of its articles.[2] But it also incorporates a number of the more drastic Egyptian reforms of 1920 and 1929, together with a few noteworthy amendments and even innovations of its own, while it also includes a few topics which fall outside the scope of either the Ottoman or Egyptian legislation. It seems appropriate, therefore, that this article should be devoted to a short but comprehensive summary of this Jordanian Law, as an example of the other recent Laws which have been discussed, but for reasons of space could not be systematically summarized in the present series of articles, together with a brief discussion of the sources from which its different provisions were derived.

Chapter I is entitled "Proposal of Marriage" *(khiṭba)* and consists of three articles. The first, however, has nothing to do with the subject of the chapter, for it concerns the title of the Law as a whole and the date of its application; whereas the next two follow the corre-

[1] This reads: "In any matter not mentioned in this Law, the authoritative Ḥanafī opinion shall be applied".

[2] Excluding, *inter alia*, the sections in the Ottoman Law peculiar to Jews and Christians respectively, for these were never applied in Jordan.

sponding articles[3] of the Ottoman Law. Thus article 2 declares that a marriage contract is not concluded by a proposal of marriage which does not constitute a proper declaration *(ījāb)* and acceptance *(qabūl)*, nor by a mere promise; and article 3 provides that if either party breaks an engagement, or dies before the actual contract of marriage is concluded, then any property which has passed hands as an advance of dower may be reclaimed if still in the girl's possession, or its value recovered if not, "while in regard to articles given by either party to the other as presents the rules regarding gifts shall be applied." This means, in the Ḥanafī law applicable thereto, that such gifts may be revoked during the parties' lifetime provided they have not been alienated, destroyed or changed in nature (e.g., by a length of material being made up into some article of dress), but not if any of these things have happened, or after either of the parties has died: for the Ḥanafīs make no distinction in this matter of the recovery of premarital gifts, as in the Mālikī system, between those given by the one responsible for breaking the engagement on the one hand and by the one not so responsible on the other.

Chapter II is termed "Capacity of the Parties" and comprises thirteen articles. Thus article 4 corresponds to articles 4, 5 & 6 of the Ottoman Law,[4] but with one interesting and important difference: namely, that the minimum age at which a boy or girl who has not reached eighteen or seventeen years of age respectively may apply to court for permission to marry on proof of sufficient maturity—together, in the case of the girl, with her guardian's permission—is here put at fifteen in both cases, instead of twelve and nine respectively. This means that parties are not competent to marry under the Jordanian Law, even with consent of court, until they reach the age which most jurists regard as the maximum age of puberty; while they are not allowed to marry even then, or until they reach the maximum age of puberty in the view of Abū Ḥanīfa, without first giving the Qāḍī the opportunity to assess their physical development and suitability for marriage, and without, in the case of a girl, her guardian's consent.[5] It must, however, be noted in this context that the age of seventeen prescribed for girls, in accordance with the Ottoman Law, at the beginning of article 4 and in article 5 of this Law gives place to eighteen in sub-section (b) of article 4 and also in article 24: so it is not apparent which age is really intended.

The majority of the other articles in this chapter are of no outstanding interest, since they follow both the normal Ḥanafī Law and

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[3] i.e., articles 1 and 2 respectively.

[4] See Article III in the present series, THE MUSLIM WORLD, April 1951, p. 116.

[5] For a discussion of the juristic basis of the Ottoman provisions, see ibid., pp. 117 and 118.

the Ottoman model in providing that a Qāḍī may marry a girl who has reached seventeen, whether a virgin or one who has been previously married, to an eligible *(kuf')* suitor even against her guardian's will (article 5, and Ottoman article 8: this is perfectly normal practice, since in Ḥanafī law the girl could in fact give herself in marriage, without any reference to the court at all, in such circumstances); that marriage guardians are limited to agnates in their own right in the Ḥanafī order of priority (article 7, and Ottoman article 10: this represents the view of the Two Companions as against that attributed to Abū Ḥanīfa himself, and is consonant with the fact that the only right left to marriage guardians under this Law is that of objecting to a match which wounds family pride);[6] that no lunatic, imbecile or minor may act as a marriage guardian (article 8, and Ottoman article 11: this is perfectly normal); that the usual Sunnī rules regarding the prohibited degrees and other impediments to marriage are all applicable (articles 9-16, cf., Ottoman articles 13-19); and that the last clause of article 16 follows article 9 of the Ottoman Law and normal Shāfi'ī, as distinct from Ḥanafī, principles in forbidding the marriage of insane persons except in cases of necessity—and then only with consent of court.[7] There are, however, two points of greater interest: namely (a) that article 12 decrees that a man who has divorced his wife by three *separate* divorces may not remarry her until she has married someone else, and the insertion of the word "separate" (which does not occur in article 15 of the Ottoman Law) points to the adoption of one of the outstanding Egyptian reforms in article 72 below; and (b) that article 6 comprises the most interesting innovation peculiar to this Law when it provides that the Qāḍī or his deputy shall not give consent to a marriage in which the difference in age between the spouses exceeds twenty years unless and until he has made sure that the younger party is willing, that she[8] gave her consent without compulsion or duress, and also that the marriage is in her interests. In so far as duress is concerned, this is re-iterated as a matter of general application in article 28, where a marriage so concluded is pronounced "irregular," as in the Shāfi'ī view: and even parental compulsion would today, of course, come under this heading, as the marriage of minors by *jabr*[9] is now precluded (and the legitimate use of *jabr* thus limited to the marriage of insane persons, under the conditions and safeguards mentioned above). But the question of the

[6] For a discussion of the Ottoman Law in this respect, see ibid., p. 118.

[7] For discussion of this point in the Ottoman Law, see ibid., same page.

[8] The text of the article does not specify the sex of such "younger party", but the inference seems sufficiently obvious.

[9] i.e., marriage by compulsion.

"interests" of the younger party goes well beyond this principle, and it is noteworthy that the marginal summary of this provision reads "Equality *(kafā'a)* in respect of age." The article, however, is inserted here and not in the chapter devoted to marriage equality in the technical sense: so it seems improbable that, should a marriage be concluded between parties whose ages are more than twenty years apart without reference to the Qāḍī at all,[10] such marriage could afterwards be dissolved on the plea of the younger party, or someone acting on her behalf, that the match was not in her interests.[11]

Chapter III is entitled "The Contract of Marriage" *(nikāḥ)* and comprises six articles. Thus article 17 lays down the usual Ḥanafī rules about the necessity for, and the qualifications of, the two witnesses who must witness the contract of marriage (cf. article 34 of the Ottoman Law): but it also provides that the contract must be concluded before a competent official by means of an official certificate, on pain of penalties to which the person who concludes the contract, the two parties and their witnesses all become liable in default. Articles 18 and 19, like articles 35 and 36 of the Ottoman Law, prescribe the form of the contract itself, and follow the Ottoman precedent in adopting the Shāfi'ī view that the words used must have express and unequivocal reference to marriage.[12] Again, articles 20 and 22 provide respectively that it is the local Qāḍī or his deputy who must arrange such contracts and that the husband who does not apply to one or other of these officials, or anyone else who acts otherwise, will be punished under the Penal Code (cf. article 37 of the Ottoman Law and the Rules of Administrative Procedure issued in conjunction therewith).[13] Article 21 is even more interesting, for it provides that "If a stipulation of benefit to one of the parties is included in the contract this must be respected—e.g., a stipulation that the wife should have the right to divorce herself, that her husband should not make her leave the town where he agreed that she should live, or that he should not marry a co-wife: provided that in any case of dispute such stipulation must have been registered in the certificate of marriage. If, then, the husband disregards these stipulations the marriage shall be dissolved at the request of the wife".[14] This provi-

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[10] See below.

[11] If a plea of compulsion could be substantiated, on the other hand, the marriage would be regarded as irregular under article 28 below.

[12] e.g., it would not be enough for the girl to say "I have given myself to you," and for the man to reply "I have accepted." See Article III, p. 119.

[13] For a discussion, see ibid., pp. 118, 119.

[14] I am informed that the insertion of such stipulations in marriage contracts is today the rule rather than the exception among upper class families in Jordan, and increasingly common among all classes.

sion represents a combination of articles 38[15] and 61 of the Ottoman Law, although it does not go quite so far in one particular[16] as either the Ottoman Reform (which was never applied in Jordan) or the draft article, approved by the Egyptian Cabinet in 1926 but never promulgated because of the opposition of King Fuad:[17] while the proviso about registration is a new but salutary safeguard of the sort which has often been noted in other contexts.

Chapter IV is entitled "Marriage Equality" *(kafā'a)* and comprises five articles. Thus article 23 enacts that a marriage is not binding unless the bridegroom is the equal of his bride in property *(māl)*, i.e., able to produce her "prompt" dower and to undertake her support. This represents the normal Ḥanafī view of equality in *māl*, although there are differences of opinion as to whether the dower which the bridegroom must be able to produce represents "prompt" dower, "proper" dower, or the whole dower stipulated in the contract; and also whether he must be able to support her for a month, six months or a year, or merely prove that he is earning enough money to do so (i.e., that he is *kasūb*). The article, which represents a combination of a shorter form of article 45 with article 46 of the Ottoman Law, also follows ordinary Ḥanafī principles in stating that *kafā'a* is to be reckoned with exclusive reference to the time when the contract is concluded. Article 24 corresponds to article 47 of the Ottoman Law[18] and provides that where either a virgin or previously married woman who has reached the age of eighteen[19] denies that she has a guardian and gives herself in marriage, then if the man she marries is her equal the contract will be binding even if the dower be less than her "proper" dower, while if the man she marries is not her equal her guardian may refer the matter to the Qāḍī and demand the dissolution of the marriage. From this it seems obvious that the solitary consideration concerning marriage equality mentioned in the previous article is not intended to be exhaustive, so the whole Ḥanafī law of *kafā'a*—which has regard to religion, freedom, lineage, profession, piety, property and wealth[20]—is, presumably, still applicable in

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[15] For a discussion of article 38 of the Ottoman Law, cf. Article III, pp. 122-124. Article 61 reads: "If after the contract is concluded stipulations inserted at the time of the contract for the benefit of one of the parties are not respected, then the marriage is irregular."

[16] i.e. the stipulation about a co-wife being divorced.

[17] cf. Article III, pp. 125 and 126.

[18] For a discussion of this article and its juristic basis cf. ibid., pp. 119 and 120.

[19] For the confusion between eighteen and seventeen in this Law, see p. above.

[20] cf. article 45 of the Ottoman Law. Property *(māl)* and wealth (*ghinā* or *yasār*) are two separate categories in the Ḥanafī law of *kafā'a:* the one is defined above, and the other is what its name implies.

Jordan under article 130 of this law.[21] Articles 25 and 26 are perfectly normal,[22] and correspond to articles 48 and 49 of the Ottoman Law;[23] while article 27 again follows the Ottoman Law and one Ḥanafī opinion in providing that in cases where the bridegroom is not his wife's equal the Qāḍī may dissolve the marriage if the demand is made before pregnancy becomes apparent but not afterwards;[24] and that the explicit or implicit consent of a guardian causes the right to demand such dissolution finally to lapse.

Chapter V consists of three rather inadequate articles concerning that most vexed question, among Ḥanafīs, of "Irregular and Void Marriages," as covered in articles 52-58 of the Ottoman Law. Here article 28 provides that "a marriage shall be irregular:—(i) if the two parties are not competent to contract a marriage; (ii) if the marriage is concluded without witnesses; (iii) if the marriage is contracted under duress; (iv) if the witnesses do not fulfill the relevant rules; (v) if it concerns one of the women who must not be co-wives under article 13 while another such is still married to, or performing the *'idda* in respect of, the bridegroom; (vi) if it is either *mut'a* or 'temporary' marriage." Again, article 29 enacts that "a marriage is void:—(i) if it concerns one of the women within the prohibited degrees according to article 14; (ii) if it concerns a Muslim girl and a non-Muslim man." Finally, article 30 provides that "No plea of the irregularity of a marriage on account of the age of the parties shall be entertained by the courts if the wife has given birth to a child, if her pregnancy has become apparent, or if the two parties fulfill the conditions of capacity prescribed by article 4 at the time when the action is brought."

It is noteworthy—and curious—that these provisions make no express mention of the legal category of a marriage with another man's wife or *mu'tadda* (as forbidden by article 9), with a fifth wife on the part of one who already has four wives or *mu'taddas* (as forbidden by article 10), with a wife whom the bridegroom has previously divorced three times and who has not subsequently been married to another man (as forbidden by article 12), or with those within the prohibited degrees of fosterage or affinity (as forbidden by articles 15 and 16).

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[21] See p. 190 above.

[22] Except that it appears that there must be a misprint in article 26, when it states that the consent of one of several equally entitled guardians to an "eligible" suitor causes the right of objection on the part of the others to lapse (and that where the prior guardian is absent the consent of a more remote guardian extinguishes the former's right of objection); for here the sense clearly requires "ineligible" suitor.

[23] cf. Article III, p. 120, for a discussion of these articles.

[24] For a discussion of this provision, see ibid., same page.

They also part company with the Ottoman Law[25] in declaring a marriage with a woman within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity to be void rather than irregular (thereby returning to normal Ḥanafī principles): but they maintain the Ottoman attitude towards *mut'a* and temporary marriage, void though both these contracts are considered among almost all Sunnīs. It seems probable, however, that the forms of marriage forbidden by articles 9-12 would, like that forbidden by article 13, be regarded as irregular by the courts which must apply this law, while those forbidden by articles 15[26] and 16 would, like those forbidden by article 14, be regarded as void. Again, article 30 also departs from the text of the Ottoman Law, although not materially from current Syrian practice;[27] for its effect is that the marriage of those who have not reached eighteen and seventeen years of age respectively will be judicially declared irregular if the matter is brought to court before there is any sign of the wife's pregnancy and before the parties have reached these ages, but otherwise the marriage itself will be allowed to stand although the parties, and any others concerned, will presumably still be liable to prosecution for breaking the law. This is, of course, a very different thing from the denial of all judicial relief in respect of any matrimonial cause based on an unregistered marriage which is characteristic of the Egyptian reforms.[28]

Chapter VI is entitled "The Legal Effects *(aḥkām)* of Marriage" and comprises nine articles. Articles 31-33 follow articles 69-71 of the Ottoman Law regarding the wife's right to dower and maintenance, and the mutual rights of the spouses to inherit from each other; regarding the husband's duty to prepare a marriage home which fulfills the relevant rules; and regarding the wife's duty to live in such marriage home and to accompany her husband wherever he chooses to go, provided there is no legal impediment.[29] This last provision, however, represents a much disputed point among Ḥanafī jurists, and article 33 adds the words, not found in the Ottoman Law, "And an intention on the part of the husband to injure or harm her, or the fact that he is not to be trusted with her *(amīn 'alayha)*, is to be considered a legal impediment in this context." Article 34, again, follows article 72 of the Ottoman Law in providing that neither spouse has the right to accommodate any of their relatives in the marriage home without the other's consent, except that the husband may so

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[25] For a discussion of the relevant provisions, see Article III, The Muslim World, April 1951, pp. 120-122.

[26] Although the modern tendency is increasingly to disregard fosterage.

[27] See Article III, p. 116 (last para., with note 11).

[28] For a discussion of this, see ibid., pp. 113-116.

[29] For the Ottoman Law, see Article IV, The Muslim World, July 1951, p. 186.

accommodate his minor child: but it is noteworthy in passing that the Jordan Law simply describes such child as not having reached puberty, while the Ottoman Law limits this, according to orthodox Ḥanafī doctrine, to one who has not reached the age of discrimination.[30] Articles 35 and 36 define some of the mutual duties of marriage in perfectly normal fashion (cf. articles 73 and 74 of the Ottoman Law);[31] while article 39 provides that an irregular or void marriage must not be allowed to continue, but that if the parties do not separate of their own accord they must be made to do so in the interests of public morality (cf. article 77 of the Ottoman Law, and normal Ḥanafī practice). Articles 37 and 38 are, however, much more controversial, for article 37 provides that a void marriage shall have no legal effect whatever, whether consummated or not, as also an irregular marriage which has not been consummated—i.e., there is no establishment of rights to maintenance, paternity, observance of *'idda,* the impediment of affinity, or mutual inheritance in such cases; whereas the consummation of an irregular marriage is said, in article 38, to give rise to dower, *'idda,* paternity of issue, and the bar of affinity between the parties, although not to the other effects of a valid marriage. This follows articles 75 and 76 of the Ottoman Law and corresponds tolerably well with the statements of certain modern Ḥanafīs: but it seems nevertheless to depart somewhat radically from basic Ḥanafī principles whereby (a) the bar of affinity is raised even by illicit sex relations *(zinā),* (b) dower is incumbent wherever an act of intercourse does not involve the punishment for *zinā* (and this principle is common to most schools); (c) *'idda* is incumbent wherever there is some *shubha* (semblance or doubt) sufficiently strong not only to ward off the penalty but also to remove the stigma of *zinā;* and (d) paternity is always established in the last named circumstances, and according to some jurists also under those covered by (b) above. It seems, however, that the departure from Ḥanafī doctrine under point (a), at least, was fully intended, since article 16 expressly states that the consummation of an irregular marriage—as distinct, presumably, from an act of illicit intercourse—will raise the bar of affinity between the parties: and this corresponds to Mālikī and Shāfi'ī principles. If, moreover, it is argued that all these four different effects must be held to flow not from a void contract of marriage but from the subsequent intercourse under the relevant sort of *shubha,* the same may also be urged of irregular marriages: and it seems clear that the whole concept of the difference between irregular

[30] ibid., same page.
[31] ibid., pp. 186 and 187.

and void marriages as developed by many modern Ḥanafīs rests on a somewhat precarious and equivocal foundation.[32]

Chapter VII is entitled "Dower," and consists of sixteen articles. Most of these represent perfectly normal Ḥanafī doctrine and correspond closely to the Ottoman Law:[33] e.g., articles 40 with 80, concerning "stipulated" and "proper" dower; 41 with 81, concerning "prompt" and "deferred" dower; 42 with 82, concerning the time when deferred dower becomes due; 44 and 45 with 83, concerning the circumstances when stipulated dower is payable in full, in half, or lapses entirely; 46 and 47 with 84, concerning the effect of similar circumstances when no dower was stipulated, or validly stipulated, in the contract; 48 with 85, concerning the dower payable after the consummation of an irregular marriage;[34] 49 with 86, concerning the procedure where spouses dispute as to whether dower was stipulated or not; 52 with 88, concerning the dower payable to a wife whose husband married her in his death sickness; 53 with 89, concerning a wife's absolute right to her dower;[35] and 55 (by implication, at least) with 45, concerning the right of a wife to demand the dissolution of her marriage if her husband, who has not yet consummated the union, proves unable to pay her prompt dower—but it is noteworthy that the Jordanian Law not only lays down a regular procedure for such cases but adds that "If the husband is absent, if no news can be obtained about him, and if he has no property in the locality concerned, then the marriage is to be dissolved without delay (i.e., the month's respite ordinarily given to a husband in such circumstances). Articles 50 and 54, on the other hand, correspond closely with articles 87 and 90 of the Ottoman Law, but represent departures from the "authoritative Ḥanafī opinion"[36] regarding (a) the procedure to be followed in litigation between spouses who dispute as to how much dower was specified,[37] and (b) whether the parents of a bride are entitled to accept any payment from the bridegroom to themselves to facilitate the marriage, or the handing over, of their daughter.[38] Article 43, again, only summarizes perfectly normal Ḥanafī doctrine when it provides that where a wife has received the corpus or income of her dower, or where the parties have agreed to defer prompt dower, in whole or in

[32] See an article on "Irregular and Void Marriages in Ḥanafī Law" in the *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies,* Vol. XIII, Pt. 2, 1950, pp. 357ff.

[33] See Article IV, pp. 187 and 188, for a discussion of these articles.

[34] But it is noteworthy that whereas the Ottoman Law provides that the *mut'at al-ṭalāq* must not exceed "proper" dower, the Jordanian Law enacts that it must not exceed "half the dower."

[35] With no obligation to provide her *jihāz* therefrom.

[36] See Article IV, pp. 187 and 188, for a discussion of these points.

[37] But there is a misprint in article 50, where *"bayyina"* should clearly read *"bi yamīnihi."*

[38] See Article IV, p. 188.

part, for some specified period, then the wife's right to withhold "obedience" lapses—i.e., she may no longer refuse to consummate the marriage, move to her marriage home and submit to her husband's lawful demands: but there is no parallel to this article in the Ottoman Law. Finally, article 51 represents a Jordanian precaution against perjury and vexatious litigation when it provides that "no disputed action shall be entertained regarding the dower for which a contract of marriage was concluded if the claim contradicts the recognized certificate of marriage and is not supported by documentary evidence": and this is facilitated by the fact that article 41 (regarding prompt and deferred dower) concludes with the proviso "Provided that this shall be in writing."

Chapter VIII concerns "Maintenance" *(nafaqa)* and comprises ten articles. The first [article 56] represents a remarkable example of a combination of Ottoman with Egyptian reforms, for it follows article 16 of the Egyptian Law of 1929 in decreeing that a wife's scale of maintenance is to be calculated with exclusive reference to her husband's means,[39] but follows articles 92 and 95 of the Ottoman Law in making arrears of such maintenance actionable only after mutual agreement on a definite sum or decree thereof by court.[40] Articles 57-64[41] call for little comment, for they correspond closely with articles 93, 94, 96-100 (cf. also 154) and 101 of the Ottoman Law, as well as normal Ḥanafī practice—except that article 58 has been slightly reworded to correspond with the fact that the scale of a wife's maintenance is now calculated with exclusive reference to her husband's means (see article 56 above); that article 62 is more explicit than the Ottoman Law in providing that the Qāḍī may decree maintenance for the wife of an absent husband out of either movable or immovable property;[42] and that article 64 includes the addition that "Among lawful reasons for a wife leaving her marriage home is to be reckoned the fact that her husband has beaten her, injured her, or treated her badly." This, it will be observed, is stated in absolute terms and makes no express distinction between lawful and unlawful chastisement: but it seems improbable that a husband's right to beat his wife under Sūra 4:38 is to be regarded as having lapsed in Jordan, or that her consequent departure from his house is not to be considered "disobedience" *(nushūz);* and the clause should almost certainly be interpreted in terms of the ill-treatment described in

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[39] For a discussion of this point, see ibid., p. 193.

[40] For articles 92-101 of the Ottoman Law, see ibid., pp. 188-190. For the more radical Egyptian reform regarding arrears of maintenance, see ibid., p. 191.

[41] But there is a misprint in article 58.

[42] For comment, see ibid., p. 190 (top): the Jordanian phraseology may have been influenced by Sudanese Judicial Circular No. 17 of 1915 (art. I), or by the spirit of the Egyptian reforms. See Article IV, p. 192.

article 96 below—in which case no departure from normal Ḥanafī principles seems involved. But the last article in this chapter is of great interest, for it provides that:—

"(a) The fee of a midwife or doctor who is summoned for a wife's confinement is the absolute responsibility of the husband, whether the marriage is still extant or not.

(b) If a wife or minor son who is entitled to maintenance falls ill in such a way as to require a doctor or treatment, then the fee of the doctor or the cost of the treatment is the responsibility of the husband or father, on a par with maintenance, and shall be calculated by reference to his circumstances, be he rich or poor.

(c) Where children's maintenance is incumbent on their father he is also responsible for the cost of their education, and the pursuit of knowledge is to be regarded as one of the reasons which make a major son's maintenance incumbent on his father [as also his school fees, be they primary, secondary or university—a point to be decided by reference to the son's intelligence and educational capacity and also by reference to his father's poverty or wealth].

(d) If the father is destitute and cannot pay the fee of a doctor, the cost of treatment or the expenses of education, whereas the mother is in easy circumstances and able to pay these, she may be compelled to do so, on the basis that they shall be a debt against the father which she may reclaim if he subsequently becomes better-off: and the same shall also be true if the father is absent."

In so far as the support of a son who is a student is concerned, these provisions can find considerable support in Ḥanafī texts, while the provision about a midwife represents the stronger of two conflicting Mālikī opinions. But the authoritative doctrine of all four Sunnī schools denies that the medical expenses of a wife are legally enforceable against her husband: although the weaker of two conflicting Mālikī opinions, in company with certain Ḥanafī jurists, questions this where the husband has ample means and the wife has none, while such expenses are no doubt regularly met in practice by Muslim husbands who appreciate their wives. In view, however, of the weight of juristic opinion to the contrary, it must be regarded as a distinct reform that the responsibility of husbands (and fathers) in this respect should receive so unequivocal an enunciation, and one to which there is no parallel in either the Ottoman or Egyptian legislation.[43]

Chapter IX is entitled "General Provisions regarding Divorce"

[43] Although it seems that the Sharī'a courts in Egypt do in fact make husbands and fathers pay for essential medical treatment, etc., for their wives and children—presumably on the basis of the slender juristic authority available, reinforced by humanitarian principles.

and comprises seventeen articles. Thus articles 66 and 67 follow articles 102 and 103 of the Ottoman Law in defining the husband who is competent to divorce his wife, and the "wife" who can be divorced, in perfectly normal Ḥanafī fashion, except for the limited sense accorded to the word *faskh* already noted in connection with the Ottoman Law.[44] Again, articles 68 and 69 follow articles 104, 105 and 108 of the Ottoman Law in providing that a formula of divorce uttered under intoxication, by compulsion or when unconscious (i.e., that of the *madhūsh:* this is a Jordanian addition, but one which, by contrast with the other two provisions, represents normal Ḥanafī doctrine) is null and void,[45] and that a husband "owns" three divorces against his wife—which is, of course, an universally accepted principle of Islamic law in regard to free wives. Articles 70 and 72, on the other hand, follow the extremely daring Egyptian reforms of 1929 in providing that a suspended or conditional divorce intended only as an inducement to do something or a threat to prevent something being done shall be null and void, and that a divorce accompanied by a number, whether by word or sign, shall count only as a single—and therefore revocable—divorce:[46] while article 71 (to which there is no exact parallel[47] in either the Ottoman or Egyptian legislation) follows normal Ḥanafī doctrine when it provides that formulae of divorce not addressed or related to some particular wife shall be null and void. Again, article 73 merely summarizes ordinary Ḥanafī practice regarding revocable and irrevocable divorces; article 74 follows article 5 of the Egyptian Law of 1929 in limiting final divorces to a few specified varieties (and thus adopting the Shāfi'ī, in place of the Ḥanafī, view regarding certain expressions which indicate finality);[48] and articles 75 and 76 follow articles 106 and 107 of the Ottoman Law, together with the necessary implications of the Egyptian Law, in providing that both suspended and postponed divorces are valid and effective (when, that is, they are really intended as such). Article 77, on the other hand, introduces an interesting innovation to which no parallel is provided in the Ottoman or Egyptian legislation, for it precludes the courts from entertaining any plea of divorce from a husband, but not from a wife, where it has not been properly regis-

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[44] See Article V in this series, THE MUSLIM WORLD, October 1951, pp. 273 and 274.

[45] Article 68. This is also true in Egypt, under article 1 of the Law of 1929.

[46] Articles 2 and 3 of the Law of 1929: for comments, see Article V, p. 276.

[47] The nearest, perhaps, being the articles regarding metaphorical expressions of divorce (cf. article 109 of the Ottoman Law, and article 4 of the Egyptian Law of 1929: see ibid., pp. 274 and 275): while article 2 of the Egyptian Law is also partially relevant, since the official Explanatory Memorandum expounds this article as including expressions of divorce used as any sort of oath (see ibid., p. 276).

[48] For a discussion of this article, see ibid., p. 275. The Ottoman Law followed normal Ḥanafī practice in this respect.

tered before the Qāḍī. This would presumably mean that an unregistered divorce would be no defense by a husband against a claim for maintenance by his wife, while an unregistered divorce for which there is any adequate evidence would constitute a valid defense by a wife in an action for "obedience," etc., brought by her husband: and this seems both sound and beneficial, since the husband remains an absolute dictator in the matter of unilateral repudiation. Articles 78-82, again, correspond to articles 112-114 and 117-118 of the Ottoman Law, and normal Ḥanafī practice, regarding revocable divorces and their revocation, final divorces and the renewal of the contract of marriage, and triple divorces and the impossibility of remarriage until the wife has experienced an intervening marriage—including, in the last case, the interesting provision, which alone in these articles represents a departure from the authoritative Ḥanafī doctrine, that this intervening marriage must not be concluded with even the unexpressed intention of making the woman again lawful to her former husband *(qaṣd al-taḥlīl).*[49]

Chapter X is entitled "The Option of Separation" and comprises eighteen articles, mostly somewhat long. Thus articles 83-88 correspond to articles 119-125 of the Ottoman Law and concern a wife's right to claim dissolution of marriage on the grounds of her husband's affliction with certain types of disability or disease. The first three represent normal Ḥanafī doctrine regarding eunuchs and impotent persons; while the fourth, fifth and sixth apply the variant view of Muḥammad al-Shaybānī (except that an erroneous "not" has apparently crept into the text of article 86) regarding a husband afflicted with some such disease as makes married life dangerous to the wife.[50] Articles 89 and 90, however, go beyond the Ottoman legislation and follow articles 12 and 13 of the Egyptian Law of 1929 in granting a wife the right to dissolution of marriage on the grounds of injury suffered by reason of her husband's physical absence from her, without lawful reason, for not less than a year—together with the details of the procedure to be followed in such cases:[51] but it is interesting to notice that such relief is only applicable, in Jordan, where the husband is of known whereabouts, although it is then applicable whether he can be contacted or not. Articles 91 and 92, on the other hand, concern the case of a husband who *disappears,* either in circumstances which "make it impossible for his wife to obtain maintenance from him," when she may be granted a divorce after one year has passed without news; or in circumstances where he has left her property "of

[49] For comments on this point, see ibid., p. 277.

[50] For a discussion of these provisions, see ibid., pp. 277 and 278; and for the similar Egyptian reforms, pp. 278 and 279.

[51] For a discussion of the Egyptian Law, see ibid., pp. 284, 5.

the sort from which maintenance is obtained,"[52] when she may be allowed to keep the *'idda* of widowhood and then remarry four years after her petition, under normal conditions, or one year after the return home of the contending armies and their prisoners, in time of war. The first of these provisions corresponds to article 126 of the Ottoman Law, except that the latter makes no mention of the necessity for a year without news; while the second corresponds to article 127, except that the four years is here to date (as in article 7 of the Egyptian Law of 1920)[53] from the wife's petition, not from the failure of all enquiries, while the phrase that she must have suffered injury from loneliness and separation is here again inserted.[54] It is noteworthy in this context, however, that article 99 (below) follows article 5 of the Egyptian Law of 1920 in allowing a wife divorce from an absent husband who is "distant, so that contact with him is difficult, of unknown whereabouts, or *missing*" without any such delay,[55] provided that it is "proved that he has no property out of which his wife can maintain herself." But both the distinction between the circumstances covered by this provision and by article 91 respectively, on the one hand, and the marked difference, on the other, between the rules applicable where absent husbands are of known or unknown whereabouts[56]—even where, in the first case, no communication or contact is possible—seem somewhat far fetched and unnecessary, compared with the greater simplicity and consistency of the Egyptian provisions. Again, article 93 follows article 14 of the Egyptian Law of 1929 regarding the divorce of the wife of one finally sentenced to not less than three years' imprisonment after she has suffered not less than one year's separation;[57] article 94 follows article 128 of the Ottoman Law regarding the position of a woman so divorced and then remarried should her first husband subsequently reappear; while article 95 represents the direct opposite to article 129 of the Ottoman Law in regard to a woman who has remarried after a decree that her husband must be considered dead—for in this case, too, the Jordanian Law provides that the second marriage must stand (cf. article 8 of

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[52] This phrase, copied from the Ottoman Law, seems out of place in the Jordanian legislation, where the Ḥanafī distinction between property of the sort from which maintenance is obtained and other property appears irrelevant in view of the terms of articles 62, 99, etc.

[53] See discussion of both the Ottoman and Egyptian Laws, Article V, pp. 281 and 282.

[54] As an echo from articles 89 and 90, and articles 12 and 13 of the Egyptian Law of 1929 (see above), not the parallel Ottoman and Egyptian provisions.

[55] See Article V, p. 279.

[56] But the logic, presumably, of this difference is that in articles 89 and 90 the husband is regarded as being at fault, by contrast with article 92—and this is one reason why the wife is divorced in the first case but considered a putative widow in the second.

[57] For discussion see Article V, pp. 284 and 285.

the Egyptian Law of 1920, which represents a compromise between these two views).[58]

Articles 96 and 97 concern a plea by a wife for divorce for ill-treatment. They represent a detailed adoption of articles 6-11 of the Egyptian Law of 1929, except (a) that here no provision is made for such divorce, even on proof of ill treatment, without the prior appointment and recommendation of two family arbitrators—a point in which this Law follows article 130 of the Ottoman Law regarding dispute and contention between spouses; and (b) that, here, on the contrary, provision is made for a decree of *khul'* (divorce for a financial consideration) where it seems that the wife is, or at least may be, primarily at fault—and in this, again, the Ottoman Law supports the Jordanian variant.[59] But it is also noteworthy that the earliest provision of all on this subject, Sudanese Judicial Circular No. 17 of 1916 (articles 14 and 15), corresponds to the Egyptian Law in the first of these important points but to the Ottoman and Jordanian legislation in the second.[60] Finally, Articles 98-100 correspond exactly to articles 4-6 of the Egyptian Law of 1920[61] (as we have already seen in regard to part of article 99) in providing for judicial divorce for failure of maintenance: so it is noteworthy that the Jordanian Law includes the double provision for a wife who is left without maintenance, either to claim and obtain a maintenance order and, where necessary, money or credit[62] or else to demand dissolution of marriage.

Chapter XI concerns the *'idda* and includes thirteen articles. Articles 101-112 seem to require no comment, since they correspond closely to articles 139-147 and 150-151 of the Ottoman Law and also to the normal Ḥanafī doctrine, except in articles 101 and 102 (Ottoman 139 and 140), where there is a minor departure from Ḥanafī law regarding the minimum period of *'idda* and a major departure regarding the maximum period thereof: but both articles follow the Ottoman Law *verbatim,* including the mis-application of what was presumably intended to be Mālikī law in the latter article.[63] Article 113, on the other hand, abandons Ottoman for Egyptian precedents when it enacts that "The maintenance during the *'idda* of a divorced wife who is entitled to maintenance is regarded as a debt against the one who divorced her from the date of divorce[64]—for this corresponds

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[58] See discussion of both the Ottoman and Egyptian Laws, ibid., pp. 283 and 284.

[59] See discussion, ibid., pp. 285 and 286.

[60] See discussion, ibid., pp. 286 and 287.

[61] cf. ibid., pp. 279 and 280.

[62] See articles 58-62 above, besides the provisions in articles 98-100 applicable to cases where a husband who fails to support his wife has property out of which a maintenance order can be executed.

[63] See discussion in Article IV, The Muslim World, July 1951, pp. 193-195.

[64] cf. ibid., p. 191 (bottom). Article 153 of the Ottoman Law, on the other hand, reads as follows: "The maintenance of a woman during her *'idda* lapses if this

to article 2 of the Egyptian Law of 1920 and contrasts with article 153 of the Ottoman Law. This appears somewhat strange, in view of the fact that this Law has in general followed the Ottoman rather than the Egyptian legislation in regard to a husband's liability for arrears in his wife's maintenance.[65]

Chapter XII is entitled "The Maintenance of Relatives" and consists of nine articles, to which there is no parallel in either the Ottoman or Egyptian legislation. Thus article 114 defines the circumstances in which an individual is responsible for the total or partial support of various relatives: but article 115, surprisingly enough, goes back to the subject of wives observing their *'idda* and lays down, in normal Ḥanafī fashion, the principles which govern the question of the houses in which they must reside and their behavior during such residence—while articles 116-122 return to the subject of the maintenance of relatives. In the main articles 114 and 116-122 correspond with ordinary Ḥanafī practice: but they depart from this to the extent that they insist, in regard to collaterals only, on the one responsible for support being an heir to the one for whom he is responsible (articles 114 (4) and 119)—for this represents a partial acceptance of the Ḥanbalī principle of liability for the support of relatives, which is frankly and consistently based on the right of inheritance, as against the Ḥanafī insistence on relationship within the prohibited degrees of marriage; that this criterion of rights of inheritance is more widely applied than in the normal Ḥanafī view in deciding which of several possible relatives should be held responsible for the maintenance of some needy member of the family (article 119); and that a more remote relative is regarded as excluded from all legal liability where the one who is primarily responsible is himself too destitute to support his kinsman (article 118). But it is also important to remember the provisions of article 65, discussed above,[66] in regard to the subject-matter of this chapter.

Chapters XIII and XIV concern the "Custody of Children" *(ḥaḍāna)* and "Paternity" *(nasab)* respectively, and each consists of a single article. These represent the adoption of two Egyptian reforms, as enacted by article 20 and part of article 15 of the Law of 1929. The former allows the Qāḍī—on a variant Ḥanafī view—to extend the period of women's custody of children from seven to nine years of age in regard to boys, and from nine to eleven years of age in regard to girls, where this would appear beneficial;[67] while the latter decrees

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expires before the scale of such maintenance is fixed by decree or mutual agreement."

[65] cf. articles 56 and 57 above.

[66] See p. 200 above.

[67] For a discussion of this Egyptian reform, see Article IV, pp. 197 and 198.

that the paternity of a child will not be established if it can be shown that his parents had "never met from the time of the contract of their marriage." This represents the Mālikī and Shāfi'ī view that paternity is established by birth to a married woman not less than six months after her marriage provided that co-habitation between the parents was possible, as against the Ḥanafī view that it is established by birth to such a woman after such number of months regardless of the fact that she may have lived in the Orient and her husband in the Occident from the date of their marriage by correspondence until that of the infant's birth.[68]

Chapter XV is entitled "Missing Persons" *(al-mafqūd)* and comprises two articles, both of which follow the Egyptian Law of 1929 (articles 21 and 22). Under these a decree of putative death may be made four years after a missing man's disappearance, where his death seems probable, or such longer period as the Qāḍī may regard as sufficient to make his death probable: whereupon not only is his wife entitled to observe the *'idda* of widowhood[69] and then remarry, but his estate is to be distributed among his heirs. This last clause represents the Ḥanbalī opinion and is the solitary provision in the present Law regarding matters of inheritance.[70]

Chapter XVI is termed "Heterogeneous Provisions" and consists of the remaining six articles in the Law. Thus article 127 provides that all references to a "year" in this Law refer to a lunar, Hijrī year; and this is the direct opposite to article 23 of the Egyptian Law of 1929, which provides that the reference in several of the articles of that Law is to a solar year of three hundred and sixty-five days.[71] Articles 128 and 129 concern the principles applicable to cases of divorce and inheritance where the divorce or death concerned occurred before the promulgation of this Law; article 130, as we have seen, provides that the authoritative Ḥanafī opinion should still be followed in any matter not covered by the provisions of this Law; article 131 decrees the repeal of several previous Laws, including the Ottoman Law of Family Rights of 1917 as applied in Jordan; while article 132 makes both the Prime Minister and the Grand Qāḍī responsible for the enforcement of this legislation. With this provision the Law ends.

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[68] For a discussion of this Egyptian reform, see ibid., pp. 196 and 197.

[69] This provision overlaps article 92 above, but makes no reference to the special rule for time of war; while the latter, of course, makes no reference to the *mafqūd's* estate, or to a period in excess of four years.

[70] For a discussion of the Egyptian reforms of 1920 and 1929 regarding missing persons, see Article V, The Muslim World, October 1951, pp. 281-283.

[71] See ibid., p. 284, and especially note (30): also Article IV, p. 196, note (43).

THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH AND ISLAM TODAY

THE SPUR OF THE MOMENT III

We turn in this third paper from the "whither" to the "whence" of Christian missionary communication. But first a brief résumé of the argument to date. It has been suggested that Islam today has entered upon a new phase of her historic existence, with the significant political and social changes of the first half of the 20th century, and that these changes, involving a new destiny of self-responsibility for almost all the household of Islam, present issues of a searching character, the response to which—whether in terms of constitutional definition, theological enterprise or social action—represents a crisis of decision. We are familiar enough with these issues for they are the recurrent themes of commentary in many quarters. But they, and the reactions to them, are in turn a kind of mute commentary upon the mind and quality of this generation both in East and West. It is this second 'commentary' which is now our concern. Is the population problem in Egypt, for example, to be "solved" only by allowing the subsistence level of the fellahin to be still further depressed, or are there solutions which vigorous and imaginative leadership can recognize and implement? Is the Palestine tragedy to be assessed only in retrospective terms, however just these may be, or are there steps, costly in the taking but liberating in their outcome, which could inaugurate material retrieval? Is the course of political and social development to be hindered by short-sighted self-interest, or served by disciplined self-criticism? Is nationalism to be harnessed constructively to social betterment as the driving force of the love of one's country as one would wish it to be, or is it to be monopolized by mistaken and frustrating interpretations, drawn from the deceptive illusions of demagogy? Is the menace of Communism to evoke a deep assessment of the current economic situation and of prevailing attitudes of possession so as to give the lie to the doctrine of the inevitability of the class war, or is it to be greeted with a superficial refutation that has not measured its challenge? Is social idealism to find due means of expression and of action through the existing political order, or must it be compelled into subversive methods by the irresponsiveness of the processes of government? What is to be the future of the new industrialisms of the Middle East and how is their varied impact upon the pattern of society to be wisely controlled?

It is evident that these, and many other, questions which formulate themselves out of the welter of the contemporary Muslim world, turn largely upon the quality of the dominant religion. This we have argued. It is not always as clear that they turn almost equally upon the quality of our "Christian" and Western relations. There is hardly

a domestic problem of the Muslim world which in some sense or other, actual or emotional, is not bedevilled—or at least conditioned —by Western relationships. There is scarcely a solution which is not complicated by the fact that in some way—politically, technologically or economically—it involves the West. This fact imposes great responsibilities upon Christianity in its pure missionary outreach of concern and love. It is heightened by the further fact that the general questions at issue make their own interior demands upon Muslim thought. Some outline was attempted in April last of how Islam, as a set of theological beliefs and as a pattern of behavior for society and for persons, is required by its contemporary context to face the meaning of continuity. Science, history, Communism, the atomic age have all confronted it squarely with tests as to its belief about God, human nature, faith and the relevance of religion. It has to recognize the changed context of the generation to which its dogma and tradition are now offered and to take note of the intellectual problems besetting these heirs of its message. They may arise in terms of philosophical misgivings about Creation, revelation or Prophethood, or in terms of mental reservations about historical claims and interpretations, or yet again in terms of personal bewilderment about the adequacy of the old forms to the new tensions of political and social life. There is the strong Communist diagnosis of religion as the product of the economic system, the instrument of the supremacy of the ruling classes and the solvent of a disaffection which should rather be stirred. There is also the pressing fact of secularism, which cannot be countered only by assertion, or conquered by dismay. All these, and others, come with their demand for strenuous custodianship of belief and active, intelligent championship of religious practice. These duties in turn raise the kindred questions as to what constitutes the essence of the faith and how agreement can be had upon its definition and authentication. The continuing religion must be seen to be both the religion and continuing. Due response to these interior obligations, we argued, is a condition of that role in the Muslim world which Islam is summoned to play by the bigness and precariousness of the times. Just as all external issues depend finally upon those sanctions and resources we call religious, so these sanctions and resources themselves hinge upon the rightness of theology and the soundness of devotion. The clue to all problems leads through and beyond economics, politics, law and government, to human nature and its remaking, to the Divine Nature and its disclosure.

We do not, therefore, understand aright even the surface issues of the Muslim world unless we see them as issues for, and in, Islam, and when we understand them so, we also see them as items in a Christian obligation of understanding, witness and service. The pres-

ent opportunities of Islam are tests of Islam, to which only Muslims can give the answer. In both senses, they are also occasions of Christian relatedness in truth and ministry. Yet it precisely here that we encounter again the unhappy fact that almost every one of them is also an occasion of Western involvement. In its Christian ministry to Islam today, the Church is continually met by the paradox that its Western-ness is at odds with its Christian-ness, that its geographical associations (in the mind of the Muslim) have compromised its theological relevance, that, in a word, Christendom has forestalled Christ. To militate against this tragedy is a most urgent missionary obligation, which calls for strenuous action. We need to be very much more aware of the duty to search ourselves implicit in the duty to proclaim Christ. We must feel the spur of all that is discrediting in Christendom, if we would also respond to the call of the current situation in Islam. Our capacity to bring to our Muslim tasks the quality of response they demand will depend upon the quality of our criticism of ourselves. We must heed in repentance the relevance of Christ for the West, if we would bear it to Islam as a faith. This is the spur of "the discredit of Christendom." It will be well to investigate it in some detail in order to see what the disparity between Christianity and Christendom means in Muslim eyes. Because of what Christians are much of what Christ is remains obscured, and because of what they are not much else goes by default.

G. K. Chesterton has "A Song of Gifts to God" in which the Wise Men at Christmas debate their gifts. The first considers that the presents are too poor as an expression of thanks, the second that they are inappropriate since God possesses all. The third and wisest sees that the purpose lies not in the gifts, but in the giving.

> "It is not He but we.
> We say not He has more to gain, but we have more to lose.
> Less gold shall go astray, we say, less gold, if thus we choose,
> Go to make harlots of the Greeks and hucksters of the Jews."

What we arrogate to ourselves we corrupt: only what we yield is safe. And so the poem ends:

> "We bring Thee back great Christendom, churches and towns and towers,
> And if our hands are glad, O God, to cast them down like flowers,
> 'Tis not that they enrich Thine hands, but they are saved from ours."

Islam may be regarded as a touchstone of that truth. In the world of this generation Christendom is too much disqualified by neglect of worship. What it thus withholds from God it wastes upon itself. The ubiquity of Western modes of life and of its applied science means that the impact of its disloyalty to the Spirit is also worldwide. The conflict in the soul of the West is not only an internal Western issue. It is a factor of universal import. This is the penalty of world leader-

ship in industrial power and of a long start in the mechanization which makes the modern age. Not the techniques only, but the temptations, of the West are everywhere. A missionary secretary wrote a poem in a New York office about the turn of this century, one verse of which ran:

> "There's Asia on the avenue and Europe on the street,
> And Africa goes plodding by, beneath my window seat."

He was rightly concerned about the influence of New York upon the oriental visitor. But the problem is multiplied and intensified a thousandfold when the avenue goes to Asia and the West goes, not plodding, but sauntering—or speeding—by, beneath the watching eyes of Africa. This irrepressible export of the West has within it that which no Customs barriers can exclude—an attitude, an ethos, a relationship to things. Tyndale, it is said, exported his English New Testaments from Holland into England in bales of merchandise. We are exporting, secreted in our trade and goods, a quality of life, a secularity, which all too often betrays what is deepest and truest in our own heritage. We have allowed a conspiracy of silence about Christ, or simply left the clamour of immediate interests, commercial and political, to drown all other voices. How much of the world—if the expression may be permitted—is "audio-visualised" from California. The film industry, it is true, is growing fast in Egypt and elsewhere, but Hollywood has long set the pattern of what is to be expected on the screen. It is a pattern which too often misleads the Eastern and distorts the Western spirit.

Or it may be, as in Morocco, that imperative Western needs, symbolized by the almightly bull-dozer, deracinate the familiar features of the countryside and leave unspoken bewilderments in the native soul. These, maybe, are of small importance alongside the overriding considerations of defense. It is better that a land should lose its landscape than that a world should perish. No doubt. But the omnicompetent way in which we confer these benefits raises questions which may in the end frustrate their purpose. Are our intentions really good enough and do we search our spirits in a manner worthy of our conviction that the world is only safe with us?

Perhaps this ubiquity of the West in the necessary relationships of our modern world is too big a destiny for our souls. At least a surer way to becoming big enough for it would be to become smaller in our own eyes, and to re-examine the quality of our "invisible exports." If there is a certain election in the accidents of history and geography and of geology, then it is a Scriptural truth that election is always to trust and not to advantage, to greater obligation rather than greater privilege. Yet, by and large, our attitude to that election

has been all too feebly subdued to its true nature. We have allowed our general pressure upon other lands and peoples to be characterized by indiscriminate commercialism, interested only in markets and raw materials. Trade has never been sufficiently aware of the effects of its pursuit upon the minds and communities with which it dealt. If the Communist diagnosis is reprehensible in our eyes because it is a theory which puts all things under economic feet, how often has our practice had the appearance of doing the same? We have been keen to exploit sources of supply and have, often to great material effect, developed the economic potential of other countries, for their good as well as our own. Yet the "good" has been very imperfectly subordinated to properly Christian standards of judgment. We have geared the world to the idea of production, but we have neglected for it and for ourselves a true attitude to consumption. In the self-regarding manner of modern Western commercialism, with its cult of advertisement, we have almost reversed the proverb and made invention the mother of necessity. Products must be consumed because they are means of profit, rather than because they are means to existence. Everything must be done to develop the market without regard to how we ransack the resources of nature or distort the spiritual quality of life. This over-exaggerated gospel of consumption makes little sense and much havoc in vast areas of the world that have sadly under-developed production. It is little wonder that Asia in its closeness to famine looks upon America in its nearness to satiety, with mingled admiration and contempt. That inter-mixture is in any event a dangerous one. It is still more so when the admiration is for the wrong things and the contempt from the wrong motives. Yet how much responsibility do we normally assume both for what we seem and for what we are, in a world that allows our failings no privacy and our virtues, where they are active, no mercy? Too much of our gold, or rather our commerce, goes to make hucksters everywhere, because we have failed to subdue it to the worship of God. For worship, in the oft-repeated words of Archbishop Temple, is the only thing that can save the world.

So much for the general failure of the "Christian" West to comprehend its own true being and for the consequences of this failure in the world at large. There is, however, a further truth. When we fail to bring the ultimate categories to bear upon our relationships, we fall into seriously limited criteria in our foreign policies. We are liable to take unimaginative views of the needs and reactions of others. Not least is this the case in the Western approach to questions of Middle East defense. Forgetful of the sobering fact that it was the European West which produced Hitler and impoverished itself in defeating him, we expect the Arab East to see the problem of con-

fronting the new situation of Soviet expansion, made possible by Hitlerism, in solely Western terms. There may be little doubt that its material future is more or less contingent upon the kind of defense the West proposes. Our purposes, as we see them, may be reasonable and desirable, but the more we are so persuaded, the more ready we should be to recognize that they might look differently from the Nile or from Damascus. The present juncture in history is interpreted differently by those for whom it is the threshold of a new independence, than by those for whom it is another chapter in a long defense of liberty. The Iron Curtain division of the world is something which many Muslims would like to treat as an external contest where they can be spectators. Any conviction to the contrary, however irresistible in our logic, must be reached in theirs. We cannot ignore the fact that our advocacy is an interested one. Such situations may be galling to the impatience of politicians and strategists. But in the last analysis, even the bases in which they are interested depend now upon the goodwill and co-operation of peoples and governments. These considerations are, of course, in practice the responsibility of embassies and diplomats. But in principle they are also the vital concern of all who care for the reputation and moral authority of the West. Political and military interests must be assessed in the light of more ultimate criteria and then subordinated to them.

Perhaps at this point the recent Iranian oil question is apposite as a further example of a tendency to assess a situation in terms that are too Western. It had been evident for some time that a closure of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's operations would have immediate and far-reaching consequences for the Iranian economy—consequences which would expose the country to dangers that even ardent nationalism might be held sane enough to recognize and avoid. The gamble on the assurance that obvious financial interests would finally triumph proved in fact unsound. Here was a disconcerting kind of leadership, which, however ill-advisedly, preferred a sense of independence to an advantageous bargain.[1] It is little help in retrospect to wonder how it could have been, or how nations can be saved from the ill consequences of their own obstinacy. But at least incredulity and contempt saved neither the oil nor the situation. For neither could have been saved except by way of timely comprehension.

Similar but wider issues are raised by the manner of our reaction to Communism as a serious contender in the Muslim world. Here too the need is to react both rightly and in time. We must beware

[1] For a discriminating analysis of this failure in understanding and a balanced assessment of the role of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. in Persia—its blemishes and its merits—see Olive Suratgar: *I Sing in the Wilderness.* London, 1951.

of treating Communism as a means of scaring potential allies into our Western orbit, or as a convenient scapegoat for other ills and wrongs. For that would be to offer a merely negative resistance and to justify its strictures. Nor must we allow it to suggest to us easy alliances between Islam and Christianity which would ignore the deep searching to which Communism, rightly reckoned with, should expose both. It may well be that the menace of Communism will compel the two faiths into a closer sense of what is common in their theisms. But it also poses profound questions about the nature of man, the root of evil and the meaning of history, which may illuminate as nothing else has yet done the distinctive relevance of Christ to Muslim thought. A superficial alliance, based on a paltry sense of danger, would foreclose a situation potential of tremendous consequences for good in Islam and which Christianity is uniquely qualified to serve by virtue of its theology of redemption and of love. This would be a calamity of the first magnitude. For the Church has never before had the opportunity of ministering to an Islam in the position where Communism sets it. Nor for that matter has anything in recent centuries faced the Church itself with so radical an occasion of reckoning with its historic doctrine. On both counts, we may yet bless the day which confronted us with the necessity of such a response. But all this could be lost for ever by the hasty attitude which brings only a cheap resistance and so in a measure confirms Communism by tacitly accepting its diagnosis of ourselves as impervious to change and incurably recalcitrant.[2]

The basic Christian case against Communism turns ultimately upon the fact that the subject of the only true revolution is man and not the masses, or the body politic, or the economic system; that the Communist revolution is really itself "an opiate of the people"—an illusion that harbors within itself its own nemesis and falsity; that, identifying evil in a horizontal way as between classes and classes and knowing nothing of a vertical wrongness against God and of His moral judgments and salvation, it is destined to perish in its own ruins. Not so shall human selfishness be expelled or refined. But this is not to say that its protests are not to be heeded in a world where it should be a deep concern to know why it should be the force it is. As Islam and Christianity together ponder these truths they may well find their mutual relations being steadily changed. But this will hardly be if "Christian" nations reckon and invite their Eastern

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[2] cf. the Report of the All-World Muslim Conference, English Edition, London, 1949. "Moslem Union representatives are starting on a tour of the Islamic States in the Near and Middle East to discuss and decide in what way a close and effective co-operation can be achieved between Islam and Christianity." *Al-Urwat al-Wuthqa,* Paris, Jan., 1950, p. 11.

friends to reckon with Communism only in terms of defensive pacts, air-strips and war potential.

But to some extent, it may be objected, the Western world has resisted the temptation to think solely in military terms. Is it not recognizing a duty to concern itself with the economic well-being of the under-developed nations and to combat Communism by speeding the tractor and harnessing the river? That is true. The Point Four Program is an imaginative recognition of world responsibility. As an effort to help others to help themselves it is finely conceived. The Muslim segment of the world stands to gain much from its operations. Here is belief in the welfare of one's neighbor and a wide interpretation of where he lives. Yet it is germane to the course of our present argument to emphasize that the breadth of view exemplified in Point Four requires a higher range of obligation than the Program itself can ever attain. It reaches up towards something beyond itself, into a realm where governments as such do not penetrate. If we miss this fact and, missing it, overestimate the potentialities of Point Four or minimize its obstacles, it will be no more than a further symptom of our materialism.

In referring to its limitations, the demands upon its personnel for sympathetic relation with foreign people, for unostentatious living and unpretentious conduct and the like, were not the primary issue in mind. Rather the truth that technological "know-how" is entirely conditional upon the way it is received. Its givers are in the exacting position of having at the same time to win acceptance. To do this involves a sacrificial intimacy with people which no technology can accomplish, unless it is also love. This is the dilemma of Point Four. It needs the goodwill which originates only in Heaven. That goodwill can, of course, enter into its operations,—given the people. But apart from such people, it cannot be assumed in calculations of what the Program may achieve.

Furthermore, Point Four depends—not least in the Muslim world —upon factors beyond the purview of external politics. There is the danger that its aid may only serve to bolster and perpetuate régimes which need to be reformed and thus in turn its value in forestalling incipient Communism will be destroyed. Yet such transformations can only be achieved from within. Apart from example and behest, the West has no political means, under any acceptable interpretation of national relationships, of bringing about such changes. Only some supra-national entity like the Christian Church, religiously related to the situation, could serve such a task. Perhaps our time is unique in imposing upon us an enterprise, so necessary to ourselves as to be a government measure, and yet depending squarely for its success upon factors beyond the reach of the spirit of this world. We have come

into a position where our materialism, if we do not subdue it, can make bankrupt even our own programs for security and where our hopes, if they are to be valid, must be of the Christian kind.

If the desirable changes in Eastern countries can only be soundly developed and consummated from within, they can nevertheless be retarded from without. Western complications can so readily be made the excuse for postponement. Egypt is an immediate case in point. Most detached observers believe that there is a close connection between the prospect of energetic political reform there and the final withdrawal of the British forces. The campaign against foreign troops pre-occupies and embitters sentiment. While it continues all internal criticism and cleansing can be stigmatized as diversionary by the elements most in need of it. The crucial and absorbing anti-foreign purpose has no difficulty in asserting its priority and priorities based on negatives can be highly mischievous things. Moderate elements in Egypt, therefore, look for rapid concessions from the British on the two major issues, as the only sure means of satisfying public sentiment and averting evils, which, otherwise, will rankle and perhaps explode. This makes the obligations of British policy delicate and difficult in the extreme. It must weigh whatever it seeks as the trustee of the West and of the Sudan, in the light of the knowledge that its decisions are fraught with these larger consequences. It would be tragic if statesmanship failed to find a way of attaining its legitimate objectives that also satisfied the internal exigencies of a desperate situation. Could there be a clearer illustration of the truth that what Western nations are and do is vitally related to the interior travail of Islam?

The foregoing is in no sense a comprehensive statement of how Christendom, in its relatedness to Islam on political and commercial levels, has the reputation of Christianity in its hands. On such a topic comprehensiveness is here impossible. Many other fields come readily to mind—Arab Palestine and its history since 1917 and 1948, the conflicts in French North Africa, racial issues in Africa and elsewhere, our attitudes and choices on these and other points in the United Nations. But in every case the stake is the same. All are occasions definitive of the West and accordingly definitive also of what we make of Christianity, or what we make despite it. In all, it is not only a question of what case we can make for ourselves, but what verdicts others reach about us. We need to be as sensitive to how we seem as to what we think we are—at least if we believe in love of our neighbor. In such light we cannot doubt that we are a source of much misrepresentation of Christianity and the occasion of much confusion and disservice to the problems of our Muslim neighbors. Can it be doubted that to brand these misrepresentations, to labor for their removal and to

combat their consequences are duties inseparable from the missionary vocation? We cannot accept the suggestion that the organized missionary enterprise has no duty towards the political and other contacts of the West with Islam. If he declines such responsibility, the missionary will find himself a lonely preacher of Christian piety, calling souls to an allegiance which is belied by many of those who, for his hearers, are its representatives. By all means let us press forward with a humble commendation of Christ to ordinary folk everywhere. But let us not miss the parallel duty to militate on every level against every disavowal of Christ, explicit or unconscious, in our Western society and life. "These ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone." Christianity is not isolationism for Heaven.

Space allows a glance finally at one other important area of Western-Muslim relationship, namely orientalism. Here the danger is the opposite one from that in mind in the preceding paragraph. If there is the missionary who proclaims Christ without reference to the problem of "Christians" as Muslims see them, there is the orientalist who wishes to establish relations on a basis of religious "neutralism." The one ignores the embarrassment of all other issues in his concentration on the preaching, the other excludes the embarrassment of faith in his concentration on good relations. Both are guilty of oversimplification. The one leaves out Christendom, the other Christ.

Orientalism in the West has much to its credit, but in so far as it is a religious neutralism it does not constitute any final answer to the problems of Islam. For these, being the problems of a religion, are problems to which we must bring a readiness for religious fellowship. The long and continuing activities of Western orientalism are a remarkable contribution to the total East-West relationship. The patience and thoroughness with which scholars have investigated the intricacies of Muslim history and literature are entirely commendable. The service to truth, in quiet and disinterested loyalty to all its clues, which scientific scholarship renders, is not only a technical but a moral virtue. That sense of duty to facts and of impartiality in their discovery and interpretation may be considered in itself a religious thing. When its standards and detachments are everywhere reciprocated and Muslim scholars know Christianity with the same objective thoroughness a great day will have arrived. Meanwhile the spread of such scholarship in the general educational life of Muslim nations is helping to recover some of the best features of the golden age of Muslim learning.

Yet, great as all these achievements are—and how inestimably better than past ignorance and prejudice on both sides—they do not by themselves meet the ultimate need of the present time. We must not allow their worth to blind us to their limitation. Indeed, our very

satisfaction in dispassionate scholarship, while equipping us in one direction, may disqualify us in another. It may disqualify us, that is, if we suppose that a fully Christian relation to Islam is attained in understanding it. We must not baulk the hurdle of communication. Scholarly detachment must not appear as irreligion. The balance is admittedly a difficult vocation, but scholarship would be wrong to think that neutrality is a necessary price of objectivity. It is remarkable what the progress of Islamics owes to Christians of conviction. The whole study of the comparison of religions is much in debt to Christian Missions. But in our present mood of reticence and suspension of belief, there is a danger lest Islamics should be regarded only as an academic pursuit. In the modern craze for research and specialization we are liable to isolate our interest as students from our duty as Christians and to take refuge in the illusion, or the comfort, of a study that calls for no action, incurs no debts and involves no responsibilities other than logic and verification.

Surely nothing could be less appropriate to Islam than a devitalized, conviction-less Islamics, which had lost sight of a great, vast, living entity, in the full tide of existence and fraught with the destinies of millions. A living religion calls for study on the part of those whose religion is alive. It is for this reason that this Quarterly, whose honored founder we mourn at this time, has always stood for the belief that scholarship about Islam can very properly be Christian and that Christianity in its relations is properly to be served by objective scholarship. A merely academic interest in Islam would be only another instance of an imperfect Western relationship, and, to the extent it was widespread, a further evidence of our secularity. It would perhaps be the most subtle and revealing of our failures. In the long run neither Islam nor history would forgive us—not to mention Heaven!

Where then do we stand? In our assessment of Western relationships with Islam not all is finally secular, nothing is irretrievable. Our concern must be to lift those relationships on to the highest possible plane of truth and love, and where we cannot lift, to protest and bear witness. Our supreme concern must be to explore with Muslims that Christian understanding of grace, regeneration and surrender which holds the clue to the reasons why Christendom and Christianity are not the same thing. Above all, we must be at endless pains to convey Christ. Perhaps the two tasks are not so far apart. For it is a picture of the excluded Christ which Holman Hunt entitled "The Light of the World"—a Christ excluded, not from Thebes or Athens, but from Laodicea, not from a pagan stronghold but from a Church. If they can understand why He still needs to knock at our doors, they may the better understand His knocking at theirs.

KENNETH CRAGG

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Submission in Suffering and other Essays in Eastern Thought. By H. H. Rowley. Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1951. pp. ix, 170.

Professor Rowley is known to readers of our Quarterly as an Old Testament scholar, several of whose books have had some bearing on our particular field of interest. In his earlier years, however, he lived and taught in China, which is why Chinese thought bulks so largely in the volume before us. What we have here is the revised edition of three Essays which have already been printed elsewhere, the first, which gives its title to the book, on "Submission in Suffering: a Comparative Study of Eastern Thought," a second on "The Chinese Sages and the Golden Rule," which performs the good service of pointing out how hazardous it is to jump from verbal similarities to the Golden Rule in the writings of other sages to the conclusion that the Rule meant the same for them as it did for Jesus, and a third on "The Chinese Philosopher Mo Ti." There is a good deal of repetition, even in the matter in the footnotes, particularly in the second and third Essays, but perhaps that was inevitable.

The interest of our readers will be for the most part in the first Essay which discusses the various solutions which have been proposed for the universal and constant problem of undeserved suffering. Jewish thought both in the Bible and in the extra-Biblical literature was much exercised by this problem, and it continued to exercise the Rabbinic writers till well on into the Middle Ages. Even earlier it had been a problem for the sages of Mesopotamia, for there is a well-known Babylonian text in which the innocent sufferer speaks out to impugn the justice of the gods and is answered by a pious man who teaches submission and resignation to the will of the gods. The much-discussed Indian doctrine of *karma* and reincarnation was an attempt at a final solution of the same problem, and it seemed so cogent a solution that it was taken over into both Buddhism and Jainism and developed in accordance with the peculiar genius of each of these religions. The Indian solution was philosophically conceived, and in the works of the Chinese sages the solutions suggested again stand on a philosophic basis. In Islam, however, there is no attempt at any philosophic justification, the Muslim doctrine of submission and resignation to the will of Allah being based flatly on religious grounds. The character of Allah being what it is, passive submission to whatever He chooses to send to us is the highest virtue. Professor Rowley suggests, however, that there is a better solution outlined for us in the New Testament, namely that such suffering is never merely penal, nor something we can only passively and virtuously accept, but is in itself a means for the enrichment of life, an instrument of blessing, an avenue for consecrated service both of God and of fellow men, and as such it can be welcomed and turned into an experience of high adventure.

ARTHUR JEFFERY

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This is the Way: Prayers and Precepts from World Religions. Chosen by Jesse Orton Jones. Illustrated by Elizabeth Orton Jones. New York, Viking Press, 1951.

My five-year-old son is entranced with *This Is the Way,* a slender book of prayers and precepts from world religions. It is charmingly illustrated with sketches of children of different lands following the Dove of peace down a long road, over many hills. They meet and are joined by neighbors of various colors and creeds, moving onward toward the great Light that blesses all alike. Flowers and birds and little animals, notably a proud Siamese cat and an ordinary alley kitten, declare with the children the glory of a common God, and from the summit of the last hill the Dove turns to guide the rest of the waiting world.

My child studied the pictures as I read the text, paraphrasing from time to time when he interrupted to ask, "What does that mean?" The words of American Indians, Hindus, Buddhists, Bushmen, Taoists, Confucianists, Muhammadans, Zoroastrians, Hebrews, Sikhs and Christians all point one way, though the children's skins are of different colors, though they dress according to their own customs and worship in homes and churches as different as their clothes. The little Muslim, for instance, in his fez and long white dress, is discovered kneeling on his prayer rug in a mosque with the crescent moon shining through a narrow, arched window. He flings his rug over his shoulder to join the others on their journey, and the accompanying words from a tradition ascribed to Muhammad and from the Quran sounded as familiar to my child as the words in his own Bible:

> No one of you is a believer until he loves for his brother
> What he loves for himself,

and

> Praise be to God, Lord of the worlds.
> He is Lord of the East,
> And He is Lord of the West;
>
> Lord of the heavens and of the earth,
> And all that is between them,
> And Lord of the sun's risings.

"Let's read it again," said my little boy, turning back to the first page. "I like the way the words say what the pictures mean."

"What do they mean?" I asked.

"That if we all took off our skins we'd be just alike underneath."

And how much more of the message need a child understand?

ELEANOR C. SCHAFER

Yankton, S. D.

The World Through Literature. Ed. by Charlton Laird. New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951.

The World Through Literature, a monograph of the National Council of Teachers of English, is a volume of essays by fifteen specialists in thirteen great literatures. Edited and introduced by Charlton Laird, it aims to promote understanding and sympathy among

peoples as well as to provide a background for students of comparative literature.

The inclusion of Arabic literature is attributable to the late Arthur E. Christy, who proposed and planned the book, and whose study of Near Eastern life and thought has been responsible for much of the reawakening of interest in this culture. This section consists of two essays. The first is an appreciation of the Qur'an (Koran), the influence on it of the unwritten literature of Arabic poems and proverbs that preceded it, and its influence on every aspect of Muslim life. The second, by Edward J. Jurji, of Princeton Theological Seminary, tackles more exhaustively the history of Arabic literature in general, from its medieval roots to the present, including the rebirth of literary activity in, for instance, Turkey, Iran, and Indian Islam. At a time when world events are bringing the material wealth of the Near East into our lives, it is essential that we should have some means of access to their culture, and Professor Jurji, beautifully at home with poets and political figures alike, introduces us to many men important in the history of the Near East. His treatment is an admirable corrective to the current belief that men of power appear spontaneously, apart from the world of ideas. He puts new emphasis upon the better-known aspects of Islamic literature when, for example, instead of confining his remarks to the dictatorial reformer, Kemal Ataturk, he gives credit to Gokalp, who sowed the literary seeds of Turkey's modern nationalism. He leads us step by step and name by name from the earliest Muslim writers to Mohammed al-Maraghi, whose suggested reforms to emancipate Islam from the shackles of medievalism have recently caused heated debates in the Arabic world.

As a handbook of reference for teachers or students, this is a valuable collection of essays. It provides a quick picture, or a quick review, of the literary culture of all these peoples: primitive, Chinese, Japanese, Indian, Arab, Greek and Latin, Italian, French, Spanish and Portuguese, German, Scandinavian, Slavic and Latin American. However, because of the exigencies of space, it presupposes a certain acquaintance with or access to the actual writings of these peoples. As a textbook for students, it would be inadequate; it describes rather than presents. One feels the need for more examples, for more passages quoted, for more actual contact with the words written by the authors mentioned. The most charming parts of the sections on Eskimo or Chinese literature, for instance, are the poems reprinted; it is these that make us understand and sympathize, rather than the historical treatises about them. Each essay makes a fine starting point from which the student, with the guidance of the bibliography provided, can branch out into further reading; but taken by itself this book is more a panorama of history than a record of men's writings, and the student unacquainted with the culture whose literature is being described may find himself in a bewildering maze of names.

However, when One World has changed from a philosopher's dream to an immediate necessity, such a handbook as this does much to open a way, for nothing is more truly international than great literature.

ELEANOR C. SCHAFER

The Birth of Civilization in the Near East. By Henri Frankfort. Bloomington, Indiana, Indiana University Press, 1951. pp. 116.

The four chapters of this book are expanded versions of lectures delivered at Indiana University in the winter of 1948-9, on the Patten Foundation, with an Appendix discussing the evidence of early cultural contact between Mesopotamia and Egypt.

The first chapter, on the Study of Ancient Civilizations, is devoted to criticism of Spengler's *Decline of the West: Outline of a Morphology of World History,* and the volumes of *A Study of History,* by A. J. Toynbee. The author objects to the metaphors of individual human life and of paths of progress that Spengler and Toynbee use to illustrate their histories of society, explaining that images, while they make the ideas of the historians clear, are not relevant to the historical facts of the civilizations under consideration. Yet the very title of the critic's own book contains a metaphorical term that presupposes parentage, declared to be practically non-existent in the case of Egypt and to extend through centuries in the case of Mesopotamia.

The book states (p. 26) that Toynbee's "experience," i.e., his intimate acquaintance with historical data, is confined to classical antiquity and its western descendant. When the present reviewer, whose field is narrowly limited to Arabic and Islam, read Toynbee's first volume he was delighted to find references to the best authorities in Islamic studies, for he too knew the historian to be a Classical scholar. Years later he learned that Toynbee's "experience" qualified him to write about the Near East, for he had read Arabic with one of this generation's best Orientalists. It is upon his competence in archaeological art that the author of this book chiefly depends for his exposition of the permanent social features of Egypt and Mesopotamia. It is upon an author's work rather than his personal qualifications that criticism should be based. Scholars have their competences confined to limited fields, as a look into any university catalogue or library or general encyclopaedia will tell. This books shows how archaeological art can provide interpretations of pre-historic ideas that later protoliterary texts confirm.

The last two chapters are cordially commended to the attention of Orientalists, including those whose specialty is the contemporary Near East. It is well known that Judaism, Oriental Christianity and Islam are all totalitarian in the sense that in them religion permeates, integrates and dominates all departments of life. Nationality and religious affiliation are identical. Communal loyalty controls the life of the individual. Adherence to religious belief and practice is expected of both the ruler and the ruled. The "ten thousand things" of the Law weigh upon the orthodox Jew. The creeds and disciplines of the Eastern and Roman churches direct the conduct of their adherents. The Qur'ān and Sunna of the Community guide every activity of the faithful Muslim. The way to anticipate the probable reaction of the followers of any Eastern community is to know their convictions and their customs. To this reviewer the great value of this book is that Professor Frankfort makes it clear that the earlier civilizations of the Near East integrated the individual not only with all social phenomena and life, but also with the whole cosmos. Judaism, Chris-

tianity and Islam made the Divine Being transcendent, but the earlier faiths of the Near Eastern civilizations taught the integration and essential identity of all that exists in one bundle of life.

No better evidence of the progress of the civilizing of the mind of man is needed than the listing of the forms of divination that are obsolete and unpracticed in increasing areas of the world. Such a list is given, to satisfy the curious, in the editions of Roget's *Thesaurus of the English Language*. Although astrologists and a few others of that ilk persist, true religion and real science free the mind of mankind from the unspiritual and unscientific ideas of the past and claim for each individual complete personal liberty in his relationship with the Divine, his individual responsibility and his unique worth among mundane phenomena.

EDWIN E. CALVERLEY

History of the Arabs, From the Earliest Times to the Present. By Philip K. Hitti. New York, MacMillan, 1951 (1952). pp. 822. $9.00.

In the review of the Fourth Edition of Professor Hitti's *History of the Arabs* which appeared in THE MUSLIM WORLD for January, 1950, it was stated that the emendations and additions therein made it worth while for libraries and teachers to replace any former edition with that one and for others to insert the changes and new material in the copies they already owned.

This Fifth Edition makes it worth while for libraries, teachers and all others interested in the Arabs to have it at hand. This will be important when checking variations in dates between those given in Hitti's previous editions and in the works of other historians. It may be taken for granted that the author has re-examined for the present edition all questioned dates and retained them or changed them in accordance with his evaluation of the original authorities.

Furthermore, for the first time the title page carries the sub-title, "From the Earliest Times to the Present." The three new chapters are, indeed, sketchy, but they give an Arab historian's summary of Arab relationships with Turkey, Egypt and the Modern West.

Professor Hitti's real continuation of the *History of the Arabs* is in his recently published *History of Syria, Including Lebanon and Palestine,* reviewed in our issue for January 1952, page 75.

These two works place Philip Khury Hitti in the company of the best historians of the world. That he has produced these books along with his teaching responsibilities and frequent international services is impressive evidence of his personal industry, his scholarly ability and his great devotion to his native and adopted nationalities, for both of which his service is preeminent.

E. E. C.

South Arabian Poetry, I: Prose and Poetry from Hadramaut. Edited, collated and corrected, with an introductory Preface, by R. B. Serjeant. London, Taylor's Foreign Press, 1951. pp. xiv, 87, 184. Price, 35/—.

In the years 1947-1948 Mr. Serjeant spent some months in South Arabia, mostly in the Ḥaḍramaut, as a Colonial Research Fellow. Some of the results of his studies there have already appeared in the

Bulletin of the London School of Oriental Studies, the *Journal* of the Royal Asiatic Society, the Belgian *Le Muséon,* and the *Transactions* of the London Philological Society, but this book is the first part of his main project for collecting the traditional poetry of the Ḥaḍramaut. It contains some eighty pieces, longer and shorter, in Arabic text written elegantly for him by local calligraphers, together with his introductory study of contemporary poetry in South Arabia, its types, its metres, its place in the social life of the people, together with some biographical notes on the more important figures whose work is represented in the collection. It is fortunate that the Ḥaḍramis have not yet come to despise the colloquial languages as a medium for literary expression, which is the case in other areas of the Arab world, for much of this material in the colloquial idiom is of great interest. Like most colloquial material, however, it abounds in local allusions which are largely unintelligible without a commentary, and such a commentary is promised us in the second volume.

Perhaps the section of most interest to our readers is that on the Ḥaḍramī song. Although there are the usual orthodox injunctions against music, such as one may expect in any area of the Islamic world, music both instrumental and vocal is popular among the people, and Mr. Serjeant has much interesting detail to give us about the songs which accompany the local dances, the songs of the camel-drivers, the tribal *zāmils* or battle songs, hunting songs, the songs at the local *mawlids,* the songs which accompany various operations of labor whether in the fields or in the town, and the happy songs attendent on domestic ceremonies. It is exceedingly curious to read how annually for the pilgrimage to the tomb of the Prophet Hūd there are traditional songs and recitatives which the local Sayyids have striven in vain to purify from ancient pagan elements which still persist from pre-Islamic days. To this reviewer it was news that for the celebration of the Prophet's birthday in Rabī' al-awwal there are special Ḥaḍramī *mawlids,* some of them of quite recent composition, which are sung to characteristic Ḥaḍramī tunes. Material such as is assembled here not only adds to our knowledge of the life of the people in this relatively little known area, but is an important contribution to our understanding of popular Islam in South Arabia.

ARTHUR JEFFERY

Ibn Khaldun and Tamerlane. By Walter J. Fischel. Berkeley, University of California press, 1952. pp. 149. $2.50.

There is something peculiarly fascinating about meetings between world conquerors and men of thought: Alexander and Diogenes, Napoleon and Goethe and other examples occur to the mind. But few of these encounters were as dramatic as that between Timur Lenk and Ibn Khaldun, in 1401. Let down over the city walls of Damascus, like Saint Paul, to negotiate the surrender of the city, Ibn Khaldun found himself engaged in long discussions with Timur about the Maghrib, the Turks, the Caliphate and the precise identity of Nebuchadnezzar. Both men show up remarkably well: Ibn Khaldun tactful, diplomatic but determined to stand by his authorities even

where they conflict with the opinions held by the king, and Timur surprisingly merciful and "highly intelligent and very perspicacious, addicted to debate and argumentation about what he knows and also about what he does not know."

Professor Fischel has done a magnificent piece of scholarship. In addition to a translation of Ibn Khaldun's account of the meeting, based on three unpublished manuscripts, he has supplied a valuable and very learned commentary and a useful introduction and index. The University of California press is also to be congratulated on the excellent quality of paper, type and reproductions. Altogether, this book can be highly recommended to those who are interested in either the career of "Tamburlane" or the genius of Ibn Khaldun. It fills a gap in an important period in the history of the Near East.

C. Issawi

United Nations, N. Y.

Tunisie. By Pierre Hubac. Paris, Editions Berger-Levrault, 1948. pp. 154. Table of contents and numerous illustrations.

The author lived in Tunisia from 1911 to 1934 and has written a number of other scholarly works on Tunisia. In this book he treats the physical aspects of the land, its inhabitants from Phoenician times to the present, its evolution from prehistoric times, its natural resources, the organization of its government, the various social, economic and political problems facing Tunisia, and its intellectual and cultural life.

E. H. Douglas

Initiation à la Tunisie. By A. Basset, L. Bercher, R. Brunschvig, M. Calvet, A. Cardoso, J. Despois, E. Gobert, H. Idris, G. Marcais, W. Marcais, G. Picard, J. Pignon and Ch. Saumagne. Paris, Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1950 pp. 387. Tables of illustrations, tables of contents, many illustrations.

Mention of the names of these renowned scholars suffices to guarantee the worth of this composite work. In historical detail they present:

1. The physical aspects of Tunisia.
2. The past: Berber, Punic, Roman, Vandal, Byzantine antiquity; the Middle Ages; period since the Turkish conquest; Muslim art.
3. The Tunisian people: Muslims and Israelites; urban and city life; religious life; cultural evolution; Arabic and Berber speech.
4. The Protectorate: Political and administrative organization; justice; Europeans.
5. Economic activity: Agriculture and stock-raising; forests and fish industry; mines, industry, commerce; ports, railroads, highways, airports, water-power.

Ample bibliographical references are of special value.

A fair appraisal of the so-called "Tunisian question" requires a knowledge of facts. Without being exhaustive, this and the previous work produce facts that will help the enquirer to appraise equitably the situation. The reader has the impression that the writers, while naturally holding the French point of view, are trying to enlighten

the field objectively, pointing out both weaknesses and elements of strength, as the case may be, in an effort to clear the way for future progress for the good of the people.

E. H. DOUGLAS

Tunis and New York

The Near East and the Great Powers. Edited by Richard N. Frye, with an introduction by Ralph Bunche. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1951. pp. vii, 214.

This volume publishes in revised form the papers and remarks of participants in a conference on *The Great Powers and the Near East* held at Harvard University, August 7-9, 1950. It consists of a series of essays by specialists on the area from the academic, business, diplomatic and United Nations milieu's, as well as by private individuals keenly interested in this subject. These are grouped into two main headings subdivided into two sections each. Under the heading, "THE GREAT POWERS—Political and Economic Factors," Professor H. A. R. Gibb of Oxford; Charles Malik, Minister of Lebanon to the U.S. and her representative to the United Nations; Professor William Thomson of Harvard; Harvey P. Hall, Editor, *The Middle East Journal;* George G. McGhee late Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, and currently U.S. Ambassador to Turkey; Charles P. Issawi, Secretariat of the United Nations; Professor Leonid I. Strakhovsky of Toronto University and Ralph Bunche, of the United Nations, investigate topics such as "The Near East between East and West," "The Pattern of Great Power Impact on the Near East" and "Economic Development and the Near East." Cultural factors are discussed by Mortimer Graves, Administrative Secretary, American Council of Learned Societies; George C. Keiser, Chairman, Board of Governors, The Middle East Institute, and Professor Gibb.

The second main division of the book deals with "THE NEAR EAST," under the subheadings, "The Palestine Problem," and "The Arab World." J. C. Hurewitz, Lecturer at the Center of Israeli Studies, Columbia University; Moshe Keren, Counselor, Embassy of Israel; and Dr. Bunche deal with Israel in her relations with the U.N., the U.S. and her struggle to establish sovereignty.

E. L. De Golyer, Director, American Petroleum Institute, introduces the section on the Arab World with a clear statement on the evolution of U.S. oil interests in the Middle East. Majid Khadduri, Professor of Middle East Studies, School of International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, gives a thorough analysis of "The Scheme for Fertile Crescent Unity; A Study of Inter-Arab Relations"; and Moshe Perlmann, Professor of Islamics, New School of Social Research and Dropsie College, completes this section with "Notes on Labor in Egypt, 1950." The book closes with remarks made by Charles Issawi and others at the Conference, a brief conclusion by H. A. R. Gibb, two appendices entitled, "Discussion," and "Program of the Conference," respectively, and the index.

Dr. Malik's essay on "The Near East and the West" is a thought-provoking challenge to our pride, honesty and philosophical insight. It foreshadows, in certain respects, his eloquent plea for diligence in

seeking mutual understanding which appeared in *Foreign Affairs* in January, 1952, as "The Near East: A Search For Truth." Mr. Hall's analysis of "The Pattern of Great Power Impact on the Near East" depicts in bold outline how we in the West have tried to mold our Near Eastern friends in our own image, with questionable success. Mr. Hurewitz reminds us of the almost infinite and certainly painstaking efforts of the U.N. to settle the chaotic situation in Palestine and how, by a remarkable variety of sincere, and skillful means, it succeeded in limiting hostilities, then producing an uneasy armistice between Israel and her Arab neighbors, in spite of the cynical and hostile attitude of some members of the organization. Professor Khadduri gives a clear and unique study of Inter-Arab relations from 1920 to 1950 in the longest and one of the best parts of this uneven book. None of these papers really examines rural life in any detail. A serious defect is the lack of any extended discussion of the present desperate plight of almost a million Arab refugees displaced by the war in Palestine who have subsisted on an uncertain charity from their Arab hosts, the U.N. and hard-pressed private agencies for almost four long soul-destroying years. No situation in the Near East is more tragic, none so acutely demands our immediate and persistent attention.

This book is a refreshing change from the integrated survey type study of a particular area as it allows more scope for the discussion of key topics, and does not pretend to present a comprehensive coverage. Professor Frye is to be congratulated on having organized this Conference and for the publication of such a range of provocative interpretations. It is heartening that there are four able Near Eastern contributors to this volume. Readers will learn much and ponder more over these well considered and timely statements on a vital area, critical in the human, strategic, material, speculative and spiritual realms.

HOWARD A. REED

New Haven, Conn.

The Persian Language. By Reuben Levy. New York, Philosophical Library, 1951. pp. 125. $5.75.

In this volume the author, who is Professor of Persian in the University of Cambridge, attempts to describe in very brief form the structure of modern Persian.

The first chapter, which is apparently designed to serve as an introduction to the book, gives a sketchy account of the area, climate, population, economic life, etc., of Iran. Then it outlines the racial and linguistic groups, the various dialects of Iranian and non-Iranian tongues and ends up with a list of Persian words in English. The second chapter deals with the script and pronunciation. The following four chapters, two on "The Noun and its Adjuncts," and two on "The Structure of the Sentence," form the bulk of the work.

The last two chapters are entitled "Outstanding Figures in Persian Literature" and "Recent Developments." The remainder of the book contains three short sections on the religion, calendar, proverbs of Iran, an appendix, a bibliography and an index.

The author does not state for whom the book is written, but from all indications it is intended for beginners. If it was designed for this

purpose, the treatments of certain sections are inadequate and incomplete. For instance, the chapters on "The Noun and its Adjuncts" and "The Structure of the Sentence" give bare outlines and scraps of information which will be puzzling to the beginner. Comments on the *conjugations, uses of tenses* and *types of sentences* suffer from brevity. On the other hand, if the book is written for the benefit of advanced students and scholars, it can scarcely contribute anything to their knowledge. Had occasional references been made to other well known works, especially reliable Persian grammars, the value of the volume would have been greatly increased. Topics treated in the last two chapters obviously are not new; they consist of a certain amount of well selected material but lack a deeper and fuller explanation.

The system of transliteration used by the author is complex and old-fashioned. If a method of transcribing each sound by a single phonetic symbol had been chosen a lot of time and labor would have been saved. The author avoids the diacritical marks normally used in the transcription of certain sounds, i.e., a dot under the letter to indicate the emphatics. (Diacritical marks have been used only twice, on p. 107). This omission is a source of confusion to the beginner who must constantly refer to the dictionary to determine the correct spellings and pronunciation of words.

To cite a few specific instances—the sounds *tēh* and *ṭā* are both transcribed as t; the sounds hēh (hay-e ḥuṭṭī) and *hēh* (hay-e howwaz) are both transcribed as h; the sounds *gahyn* and *ghāf* both appear as *gh,* although *ghāf* is sometimes transcribed as *q;* the sounds *sēh, sīn* and *ṣād* are all transcribed as s; the symbol for the sound *'ayn* is sometimes represented and sometimes altogether omitted in transliteration. The long vowels and the *tashdīd* are frequently not indicated. Besides, there are a number of inconsistencies in transliteration which are misleading. For instance, the name *Sa'dī* is spelled in four different ways: (p.23) *sa'adī;* (p.53) *Saadī;* (p.78) *Saadi;* (p.85) *Sa'dī.* The rendition of the Persian *eẓāfa* with the vowel *é,* without even a hyphen to separate it from the governing noun, is also a handicap. The student will have difficulty in distinguishing the vowel é at the end of a word like *herké* (p.85), from the vowel *é* at the end of the word *lashkaré* (p.90) which is the vowel of *eẓāfa* showing that *lashkar* is in construct form with the word *bīgāna.*

From these generalities let us now turn to more specific points; page number is given in parenthesis and the reviewer's comment follows the colon in each instance. (11) The classic examples of the use of the Huzvaresh are given by Ibn al-Maqaffa': what is really meant here is that later historians such as al-Nadīm, Ibn Khallikān and others mention that Ibn al-Muqaffa' is reported to have said that. . . . Since there can be no direct quotations from the extinct works of Ibn al-Muqaffa', it is best to supply the secondary sources rather than confuse the reader. (11) According to Ibn al-Muqaffa' ——: see the previous comment. (16,17) Persian words in English: This list does not seem to be exhaustive; others may be mentioned such as bulbul, candy, jackel, jungle, mummy, pistachio, saraband, satrap, scarlet, shikari, sowar, subadar, tafetta, teapoy, vizier, zemindar, zenana, zircon, etc. For a more complete list see "Persian Words in English," A. A.

Daryush, S.P.E. Tract No. XLI, 1934. (24) khāné (house) or even khānī: never pronounced as khānī in Iran; perhaps in India. (24) The Times correspondent in Teheran in 1947 gave the then Prime Minister's name as Qavam-es-Sultani: shall we consider the Times correspondent as an expert on Persian pronunciation? Could this have been a misprint? (24) The word balī (yes), in spite of its spelling, is pronounced bāli: not in Iran. (25) Qūjūr (for Qājār, the name of the dynasty displaced by the present reigning one): to this reviewer's knowledge it is always pronounced as Qājār. (25) Banque Millié Iran: the Persian spelling is wrong. (25) bhob (good): misprint for khob, pronounced as khūb; rarely as khob. (27) asp: although pronounced as asp is always written with a *b* in modern Persian. (27) yābūī: may best be transliterated as yābūy. (28) Shāhzan (queen): never used; the queen may be referred to as the zan-e shāh (the shah's wife) but even in this form is very rarely used. (28 n.2) kaffé dast; pronounced as kaf-e dast. (36) hazār takka havāpaymā: takka is never used in this connection; dastgāh or simply 'adad. (42) tamāshāyī (spectator): should be tamāshāchī. (44) —estān: should be —stān, which is the correct suffix. (44) sarvān or sārvān (camel-leader) sār (camel): sārvān or sārbān may also be applied to a horse or mule driver; certain careless lexicographers, notably the author of the Burhān-e Qāṭi', supply such unreliable and incorrect definitions. (45) Shekārché (huntsman): should be shekārchī. (45) daryāzhé (lake): correct form daryācha; the diminutive suffix being cha not zhé. (46) nowkhodā (shipmaster, pilot): should be nāwkhodā; more commonly pronounced as nākhodā. (48) ta'alīm-gar (instructor): not used in Iran, must be of Indian origin. (52) dar ruyé sāhel (on shore): not used, simply dar saḥel. (54) zirā ché (because): not used. (66) masūl (responsible, lit., asked): for mas'ūl; both the Persian spelling and the transliteration wrong. (72) dībāī (brocade): may best be transcribed as dībāy. (74) raīse dowlat (the Prime Minister): read ra'īs-e dowlat. (77) taaziya (a "Passion" play): should be ta'ziya. (95) The fame of the poem (rubā'iyāt) spread through English and American influence to Persia, where previously Omar Khayyam had been known, as has been said, almost exclusively as a mathematician and astrologer: this statement is incorrect and misleading; Khayyām's poems, in spite of his fame as a mathematician, spread shortly after his death. His poems were well known in Iran, India and Turkey long before Fitzgerald's version of the *rubā'iyāt* appeared in English. Specimens of his poetry have been quoted in the numerous Tazkirahs, and his verses have been sung by the common people for hundreds of years. (103) tīmcha (arcade): this word has been in use in Iran for at least two hundred years and will not be found in the Farhangistān's list of new words.

In spite of these shortcomings, Mr. Levy's book contains some useful material, especially the sections on the religion, calendar, proverbs and popular wisdom of Iran, specimens of Persian prose and representative writings. It is recommended and deserves further development by its author.

M. A. Simsar

New York City

A Medical History of Persia and the Eastern Caliphate From Earliest Times Until the Year A.D. 1932. By Cyril Elgood, M.A., M.D., F.R.C.P., late Physician to H.B.M. Legation, Teheran, Persia. Cambridge, England, University Press, 1951. pp. 616, 6 illustrations. $10.00.

Dr. Elgood possesses unusual qualifications for the writing of this history. He is a classical scholar and Orientalist, able to read and translate ancient Arabic manuscripts as well as other source material in the original Persian, Greek and Latin. Besides this he has an intimate knowledge of conditions in Persia which could have been derived only from having lived and practiced medicine in that country.

The book is easy to read and very interesting, being frequently enlivened by medical anecdotes. The background of Persian history into which is woven all that can be learned of medical personnel and practice in each period makes the book intelligible to the general reader. Westerners engaged in medical work in the Middle East will find the perusal of this volume especially rewarding. Their patients may have inquired, "This disease of mine, is it hot or cold?" Such a question is not easy to answer; but it will be understood if the mind can go back to the "Golden Age" when the caliphs in Baghdad encouraged the translation of Greek medical classics. The writings of Hippocrates and Galen thus introduced into Arabia and Iran belief in the "Humoural System" which was taught in the medical schools of both Europe and Asia until it was supplanted by the "Circulatory Theory" of Harvey. When many manuscripts of Greece were lost, it was their Arabic translations which preserved the "system" for posterity. The Arabic writings of Persian physicians, translated into Latin, became the recognized medical text books of Europe. Thus it was that Avicenna and Rhazes, among others, and their treatises became known by their latinized names. The author gives a whole chapter to Avicenna and Rhazes. Both for their original writings and for their transmission of the humoural theory from Greece these men are justly famous. And even yet, to many of the inhabitants of the Middle East, diseases are still classified as "hot" or "cold," "moist" or "dry," according to the ancient theory of the humours.

Although the humoural system became obsolete with the advent of Harvey's teaching, Dr. Elgood sees modern investigation of disease processes returning nearer and nearer to the Greek concept. It is certainly true that doctors are learning, more and more, of the pertinence of a patient's physical type, his temperament and his emotional experience to the incidence of certain diseases.

Volumes have been written on the subject of Arabian Medicine dealing with the period of the Eastern Caliphate. Dr. Elgood's present book also includes this period. But he considers that in making available a continuous history of medicine in Persia and the surrounding countries, beginning with the Mythological Age and continuing until the year 1932 he is "breaking virgin soil." In the year 1934 he covered the same periods, in abbreviated form, in his handbook, *"Medicine in Persia,"* one of a series of similar works having the general title, "Clio *Medica.*"

In reading of the periods before the Caliphates one learns of the Persian medical school and hospital of the Nestorian Christian University at Jundi Shapur. This was at the height of its glory at the time of the invasion of Persia by Islam in A.D. 633. It was from this school

that many of the famous personal physicians of the caliphs were secured. It was the leading medical faculty of the world in its time. After the overthrow of the Abbasid caliphate by invading Mongols in 1258, when the water of the Tigris ran red, green and black from the ink of Baghdad's precious illuminated manuscripts, medical progress continued in Persia. After this time, the author remarks, Persian physicians wrote in their own language, and Greek medicine became truly Persian.

Before continuing in chronological sequence the author interposes at this point two chapters on Arabian Medicine in Theory and Arabian Medicine in Practice, in which he gathers together from all his resources, including stories of the *Arabian Nights,* information as to medical customs and the achievements of the physicians of whom he has been writing. Medical training and examination for licensure are discussed. There was much quackery and deception. But public health regulations and surgical methods at their best, were surprisingly advanced. Ophthalmology was a recognized specialty and the caliphs employed their own personal ophthalmologists as well as their personal physicians.

The account of the Mongol Domination occurs at about the middle of the text, followed by chapters on the Empire of Tamerlane and the Safavids. The last third of the book begins with a chapter headed, The East India Company in Persia. From this point to the end of the book one has the feeling that in telling the story of British doctors in Persia the author has achieved his principal purpose. Probably this is the only book in which one can find this significant information. The 131 volumes of diaries written by the representatives of the East India Company in Persia and now preserved in the India Office in London constitute the sources used.

It was in 1611 that Shah Abbas the Great sent his ambassador to the court of James 1 of England "to offer to the English the free and absolute use of two ports in Persia, in return for their friendship and trade." The ambassador himself was an Englishman, the famous Robert Sherley. Five years later, the Persian section of the East India Company was founded by the establishment of "factories" at Jask and Ispahan.

Many of the men sent to Persia by the British government were physicians. The greatest of these men, according to the author, was Sir John McNeill to whose biography a whole chapter is devoted. It was into the succession of British doctors that Dr. Elgood himself entered when, many years afterward he became "Physician to H.B.M. Legation in Teheran." His experience was gained during the transition period when control of quarantine and other medical services passed from the British to Nationals. Through many years preceding this time the personal physician of the ruling shahs was usually British, French or Russian or of some other European nationality.

Dr. Elgood naturally looks at his subject through British eyes. And the contribution of Britain to this part of the world should not be minimized. Anyone who has lived on the Persian Gulf and traveled in safety on British-India steamers must realize his debt to the British for ridding the Gulf of pirates. And those who can picture the horrors of the terrible epidemics of plague and cholera which formerly ravaged Basrah and ports along the Gulf must feel gratitude

to British doctors for establishing and enforcing quarantine measures.

The present reviewer, formerly a medical missionary in Kuwait, on the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf, has read this book with great interest. The author has not forgotten to mention the contribution of medical missionaries in Persia. He had for his perusal the records of the mission of the Church of England. Regrettably, only a few remarks in one very short paragraph refer to the service given by the Persia Mission of the American Presbyterian Church. Their first doctor, Dr. Asahel Grant arrived in Persia in 1835, almost a century before the end of the period covered by this book. In 1882 the first American hospital was opened by Dr. J. P. Cochran in Urumiah. After that, hospitals were founded successively by American missionaries in Teheran, Hamadan, Tabriz, Resht, Kermanshah and Meshed. American doctors and nurses are still giving outstanding medical service in Iran. It is to be hoped that future editions will give adequate recognition to this contribution.

Each medical agency which has had a part in the history of Iran has significance in today's situation. To be intelligent about present happenings and future possibilities anyone will do well to read this delightful and very useful book.

ELEANOR T. CALVERLEY, M.D.

Kashir: Being a History of Kashmir, From the Earliest Times to Our Own, By G.M.D. Sufi, M.A., D. Litt., Lahore, Pakistan, The University of the Panjab, 1949. Two vols., lxxviia, 341, 148; 343-833c, 151-258, I-IV. £4/10/—or $12.00.

This first comprehensive history of the Valley of Kashmir is a superb work. It is generous in size, for it has over a thousand pages. It has over a hundred illustrations and maps, many of them in color. Its bibliography is exhaustive and includes old and rare volumes as well as many fugitive articles. The author could have re-written the information he found in his sources, but he preferred to share with his readers the varied flavor of their accounts. He has given full credit for every borrowed statement.

The author gives excellent accounts of the literature, arts and crafts of the people and some report of their folklore and social and religious life. Concerning this last subject more might have been provided from the author's own investigations and experiences. This reviewer, for instance, would have liked to learn, at long last, why, when visitors buy quinces in Srinagar, the Kashmiris stipulated that they could remove and keep the seeds in the fruit. Were these seeds wanted for horticultural or medicinal purposes? The author does not gloss over the backward state of the common people. He makes his readers share his concern for their material, cultural and spiritual progress. Yet the reviewer would have liked to see greater attention given to the services of the missionaries for the medical and educational welfare of Kashmir.

But what the book has is splendid. The author is to be thanked for the labor he lavished on it. The University of the Panjab is to be congratulated for accepting and publishing it.

E. E. C.

Revival of Islam Through the Medium of Films

"The Higher Committee of Al Azher, the oldest centre of Islamic learning—has not only not objected to the realization of this method but have advised Muslims all over the world to encourage it.

"The adoption of this medium, it is pointed out, is likely to remove the age old prejudice among Muslims against photography.

"The first step in this direction was taken last year by Ibrahim Izzddin Bey, a prominent Egyptian, whose film Zahoor Islam, 'Dawn of Islam' won him deep admiration in religious quarters of the Muslim world.

"The film depicts the advent of Islam and the numerous hardships which it had to face in its early stages. The production of such a film presented formidable difficulties in view of Muslim sentiments against photographing early Muslim personalities. It was a controversial issue as to who could be photographed.

"However, the Mufti of Egypt, Hasnain Makhluf, finally solved the problem by declaring that the taboo against filming applied only to the Holy Prophet, members of his family, and the first four Caliphs.

" 'Zahoor-e-Islam' gives a graphic description of pre-Islamic life and shows how Islam grew from strength to strength in face of numerous obstacles. Among the historic events shown in the film are the Battle of Badar and the migration of Muslims from Mecca to Medina. Some of the scenes were shot in Saudi Arabia and special care has been taken to show several historical places.

"Within a short period of its release the film gained wide popularity not only in Egypt but in other Muslim countries as well.

"The film which has also been translated in English and is being shown in educational institutions of America is likely to be dubbed in many other languages for the benefit of Muslims who do not understand Arabic or Turkish.

"The film was translated in Turkish language and shown in Turkish schools when the Turkish Government declared it to be an educational film thereby exempting it from all customs charges."

Quoted from *The Civil & Military Gazette* of Karachi, dated March 19, 1952.

The Zwemer Memorial Fund

Friends of the late Dr. Samuel M. Zwemer are establishing a fund in his memory. In accordance with the wishes of his children, contributions will be used for a Library and Reading Room in Bahrain. Gifts should be sent to:

THE ZWEMER MEMORIAL FUND,
c/o The Reformed Church in America,
156 Fifth Avenue, Room 902, New York 10, N. Y.

SURVEY OF PERIODICALS

By Sue Mollesòn Foster
Union Theological Seminary Library

I. GENERAL

Clove-scented Zanzibar. W. R. Moore. (In *The National Geographic Magazine,* Washington, D. C. February, 1952. pp. 261-278).

Finely illustrated description of this beautiful island where David Livingstone prepared for one of his famous African expeditions.

Dante and the Legend of the Mi'rāj. Theodore Silverstein. (In *the Journal of Near Eastern Studies,* Chicago. April, 1952. pp. 89-110).

The first installment of a study on the problem of Islamic influence on the Christian literature of the world beyond death.

Dante et l'Islam d'après des Travaux Récents. M. Rodinson. (In *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions,* Paris. Octobre-Decémbre, 1951. pp. 203-235).

Traces the probable Muslim influences on the "Divine Comedy" and discusses in particular the researches of Miguel Asin Palacios.

The Defence of the Holy Places. Evelyn Waugh. (In *The Month,* London. March, 1952. pp. 135-148).

A plea for the actual internationalizing of Jerusalem, thus ending the shame and confusion caused by our rulers' indecision.

The Influence of the Arabic Language on the Psychology of the Arabs. E. Shouby. (In *The Middle East Journal,* Washington, D. C. Summer, 1951. pp. 284-302).

The author believes that literary Arabic, representing the ideal self, and colloquial Arabic, representing the real, or lower, self, may account for the puzzling contradictions in the Arab personality.

The Leiden Tradition of Arabic Studies. G. W. J. Drewes. (In *The Islamic Review,* Woking. October, 1951. pp. 9-15).

An historical account of the work undertaken and accomplished by Leiden University and its great Arabic scholars during the past four hundred years.

The New Arabic Script. Mahmoud Taymour Bey. (In *The Islamic Review,* Woking. October, 1951. pp. 16-20).

Presents reasons for the adoption of an alphabet of thirty forms, instead of the present three hundred, but would retain the diacritical points now in use.

II. ARCHAEOLOGY

Archaeological News: The Near East, 1950-1951. W. S. Smith. (In *The American Journal of Archaeology,* Richmond, Va. January, 1952. pp. 39-50).

A comprehensive survey of vast undertakings.

The Bronze Age in the Near East. George M. A. Haufmann. (In *The American Journal of Archaeology,* Richmond, Va. January, 1952. pp. 27-38).

Completes an article begun in 1951 (vol. 55, pp. 355-365) dealing in great detail with "Stratigraphie comparée" by the celebrated archaeologist, Claude F. A. Schaeffer.

Excavations at Dibon in Moab. F. V. Winnett. (In *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research,* Baltimore. February, 1952. pp. 7-23).

A well illustrated account of work done 1950-1951 and includes the description of an early Moabite inscription by Fr. R. E. Murphy, O. Carm.

The Ghosts of Jericho. James L. Kelso. (In *The National Geographic Magazine,* Washington, D. C. December, 1951. pp. 825-844).

Aided by more than a hundred Arab refugees, the author conducted extensive excavations into the Jericho of the Herods.

Jericho: The Archaeological Problem. Gurston Goldin. (In *The Hibbert Journal,* London. January, 1952. pp. 130-137).

A careful documented historical study.

Matarrah: A Southern Variant of the Hassunan Assemblage. Linda and R. J. Braidwood, J. G. Smith, and Charles Leslie. (In *The Journal of Near Eastern Studies,* Chicago. January, 1952. pp. 2-75).

An elaborately illustrated recital of findings in a village site in North Central Iraq, not far from Kirkuk.

La Troisième Campagne de Fouilles à Tell El-Far'ah près Naplouse. R. P. R. de Vaux. (In *Revue Biblique,* Paris. Juillet, 1951. pp. 393-430; Octobre, 1951. pp. 566-590).

Fully illustrated account of extensive and rewarding diggings undertaken in 1950.

III. ARABIA

The Lost Ruins of Quraiya. H. St. J. B. Philby. (In *The Geographical Journal,* London. December, 1951. pp. 448-458).

Although known to Doughty, Burton, Musil and other explorers, the ruins had not been visited for real investigation until 1951, when the author found much of interest in the citadel and in the surrounding terrain.

Yemen Opens the Door to Progress. Harry Hoogstrall. (In *The National Geographic Magazine,* Washington, D. C. February, 1952. pp. 213-244).

Describes the activities of an American Navy scientific expedition surveying medical problems at the invitation of H. M. the King of Yemen.

IV. HISTORY OF ISLAM

Deux Voyageurs du XVe Siècle en Turquie. Izeddin. (In *Le Journal Asiatique,* Paris. 1951, fasc. 2, pp. 159-174).

The travellers are Bertrandon de le Broquière and Pero Tafur, who visited Adrianople at different times and left interesting accounts of the Turks and their ruler, Mourad II.

Der Islam in der Neuen Turkei. Gotthard Jaeschke. (In *Der Welt des Islams,* Leiden. Vol. 1, no. 1-2, 1951. pp. 3-174).

An exhaustive study with bibliography and copious footnote references.

V. QUR'AN. TRADITION. THEOLOGY

Éléments d'une Bibliographie des Questions Musulmanes Actuelles. R. Le Tourneau. (In *Bulletin des Études Arabes,* Algiers. Janvier, 1951. pp. 6-12).

The entries are arranged by countries and are largely French.

Islamic Economics. Mahmoud al-Lababidi. (In *The Islamic Review,* Woking. March, 1952. pp. 5-14).

Examines the capitalist and communist systems and compares them with the Muslim—much to its advantage because it is based on moral and ethical doctrines and recognizes the equality of capital and labor.

Monasticism and Islam. (In *Notes on Islam,* Calcutta. September, 1951. pp. 97-100).

Finds Muslim opposition to the monastic state a fairly recent innovation and affirms that thousands of monks flourished in the 7th and 8th centuries in Moslem lands.

The Religious Element in WAQF Endowments. J. N. D. Anderson. (In *The Royal Central Asian Journal,* London. October, 1951. pp. 292-299).

Discusses the practice and opinions on this subject as expressed by the Ḥanafī and Shāfi'ī schools of thought.

VI. RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL LIFE

Israel Faces Its Arab Minority Problem. Judd L. Teller. (In *Commentary,* New York. December, 1951. pp. 551-557).

A careful effort to afford a fair case for both parties, but offers no solutions.

The Lesson of Turkey. Richard D. Robinson. (In *The Middle East Journal,* Washington, D. C. Autumn, 1951. pp. 424-438).

Discusses the six basic policies which have developed Turkey into the "Western bulwark in the Middle East."

Muslims in South Africa. Dr. I. D. du Plessis. (In *The Islamic Review,* Woking. March, 1952. pp. 17-19).

Describes the Cape Malays' struggle for economic survival.

Nomadism. Raphael Patai. (In *The Southwestern Journal of Anthropology,* Alberquerque. Winter, 1951. pp. 401-414).

Documented comparison of the life led in the Middle East with that in Central Asia.

Pakistan's Policies in Southeast and East Asia. Mushtaq Ahmad. (In *Pakistan Horizon,* Karachi. June, 1951. pp. 81-93).

The author argues for independent action and for less dependence on London and Washington.

RURAL SOCIAL CENTERS IN EGYPT. Beatrice McCown Mattison. (In *The Middle East Journal,* Washington, D. C. Autumn, 1951. pp. 461-480).

Describes the successful efforts being made in more than 150 village centers to reduce poverty and disease among nearly two million fellaḥīn.

VII. POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS

ABDULLAH'S JORDAN. Esmond Wright. (In *The Middle East Journal,* Washington, D. C. Autumn, 1951. pp. 439-460).

The assassination of the King, who had stood for political stability and realistic statecraft, has been a severe blow to Allied security in the Middle East and has swung the center of Arab influence back to Cairo.

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS. H. A. R. Gibb. (In *International Affairs,* London. October, 1951. pp. 440-450).

Presents an extremely unbiased statement of the aims and reactions of both parties and expresses the fear that Britain's desire to ward off communism from Egypt and the Middle East may be having the opposite effect.

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS. 1950-1951. G. E. K. (In *The World Today,* London. November, 1951. pp. 458-465).

Traces the rapid deterioration in conditions which have been worsening steadily since 1948 when Egypt began to blame her defeat by Israel on Britain.

COMMUNIST STRATEGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Mark Alexander. (In *The Twentieth Century,* London. November, 1951. pp. 394-400).

Although employing fifth column and what the author calls "Indian" tactics, the Communists are not ready for armed insurrection unless a Third World War materializes.

ISLAM AND THE MIDDLE EAST. Sir William Barton. (In *The Quarterly Review,* London. January, 1952. pp. 56-67).

The article forcefully shows the need for concerted action by Britain and the United States to win the confidence of the Arab States, which are still fearful and resentful of the favours received by the Jews.

THE MIDDLE EAST—A REVIEW OF EVENTS. M. Perlmann. (In *Middle Eastern Affairs,* New York. October, 1951. pp. 322-326).

Covers happenings from June 16 to September 30, 1951.

THE NEAR EAST: THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH. Charles Malik. (In *Foreign Affairs,* New York. January, 1952. pp. 231-264).

The Lebanese Minister to the United States presents a moving conception of the inter-relation between East and West, a keen appraisal of Arab-Jewish difficulties and a penetrating understanding of Communist aims and methods in the area.

SYRIA: A LESSON IN GEOPOLITICS. Joseph S. Roucek. (In *Current History,* New York. April, 1952. pp. 221-226).

Syria's position as a link to three continents makes her important in any plans for the Middle East and Britain, France and the United States are using every inducement to bind her to the West.

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY SINCE THE REVOLUTION. Omer Riza Dogrol. (In *Pakistan Horizon,* Karachi. June, 1951. pp. 61-67).

At the present time fear of Russian aggression is aligning Turkey with the Western Allies although her previous relations were strongest with the Arab World.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE TUNISIAN AND EGYPTIAN CAUSES. Abu Muhammad. (In *The Islamic Review,* Woking. March, 1952. pp. 26-33).

An indictment of Western policies.

VIII. MISSIONS TO MUSLIMS

CHRISTIANITY IN THE HOLY LAND. E. Every. (In *The Christian East,* London. September-December, 1951. pp. 195-202).

Presents a careful survey of the difficulties encountered since the emergence of Israel.

ON TOUR THROUGH SOUTH-EAST ASIA. Hendrik Kraemer. (In *The Ecumenical Review,* New York. January, 1952. pp. 117-130).

Although the author covered a large area during his trip, his first impressions were of Pakistan where he found the missionary situation encouraging on the whole though there is need for a better presentation of the Ecumenical Movement.

THE SWORD, THE HAMMER, THE SICKLE AND THE CROSS. Msgr. Fulton J. Sheen. (In *World Mission,* New York. Winter, 1951. pp. 3-6).

Discusses the possible union of Islam with Communism in their common hatred of the West and stresses the need for the vital presentation of Christianity to win Muslim conversion.