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WHY I AM A CHRISTIAN

I was born in a Moslem family. My fathers were all very earnest Moslems, observing strictly the Islamic practices and traditions. One of our close relatives was the Imam of the city, who used to come to my home to read the passages from the Koran and to tell me some stories. In 1886, there came to Paoning from Hanchung in Shensi some English missionaries, who rented part of our house. I was too young then to understand much about religion, but those stories from the Koran seemed to be very interesting to me. The Old and New Testaments of the Christians and the explanations given by the missionaries again greatly enchanted me. However, I was yet half believing and half doubting. In 1888, the missionaries rented some more rooms from us to open a school, and engaged an old scholar to teach. For convenience's sake, I joined that school. In five years I received much religious training. The characters of those Westerners moved me very much. The one who attracted me most among them was a lady missionary, Miss F. M. Williams, whose meekness and kindness were really Christ-like. Rev. Walter Taylor was another one, whom I can never forget during my life. Once I suffered from fever, and nearly lost my life. During my sickness, Mr. Taylor looked after me every day. Through his love, I began to know Jesus. I was re-born both physically and spiritually. In 1899, I was appointed an evangelist. It has been well over forty years now, and my faith in, and my love of, the Lord are even greater. Now I shall explain why I believe in Jesus:

Jesus was willing to sacrifice for us, die for us, and forgive our sins, and we shall be saved through faith in His grace.

I use Christ's Cross as a weapon to control my own passions. When we cannot control our fleshly lusts by means of reason, let us think of the Cross of Jesus, the sure way of victory (cf. Gal. 5:24).

The Cross is the highest expression of love, through which we shall be able to make the home a group of loving, mutual helping and co-operating members, to give the people of all classes in the nation brotherly friendliness, and to spread international good-will which naturally results in peace and harmony among the nations. If we practice the spirit of the Cross in our lives, it will not be difficult to make the whole world into the Kingdom of God.

My conversion from Islam to Christianity was not because I was compelled or lured to do so. It was a natural result of my reasoning. The religious experience I gained through faith helps me stick to my Ministry through all my life.

BISHOP KU HO LING

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ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION

"Freedom of religion"; it sounds simple and elemental. But it is neither. For it presupposes not only a philosophy of the state, of religion, and of the individual, but in each case a certain definite philosophy. And further it must be remembered that the practice of religious freedom is a relatively new phenomenon in world history. In both Christendom and Islam through the centuries, tradition, society, religious authorities, and the state have agreed in requiring, and if need be compelling, the individual to conform to the religious pattern which they favored.

There are current today under the name of "freedom of religion" a number of conceptions which stem in reality from authoritarian roots.

There is the idea of the freedom of a minority group, it may be racial, to continue unmolested in the beliefs and practices of its ancestral faith. Such toleration has been characteristic of Islam in relation to Christian and Jewish minorities that acknowledged Moslem sovereignty. On occasion this toleration was extended to Magians in Persia, and even to Hindus in India. In the Middle Ages, Jews and members of heretical sects who fled from Christian persecution in Europe profited from this same toleration, and found a refuge in the Ottoman Empire. Yet the Islamic state did not hesitate to take radically repressive measures against its own heretics *(zindiq)*. As the extreme of bigotry, the demand of Philip II of Spain for religious conformity throughout his dominions is notorious.

There is the idea of freedom for the members of a minority group to propagate their religious faith. So the Islamic state permitted Nestorian Christians to spread Christianity freely among the non-Moslem peoples of Asia, but it forbade such efforts among Moslems. Similarly Byzantium forbade Jews, under pain of death, to attempt to make Christians Judaize.

There is the idea of freedom for any individual to refuse to conform to the religious beliefs and practices of his group. Both Christendom and Islam have on many occasions denied this freedom to their adherents. The treatment of heretics in Christendom, ranging from minor discriminations and disabilities up to confiscation of goods and burning at the stake during the Middle Ages, is an alarming illustration. The Moslem law of apostasy is still in force. A certain right to change one's faith has always been acknowledged. A Jew might become a Christian, and a Christian might become a Mos-

lem. But it was a "one-way" road. The Christian might not turn to Judaism, nor the Moslem accept Christianity.

There is also the idea that, when a government or society does not grant any of these three forms of religious freedom, it may be compelled to do so by pressure from without. The pressure may be social, economic, political, or military. It cannot be denied that at times such external pressure has led to the relaxing of oppressive laws, or has secured to religious non-conformists a freedom which they had not before enjoyed. So state Shintoism and all its requirements have been abolished in Japan. However, the question always remains whether freedom so obtained may not be revoked when external pressure slackens, whether ways may not be found to circumvent such a concession, whether social disapproval will not render the concession inoperative, whether the concession will not provoke smouldering resentment.

All these conceptions of "freedom of religion" have a common weakness in that they concern a freedom that can be granted by government. This is tacitly to recognize the right of government to control the religious beliefs and practices of the individuals under its sovereignty, and what the state bestows the state can take away. Yet this has been the accepted idea since the days of Constantine the Great among many Christians, and the accepted idea among Moslems.

Genuine "freedom of religion" rests upon entirely different foundations. For it holds that religion is not a matter primarily of dogma, canon law, and ritual, that can be prescribed by any authority, but of the personal and direct relation of the individual to his Creator. It holds that every individual is responsible directly to God for what he believes and does in matters of religion, and subject in these matters to the dictates of his conscience alone. It holds that the state exists for the administration of public affairs, and is the servant of the people, not their master, and that what the conscience of the individual may dictate in religious matters is none of the state's concern. It posits that freedom of religion is a natural right and endowment, not a grant from any state or religious organization. The adherence of the individual to any form of belief or practice, or to any religious group, is and in the nature of the case inherently must be purely an affair of his own conviction and will.

It has been essentially these conceptions on which has rested the freedom of religion which has come to prevail in "non-conformist" Christian countries. That an autocratic state graciously has granted to certain of its subjects the right to dissent in religious matters is not the case. Rather the people, in one way or another, have decreed that the state has no right to interfere in their religious affairs. It is

true that the dissenters, having achieved a measure of freedom, may have denied for a time to other dissenting groups the very freedom that they claimed for themselves. But progress has come, however slow, through expansion of the area to which these conceptions were recognized as applying.

How can true freedom of religion be realized in a society where such conceptions are not held, and where this natural right is not admitted? The answer is by processes similar to those by which the right has come to be recognized in the societies where it is now accepted. Public opinion and public conscience must sense the need for this freedom, and become aroused and begin to seek it. A growing consciousness of the need may result from contacts with members of societies that enjoy religious freedom. It may be stimulated by the study of history, by study of the nature of religion and of comparative religion, and by study of the nature of man. The process may be promoted by the spread of literature and through the public press; also through emphasis on liberal education, which endeavors not to indoctrinate the student but to develop his capacities with a view to his own free choice of the path that he will follow.

It would seem that there came to Muhammad at one time an insight that such freedom is of the essential nature of true religion. Later the Qur'anic verse in question (ii.257) was said by Moslem scholars to have been abrogated, but the truth to which it gives expression is permanent. "There is no compulsion at all in religion" (*lā ikrāha fī 'd-dīn*). And the passage continues, "The right has become clearly distinguished from the perverse, and whoever curses *(yakfur)* Taghout and has faith *(yu'min)* in Allah has taken hold of a firm handle that never gives way." This is, in effect, to say to those to whom the words of the Qur'an first came, "The right way has now been made plain; let each man decide for himself. Faith in Allah is recommended; he who makes this choice will not regret it." When a group of men anywhere in the world of Islam grasps this insight, and begins to seek a corresponding freedom of religion, then the first step toward its achievement will have been taken. And when this freedom is achieved, it will be permanent, because it signifies the satisfaction by the people themselves of a need that they have felt.

Recourse to military or political power in the interest of religion on the part of either Christendom or Islam has been an appeal to an extraneous force. Circumstances may have furnished the justification, and the appeal to force may have served a purpose. We need not be too critical in our estimates of the past. The Christian state under the successors of Constantine stood as a bulwark, protecting a society in which the Christian Name was honored. The Islamic state was established avowedly for the defense of Islam, and was most

effective to that end. But certainly the time must come, and there are lands where already it has come, when the essential incompatibility between physical compulsion and religion of the heart will be recognized, and men everywhere will be free to follow the dictates of conscience in religious matters without hindrance or threat, and without fear.

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The Arab League

Mr. S. A. Morrison in a thoughtful article points out some of the factors that constitute the future of the Arab League (*World Dominion,* London 1945):

There is clear evidence that the Arab countries are resolved on securing explicit international recognition for their cultural and political status. When the Higher International Court of Justice Conference was held in Washington in April, 1945, the Egyptian delegation was supported by the Hejaz, Syria and Iraq in submitting a memorandum demanding that the Islamic legal system should be taken into consideration in the composition of the Court referred to in Article 9 of the Convention, which recommends that principal legal systems should be represented in the Court. This demand was grounded on the claim that Islamic law is *sui generis,* and has been recognized as such in previous conferences of Comparative Law. A letter in the same terms was addressed by the Egyptian delegate to Abdel Rahman Azzam Bey, who promised that the Council of the Arab League will discuss it at its next meeting.

Similarly, at the San Francisco Conference, the Egyptian delegation suggested that the number of members of the permanent Council should be increased from eight to fourteen, and that, apart from the representatives of the Great Powers, they should be selected from "the principal regions of the world by regional agreement." No doubt the delegation had in mind the appointment to the Council of an Egyptian delegate as representing the Arab League.

The events of the past few months have served to focus the spotlight of world attention both on the sensitiveness of Arab countries on questions of national independence and cultural autonomy and on the danger to world peace of a clash between the strategic, political and economic interests of the Great Powers in the Near East. Peace and prosperity alike demand co-operation, not only between the Arab countries, but between them and the Great Powers, and between the Great Powers themselves. The problem of reconciling the national aspirations and cultural freedom of the Arab nations with the claim of world order and democratic conceptions of communal and personal life calls for the wisest statesmanship in both the East and the West. It is this problem which provides the background of the critical situation that now faces the Christian Church and the work of missions in Arab lands.

BLAISE PASCAL ON MOHAMMED

Blaise Pascal has discussed Mohammed in several fragments of his *Pensées*.[1]

While this study is entitled "Pascal on Mohammed," we must remain aware of the fact that some of the fragments in question were entitled "Against Mohammed." Further, let it be clear that we are not aiming at any "restoration" so-called, of the argument in question. We would be satisfied to try and read the fragments in the context of Pascal's thought as we have come to know it.

This at least can be said, namely that our fragments express the concern of a passionate Christian who came to acknowledge in his later years, that there is one substantial Truth, and that it alone is the Truth. This firm position implies a definiteness of purpose incompatible with what is known today as a policy of appeasement. Does it leave room for tolerance?

We know that Pascal had a deep appreciation of sincerity. For example, he once rendered the most gracious homage to Menjot, a Protestant Doctor. This was not alone the fact of politeness, to be sure. The occasion to which we refer took place in 1660, at a time when Pascal had given up worldly relationships. Menjot himself ascribed Pascal's homage to Christian charity. Anyone familiar with Pascal's sense of commitment to the Christ will agree with that judgment.

Pascal's tolerance went beyond the limits of the Christian fold. Fragment 590, for example, admits that "in all religions one must be sincere: true heathens, true Jews, true Christians." Whatever be the enthusiasm of Pascal for the Christian cause, therefore, we find him ready to pay homage to sincerity in whatever religious cause. His basic disagreement with other religions, therefore, resolves itself into a matter of truth and error, and it is at this point that no compromise can be expected from him. Blaise Pascal respects the sincerity of a true Mohammedan, but he must look into his credentials.

It is evident to him that the soldiers of Mohammed follow a certain set of laws which they obey strictly; but so do robbers, heretics, and even logicians. Are such laws those of God and nature, or are they laws made by the people for themselves? If this last alternative be the case, we are not dealing with law-abiding people, but clearly with licentious people. It even seems that "their licence must be without any limits or barriers, as we see that they have broken through

[1] *Pensées* (*Thoughts*), Fragment 393, 591, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 619 in the Brunschvicg edition.

so many that are just and sacred" (Fr. 393). Remembering that the word *sacred* originally meant *untouchable,* helps us to appreciate one of Pascal's greatest concerns, i.e., his concern for law and order. To him who had witnessed the *Fronde,* civil war was the greatest of all evils. What, then, of lawlessness and anarchy in the face of a holy God?

Should anyone have objected at this juncture by saying that the Christian religion is not the only religion and that law and order in reference to God are therefore a debatable matter, Pascal would have agreed with the statement of fact, but *not* with the inference drawn from it. Fragment 589 constitutes a firm pronouncement on the subject: there is a far cry between the fact that the Christian religion is not the only one and the assertion that in this we have a reason for believing that it is not the true one. The contrary is true: the fact that it is not the only one makes us see that it is (the true one). Fragment 817, which was probably written at the same time, shows the mind of Pascal at work on this knotty problem: how does it happen that men believe so many liars and give credence to so many impostors? There is a fallacy in the way in which people commonly reason on matters such as divination by dreams, sorceries or false miracles. To them, "a thing is possible, therefore it is." Now the truth of the matter appears to be that people are unable to distinguish between particular effects which are true, and a good many which are not. Looking more clearly into the matter, we come to realize that it is precisely because there is some truth in a given situation that the false elements in it get support. "We must reason in the same manner about religion; for it would not be possible for men to imagine so many false religions, had there not been a true one." In this connection, Fragment 816 has it that unbelievers are "the most credulous. They believe the miracles of Vespasian in order not to believe those of Moses."

Although miracles play a great part in Pascal's religious thinking, he would seem to realize at this point that such a consideration should not be introduced too early in the debate. The miracles of Moses, of Jesus Christ, and of the Apostles "do not at first seem convincing"; therefore Pascal would "only wish here to put in evidence all those foundations of the Christian religion which are beyond doubt, and which cannot be called into question by any person whatsoever." To him such a foundation is the fact of a peculiar people seen in many places of the world, "separated from all of her peoples of the world, and called the Jewish people" (Fr. 619).

Pascal said in his own way, before Bossuet, that man frets, but God leads him on. All history appeared to him as sacred history, once he came to see it in the perspective of the Bible. Faith, by giving

him a true understanding of prophecy, drew back the curtains and showed him history as a single drama with a unified theme. His intelligence enlightened from above allowed him to trace the conflict of God's purpose at grips with the purposes of man, and to watch man's purposes taking their proper place, and at last palpitating within the purpose of God. He now saw the Messiah appear who had been "foretold by the state of the Jewish people, by the state of the heathen, by the state of the temple, by the number of years" (fr. 708).

On the other hand, Pascal saw religions "teeming in profusion" *(des foisons de religions)* in many parts of the world and at all times; but their morality could not please him, nor could their proofs convince him. Thus he should equally reject "the religion of Mohammed and of China, of the ancient Romans and of the Egyptians for the sole reason that one having no more marks of truth than the other, reason cannot lean more towards one than towards the other" (fr. 619).

We are now ready to appreciate Pascal's sketch-plan of humanity as it is given in Fragment 591.



In the lower circle Pascal evidently included libertines and atheists. It is interesting to see that heathens and Mohammed are clearly differentiated from them. They are religious people, which, according to Pascal, means that they have a certain intuition of God *("Dieu sensible au coeur")*. We should probably refrain from applying to their experience the famous word of the Christ said to Blaise Pascal in the *Mystère de Jésus,* "Thou wouldst not be seeking Me, hadst thou not already found Me." We should remember that the Biblical theology of Pascal was formulated at a time when the history of religions was only beginning to formulate its problems and its methods. Let us also remark that while Pascal anticipated the fideism of Schleiermacher, just as he had anticipated the theories of feeling and will of James and Lange, he forsook granting advantages to heathens and Mohammedans. Let us finally insist on the fact that Pascal was a Roman Catholic, that he read Scripture in the light of

Tradition and in fervent submission to the discipline formulated by Councils and Popes. With all the above considerations in mind, the reader will tend to be surprised by what Pascal was willing to grant.

The newest element in his apology for Christianity is that he discarded the old method by which apologetics started with a formal demonstration of the existence of God, proceeding with the demonstration that God had revealed himself. Pascal adopted a psychological method according to which he would start from individual cases and needs, going as far as clutching by the lapel of his coat the freethinker he had just caught at the gambling table. He would then make use of the libertine's own preoccupation to shake him into consciousness. Yet, however new and original this psychological method of approach may have been, it did not allow Pascal to carry to any extent the consideration of common aspirations underlying all religions. In this connection he was far more timid than Paul on Mars' hill. It would be hard to imagine Pascal saying to heathen or Mohammedans "whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you." Yet since we in our day are inclined towards the other extreme, that of losing sight of the uniqueness of Christianity, we would do well to look closer into Pascal's reasons for shying away from the comparative outlook.

The sketch-plan of humanity given in Fragment 591 sets Jesus Christ apart from both heathen and Mohammedans, and above them, in a *closed* rectangle with round corners. According to Pascal as according to the Apostolic Preaching so splendidly brought out in our day by Professor C. H. Dodd, Christianity *is* the Christ, and the Christ is unique. As we have seen before, the Messiah appeared as foretold in connection with the fact of the Jewish people set apart according to the purpose of God. Fragment 601 concludes in this connection with the statement: "Our religion is so divine that another divine religion has only been the foundation of it."

It is interesting to observe that this Fragment 601, so important in our discussion, is entitled "Foundation of Our Faith." This foundation is the Christ; beyond the Christ, it is the Jewish religion. Throughout this divine epic the Living God is at work, whose roaring loom is history now conceived as *Gesta Dei.* The record of the same is the Book, "the most ancient book in the world and the most authentic" (Fr. 601). The same filiation as that seen in the matter of the Christian faith, is naturally found reflected in the tradition of the Book. It is Jesus Christ who in the final analysis gives Scripture its authenticity and its meaning. This authenticity appears in evidence from one end of Scripture to the other. Pascal likes to bring out the extraordinary fact that the Jews lovingly preserve a book that condemns them (Fr. 631). Their sincerity is then seen to be

beyond question, and this lends distinction to the contrast between sacred and profane writers: Moses does not hide his own shame, whereas Josephus hides the shame of his nation. Truly, in the inspired words of Isaiah, "this book shall be for a testimony" (Fr. 630). The fact is that the Jews evidently never understood how it was, that our Hidden God, in carrying out His marvelous plan, was able to veil the entire life of Christ and of Christianity within the depths of the Hebrew text. The Jews saw in the text only the carnal meaning which suited them, and it was this which actually saved the Scriptures for us.

So we have on the one hand Jesus Christ, and the Jewish religion established on the rock of the divine revelation; on the other, Mohammed and "his books"! As we have just spoken of the blessed obscurity of some parts of the Old Testament, it may be objected at this point that there is also a great deal that is obscure in the Koran; but the cases are not on a par. For instance, the prophecies of Scripture are "manifest and fulfilled" (Fr. 598) while Mohammed was not foretold (Fr. 600). But why should Pascal remain on the defensive when it is so natural for him to come out in the open at this juncture? "It is not by that which is obscure in Mohammed, and which may be interpreted in a mysterious sense, that I would have him judged, but by what is clear, as his paradise and the rest. In *that* he is ridiculous. And this is why it is not right to mistake his obscurities for mysteries, since what is clear is ridiculous" (Fr. 598).

If we now consider Mohammed in the light of what has been said of Jesus Christ, the experience will prove to be fatal to his religion. Mohammedanism has for its foundation the Koran and Mohammed (Fr. 601); yet "the Koran is not more of Mohammed than the Gospel is of Saint Matthew" (Fr. 597). As a reader of Charron, Pascal was familiar with the testimony rendered to Jesus by Mohammed. This knowledge of Jesus caused Mohammed to appear all the more guilty, for having disagreed with what the Master had said; still worse, for having maligned the Christian cause. "Therefore Mohammed was a false prophet" (Fr. 597).

False! as he branded it with this single epithet, the fiery Pascal pursued his case against Mohammedanism as against religions *other* than the religion of the Bible. "They have no witnesses. The Jews have." Pointing to the Vulgate, Pascal quoted Isaiah (43:9; 44:8) to the effect that "God defies other religions to produce such signs." Mohammed is "without authority" (Fr. 595). His reasons should then be very strong since he relied on their own force. What were they, then? Nay, who rendered testimony to him, but himself? According to John (5:31) Jesus knew that if he bore witness of himself it might be said that His witness was not true (Fr. 596). There is indeed

Another that beareth witness of Jesus; and Jesus knows the same witness to be true. As to Mohammed "he, miserable creature, is alone" (Fr. 596). He has not been foretold (Fr. 599, 601); he has done no miracle, taught no mysteries, even according to his own tradition. Besides, what is the morality, what the happiness held out by him? (Fr. 601)

Pascal believed only the testimony of those witnesses who stood ready to die for its sake (Fr. 593). How, may we ask, did Mohammed compare with Jesus in this connection? Jesus gave His life in ransom for many; He caused His disciples to make the supreme sacrifice; "Mohammed slew. Jesus Christ caused His own to be slain" (Fr. 599). This same Fragment winds up the argument regarding the difference between Jesus Christ and Mohammed in the following terms:

"Mohammed forbade reading; the Apostles ordered reading.

"In fact the two are so opposed, that if Mohammed took the path of human success, Jesus Christ took that of human destruction, and instead of concluding that, since Mohammed succeeded, Jesus Christ might well have succeeded, we ought to say that since Mohammed succeeded, Jesus Christ should have been destroyed."

Yet, what do we see? While nobody renders testimony to Mohammed, Jesus Christ is worshipped. There is no Mohammedology while "the Psalms are chanted throughout the whole world." This last thought must have impressed Pascal. The manuscript shows that it was first written in pencil, probably jotted down on the spur of the moment. It refers to what is perhaps the most Pascalian of all the themes of Pascal, i.e., the Lordship of Jesus. New Testament scholars of our day, trying to discover the earliest Christian tradition embedded in the Epistles and in the Gospels, have come to the conclusion that the simple proposition "Jesus is Lord" was in all probability the most elementary, the most genuine form of the Good News.

At this point we are ready to understand in all its finality the stand taken by Pascal in his thinking on Mohammed. It is expressed in the first line of Fragment 600 in these simple terms: "Every man can do what Mohammed has done." For the corollary of Pascal's Christology was a basic, unremitting opposition to the naturalistic approach to religion. We may very well see in this corollary the reasons for Pascal's unwillingness to compromise with Mohammed. His experience as a scientist had taught him that a dividing line should be clearly drawn between subject matter pertaining to rationalism and naturalism on the one hand, and subject matter reserved for divine authority on the other. He always remained the same man who, in a Fragment of Preface to a *Traité du Vide* had complained "of the blindness of those who appeal to authority alone as proof in

physical matters, rather than to reasoning or to experiments"; but he was also the man overcome with *veritable horror* at "the malice of others, who look to reason alone in Theology, rather than to Scripture and to the Fathers." In this connection the *Provincial Letters* were already within the perspective of his thinking when he wrote the famous Preface. Thus his quarrel with any form of Pelagianism was fundamental in nature.

With due regard for the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, we may conclude: so was his quarrel with the man Mohammed. For in this matter of Christianity versus naturalism, there was never any deviation from the main pathway of the thought of Blaise Pascal.

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The Crucial Issue

The crucial issue between Judaism, Islam and Christianity will turn on "whether individual events and the historic process as a whole are more intelligible from the Christian than from either the Jewish or the Moslem standpoint. To put it in another way, it depends on whether in the course of history Christianity can do fuller justice to Judaism and Islam than Judaism and Islam can do to Christianity." Dr. Whale goes on to argue (to our mind conclusively enough) that whereas neither Judaism nor Islam can fit Christ into their whole scheme, Christianity can give a place to the other two faiths without itself being compromised, and concludes that "the association of Christianity with history is essential gospel. . . . Christianity is more profoundly true than Hinduism and Buddhism precisely because historical events mean more to the Christian than they do to the Buddhist or the Hindu."

The very arrangement of Scripture encourages us in this belief, for we can only assume that history is integral to its value since its form throughout is historical. For convenience we might have desired it otherwise. An indexed arrangement of *Daily Light* would doubtless have settled many theological problems and discussion which have arisen from the present form of Scripture. In this respect the Bible may be contrasted with other religious books, and in particular the Koran, in which the historical setting of the logia is minimised.

R. F. HETTLINGER
in *The Evangelical Quarterly* (Oct., 1945)

HOW WE PREACH CHRIST IN IRAN

My friend and co-worker, our evangelist, Naiyib and I went round about the villages of this valley of Meshed in the direction of Kuchan, travelling in twenty days a distance of about forty-eight *farsackhs,* or nearly two hundred miles. Most of this we did on foot, carrying our camp necessities by pack animals, usually two donkeys.

We had great joy in this journey and a complete sense of God's presence and leading. We gave the message to everyone on the way who joined us or met us; and likewise to farmers and plowmen along the way, or, again, to shepherds as we crossed barren plateaus. In the villages through which our course led us, we paused long enough to give the Gospel message to groups that would gather and then left tracts and Scripture portions for them to read. To farmers and plowmen, many of whom were planting wheat, sowing good seed, we spoke of the good seed we too were sowing, or we left with them Jesus' invitation, "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you and learn of me." We could point to the wooden yoke upon their own beasts, and in emphasizing his words, "learn of me," we left with them Scripture portions, some part of which we had explained to them. To the shepherds, we told again and again about the Good Shepherd who laid down his life for his sheep. To land-owners, riding horseback through their lands or among their tenants, we most often spoke of the man whose barns would not hold all that his crops had yielded, or we left with them Mr. Allen's effective little sermon tract, "The Greatest Transaction in the World," which is based on the text, "What doth it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?"

Because security is not as it formerly was, we could only hire pack animals for a distance not to exceed fifteen or twenty miles. The answer was always the same, "If we go farther than that, we cannot return before sunset, and then we must stay with you overnight and that means two days for which you must pay us." So our usual stage was not over fifteen miles, which we were ordinarily able to make by two o'clock in the afternoon, thus giving us the rest of the day for work in the town or village where we remained for that night. On the way we would often pass through many villages and be able to send tracts or Scripture portions to other villages off our trail, by those whom we met or passed on the way. So that in all we were able to give the message to sixty-five villages.

Usually we ate our lunch as we walked in the way—a disk-like round piece of village bread, perhaps a few walnuts, or some raisins.

Although we had a tent and camping-outfit, only five times did we pitch camp. The other nights we were guests in native homes, sharing their gracious hospitality, eating their food, sitting on the floor, and keeping ourselves warm with our heavy *pusteen* (sheep skin) robes. Never have I known people receive the word more eagerly than in these places. In only one place did we encounter any opposition, and that was from a young Islamic theologian who was uninformed and beyond measure bigoted, so much so that even his own friends did not take him very seriously. Twice we were received by young men in government headquarters of the agricultural department of the Shrine of Imam Riza in Meshed. On both of these occasions, we had fine talks and these young men eagerly received selections of our literature.

Our first stopping place was a large village town where we rented a room, so that we could lock it while we made tours for four days to the villages in that immediate neighborhood. The first day we spent with our friends at Noghander. It was Friday and the whole male population was at a religious meeting. But after their meeting we were taken to our friends' home and were able to distribute tracts in the village square and return to our lodging place five miles away. The next day we walked to a high mountain "robber" village ten miles distant; a village to which Naiyib had gone in an armed force twenty years earlier, to arrest the robber band. Two years ago we passed through this village and made friends in one home. We arrived at this home, hot and perspiring from our climb up the trail. We sat in the sun in a small room which was a top balcony porch room in the last tier upwards in a long, graduated stair-step village slope up the steep mountain side. The people of this village have herds of sheep and goats, and they have, by infinite labor and patience and skill, cultivated both steep mountain sides into lovely apple orchards by bringing irrigation water in channels from the rushing stream above, along the steep mountain sides. This town is now famous for its red apples, and people from far-off villages of the plain come there for apples, bringing wheat to barter in exchange.

In our fifth day's stage we had proof of the value of earlier service our hospital had rendered. Passing through a large village, we gave as message the Sermon on the Mount to a group of men gathered in front of the stores. Most of them were Seyyeds, that is, supposedly direct descendants of the Prophet. But they gave eager attention to this sermon of Jesus. It furnishes the most vivid contrast between Christianity and Islam or the law of Moses, of which Jesus spoke. Villagers hearing this for the first time never fail to marvel at its high and difficult standard, as compared with their own. Having given our tracts and portions, we were starting on, when an old man

begged us to come to his house for tea, but we declined and passed on. His eagerness came from his appreciation of the successful operation Dr. Hoffman had performed on a relative's eyes. Again, a young man, a Kurd, came riding up from our rear. He had a load of apples and walnuts he was taking from a mountain village to his village in the plains. He quickly dismounted and urged us to ride his donkey. He would have it no other way, and as we took turns riding along, we learned that he too had spent some time in our Hospital, and had been cured of a severe illness. As we went along, we told him the good news of Christ, to which he eagerly gave ear, following us through the village of our destination and stopping with us for bread and tea until about mid-afternoon, and listening with attention as we spoke and read to the group of men who had gathered while we pitched camp. When he left us he carried with him a small packet of tracts and Scripture portions for his far-away village, begging us to come there too.

Our next day's fifteen-mile stage took us through five villages and into the valley of the plain. We had no other choice. It had rained in the night and the *charvadars* whom we had engaged refused to take us over the mountains, saying it had snowed; but we found later that they feared robbers in the mountains, and the rain and slight fall of snow offered a good excuse. That night we pitched camp at the edge of a Kurdish village. Crowds gathered, of very dirty, diseased-looking adults and children. In the warm afternoon sun our wet tent dried rapidly and the flies moved in to appropriate it. We had tea and gave the Gospel at the same time, but attention was very poor. Evening shadows lengthened, and a number of men coming around did not look trustworthy to us. We wondered how safe the night might be. A young land-owner, the village *arbob,* came up to our tent, asked a few questions, and said, "You will come to my house. You are my guests." We assured him we were comfortably settled for the night and it would be too much trouble to move now, but he would not hear our refusal, and gave orders for his retainers and other tenants of the village to pick up our tent, beds, kits and all and take them to his house. So, we became his guests. He was a worldly-minded young man, married and with two small sons, and far less interested in eternal life than the rich young ruler of Jesus' day. Nevertheless, in the course of the evening we were able to give our witness. He picked up our books and fitfully glanced through them, but soon became distracted with his many duties and the comings and goings of servants and village tenants. His steward, a quiet, thoughtful fellow, gave much better ear. When late dinner was served and we were eating, we heard this man reading aloud to the assembled women folk and servants in the *andarun,* or women's quarters. We

believe that our presence and our witness, our prayers at meal time and the good word left with him when we departed the next morning, will some day bear fruit.

That day we made our longest stage of about twenty-five miles, cutting completely across the valley to Rodkhan where we had planned to go if we did not succeed in getting across the mountains. We had visited this town about ten years before, and wondered whether we would find any evidence of that former visit. Would there be any springing up of the good seed sown years ago? These were questions occurring to us that long day as we passed through many villages of the plain. Most of the villages we saw that day were Kurdish, and how many there were and how endless the way seemed! We plodded along, but still Rodkhan was five miles distant, and the sun was beginning to set. As darkness fell we reached the street of this ancient and unkempt town. In the midst of flocks and cattle and donkeys and children and adults we entered the street and inquired throughout its whole length for a place of lodging. Never had we been so tired and the air was cold. If no lodging, where could we pitch our camp? No one seemed inclined to give us a room. "Muskil" (it is not likely) was the only answer given. We always prayed as we finished a day's stage, asking God to lead us to the most effective place to stay or camp. From the group of dark faces staring at us, a young man stepped forward, and it took courage for him to make this offer, saying, "I have a room, come to my house." No one knows how grateful we were at that moment. At his humble home, while our luggage was being untied, we quickly saw that his wife was clearing out their own living-room, a small, none too clean room, blackened by a century of smoke; clearing it of immediate essentials of their own, and carrying them to another room, so that we might have their best room for the night or for so long as we remained. Before we had settled for the night, or finished tea (which, by the way, after a long journey, is the most welcome and tasty drink in all the world) another fine-appearing man, a Shirazi, had come in. And as we gave the Gospel, another young grandee also came in. The Shirazi was a friend of the host, and we soon learned that these two men remembered our former visit and were both very much interested in the Gospel. The young grandee had heard of our arrival and now appeared to take us away from the humble home of our poor host to his more wealthy and pretentious home. With difficulty we politely resisted his set determination and bold pleading. Finally he left us when we told him that by our belief and instruction from Jesus to his disciples, "When we entered a place we were not to leave there until we had departed from that town." But we did dine with him the following day and found in him a very eager listener, one who was seeking for truth and for peace of heart.

That day we went through the shops of the town and gave the Gospel to many groups. We sold many tracts and Gospel portions. A stalwart land-owner, with karakul sheep-lined coat, came up to me, saying, "Sir, I was in your Hospital some months ago when you came visiting the sick, and I remember your prayer for the man I was visiting. Yesterday I lost one of my children from this plague which is prevalent. Another of my children has a foul infection in her scalp. Do you have any medicine with you?" I took him to our room, gave him some medicine, and then read him some verses to comfort him in that hour of his bereavement; as we returned to the bazar, he went to Kashmeri and purchased a Gospel of John. As he went on his way, he begged us to come and see him. Not only our host and his Shirazi friend but also another small merchant of that town expressed their desire to be Christians; and so we spent the last night giving instructions and giving them books which will prepare them for this step, if they have truly with heart and soul received Christ.

Our trip to another high mountain village, and our second attempt to cross the mountains proved eventful, if disappointing. We were guests of a Hadji, a wealthy old land-owner and village ruler, who had made his trip to Mecca, but who was just as hungry, and as eager a listener to the Gospel as if he had saved that $2,000, spent for his journey and right to the title of Hadji! His three sons were fine mountaineers, the middle one the present village ruler, but the quiet eldest one, far more receptive of our message. That night the old father picked up our New Testament, after we had given the message at some length, and read here and there. Finally he called to his sons to give ear, and he read to them aloud the twelfth chapter of Romans. "You see," he said, "I have given myself to hospitality. Now it is up to you to carry out these other teachings." The next day they sent us along our way back to the valley on good strong pack mules, having flatly refused to furnish animals to take us over the mountains.

The following days, until the end of our journey, were spent shuttling back and forth in the valley, giving our message to plowmen, shepherds, villagers, small merchants, travelers, and all with whom we had any opportunity. Stage by stage, we worked now toward Meshed. At every stop, God led us with greatest love and kindliness. I recall with joy the light and hope lighting up the faces of several old grey-bearded men, plowing by the way, upon hearing Jesus' invitation, or the story of the Good Shepherd, or the twenty-third Psalm.

On the seventeenth day we arrived at a village where we had camped some years before and had given out tracts and books with our message. We entered the middle of the village and turned south along the main street wondering where God would lead us, whether

to pitch tent here or to find an empty room to rent. We found no one with a place for us, but some in the village bazaar said, "You were here years ago. Why not go back where you camped that time and make your camp?" So, with a young man leading us we turned and retraced our steps around that whole side of the village, finding no suitable place. Finally we came out on the fields where we had camped years before. At present it is somewhat unsafe to camp out in the fields, or far away from the village itself. As we were wondering what to do, Naiyib said, "Here is an enclosed garden; though it is small, it has trees for shelter from the wind, and it is dry." We secured permission to camp in this small, enclosed garden, and before our tent was up, a group of villagers had gathered and we were sitting down to read and talk and give our message. How eagerly they listened, especially an old man with kindly face and grey beard. When the listening group dispersed a bright-faced, friendly youth brought us a bowl of sweet curds and four loaves of freshly baked clean bread. He had in his hand a copy of "The King of Love," one of our books, worn and frayed with constant usage. He had secured it on that former trip. He said to us, "Our house is just over this wall; if you need anything, just let us know." We were amazed. God had led us all over that village to bring us just over the wall from a household in which his word had found good soil, and in which He had been giving it nurture for all these years! The kindly-faced old man was the young man's father.

That was the crowning experience of our whole trip. The thrill to us to know, with some evidence, that all the sowing of the good seed we have done has not been labor in vain. God has caused some seed to fall on good ground, where He himself has nourished it. Now it has been our privilege to pass that way again and to water it, until it shall surely spring up unto eternal life in the hearts of this sturdy village stock who have been comparatively less spoiled than the city folk by these last decades of idolatry and materialism.

On our way we passed through the ancient city of Tus, city of Al Ghazali, and the Persian epic poet, Ferdusi, to the ancient caravan road, where we hastened on until evening. At our last village stop we pitched our tent in the garden of the leading *mullah* of Meshed, only nine miles remaining for us to reach the city. That evening was a blessed evening of prayer and thanksgiving to God for his love and goodness to us in all the way that we had gone. We prayed together for all the villages and for all the people we had met. Naiyib had given our remaining books to a group in the village square, and he found them all gathered later, with one young man reading aloud, all the others eagerly giving ear.

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MY APPROACH TO THE MOROS

When Magellan discovered the Philippine Islands in 1521, he found Mohammedans, and misnamed them "Moros" because in 1492, twenty-nine years before, the Moors had been driven out of Spain into Africa. The Spaniards made a worse mistake when they fought these "Moros." They kept on fighting until America took over the Philippines in 1898. American soldiers fought the Moros for fifteen years and killed half of them. Then we tried a new policy. Our troops pulled out and left the Filipinos and missionaries to finish the job. The Superintendent of Schools and the missionaries conspired to win the friendship of the Moros. First we began to study and appreciate their art. They have lovely brass, silver, gold; weaving and carving. We studied the Koran, and sought common ground with the Bible. We found sixty of our own Bible patriarchs and prophets were theirs also. We found that Mohammed placed Jesus Christ above all other men, higher than he is placed by the Jews. This attempt to understand them led them to request us to teach English.

We persuaded them to learn their own language first—it had never been reduced to writing. The Moro priests knew some Arabic. So we adopted an alphabet, and rapidly improved our technique of teaching them to read. They needed only twelve consonants and four vowels. Everybody we taught to read became our friend. It was as though we had removed cataracts from their eyes. We started a simple little bilingual newspaper, *Lanao Progress,* and printed religious and moral and social articles to help the Moros. We had an agricultural expert to find better seeds, and to show the Moros how to get larger returns for their efforts on the land. We gave away thousands of fruit trees. We had a nurse and a dispensary. We had a church, and spent much time and thought and prayer on how to live, so that the Moros would see Christ in us. We tried to play a game with minutes, recalling Christ one second in each minute, so that we would become like Him. We printed in our *Lanao Progress* stories of the wonderful compassionate love of Christ—these stories now are in book form, "You Are My Friends", printed by Harpers. It was wonderful to see the wave of hate melt away like fog before the sunlight. Town after town around Lake Lanao capitulated to this onslaught of love, until the very outlaws in the mountains, although hunted by the government, became our friends. We became the go-between for outlaws and government, and persuaded outlaws to surrender and become law-abiding citizens, promising to defend them in court. Some of them joined our church and became magnificent Christians. We had a high school for two years before Japan struck, and were

preparing Moros for Christian service and the ministry. In ten years an entire tribe had been converted from implacable enemies to loyal friends. After that experience, I am sure that love of Christ expressed in appreciation and in compassionate service on an adequate scale, can change people from enemies to friends in ten years, anywhere in the world. We developed a technique for witnessing for Christ at the moment "when the iron was hot". We always loved our students and prayed for them while we were teaching them. We *tried* to make them love us as ardently as a young man woos his sweetheart. We were profuse in our praise, and showed our joy at their progress. Often they asked how they could repay us. Our answer was: "I don't want any pay." I learned this from Jesus. He was forever trying to help and help, to teach, to heal, to defend and save people. "I think if all the people in the world were like Jesus, this would be heaven. I want to be like Jesus and that is why I am teaching you. When I finish I want you to take these lessons and teach your neighbors. Don't take any pay for it and your heart will sing. Jesus has taught us that the happiest people are those who spend all their thought and time helping others."

So teaching illiterates becomes the spearpoint for leading them to Christ. It also opens the Bible. The Bible is now in the language of 95% of the people on earth. But only 40% of the world can read and only 10% of the so-called "non-Christian world". So the prodigious work of the Bible translators is useless with 60% of the world, and with 90% of the "non-Christian" world, until they learn to read. These are the reasons why literacy has become one of the most useful mission methods in such a short time.

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RELIGIOUS VALUES IN AL-GHAZĀLĪ'S WORKS

Apart from a general personal interest in Islamics or the Arabic language, there seem to be three main reasons why Christian workers in Muslim countries interest themselves in Muslim literature: (1) to orientate themselves with reference to the religion of the Muslims by reading as widely as possible of their religious literature; (2) to understand the Muslim teachings in order to refute them; (3) to understand Muslim teachings in order to use them as points of departure for the presentation of Christian teaching. The first reason should win a ready response from all who work, or intend to work, among Muslims in any part of the world. They should become thoroughly conversant with Muslim teachings and Muslim terminology before undertaking to work among Muslims, and no better method exists for doing this than to read widely from Muslim literature. The second and third reasons will not usually obtain equal favor among Christian workers. Those who are interested principally in the refutation of Muslim teaching may likely have little interest in the use of Muslim teaching as a means of clarifying the Christian position, or may even have definite objection to so doing; and *vice versa.* There will probably always be difference of opinion over methods, but it is important that methods which are believed useful should be freely discussed that through united effort by the use of the best available methods we may achieve our common goal. This paper will endeavor to lend support to the third reason for wide reading of Muslim literature.

Workers in Muslim lands will generally agree, I believe, that experience has not failed to show that the Christian religion must be presented to Muslims at best as a foreign religion. I do not mean merely that it is geographically foreign—that it comes from the West, whereas Muslim lands are in the East. This East-West division in itself is a sufficiently great handicap; it raises a wall of prejudice before any start is made. What I have in mind, however, is more far-reaching and perplexing than this alone. It has to do with the mind and the spirit. The Christian religion is foreign to Muslims in its ideology. It is commonly said, for instance, that both religions believe in only one God; yet when that has been admitted, the ways of the two religions almost immediately diverge. Their ideas about God are different, and they become increasingly different until the Muslim flatly rejects the Christian idea of the Fatherhood of God, and the Christian rejects the Muslim idea of the utter transcendence of God which, except in Sufi teaching, completely separates God from man and the world. The Christian teaching of God is foreign

to the Muslim, and so long as it is given solely from Christian sources, it will remain foreign. It is the task of the Christian worker to explain the Christian view in the most intelligible way to the Muslim, and if assistance can be obtained from literature which is familiar to the Muslim, should that assistance be refused merely because it comes from Muslim sources?

Again, it has been said that both religions honor Jesus. Muslims often say that they honor Jesus more than do the Christians themselves, because Muslims always give Jesus the title of "prophet", whereas Christians speak of him only as "Jesus" without any title; and furthermore, Muslims always utter a prayer for Jesus when they mention his name, whereas Christians never do such a thing! Yet the idea of Jesus presented by the Christian worker is foreign to the Muslim—not only in the stories associated with Jesus, but also in his personality; and if help can be obtained from sources more familiar to Muslims whereby to set forth the Jesus of the Gospels, shall we reject that help merely because we believe that in the main the Muslim idea of Jesus is badly distorted?

Not only in these isolated cases, however, but in the broad outlines, also, is the Christian religion foreign to the Muslim. The emphasis on sin, repentance, salvation, fellowship with God, the Holy Spirit, and a host of other ideas, common enough to the Christian, seems overdone or quite misplaced to the Muslim. Religious terms common to both religions are differently interpreted or receive different emphasis. Moral teachings of Christians seem unintelligible or at best non-Muslim. They may be all right for the Christian, but Muslims are different. From the very start, the Christian worker must face the fact that what he is about to say will sound very strange in the ears of the Muslim. Hence, the necessity of preparing the way as much as possible before the start is made.

The Moslem World has reflected through its articles a growing, yet perhaps still an inadequate, appreciation of the great Muslim teacher, al-Ghazālī. Apart from the reviews of books dealing with al-Ghazālī or his works, nine articles have been published during the period of its existence, dealing with the life or works of al-Ghazālī—five of them in the last twelve years. He was a highly esteemed scholar among Muslims of his own day, and his writings are regarded with great reverence throughout the Muslim world to this day. He was not a Christian; and though the Christian standpoint was more clearly discerned and expressed by him than by most of his co-religionists, he made no apparent effort to bring the two religions together. Rather, he appeared to recognize in the Christian religion higher values than were taught and practised in Islām, and he sought to bring Islām to a more definite appreciation of those values. That

he kept his place in the fold of Islām and gained such wide acceptance for his teaching with its new emphases points to the strong character of the man, the strength of his personality, and the majestic power of his intellect.

I would not leave the impression that al-Ghazālī is the only Muslim writer whose writings will yield religious values. I believe that there are many others, some of whose works are all too little known. Nevertheless, adherence can be obtained for the teachings of al-Ghazālī throughout the Muslim world, and his writings have been made more widely available to the non-Arabic reading world than those of any other Muslim writer. I am therefore confining attention for the remainder of this paper to his writings and would make a brief survey of the passages from some of his works which, in my opinion, will help the Muslim to understand and better appreciate Christian religious teachings, to the end that these teachings may cease to be entirely foreign to him. Limited space forbids an extensive presentation of the religious values to be found in al-Ghazālī's writings. We shall confine ourselves for the purpose of illustration to a few of the more basic teachings which seem to have a bearing on the presentation of Christian truth.

Let us start with his teaching of Jesus. At this point, it would be well to call attention to an article written by Dr. Zwemer for THE MOSLEM WORLD in 1917 (Vol. 7, p. 144), entitled "Jesus Christ in the Iḥyā'." In this article numerous passages are quoted in which al-Ghazālī makes reference to Jesus, many of which cannot be traced to our Gospels, but some are obviously taken from some version of the canonical Gospels. The article is commended for careful study. Here we can indicate only a few passages.

(1) "Said Jesus (on him be peace), 'Blessed are those who humble themselves in this world for they shall be the possessors of thrones on the day of judgment. Blessed are those who make peace between men in this world for they shall inherit Paradise on the day of resurrection.' " To be sure, this is not an exact parallel of our version, but it gives adequate ground for presenting our entire list of Beatitudes with any remarks we may wish to offer by way of explanation. But why not offer our own version and remarks without reference to al-Ghazālī? Because our version is foreign—not only in sound, but also as coming from a Christian book, and prejudice will at once mount. But al-Ghazālī's version helps to pave the way. He has accepted this passage and has written it into his book without question, and prejudice against it will diminish in proportion to the degree of his acceptance by the particular group of Muslims who read it.

(2) "Said Jesus (on him be peace), It has been told of ancient times: a tooth for a tooth and a nose for a nose; but I say unto you,

Do not resist evil for evil, but whosoever strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the left also; and whosoever taketh away your cloak, give him your inner garment also; and whosoever desireth you to go with him a mile, go with him twain." (p. 151). Here is an opportunity already prepared for preaching a sermon on Matthew 5:38-41 with the unqualified support of al-Ghazālī.

Not all the passages noted in Dr. Zwemer's article will yield values as readily; but if there are no values in them, they do not need to be considered. Where prejudice can be broken down, or attention can be more easily won, by the help of al-Ghazālī, it seems the better part of discretion to accept this help.

Al-Ghazālī and many other Muslim writers urge the practice of the presence of God in daily life. To be sure, many of these are Ṣūfī writers, but there are Ṣūfī writers, and al-Ghazālī is among them, whose writings are acceptable to orthodox Muslims. There are, of course, many Christian writers who urge the need for the same practice, but the Muslim ear will be open to the voice of the Muslim *'ulamā'*. Therefore, if our effort can be prefaced by a suitable word from al-Ghazālī or another acceptable Muslim writer on the subject, it is to be expected that it will win readier attention and more lasting impression. Such a word might be chosen from the *Bidāyatu'l-Hidāyat*: "When you awake, try to wake up before dawn and let your first thought be the mention of the name of Allāh. Say: Praise be to Allāh who gave us life after he had put us to death. To Him we are resurrected. . . . O Lord, we ask that Thou wilt impel us this day to every good thing. . . . O Lord, we begin this day with Thee and we shall close it with Thee. By Thee we live and by Thee we die. To Thee we are resurrected. We ask Thee for the best of this day and the best there is in it." (Translated by Lois Wilson, Kennedy School of Missions, Hartford).

What does al-Ghazālī have to say about temptation? Here is a passage from the *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm ud-Dīn* (the chapter on the "Wonders of the Heart"): "Know that the heart is like a fortress, and Satan is an enemy who wishes to enter the fortress to take possession of it and to rule over it. The fortress cannot be kept secure from the enemy except by guarding its doors and entrances, and the breaches in its walls. He who does not know its doors cannot guard them. The protection of the heart from the evil promptings of Satan is a *prescribed duty and an individual obligation upon every morally responsible creature.*" (Translated by Walter J. Skellie, Kennedy School of Missions, Hartford). He then names the entrances as anger and appetence, envy, satiety of food, love of adornment, covetous desire, haste, love of money, stinginess and fear of poverty, sectarian and partisan prejudices, etc. The passages are too long to quote in full here.

Al-Ghazālī has an entire chapter in the *Iḥyā'* on "Repentance." The teaching is of high order, and fortunately a translation by C. G. Naish has been published in THE MOSLEM WORLD (Vol. 16, 1926, pp. 6-18). As to definition, he says: "We have already shown that man, as he is originally created, is never free from the pursuit of his appetites; and that not only does penitence mean that he must renounce them, but complete penitence also includes reparation for the past. Whenever man follows his appetite, there arises from it a darkness which clouds his heart, just as from a man's breath there arises a cloud on a polished mirror: and if the darkness of the appetites accumulates, it becomes a corruption like the vapor of breath on the surface of the mirror when the tarnish accumulates. . . . If this corruption accumulates it becomes deeply imprinted on the heart like tarnish on the surface of the mirror, which if it accumulates for a long time, eats into the substance of the iron and destroys it, so that it can never be polished again. Just as darkness proceeds from rebellious acts and appetites and clouds the heart, so a light rises from acts of obedience and renunciation of the appetites, and the cloud of rebellion is wiped out by the light of obedience." On the postponement of penitence, he says: "The procrastinator builds upon a foundation which does not exist, that is, length of life. Perhaps he will not live long, or even if he does, he can renounce sin no more easily tomorrow than he can today. . . . The procrastinator is like nothing so much as a man who needs to pull up a tree, and perceives that it will yield only to great strength. So he says, 'I will postpone it for a year and then return to it,' though he knows not that all the time the tree stays there, its roots grow stronger, while he himself, as he grows older, becomes weaker."

Sin is denounced in many places in no uncertain terms. He emphasizes the fact that sin is rebellion against God and is worthy of, and will receive, punishment in the fire if it is not repented of. The necessity of a pure heart is clearly set forth in the following passage from the *Bidāyatu'l-Hidāyat* (translation noted above): "If you wish to guard your bodily members, then you must purify your heart. The heart is the part which, if it is well, the rest of the body is well; but if it is corrupt, the rest of the body becomes corrupt with it. So occupy thyself in its welfare, so that by means of it, your members may be well."

Space forbids the prolonging of the discussion of the religious values to be found in the writings of al-Ghazālī, except for the final noting that passages which seem at first glance to be out of harmony with the Christian teaching may be used as a spring-board from which to set forth such teaching with greater hope of acceptance. Let me suggest one passage only from *Bidāyatu'l-Hidāyat:* "You should

understand that the blameworthy qualities of the heart are numerous; that the way to purification of the heart from its vices is long; and that the method of overcoming them is obscure." The best method of heart purification which Islām furnishes is admittedly obscure and the way is long, but with the encouragement of al-Ghazālī to pursue it, can we not set forth a method which has been proved clear and sure, and a way that is much shorter and freed from the tedious practices set forth in Islām?

Personally, I have received ready attention whenever I have mentioned the name of al-Ghazālī to Muslims. I believe that he may be of great assistance in the presentation of Christian truth. Much of his writing is the formal teaching of Islām and will seem not much different from the barren teaching of other teachers of formal religion, except for the apt illustrations which have a general value and the spicy wit which always adds flavour to his writings. But scattered through his writings are real jewels of thought, and the spirit which pervades his writings is frequently very close to the Christian spirit. Although these can be, no doubt, matched by the writings of Christians, quotations from al-Ghazālī are of added value for the acceptance of Christian truth by Muslims because they are expressed by the great Muslim teacher, still widely known and beloved, al-Ghazālī.

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NATIONALISM AND CHRISTIAN MISSIONS AMONG MUSLIM PEOPLES

A PROPOSED OUTLINE FOR STUDY

Introductory: Experience of the early Christian Church in the Near East.

a. Recognition of national differences within the Roman Empire in Apostolic Times:
   Romans,—to what extent strictly Italian?
   Greeks,—proud of their cultural heritage.
   Jews,—proponents of a theocracy.
b. The fate of the Christian groups in the buffer states between the Roman and the Persian Empires.
c. Suspicion and prejudice involved in the Sassanid persecutions of Christians within the Persian Empire.
d. Obstacles to the progress of Christianity in Arabia.

I. *The World Mission of the Islamic Theocracy.*

   a. Revolutionary character,—moral, religious, political.
   b. Prophetic revelation made to chosen people:
      the Book, the Shrine, the Mission.

II. *The Sudden Rise of the Muslim Empire.*

   a. The brief period of Arab supremacy.
   b. Adoption of the principle of government ownership of land that prevailed in Egypt.
   c. Acceptance of the methods of imperial administration that were customary in Persia.
   d. Greek culture in intellectual circles—
      1. assistance of Syrian Christian translators
      2. importance of neo-Platonic influences, notably the mysticism of Plotinus

III. *The Disintegration of the Muslim Empire.*

   a. The place of the Caliph in the Muslim theocracy—
      inability to suppress rival national interests;
      repeated Shi'ite defections;
      increased power of Turkish tribes of mercenaries.
   b. Failure of the Muslim Empire to re-unite after the Mongol invasions.

c. Aggression of western maritime powers,—
commercial, political, economic;
overthrow of the Moghul authority in India.

d. The Period of the Turkish Caliphate.
dissatisfaction in other Muslim countries;
repeated failure of pan-Islamic movements.

IV. *Character and Extent of "Nationalism" in Modern Islam.*

Countries to consider: Arabia, Turkey, Syria, Iran, India, Iraq, Algiers, Malaya, Egypt, Indonesia and Afghanistan.

a. To what degree has it been imitative of western nationalism?

b. Has it been manifested mainly as a protest against western exploitation?

c. Have national governments been more successful than western suzerainties?
   1. in maintaining law and order?
   2. in developing natural resources?
   3. in establishing industrial activities, irrigation projects, and agricultural developments?
   4. in extending general education?
   5. in encouraging individual integrity, love of country, and other civic virtues?

d. Have the Christian Missions contributed substantially towards the success of indigenous national undertakings?
   1. in general education?
   2. in programs of medical and philanthropic service?
   3. in institutions of higher education?
   4. in industrial and agricultural developments?
   5. in maintaining the good-will of western peoples?
   6. in the establishment of national Christian churches?

V. The World's Need of a Theocracy That Can Command International Recognition and Respect.

1. Its reality may be defined as the essential sovereignty of God.
2. Conceptions of this reality may differ in important particulars.
3. Continuous need for definitive thinking,—scriptural, scientific, experiential.
4. The conception of theocratic authority that was held by the Papacy in relation to early European conflicts among nations.

5. Do modern Protestant and Catholic conceptions of essential theocratic authority have significant beliefs in common? In what particulars do they differ?
6. Do Jewish and Muslim conceptions of theocratic authority agree in important points with Christian conceptions? What is the distinguishing difference?

VI. Jesus' Revolutionary Teaching in Regard to the Sovereignty of God.

1. The requirement, "Ye must be born again," is of international application, and there is no "chosen people" who can enter the Kingdom by some other way.
2. The new wine is not to be put into old bottles.
3. The recognition of God's sovereignty demands obedience to the will of God, rather than conformity to tribal or national customs and prejudices.

Note: This is a tentative outline of a book that might be prepared as a Symposium, or if it should be undertaken by one writer, chapter IV would be dependent on information that would have to be gathered from at least ten different Muslim countries.

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FREE WILL AND PREDESTINATION IN EARLY ISLAM

It is commonly held that one of the striking differences between Christianity and Islam is that the former insists on the freedom of the will, whereas the latter teaches predestination. Yet a little reflection shows that the matter is not nearly so simple as this. St. Paul believed in predestination in some sense of the word, and the Augustinian and Calvinistic strains in Christianity have elaborated that aspect of his teaching. On the other hand, the doctrine of free will in the form given to it by Pelagius is accounted heresy by orthodox Christianity. The following studies will show that there is almost as much diversity within Islam.

The position adopted in the present studies can perhaps be most succinctly stated in the words of a standard Anglican theologian:[1]

"Scripture holds before us two great counter-truths—first, God's absolute sovereignty (cp. *Rom.* 9, 20ff.), and secondly, man's responsibility. Our intellects cannot reconcile them.

So far as we can reconcile them at all it is by right action and vigorous moral life."

Both these great truths will be found in Islam, though the balances are weighted in favour of the first. Just because of that, however, Western Christianity with its rather Pelagian sympathies has probably something to learn from Islam.

I. QUR'ĀN AND TRADITIONS

It is said that a development can be traced in the Qur'ān in respect of the questions under consideration, and that the later passages are more deterministic. To establish this, however, would be an arduous undertaking, and its effect on the conclusion of the present study would be very slight; so it has seemed sufficient to treat the Qur'ān as a unitary whole. Both the two great truths are frequently expressed there.

God's Absolute Sovereignty in the Qur'ān.

God is presented in the Qur'ān as the almighty Lord of the Worlds, Who is creator of everything and therefore all-powerful, and Who is in supreme control of all that happens; men can do nothing unless God wills it, at least in the sense of permitting it.

"To God belongs the sovereignty of the heavens and the earth,

(The above article contains the substance of four lectures delivered at the Newman School, Jerusalem, in July and August 1944. The material is derived from a doctorate thesis of Edinburgh University which it is hoped to publish when paper is more plentiful. No attempt has therefore been made to give full references for all the statements in the text. What is given is a mere selection. It does, however, indicate the main sources of evidence considered in the longer work, whose conclusions alone are presented here.)

[1] Bicknell, *The Thirty-nine Articles* (1936), p. 286.

He createth what He pleaseth, giving to whom He pleaseth females and to whom He pleaseth males, or conjoining them males and females, and He maketh whom He pleaseth barren; verily He hath knowledge and power."

"Verily, this (*sc.* the Qur'ān) is a reminder, and he who wills chooseth to his Lord a way. But ye will not will, except it be that God willeth, verily God is knowing, wise."

"If thy Lord so willed, all those in the land would believe in a body. . . . It is not for any person to believe except by the permission of God."[2]

The fact that many of those who heard the warnings of Muhammad paid no heed to them and did not believe in God caused much concern to the Prophet. There are many passages in the Qur'ān where a man's faith seems to be attributed entirely to God's favour and guidance, and unbelief to His leading astray and abandonment.

"If God will to guide anyone He enlargeth his breast for Islam, but if He will to send him astray He maketh his breast narrow and contracted as if he were climbing up into heaven; thus doth God lay the abomination upon those who do not believe."

"Had it not been for the bounty and mercy of God towards you, not one of you would ever be pure, but God purifieth whom He willeth."[3]

Sometimes the unbelief of men is said to be due to their inability to see and hear and accept; and this in turn is the result of God's action in covering their eyes and setting a seal or lock upon their hearts.

"As for those who have disbelieved, it is all one whether thou hast warned them or not; they will not believe. God hath set a seal upon their hearts, and over their hearing and their sight is a covering; for them is (in store) a punishment mighty."[4]

The supremacy of the Divine will in all mundane events is thus strongly expressed in the Qur'ān, and yet the other of the two great truths is by no means neglected.

Man's Responsibility in the Qur'ān.

The best proof that the doctrine of a man's responsibility for his acts is an integral part of the message of the Qur'ān is not any particular texts, but the whole conception of the Last Judgment, so prominent in the early warnings. Reward and punishment are meted out to men in accordance with principles of justice, and that implies that

[2] Q. 42, 48f.; 76, 29f.; 10, 99f. Cp. 81, 27ff.; 74, 54f. (Quotations from Dr. Bell's translation, with "God" for "Allāh.")
[3] Q. 6, 825; 24, 21. Cp. 61, 5; 16, 95.
[4] Q. 2, 5f. Cp. 18, 100f.; 7, 92-99.

men are truly responsible for their acts. Muḥammad's warnings and calls to repentance likewise imply that his hearers have the capacity to respond. In one case, even people who are described as deaf to the warning, as if it were not their fault, later admit responsibility for their actions—"O, alas for us! We have been wrongdoers."[5] The following passages illustrate the teaching about the Last Judgment:

"And say: 'The truth is from your Lord; so who wills let him believe and who wills let him disbelieve'; verily We have prepared for the wrongdoers a Fire. . . . But those who have believed and done the works of righteousness—verily We do not allow to go lost the reward of any who do well in deed. For these are Gardens of Eden. . . ."

"We shall place the balances—justice—on the day of resurrection and no one will be wronged at all; if it be but the weight of a grain of mustard-seed We shall produce it."

"Now today (*sc.* the Day of Judgment) no one will be wronged at all, nor will ye be recompensed except for what ye have been doing."[6]

It is worthy of note that, in many of the passages that speak of God guiding men or leading them astray, what God does appears to be the consequence (reward or punishment) of the previous conduct of the men themselves. The Qur'ān insists on God's justice in all His dealings with men.

"As He began you, ye will come again, He having guided a part and a part having justly incurred the penalty of going astray."

"Thereby (*sc.* by His use of similes) He sendeth many astray and guideth many, but He doth not send astray any but the reprobate."

"We wronged them not (*sc.* those who were punished) but they wronged themselves."

"But verily I am forgiving to whomsoever repents and believes and acts uprightly, and lets himself be guided."[7]

These quotations are sufficient to show that the two complementary, but intellectually irreconcilable, aspects of the truth are both represented in the Qur'ān. Before discussing the Qur'ān further, however, it will be advantageous to consider some of the common Traditions on this subject.

Traditions commonly quoted in support of Predestination.

The following traditions are not intended to cover the whole of the field in an exhaustive manner; some rather different ones will be mentioned later. But the present selection, I think it may be claimed, gives a fair sample of the traditions and conceptions most influential in later Muslim thought.

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[5] Q. 21, 46f.
[6] Q. 18, 28-30; 21, 48; 36, 54.
[7] Q. 7, 28; 2, 24; 11, 103; 20, 84. Cp. 3, 80; 92, 5-10; 16, 106.

"God wrote down the decrees regarding the created world fifty thousand years before He created the heavens and the earth."

"I heard the Apostle of God say ('Ubāda b. al-Ṣāmit is reported to have said): The first thing God created was the Pen. He said to it: Write. It asked: Lord, what shall I write? He answered: Write the destinies of all things till the advent of the Hour. My son, I heard the Prophet of God say: Whoso dieth with a belief differing from this, he belongeth not to me."

"When the embryo has passed two and forty days in the womb, God sends an angel, who gives it a form and creates his hearing, sight, skin, flesh and bones. This having been done, the angel asks: O Lord, shall this be male or female? Then the Lord decrees what He pleaseth, and the angel writes it down. Then he asks: O Lord, what shall be his term (*sc.* the date of his death)? Then the Lord will say what he pleaseth, and the angel will write it down. Thereupon the latter will go away with the scroll in his hand, and nothing will be added to or subtracted from the decree."

The Prophet said of so-and-so that he belonged to the people of Hell. Some of his followers disbelieved, since the man was fighting in the thickest of the battle and covered with wounds. But at length the man could bear the pain no longer, and took his spear and put an end to his own life. The Prophet said: No one enters Paradise except a believer.

(The Prophet said:) "It may be that one of you performs the works of the people of Paradise, so that between him and Paradise there is only the distance of an arm's length. But then his book overtakes him and he begins to perform the works of the people of Hell, the which he will enter. Likewise one of you may perform the works of the people of Hell, so that between him and Hell there is only the distance of an arm's length. Then his book will overtake him and he will begin to perform the works of the people of Paradise, the which he will enter."

(Ibn al-Dailamī said:) "I visited Ubaiy b. Ka'b and said to him: Doubts concerning predestination have arisen in my heart. Possibly God will make them vanish if you communicate to me a tradition on this subject. He answered: If God should punish the inhabitants of His heavens and His earth, He would not thereby do injustice. And if you should spend in the path of God an amount larger than mount Uḥud, He would not accept it from you unless you believe in the decree and acknowledge that what reaches could not possibly have missed you, and what misses could not possibly have reached you. And if you should die in a different conviction, you would go to Hell. . . . Then I went to Zaid b. Thābit, who communicated to me a similar tradition on the authority of the Prophet."

Moses accused Adam, as our father, of being the cause of our expulsion from Paradise. Adam replied that he had not the favours Moses had had; would Moses blame him for what God had foreordained for him before he was created. So Adam prevailed.[8]

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[8] Muslim, *Qadar*, trad. 16 (=Wensinck, *Muslim Creed*, p. 54); Abū Dāwūd, *Sunna*, b. 16 (= *MC*, p. 108; cp. p. 162); Muslim, *Qadar*, (= *MC*, p. 54); al-Bukhārī, *Qadar*, b. 5 (paraphrased); Muslim, *Qadar*, trad. 1 (=*MC*, p. 55); Abū Dāwūd, *Sunna*, b. 16 (= *MC*, p. 108); al-Bukhārī, *Qadar*, b. 11 (paraphrased).

The Contrast between Qur'ān and Tradition.

When these traditions are compared with the Qur'anic quotations about God's absolute sovereignty, a striking contrast is apparent. The Qur'ān is interested in asserting God's supreme control of the world from moment to moment, whereas the traditions speak rather of what He decreed in the past, whether it be fifty thousand years before the world was created or merely when each man is an embryo in the womb. Consequently the Qur'ān thinks of God as personal and as actively willing in the present. Tradition, however, though it speaks of God, tends to conceive of man's life as being under the immediate sway, not of God, but of impersonal forces—the Pen writes his destiny, his book overtakes him, and (without any mention of God at all) what reaches him could not possibly have missed him.

This contrast is assuredly not quite so absolute as the quotations given would indicate. There are in the Qur'ān various traces of predestination in the strict sense, that is, the fixing of things *beforehand* by God, as distinct from His present control of them. There is the conception of the "term" of a man's life.

"He it is Who created you out of clay and then fixed a term—and a term is stated in His keeping. . . ."

"God will not defer (the death of) any person when his time (= term) comes; God is well-informed of what ye do."[9]

But when full allowance is made for these and other instances of predestinarian ideas in the Qur'ān and for possible occurrences of the conception of God's present control of the world in Tradition, the contrast between the two on this point remains striking. The Qur'ān is chiefly, almost solely, interested in God's present sovereignty—in the last quotation, even when the term has been fixed, He is still active; Tradition usually admits some action by God in the past, but is more concerned with the impersonal forces controlling man's destiny in the present.

It is, therefore, difficult to deny that these conceptions found in Tradition and common in Muslim thought are not a development of anything in the Qur'ān, but must have entered Islam in some other way. The obvious suggestion is that they have some connection with the fatalism current among the Arabs before and during Muḥammad's lifetime; but that is a suggestion which requires careful examination.

The Qur'ān and the Outlook of the pre-Islamic Arabs.

A student of the fatalism of the Arab poets came to the conclusion

[9] Q. 6, 2; 63, 11; cp. 7, 32.

that it had its roots in the conception of Time. *Dahr* properly means "time," he says,

"yet almost always in such a way that it is thought of as exhibiting a certain power; rarely is it mere Time, Time in and for itself . . . but almost without exception it is personified as causing good or also bad fortune, as controlling the existence of men and doing so in such a way that it is impossible for them to escape from what is in store for them. Is not that 'destiny'?"[10]

Another scholar has written:

"Time in the abstract was popularly imagined to be the cause of all earthly happiness and especially of all earthly misery. . . . Time is represented as bringing misfortune, causing perpetual change, as biting, wearing down, shooting arrows that never miss the mark, hurling stones and so forth. In such cases we are often obliged to render time by fate, which is not quite correct, since time is here conceived as the determining factor, not as being itself determined by some other power."[11]

In the first chapter of his *Muhammedanische Studien,* Goldziher characterized the ideal of the "warrior of central Arabia" as one of *muruwwa* or manliness. He

"glories in his high courage and the bravery of his companions; it does not occur to him to be grateful to higher powers for his successes—though he does not completely exclude the recognition of their domination. Only the thought of the necessity of death, the result of day to day experience which he cannot shut out from his mind, stirs up in him grim thoughts of the Manāya or Manūna, that is, the powers of Fate, which, operating blindly and without consciousness of their goal, yet with inevitability, are able to bring to nought all the plans of mortals."[12]

To this whole outlook on life Muḥammad was firmly opposed, in matters both of theory and practice. The Qur'ān describes as a false and ungrounded opinion the view of those who say: "There is nothing but this present life of ours; we die and we live, and it is only Time *(dahr)* which destroys us."[13] The context of this passage makes it clear that what is being attacked is not simply the theory about the influence of Time, but the whole way of life based on the denial of the Day of Judgment and the future life. It is, indeed, another instance of the old story of "Let us eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we die." The Qur'ān insists that the man who performs evil deeds, and who "has taken as his god his own desire," will be treated differently from the righteous man.

In contrast to the conception of *muruwwa,* Goldziher designates Muḥammad's attitude as *dīn,* religion. He might agree with his con-

[10] Schrameier, *Über den Fatalismum der vorislamischen Araber,* 26.
[11] Nöldeke, in *ERE,* 1, 661B (art. "Arabs, Ancient").
[12] P. 3.
[13] Q. 45, 23.

temporaries in their appreciation of sincerity and truthfulness, but in opposition to their practice of paying back evil with evil he preached forgiveness, he placed limitations on their use of wine and women, and he instituted prayers, which they considered unmanly. Thus the opposition went deep and affected the ordinary conduct of life.

The Qur'anic conception of the supremacy of God was, of course, not without practical results, but these were rather in the direction of fostering a true sense of creatureliness, of dependence on God and trust in Him. But it could never lead to inactivity, since God was a God of righteousness, Who also commanded His servants to perform various actions, and Who judged them in accordance with what they had done. What is properly described as the fatalistic attitude—using the omnipotence of God (or Fate) as an excuse for evading plain duties—is explicitly condemned. There is a description of those who, when asked to contribute to help the poor and needy, reply, "Shall we feed him whom if God willed He would feed?," and an account of the judgment upon such wrongdoers.

Conclusions.

It may some day be possible to extend this account of the outlook of the pre-Islamic Arabs, but for the moment it is not sufficient to establish a direct connection between that and the conceptions found in Tradition. What may fairly be asserted, however, is that the dominant trend in Tradition has more resemblance to pre-Islamic fatalism than to the Quranic belief in the sovereignty of an active and living God; this resemblance is very marked in respect of the impersonal character of the forces controlling man's destiny.

The hypothesis I would suggest to explain this fact is that the fatalistic attitude of Muḥammad's contemporaries persisted in the depth of their hearts long after their formal inclusion within the fold of Islam, and that it eventually came to expression in Tradition. Since their conversion was often mainly an external and nominal affair, that would not be at all surprising. This would mean that Tradition is an amalgam of Islamic and pre-Islamic ideas.

Such a hypothesis is supported by evidence of various sorts. There was apparently an attempt to identify God with *dahr*.[14] It has already been pointed out that impersonal forces are prominent in Tradition, sometimes even to the exclusion of any mention of God. And an examination of traditions in respect of their attitude to the practical conduct of life shows various degrees of compromise with the fatalistic tendency to do nothing except when spurred to activity by one's own inclinations.

[14] See *Concordance*, ed. Wensinck s.v. *dahr*, first two entries.

The story of the dispute between Adam and Moses, for instance is thoroughly fatalistic; a man is not to be held responsible for his actions. The conception of the heavenly decrees encourages a similar inference, and so does the statement that what reaches you could not possibly have missed you. But this tendency to fatalism is somewhat moderated when the decrees are regarded as the work, not of the impersonal Pen, but of God the righteous; and in somewhat similar fashion the statement about what reaches you, though impersonal in form, can be given an Islamic connotation and referred to God's sovereignty—as indeed happened in one of the Muslim creeds.

The tradition about the things written by the angel for each embryo in the womb is slightly different. (In other forms it is not stated that God is author of the decrees; and there are additions such as the man's sustenance, his work, and whether he is to be happy or miserable.) Here not everything a man does is predetermined, but only the date of his death and the outcome or general effect of his activity. This "modified fatalism" was possibly the outlook of the average Arab. He probably did not doubt his power to make plans from day to day and to carry them out; but nevertheless he felt that whether his plans were successful or not, whether they ultimately made for his weal or woe, was decided by some inscrutable agency quite irrespective of his own deserts. The net result of the conception is to discourage all effort and striving as fruitless, since, do what one may, the end will be the same. (Once again, what may originally have referred only to this life—happiness and misery—could easily be given an Islamic interpretation and understood of Paradise and Hell.)

The traditions about the warrior committing suicide, or a man being overtaken by his book, seem to be attempting a fusion of the old and the new. Lip-service is paid to the Muslim conception of the Judgment; a man is to be rewarded according to the last acts of his life; but these are predetermined for him according to his book. So the dominant tendency is fatalistic.

There is an interesting group of traditions dealing with the difficulty: Since man's ultimate condition is already fixed, what is the point of performing good works?

"A man said: O Prophet of God, do you know the people of Paradise from the people of Hell? The Prophet said: Yes. The man said: And why do people act? The Prophet said: Everyone acts according to what has been created for him or made easy for him."

"Then the Apostle of God said: There is no living soul for which God has not appointed its place in Paradise or Hell, and the decision of happy or unhappy has already been taken. Then a man said: O Apostle of God, shall we not then leave all to our book and give up works? Muḥammad answered: Whosoever belongs to the people of

happiness will come to the works of the people of happiness, and whosoever belongs to the people of unhappiness will come to the works of the people of unhappiness.—Then he said: Perform works, for everyone is guided; the people of happiness are guided to the works of the people of happiness, and the people of unhappiness to the works of the people of unhappiness. Thereupon he recited: So as for him who gives and shows piety, and counts true the best reward, We shall assist him to ease. . . ."

"The Prophet said: There is no one whose seat in Hell or Paradise is not written. Someone said: Shall we not then resign ourselves (*sc.* and do nothing)? He said: Do not do that. Everyone is helped. And he recited: So as for him who gives and shows piety. . . ."[15]

In these traditions are seen various attempts to combine fatalistic theory with a belief in man's responsibility in practice—not always very convincingly. It is worthy of note how in the second tradition the Qur'anic verses, which appear to regard God's action as following upon man's, are interpreted in a predestinarian sense.

Tradition, of course, is far less homogeneous than the Qur'ān. There are some where it is indeed God Who determines what happens to a man, and not an impersonal Fate, and where the practical attitude is consequently a truly religious trust in God the almighty and compassionate, and patient acquiescence in His will.

"There came to the Prophet the messenger of one of his daughters with word that her son was at the point of death. The Prophet sent the message: What God took is His own, and what God gave is His own; each according to his term; so let her bear patiently and endure."

"The Prophet, on being asked about the plague, said: God sent it as a punishment to whom He would, and He made it a blessing to the believers; for any servant (*sc.* of God) in any place who remained there and was patient, reflecting that only what God has written will befall him, will receive the like reward as for martyrdom."[16]

Wensinck's assertion that "Tradition has not preserved a single *ḥadīth* in which *liberum arbitrium* is advocated" is true in the main, but is almost certainly too sweeping. We have been considering at least incipient attempts to acknowledge human responsibility. Consider too such a saying of the Prophet as:

"There is no caliph who does not have two courtiers, one ordering and inciting him to good, and one to bad; and the protected is he whom God protects."[17]

The intention of this saying (as of conceptions like that of God's favour in the Qur'ān) is doubtless to assure men that they are not precluded from doing good works by any ineluctable fate, but that

[15] Al-Bukhārī, *Qadar*, b. 2; Muslim, *Qadar*, trad. 6 (=*MC*, p. 56); al-Bukhārī, *Qadar*, b. 5. (Quotation from Q. 92, 5-10.)
[16] Al-Bukhārī, *Qadar*, b. 4 and b. 15 (summarized).
[17] Al-Bukhārī, *Qadar*, b. 8 (= *MC*, p. 51).

on the contrary there are forces in the universe helping them on, and that therefore their moral striving is not in vain.

If, then, this evidence may be taken as establishing the hypothesis put forward above, it follows that Tradition gives us a picture of the struggle between the "activistic" ethics of the Qur'ān and the fatalistic conceptions so deeply embedded in the Arab soul—and, in the second place, between the Qur'anic conception of God, actively willing and righteous, and the fatalistic ethics of manliness and inactivity. We cannot but be impressed by the forceful impact of Muḥammad's message and spirit on his own and succeeding generations, and yet it was not sufficient to drive out these firmly lodged pre-existing ideas and attitudes. Within the House of Islam the belief in almighty and righteous God has been at war with the belief in an impersonal Fate, and, with varying fortunes the battle has continued until our own day.

II. THE UPHOLDERS OF FREE WILL

One of the difficulties to be faced by the student of the growth of Muslim theological thought is that the writers of the heresiologies, like al-Baghādī and al-Shahrastānī, had little sense of historical development and paid most attention to the logical classification of various doctrines according to the terminology of their own day; this is especially true of the lesser sects, where information is scanty. By way of exception an early theological debate is reflected in the following story:

"The fifth sect of the 'Ajārida is the Shu'aibīya, the disciples of Shu'aib. He was one of those who dissociated himself from Maimūn and his doctrine. He asserted that no one is capable of doing anything except what God wills, and that the acts of men are created by God.

The root of the separation of the Shu'aibīya and the Maimūnīya was that Shu'aib had some money belonging to Maimūn, the repayment of which he demanded. Shu'aib said to him: I shall give it to you, if God will. Maimūn replied: God *has* willed that you should give it to me now. Shu'aib replied: If God had willed it, I could not have done otherwise than give it to you. Maimūn said: Verily, God *has* willed what He commanded; what He did not command, He did not will; and what He did not will, He did not command.

Then some followed Maimūn and others Shu'aib; and they wrote to 'Abd al-Karīm b. 'Ajarrad (*sc.* the head of the 'Ajarida), who was held in prison by Khālid b. 'Abdallāh al-Bajalī. When the dispute of Maimūn and Shu'aib was made known to him, 'Abd al-Karīm wrote: Our doctrine is that what God willed came about and what He did not will did not come about; and we do not fix evil upon God. This letter reached them at the time of the death of 'Abd al-Karīm. Maimūn claimed that his view had been approved in that it was said "we do not fix evil upon God," while Shu'aib claimed that 'Abd al-Karīm

had rather approved of his view in so far as he had said "what God willed came about, and what He did not will did not come about." Thus they both associated themselves with 'Abd al-Karīm, but dissociated themselves from one another."[18]

This is rather a good example of the necessity of holding together two truths which cannot be reconciled intellectually. The ostensible subject of discussion is God's will. Shu'aib interprets this in the light of the conception of God's sovereignty or omnipotence, but he emphasizes this excessively and reaches the fatalistic (and immoral) conclusion of man's inability to perform his duty. Maimūn, on the other hand, by identifying God's will with His command (which is of what is just and righteous), is emphasizing the conception of God's righteousness; but his view is also one-sided, for he says nothing at all about God's omnipotence, and this neglect of the topic is in fact the first step to denial. The old master to whom they appeal makes no attempt to preserve logical consistency, but he maintains a balanced view in which both the complementary conceptions have a place.

This story is also interesting as illustrating the close relation in Muslim thought between God's righteousness and man's ability to act. The history of the Khawārij makes it clear that the doctrine of free will may be regarded as the logical development of this side of Qur'anic teaching, and that it is therefore unnecessary to attribute any major role to Christian influence.

The Development of Thought among the Khawārij.

The principle of the Muḥakkima (who seceded from 'Alī after the battle of Ṣiffīn in 37 A.H.) that "the decision belongs to God alone" *(lā ḥukm illā lillāh)* seems to have meant in practice that all matters were to be decided by reference to the text of the Qur'ān. This was in a way high idealism. It could easily degenerate into fanaticism, as history showed; and it contained within it disruptive tendencies, for each strong leader had his own interpretation of the Qur'ān. Yet in the forefront was the conception of the God of righteousness, demanding righteous conduct from His people.

Little is known of the theological views of any of the leaders of Khārijī risings until after the year 61, when Nāfi' b. Azraq from Baṣra, head of the Azāriqa, is said to have introduced novel doctrines. These were that he dissociated himself from the *qu'āda* (the people who "stayed at home" and did not join his movement), and declared that all those who did not fight with him were unbelievers; and he required that those who wanted to enter his camp should pass a strict test of orthodoxy.[19] For such a man whatever is not pure white is

[18] Al-Ash'arī, *Maqālāt al-Islāmīyīn*, 94f. (referred to as *Maq.*).
[19] *Maq.* 86; for Baihasīya see 116, etc.

black, and so for him there are included among the blacks not merely dualists and idol-worshippers and worldly Umaiyad caliphs but also people of the Qibla who differ from him only in slight details. The Baihasīya were another rival movement with similar views originally. In the light of their inability to cooperate with one another it is not surprising that, despite their fierce, fanatical valour, such movements had little success. Yet the excesses of their narrow, exclusive attitude should not blind us to the fact that the Divine Law (however narrowly conceived) and the righteousness of God were still central in their thought.

The impracticable exclusiveness of Nāfi' gave place to a milder tendency with Najda b. 'Āmir al-Ḥanafī, who led a rising about the year 70. He did not demand that every faithful Muslim should join his rebellion. Going out to join his army and fight the infidels (or *hijra* as it was sometimes called) was a work of supererogation, but *qu'ūd* or "staying at home" was not sin.[20]

'Abd al-Karīm b. 'Ajarrad (already mentioned above) had been influenced by both Najda and the Baihasīya. His main formula for his position still was that he associated with the people of Heaven and dissociated himself from the people of Hell—a formula that the exclusive Nāfi' might have adopted. But in his practice there were certain relaxations.

The treatment of children had already caused some perplexity. Nāfi' had been under the sway of the old Arab family ideas, and had said quite simply that the children of believers went to Heaven and the children of unbelievers to Hell; and he had concluded that it was right to kill the children of unbelievers. (The same also appears to have held of wives.) Others propounded conundrums about the fate of children whose fathers were unbelievers when the children died but subsequently became believers, or *vice versa*—possibly with a view to discrediting the conception of religion as a family, rather than an individual, affair.

The notion of personal responsibility implicit in the conception of God judging all men righteously on the Last Day now began to make itself felt. 'Abd al-Karīm and his followers, the 'Ajārida, mostly held that children were not believers until they had been summoned to Islām and had embraced it for themselves,[21] and so they dissociated themselves even from the children of believers. In practice this doubtless meant not active hostility but neutrality, and that was explicitly held by some. It is not altogether surprising to find Maimūn as the extreme exponent of personal responsibility in this matter also; he asserted that, since the children of unbelievers had committed no sin, they must be in Heaven.[22]

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[20] *Maq.* 89ff.
[21] *Maq.* 93; al-Shahrastānī, *Milal*, 95.
[22] Al-Shahrastānī, 96; al-Baghdādī, *Farq*, 264.

Another matter of debate—ignorance of the law—likewise was connected with the question when a man was to be held responsible for his acts. There was a story about the son of Najda and his soldiery misappropriating some booty; they made a plea of ignorance of the regulation and were pardoned. This raised the whole question of what knowledge is essential for a Muslim and at what point ignorance becomes culpable. It is noteworthy that a branch of the Baihasīya, the "Questioners" *(aṣḥāb al-su'āl)*, who held that, when a man had to face an action about which he was not sure, he must ask, and that thereafter ignorance was not permissible, were reckoned as holders of the doctrine of free will.[23]

Of the various sects of the Khawārij mentioned as holding the doctrine of Qadar (or free will), the earliest appear to be the Aṣḥāb al-Su'āl and Maimūn and his followers. Both were active towards the close of the first century, and may have proclaimed the doctrine as early as 80 or 90 A.D. Both, too, were involved in discussions in which the conceptions of God's righteousness and man's personal responsibility were gradually being worked out to their logical conclusion. Thus the doctrine of Qadar grew naturally in the fertile soil of Islam.

Other Early Voluntarists.[24]

Practically nothing is known about Ma'bad al-Juhanī, the reputed originator of the discussions about the Qadar at Baṣra. If he might be identified with the head of the Ma'badīya, a subject of the Tha'āliba, who held the doctrines of the 'Ajārida in a slightly milder form (though there are some difficulties about such a conjectural identification), then he would belong to much the same circles as Maimūn and the Aṣḥāb al-Su'āl, and his views might be supposed to have a similar source.

The name "Qadarīya" came to be used very loosely and vaguely, but in earlier writers, like al-Ash'arī and Khushaish (quoted in the *Tanbīh* of al-Malaṭī) there are vestiges of its restriction to a small and comparatively well-defined group. Al-Ash'arī, for instance, says in one place that "the third group of them (*sc.* the Khawārij) hold that the children of both heathen and believers are in Paradise"[25]—thus confirming what has been said about the growth of the doctrine of free will in certain circles among the Khawārij. The little that can be learned about the Qadarīya from study of these early references all tends to suggest affinities with the same groups.

It has been suggested by H. Ritter that al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī was the

[23] *Maq.* 90, 113-116.
[24] The fact that the following four paragraphs represent about 25 pages of the original manuscript will show the impossibility of giving adequate references.
[25] *Maq.* 126.

real originator of the doctrine of free will, since Ma'bad al-Juḥanī was evidently quite an uninfluential person.[26] We may allow Ritter's contention that he held the doctrine of Qadar; as a preacher of righteousness he would want to insist that his hearers had the power to lead a good life. But even so, in the light of the connection of the doctrine with other Muslim ideas, there is no ground for supposing that he alone was responsible; it was "in the air" in the Baṣra of his day. And, in so far as he held the doctrine, it would still be bound up with ideas of righteousness.

Ghailān al-Dimashqī is said to have been put to death by the caliph Hishām (105-125) because of his Qadarī views. The presence of the doctrine here among the Murji'a may seem a little strange, for the Murji'a were opponents of the Khawārij and were credited with elevating the importance of faith above that of works. The comparison with Christian ideas is misleading, however. The Murji'a criticized the Khawārij for punishing the grave sinner by expelling him from the community, that is, by declaring he was no longer a Muslim; and their aim was, not to minimize the seriousness of sin, but to find some other method of dealing with it than expulsion—which was only practicable in the camp of an exclusive rebel leader. Their view that the grave sinner remains a Muslim was accepted by later orthodoxy, and only extreme forms of it—as that he belonged to the people of Paradise—questioned or rejected. Thus the thesis that the doctrine of Qadar is related to conceptions of righteousness is not contradicted by the case of Ghailān; on the contrary it seems probable that Ghailān was executed less for his theoretical views than for his detailed criticisms of the unjust practices of the Umaiyads.

The Mu'tazila.

The Mu'tazila have been much admired by nineteenth century scholars for their liberalistic and rationalistic tendencies, but it is now being realized that they were not so much "enlightened philosophers" as "strictly theologically-minded and practically active theologians and missionaries." It is to be feared, however, that in their struggle with Manichaeanism and various Indian religions they were in danger of giving up much of the religious content of Islam.

It is clear from the perusal of the pages of al-Ash'arī and other writers that they still lived within the universe of discourse of the Qur'ān and even of the Traditions. They discussed various problems about the conceptions of the Term, of sustenance, of guidance and leading astray; Abu 'l-Hudhail seems to have accepted the term of a man's life as predetermined; in respect of sustenance the main contention was that God was righteous and therefore did not provide

[26] *Islam*, XXI (1933), 1-83, esp. 57ff.

the sustenance of the thief; and they had various lines of interpretation of guidance, leading astray and the like, but always a man's ultimate destiny was made to depend on his own activity.[27]

The Mu'tazila liked to call themselves the "People of Unity and Justice," thus giving prominence to two of their main principles. The principle of justice may be said to include the belief in free will, for the latter, though universally held by the Mu'tazila, was not named as one of their five main principles—a curious point, and one that tends to confirm what was said above about the close connection between God's righteousness and man's responsibility or freedom of will. The belief in free will was so fundamental that there are no records of any direct discussion of the point; the heresiographers only mention disputes about subordinate matters.

The development of thought among the Mu'tazila, and the relation of the different thinkers to one another in respect of the contents of their teaching has not yet been adequately studied, and there are no generally accepted conclusions from which we can profit in our present study. One line of development, however, can be fairly easily isolated, namely, the attempt to show that, despite all the evil in the world, God is perfectly righteous. This attempt is rationalistic in the sense that it is assumed that God's righteousness is perfectly comprehensible according to our human, rational conceptions of righteousness. Although in many ways Abu 'l-Hudhail of Baṣra may claim to be the real founder of the Mu'tazila, he has not much to say on this question, as his interests were mainly in the more physical side of metaphysics. It is more convenient to start with the views of Bishr b. al-Mu'tamir, founder of the school of Baghdād, contemporary with Abu 'l-Hudhail, but perhaps a little older, as he had reached maturity by the beginning of the caliphate of al-Ma'mūn.

Compared with most of the later Mu'tazila, Bishr appears a little naive in his views. He was not so consistently rational or logical, but because of that—at least in respect of the matter in hand—he was more balanced. On the one hand, he acknowledged man's responsibility for his acts; he may even be said to have extended it by his doctrine that a man was the author of the generated effects of his acts, that is, their consequences external to his own body. But on the other hand he clung to the belief in God's omnipotence, so that he even went the length of saying that God has the power to do better than He has in fact done in the ordering of the world; He is under no obligation to do what is best for men. Bishr seems to have held, quite realistically, that some who died as children would have become believers had they grown up, and that this would have been better for them.

[27] *Maq.* 256ff.

With this latter point is probably to be connected his teaching that God has in store a gift or favour *('inda 'llāh luṭf)* such that, if He were to bestow it on an unbeliever, the man would believe and would merit the reward of faith. With later thinkers *luṭf* may have come near to being the "grace" of Christian theology, but in the case of Bishr it seems to be untechnical, so that prolongation of life could be an example of God's favour.

Al-Naẓẓām, a pupil and slightly younger contemporary of Abu 'l-Hudhail in Baṣra, who also had connections with Baghdād, was influential in directing the Mu'tazila along more rationalistic paths. God's operations are now said to be subject to rational considerations. He *must* do what is best. In practice this means that God is said to be under obligation to act according to human ideals of justice and the like. In a sense reason becomes more ultimate than God. To deal with the more obvious objections to this view al-Naẓẓām propounded the further doctrine that, though the best has the nature of a limit, so that there cannot be infinite degrees of goodness, yet there could be an infinite number of things whose goodness would be equal to the goodness of what God has actually done. Presumably he would have said of the children who might have become believers that, while that would have been good, there were features about what in fact happened that made it equally good.

Ja'far b. Ḥarb (d.236) was a pupil of Abū Mūsa al-Murdār, the successor of Bishr b. al-Mu'tamir in Baghdād, but he had also come under the influence of al-Naẓẓām. He followed Bishr in his view about God's favour, but with an important modification. If a man believed as a result of receiving God's favour, then he did not merit the same reward as a man who had believed without receiving any such favour. This shows that the distinction between voluntary and involuntary action was being better understood, and that the former was even being overemphasized—what matters is what a man achieves by his own efforts, and Paradise (or salvation) has to be earned by a man's own hard work. It is also implied here that God's favour is a sort of internal assistance which diminishes what a man has to do for himself.

Man's ability to win Paradise for himself is also prominent in the statement that God has set man in "the best and highest mansion," namely, the mansion of reward. Had God so willed, He could have created man straight away in Paradise as a free, unmerited gift *(tafaḍḍul)*, but what He has actually done is better. In fact God does what is best, as al-Naẓẓām said; and He is here seen to subject to the rational ideas that righteous action must receive an eternal reward, and that Paradise when merited is better than Paradise unmerited. Presumably Ja'far would have said that evil in the world is all due

to man's sin. This was the heyday of the "liberal" optimism of the Mu'tazila, when the whole universe seemed to have been fitted into the scheme of ideas provided by man's reason. Unfortunately a number of facts that had not adequately been accounted for soon made their appearance.

Another member of the school of Baghdād of about the same period, al-Iskāfī (d.240 or 241), strongly maintained God's perfect righteousness; God could not will evil in any sense—He could not even will that unbelief should be base or evil. With this was connected the view that things are good and bad in themselves, and not because God wills them to be so. There is much to be said for such a position; our intellects find something repugnant in the idea that conduct commonly regarded as virtuous should become vicious as a result of an arbitrary act of will on the part of any being, however exalted. Yet the view as stated carries the implication that good and evil (as conceived by the human reason) are more ultimate than God.

It was about this time that various questions were being discussed, such as that of the sufferings of children. Since children are not responsible agents, they cannot be punished for their sins. Yet children do suffer. So it would seem that there is here some injustice or evil, or at least a failure to achieve what is best.

Bishr b. al-Mu'tamir had been quite prepared to admit this, since he held that God is not obliged to do what is best. At times he also seems to have suggested that the suffering was a sort of anticipatory punishment (in the case of those who died as children) for the sins they would have committed when they grew up. This was of course a piece of rather muddled thinking. The common view was that the suffering is intended as a warning to adults, and that afterwards, since suffering where there is no sin would be unjust, the children receive an indemnity *('awḍ)* to make up for it. Now it seems to have been commonly held that this indemnity was in fact admission to Paradise; and that in its turn raised awkward questions. If Paradise is the reward of merit, then the children do not merit it, since it is much more than they deserve as indemnity for their sufferings. If nevertheless they are in exactly the same position as devout Muslims, why did not God in the beginning simply create the people of Paradise in Paradise?

The discussion of the sufferings of animals is more a curiosity than a piece of serious theology, but it illustrates these points further. Animals appeared genuinely to suffer; and, as no duties had been imposed on them, their pain could not be a punishment. Some theologians held that, since God is just, the animals are bound to be indemnified. Others, more bold, ventured to argue about the form of the indemnity. For grazing animals it was easy to imagine everlasting

pastures of luscious grass; but what about beasts of prey? Some spoke of a future state in which they could retaliate upon one another, while Ja'far b. Ḥarb and al-Iskāfī approved of the ingenious idea that, after receiving their indemnity (either on earth or in some limbo), they are sent to Hell to add to the torments of unbelievers and evildoers, themselves remaining unscathed.

About this time there began to be some awareness of the difficulties involved in the very fact that by God's ordering of the world some men will remain everlastingly in Hell. If Hell harms the unbelievers, it was said, then God does harm. To say that God was acting in accordance with His justice did not altogether obviate the difficulty; even though His action was not unjust yet it seemed to be evil in some way. Al-Iskāfī is recorded to have said in this connection that Hell is really good for evildoers. This can hardly be based on a corrective theory of punishment. It quite possibly means that the sufferings of those already in Hell is a warning to those still on earth; but in that case it avoids the real difficulty. But if it means that Hell is good for those actually in it, it would seem to be denying a plain fact. This is the beginning of the breakdown of the rational theodicy.

The next thinker whom we know to have discussed questions of this sort was 'Abbād b. Sulaimān of Baṣra (d. about 250). He rather delighted in subtle logical puzzles, which often seem to us pointless, though this may be due to our ignorance of the context. God, he said, did not make the unbeliever, for "unbeliever" is composed of "man" and "unbelief," and God did not make the unbelief. This is apparently no more than a roundabout way of asserting man's responsibility for his unbelief and its removal from the sphere of God's activity. Such a statement must be balanced, however by 'Abbād's distinction between God's power over evil and the power to do evil (which He does not have). He used the analogy of the relative functions of man and wife in the production of a child. A man has power over his wife's conception of a child, but not power to conceive a child himself. Similarly God has power over movement but not power to move, and power over evil but not power to do evil. This distinction was also used later.

There is a definite movement away from rationalism in the thought of 'Abbād, and he no longer tries to account for all the operations of God in accordance with man's ideas. Contrary to various others of the Mu'tazila, he held that there was no purpose in God's creation of the world (perhaps meaning that it was not for man's benefit). Similarly he thought there was no purpose in the sufferings of children, and that they did not receive any indemnity; and, so far from believing in the indemnification of animals, he maintained they were simply collected and destroyed.

Antirationalistic tendencies are also to be found in al-Jubbā'ī (d. 303), the head of the school of Baṣra at the close of the third century. He belonged, however, to a different group within the school of Baṣra, and denied 'Abbād's distinction between "power over evil" and "power to do evil"; if God brought about conception in a woman, he argued, then God would be *muḥbil*—the word commonly applied to the husband. It would seem that the point of this is to insist that God and man act in the same world; God's power over evil must be such that He is able to prevent the man from doing evil; but this distinction, and also other trends in the thought of the second century, seemed to lead to a separation of spheres of God and man (roughly comparable to Kant's noumenal and phenomenal worlds), which could easily lead to a denial of God's effective control of the sphere of human activity.

In line with this are several other recorded views of al-Jubbā'ī. He strongly objected to the technical conception of "acquisition,"[28] by which God created an act, while man was said merely to "acquire" it—so that God acted in the sense of creating, and man in the sense of "acquiring." Al-Jubbā'ī rejected any such distinction in kind between the operations of man and of God. He even defined "creating" in such a way that it could be applied to human activity, although the power of creating was generally regarded as belonging uniquely to God. And he likewise denied that there is a class of voluntary acts such that no act of this class can ever be produced in man by God by compulsion (that is, by God's creating the act without the concurrence of the man's will), though of course he admitted the distinction between voluntary and involuntary acts. For instance, God may compel a man to an act of speech, or of justice, or of faith, but in that case it will not be the man who speaks or is just or has faith.

While 'Abbād had rigorously denied all connection of God with evil (even saying that illness and disease are not evil), al-Jubbā'ī could admit that what is at first sight evil may be attributed to God. Illness and disease are "metaphorically" evil (perhaps in the sense that, though unpleasant, they gave opportunities for growing in patience); and the punishment in Hell does really hurt people, but nevertheless is justice and wisdom on God's part. More than this, however, al-Jubbā'ī went back to the position of Bishr that God is not obliged to do what is best for men, but he allowed that He did what was best for them in respect of religion. Presumably he meant by this that, while Islām is the perfect religion, God is not obliged to bestow "favours" on men so that they all become believers (it was only too obvious that there were many unbelievers).

Some of these assertions are based on the principle that Paradise

[28] See below, p. 145.

is the reward of man's efforts and that it is good that it should be so. But al-Jubbā'ī was apparently also becoming aware of the inadequacy of a legalistic scheme of rewards and punishments to account for the ways of God, and was ready to admit that, had God so willed, He might have created men straight off in Paradise. This would have been *tafaḍḍul* (perhaps "uncovenanted grace") on God's part. The frequency of this conception of *tafaḍḍul* in the accounts of al-Jubbā'ī's thought indicates his movement away from the school of Baghdād with their emphasis on the "mansion of reward." God's ways, he was beginning to realize, are to some extent inscrutable to man. He even went the length of saying that of two men who had committed the same offence, God might pardon one and not the other.

In al-Jubbā'ī, then, are to be seen two important tendencies: (1) a lessening emphasis on man's power and self-sufficiency to win Paradise for himself; and (2) an increasing recognition that God's ways are partly beyond man's comprehension. These two tendencies bring this whole movement of thought among the Mu'tazila to a parting of the ways. If these tendencies are developed, they must lead to a denial of some fundamentals of Mu'tazilī doctrine; this, I believe, is essentially the course followed by al-Ash'arī. The alternative is to oppose the tendencies, and to follow rationalistic dogma rather than the realistic assessment of facts which was the basis of al-Jubbā'ī's views. The little we learn about Abū Hāshim's views on these matters from al-Shahrastānī and al-Baghdādī suggests that he and the Mu'tazila of the fourth century chose this line; but—as might be expected—they appear to have said nothing of much significance.

III. THE REACTION AGAINST EXTREME FREE WILL VIEWS

In later times it was common for orthodox theologians to make a threefold distinction and to say that orthodoxy with its doctrine of "acquisition" *(kasb* or *iktisāb)* steered a middle course between the extreme of free will (the doctrine of man's *qadar* or power) and the extreme of determinism (the doctrine of *jabr* or compulsion). But the early sources make it fairly clear that this triple classification was not in vogue till about the year 300. Prior to that the terms "Jabarīya" and "Mujbira" had been used by those who held the doctrine of *qadar* to designate all their opponents, though the latter seem to have preferred some other title such as "Ahl al-Ithbāt."

Not only was there no distinction at first, however, between what may be called moderate and extreme determinism *(kasb* and *jabr)* but there was also no distinction between those who upheld God's omnipotence on purely theistic grounds and those whose reasons were rather atheistic and fatalistic. Devout Muslims with a genuine

belief in the majesty and omnipotence of an active and living God could still repeat with approval traditions which relegated man's destiny to "the Pen" or to "his book." Abū Ḥanīfa's belief on the matter was stated in impersonal terms, with no mention of God—"what reaches you could not possibly have missed you."[29] And it was about the middle of the third century that the traditions quoted above were recorded as part of the canonical collections, a fact which implies that men like al-Bukhārī and Muslim accepted them as a statement of orthodox views.

A line of opposition to the Qadarīya that is independent of pre-Islamic fatalism is to be found in the Jahmīya. There is much that is obscure about this sect, and in the third century it would seem to have had much more influence than the space given to it by al-Baghdādī and al-Shahrastānī would suggest. It derived its name from Jahm b. Ṣafwān (d. 128/746), but I am of the opinion that many of the views attributed to him belong rather to about the caliphate of al-Ma'mūn. The Jahmīya of this period were closely connected with the Mu'tazila, and indeed not clearly distinguished from them till later. Both Jahmīya and Mu'tazila emphasized the principle of *tawḥid* (assertion of unity), but the Jahmīya had nothing to do with the Mu'tazilī twin-principle of *'adl* (justice).

The Jahmī account of human action is as follows:[30]

"No one acts in reality except God alone. He is the agent, and men have the acts ascribed to them only by way of metaphor. Thus it is said that the stone moves, the sphere revolves, the sun sets; and yet it is God Who does that with the stone and the sphere and the sun. God has, however, created for man a power by which the act takes place, and the will for it and the choice of it, whereby he wills it, just as He has created for man height by which he is tall and colour by which he is coloured."[31]

The last part of this is conceivably a later modification; it certainly tones down the extreme view that there is no real difference between human acts and "acts" of inanimate bodies.

The interesting thing here, however, is to ask the motive for propounding this doctrine, and when we collect all we can find about the other views of the Jahmīya it seems clear that it was thoroughly theistic. The Jahmīya were concerned to maintain the uniqueness and absolute supremacy of God; this was how they worked out the principle of "asserting the unity." They refused, for instance, to call God living, knowing and willing, because these were attributes applicable to men; He might be named only with unique attributes such as Powerful (or Omnipotent), Bringer-into-Existence, Agent,

[29] *Fiqh Akbar I*, art. 3; see Wensinck, *Muslim Creed*, 103, etc.
[30] *Maq.* 279, accepting Ritter's conjecture.
[31] Q. 57, 3.

Creator, Giver of Life and Death. Their denial, too, that the rewards of Paradise and the punishments of Hell come to an end, which is bound up with their interpretation of the verse: "He is the First and the Last,"[32] seems to arise out of the conviction that no creature is capable of sharing in the eternity of God. They even denied that the attributes of God were eternal (certainly in the case of God's Word, and possibly in the case of the others also).

Thus the Jahmīya were in no wise believers in a predetermined fate, but exalted the majesty and omnipotence of God. They followed out one strand of Qur'anic teaching to the neglect of the other. But they had contacts with Indian religions, and it is conceivable that they had some mystical idea of absorption in the Deity derived from that source.

The Jahmīya are the typical representatives of that extreme determinism which was rejected by the orthodox. The conception of "acquisition" *(kasb, iktisāb)*, which was the basis of the *via media* of orthodoxy, was probably brought into circulation by Ḍirār b. 'Amr. Ḍirār had quite close connections with both Jahmīya and Mu'tazila, and was "president of the university" (literally, held the *majlis* and the *kalām*) in Baṣra before Abu 'l-Hudhail.[33]

The best account of the doctrine of "acquisition" is al-Ash'arī's.

"The ground of the separation of Dirār b. 'Amr from the Mu'tazila was his view that the acts of men are created, and that one act comes from two agents *(fā'ilān)*, one of whom creates it, namely God, while the other acquires it, namely man; and that God is the agent of the acts of men in reality, and that men are the agents of them in reality."[34]

This doctrine was probably an attempt to describe the difference between the acts of men and the "acts" of stones, which had been neglected by the Jahmīya. There is some justification in the Qur'ān for the use of the word *kasb* in this technical way. In a sense it explains nothing; but it at least gives a name to what differentiates responsible human acts from inanimate behaviour, and so helps to keep before us one of the great counter-truths—that man is a responsible agent—while fully asserting the other—that God is omnipotent.

Al-Ḥusain b. Muḥammad al-Najjār held views very similar to those of Ḍirār but showing a higher degree of development, and is therefore to be regarded as a pupil. His credo is given fairly fully by al-Ash'arī and exhibits him as a firm believer in the omnipotence of God. He accepted the doctrine of acquisition and coupled with it

[32] Al-Malaṭī, *Tanbīh*, 30; cp. also my article on *The Origin of the Islamic Doctrine of Acquisition*, JRAS, 1943, pp. 234-247.
[33] *Maq.* 281.
[34] *Istiṭā'a* is not essentially different from *qudra* or *qūwa*, but was preferred by orthodoxy as more fitting to man's status of creature.

one that became a mark of orthodoxy later, the doctrine of the simultaneity of power and act; it is possible that he was the originator of the latter.

This doctrine requires some explanation. It is convenient when speaking in English about the present subject to use the term "free will," but it has to be remembered that the Arabic writers of our period always thought about man's "power" and never about his "freedom" or lack of it.[35] For them, therefore, the question of whether a man was free or not (as we should say) was a question about the precise nature of a man's power. Even the Mu'tazila were ready to agree that a man's power was created by God, but Abu 'l-Hudhail worked out a theory whereby the power was what we should call a power of choice. He distinguished between two moments or times, which he called the moment of *yaf'al* and the moment of *fa'al* (literally "he is doing" or "he will do" and "he did"); we might name them the moments of "resolving" and of "executing" respectively. He thought of the one moment as preceding the other in time, but the point was perhaps rather that one presented the mental or internal aspect of an act and the other the physical or outward. In terms of this conception the power to act was held to exist in the first moment, and so to be connected with the willing of the act, and to be indeed a power over both the act and its opposite. Such was the general view of the Mu'tazila.

It was in opposition to this that al-Najjār held that the power to act occurs (is created by God) along with the act.

"The power may not precede the act; help from God is originated in the time of the act along with the act, and this is the power. One power is not sufficient for the performance of two acts, but for each act a power is originated along with the origination of the act; the power does not endure; the existence or non-existence of the act depends on the existence or non-existence of the power."[36]

There is therefore nothing of choice about man's power to act. It is truly he who acts, for he acquires the power or makes it his own; but throughout God is in control. Something may be said from the psychological standpoint for the refusal to make a distinction in time between the mental and physical sides of an act, but it makes it a little difficult to account for choice between alternatives. It is curious, however, that Muslim theologians did not make the essential difference between al-Najjār and the Mu'tazila consist in whether the power was over one act or over more than one (as we should have done) but in whether it was before or along with the act—a further indication of our distance from these men.

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[35] *Maq.* 283.

[36] The name was probably given because the group affirmed (*athbata*) that the *qadar* belonged to God. It is not clear whether al-Ash'arī extended it to include people like himself.

A study of the passages in the *Maqālāt al-Islāmīyīn* about the "Ahl al-Ithbāt" reveals that by this term al-Ash'arī referred to these two men, together with a group of followers and kindred spirits. The sect, if it may be so called, is one that merits close attention.

It tried to maintain a position of balance between the great Qur'anic conceptions of God's omnipotence and man's responsibility. God's omnipotence was prominent in the teaching of Ḍirār and al-Najjār, as has already been seen. Most of the group further held that faith and unbelief are dependent on God's initiative—a man comes to have faith through God's favour; but God's operation had apparently to be followed by man's acceptance. From al-Najjār came also the view that a man's acts in the strict sense are confined to his own person and do not affect others. The idea seems to be that, if A flings a stone and that hits B, the flight of the stone after it leaves A's hand is something which God may or may not create (or may create in a slightly different direction) according to His good pleasure. That would be a way—though not a very good one—of defending the religious conviction that we are everywhere and always under God's protection and that nothing can happen to us which He does not permit; in other words, it ensures that B cannot be hit by A's stone unless God permits.

The doctrine of acquisition was an attempt to preserve man's responsibility. Another of the group, Muḥammad b. 'Isā Burghūth, insisted very strongly on the unique character of man's voluntary activity, and held that God could not compel a man to believe; He might indeed compel the man to behave in a way that appeared to the observer to be identical with belief or faith, but it would not really be faith, since faith was essentially voluntary. Thus this aspect of the matter was not wholly neglected within the group, though for most the main emphasis was on God's omnipotence.

They could not therefore altogether escape the problem of evil. They made some use of the distinction also found among the Mu'tazila between God's power over evil and His power to do evil, employing, for example, the analogy of knowledge; when God creates knowledge in a man, it is to the man that it is ascribed, not to God, and it is the man who knows thereby. But probably they preferred to rely on the inscrutability of the Divine nature and its opaqueness to human reason. They favoured a purely negative interpretation of the attributes of God; to say He is knowing, for instance, tells us nothing positive about Him, but only that He is not ignorant. And the point of their doctrine of God's essence *(māhīya)* is that this is something which man cannot know in this life, but only in Paradise.

The great importance of the Ahl al-Ithbāt is that they were the first to hold some of the positions that later came to be regarded as

orthodox, and that they defended these by rational arguments. They had connections with the Mu'tazila, moved in the same universe of discourse, and doubtless used similar methods of *kalām*. Later orthodoxy judged that they had fallen into various heresies and refused to acknowledge them; it is not surprising indeed that, as pioneers in this province, they made not a few mistakes. Yet when one comes to consider the historical development of Muslim thought they must be accorded a higher place than is usually given them.

IV. AL-ASH'ARĪ AND HIS CRITICS

Abu 'l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Ismā'īl al-Ash'arī, commonly regarded as the father of orthodox Muslim theology, was born in 260/873 and died in 324/935. He has frequently been misunderstood by modern scholars. Their liberalistic outlook made them out of sympathy with a dogmatic and scholastic theologian, and they also looked upon him as the man chiefly responsible for the downfall of the Mu'tazila whom they admired.

He sat at the feet of the Mu'tazilī al-Jubbā'ī in his native city of Baṣra, and must have been one of the brightest and favorite pupils, perhaps even the destined successor, for he sometimes took the master's place in his absence. It has already been suggested that the tendencies apparent in al-Jubbā'ī were moving forward to a crisis, and such a crisis is found in the experience of al-Ash'arī's conversion at the age of forty to the orthodox party which followed Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal. If my suggestion is correct the conversion will be the natural outcome of the movement away from rationalism present in al-Jubbā'ī.

The break between master and pupil is said to be connected with the story of the three brothers. There were three brothers, one was a good man, one a bad man, and one died as a child. If one says the child is in Paradise, that seems to make no difference between it and the first brother who has led the life of a good Muslim. If one says it is not in Paradise, that seems unfair to the child, for it has done no wrong. If, to excuse its not being in Paradise, one says God made it die when it did in order that it might avoid the sins He knew it would commit if it grew up, one is open to the retort: why did He not make the second brother die as a child before he sinned? And the conclusion is that one cannot give a rational explanation of God's dealings. This story can hardly have been used against al-Jubbā'ī himself, for the views attacked in it are rather the views of the school of Baghdād which he also attacked; but it may be that those of his pupils who approved of Abū Hāshim had reverted to some such views. In any case it is likely that the difficulties in giving a rational

account of human destiny were an important factor in al-Ash'arī's change.

The three dreams marking the stages of his conversion are very much in accordance with what psychology would lead us to expect. Early in the month of Ramaḍān of the year 300 the Prophet appeared to him and said, "Support what is related from myself." Upon that he started to consider various traditions, but he studied them according to the methods of *kalām* with which he was familiar. Some days later the Prophet appeared to him a second time and asked him what he had been doing. He gave an account of his studies, and (in some versions of the story) added that he doubted the vision of God with the eyes in Paradise. Muḥammad replied that it was not the Traditions that were doubtful but the arguments of reason, and repeated his injunction, "Support what is related from myself." After this al-Ash'arī gave up arguments of reason (the *kalām*) altogether and read only Qur'ān and Traditions. Finally towards the end of the month there was another appearance with the same request for an account of his doings. On hearing that he had given up *kalām*, Muḥammad was annoyed and said, "I did not tell you to give up *kalām*, but to support the true traditions."

This story gives a fairly accurate description of al-Ash'arī's new position. The Mu'tazila had not been pure rationalists, but their own rational conceptions had been dominant in their minds, and they had read these into the Qur'ān and into the traditional doctrines; and at times, we have seen, they had tried to subordinate God to rational ideas. Reason certainly gave the standard or norm. Al-Ash'arī did not simply abandon Reason for Revelation but worked out a compromise between the two; Revelation was to be supreme, but Reason had a secondary role of some importance.

The thought of God's omnipotence pervades all the writing of al-Ash'arī. In his statement of the creed of his party he writes:

"They affirm that there is on earth nothing either good or bad except what God wills, and that things exist by the will of God. Thus it is written: 'But ye will not so will, except it be that God willeth'; and thus the Muslims say: 'What God wills is, and what He does not will is not.' "[37]

He likewise held that faith and unbelief come from God. It is quite possible that it was the experience of conversion, in which he felt himself acted upon rather than acting, that made him lay so much stress on man's dependence on God. In this and in other points there are interesting parallels with St. Augustine.

Al-Ash'arī was, of course, familiar with the doctrine of acquisi-

[37] *Maq.* 291; cp. *Ibāna* (Hyderabad), p. 9, l. 2.

tion, but had little use for it. In the very few instances where he uses the term in connection with his own views it is to make perfectly clear that man's acquiring is still within the sphere of God's control. He does not appear to use *jabr* (compulsion) at all, except when recording the views of others, and named the opponents of the Qadarīya the Ahl al-Ithbāt. Indeed the conception of man's responsibility finds hardly any place in this theology, not so much from any theological necessity as because he lacked interest in it.

There is one interesting passage where he develops the distinction between God's power over evil and His power to do evil. His text is the Qur'anic passage about the two sons of Adam (who may be called Cain and Abel for convenience, though the names are not in the Qur'ān). When Cain threatened to kill Abel, the latter took no weapon to defend himself; "Even if you try to kill me," he said, "I am not going to try to kill you, for I fear God; I will that you should take the blame and be an inmate of Hell."[38] In this, al-Ash'arī points out, Abel is in a sense willing that course of action which includes his own killing; yet he is in no way responsible for the sin involved. A similar point is made in connection with a remark of Joseph's. There was here a very hopeful line of development—the use of relations between human wills rather than physical analogies to explain the relations between the will of man and the will of God—but nothing seems to have come of it.

The great achievement of al-Ash'arī was that he laid the foundations of a truly Muslim theology, which preserved all the best religious insights of Islam (as the Mu'tazila had failed to do), but presented them in a form of which the intellect need not be ashamed. He was thoroughly God-centered and not at all fatalistic in his outlook; though he could not deny the generally accepted fatalistic traditions, he drew theistic conclusions from them. It was the might and majesty of God filling all his thoughts that moved him to religious fervour; and his influence has done much to ensure that the essential witness of Islam is to this aspect of the Divine nature.

The School of Abū Ḥanīfa.

Al-Ash'arī was by no means the only theologian who was trying to work out some combination of reason and revelation. The Ahl al-Ithbāt have already been mentioned, and it has been seen how they anticipated some orthodox positions, although they were not admitted to have been completely orthodox. Another movement using methods of *kalām,* but of unquestioned orthodoxy, is found within the legal school of Abū Ḥanīfa. The development may be traced through such documents as the *Waṣīyat Abī Ḥanīfa* (probably early

[38] Q. 5, 31; *Ibāna,* 64f.

third century), the *Bayān* or Creed of al-Ṭaḥāwī (who died as a very old man in 321, the *Fiqh Akbar II* (perhaps roughly contemporary with al-Ash'arī), and the *Sharḥ al-Fiqh al-Akbar* ascribed to al-Māturīdī, but more likely from his followers (later in the fourth century).

Abū Ḥanīfa was specially associated with the employment of "opinion" and "analogy" *(ra'y, qiyās)* in legal matters, and the employment of rational arguments in theology would be a natural development of this tendency. The Ahl al-Ithbāt show traces of his influence; Dirār is said to have derived the doctrine of God's essence or *māhīya* from him, and al-Najjār to have been the pupil of a Ḥanafī jurist.

Of the documents named above the *Fiqh Akbar II* makes use of the conception of acquisition, while preserving the belief in God's omnipotence. The *Sharḥ al-Fiqh al-Akbar* does not mention acquisition, but has a similar conception which it claims to be a *via media,* and definitely attacks the Ash'arīya as holding the extreme of compulsion *(jabr).*

Thus the doctrine of acquisition was invented and worked out in other circles than those in which al-Ash'arī moved, and it was these circles—in particular certain groups of Ḥanafīya—who led the attack on extreme determinism (or the doctrine of compulsion). Al-Ash'arī himself and his immediate followers rather inclined to this extreme determinism, and it was only later that his school adopted the doctrine of acquisition and the claim to a middle position. We do not know how and when the change came about; it was probably in the second half of the fourth century, certainly before the time of al-Baghdādī (d. 427).

Conclusions.

Deep in the heart of the peoples to whom the preaching of Islām came was a sense of the dependence of man upon powers beyond himself—perhaps the outcome of their experiences of desert life. Before the time of Muḥammad this expressed itself in the form of fatalism, the belief that the powers on which man's destiny depends are essentially impersonal, and can be grouped together as Fate or Time. Muḥammad did not try so much to eradicate this sense of dependence as to convince men that they were ultimately dependent upon a living and righteous God Who on the last day would judge them according to their works; to a great extent he succeeded in effecting the transformation, and a truly religious sense of creatureliness appeared.

Gradually, however, something very like the old ideas came upon the stage in a new garb—the Traditions. In the third century these were officially accepted as unimpeachably orthodox by many devout

Muslims, and even an acute thinker like al-Ash'arī with his intense realization of God did not attempt to distinguish between the living God ever acting in the present and this conception of an impersonal Power which fixed man's destiny in the past. Gradually fatalistic practices, explicitly condemned in the Qur'ān, received approval; a mystical or devotional writer of the later third century suggests that to trust in God and do without medical treatment is the higher way.[39]

This study has perhaps served to show that the difference between Christianity and Islam on the question of free will and predestination is in some ways much less than is commonly supposed. The theologians of both at their best have tried to maintain a balance between the conceptions of God's omnipotence and man's responsibility (with which is connected God's justice). But in Islam the balance was soon upset by the deadweight of native fatalism, and there was nothing capable of restoring the balance. Yet in Western Christianity, too, especially among some of the heirs of the Reformation (strangely enough in view of Calvin), official theology has been overwhelmed by the inborn tendency to Pelagianism. I would therefore contend that the difference between Western Christianity and Islam (which undoubtedly exists) is not so much a difference between the religions in their pure state as between the cultures and civilizations in which they are embedded.

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Valley of the Lebanon

War has wrought many changes in the country from whose mountains came the cedars for Solomon's Temple. It was the "cross road of the world" in the time of the Crusaders, and it is again a "cross road" —this time for democracy, for Lebanon and Syria were the first small nations to be granted independence under the "Atlantic Charter". Already, many old customs and fears have been banished from the Valley of Lebanon; women are beginning to take part in the development of their country; anxious to become useful citizens in their liberated homeland. Girls are no longer content to sit at home; they care about what is happening in the world; but the thrilling new experience of leaving home to find outside employment, or doing a man's work in overalls, are adventures which need plenty of adjustment. Proof that they *are* adjusting is seen in the type of subjects they are asking Y.W.C.A. secretaries to "make a talk about". On one occasion the girls requested a discussion on "How to have the fear of God in our hearts"—which the secretary assumed meant the *love* of God. The next most called-for topic was "How to have a good reputation". There followed a series of talks on the following related topics: "Our Relationship to Our Fellowmen" and "Our Relationship to Ourselves". Future leaders of future democratic governments in Lebanon and Syria will be needed, and will no doubt come from the young people who are today the concern of mission schools.—*World Outlook.*

[39] Al-Kharrāz, *K. al-Ṣidq* (ed. Arberry), section 9, etc.

MUHAMMAD 'ABDUH THE REFORMER

Almost all of the biographies of Muhammad 'Abduh have shown that the principal goal in his life was the religious reform of Islam. This opinion, however, is true only to a certain degree. If one studies the activities of the Egyptian reformer, considers especially the extent of his teaching, and examines more carefully his works, one will be able to see that above all it was reasons of a moral order which explain the reforms of 'Abduh.

From the time of his leaving the university of al-Azhar, young 'Abduh dreamt of the moral problem with regard to social action. When, in 1882 'Abduh left for Europe and collaborated in the publication of the journal *al-'Urwah al Wuthkâ* (The unbreakable tie), his hope was to contribute to the reform of his country in bringing it to understand and practice patriotism, liberty and hard work. Later it was he, as Grand Mufti, who affirmed the rights of the *ijtihâd,* that is the liberty to think independently of all authority. And it was he who declared on several occasions that the studies of the Muslim *'ulamâ* were not worth an hour of effort if they did not lead to action, or relate to the conduct of life.[1] For 'Abduh theory and practice were always closely joined. And it is only arbitrarily that one can separate his ideas from his actions.

Muhammad 'Abduh was, in fact, a born moralist, and he wanted more to act directly on the conscience than to isolate himself in order to build a theological system more or less coherent. Like Plato, 'Abduh, it seems, believed that only direct contact would permit the transmission of ideas among others. 'Abduh was above all a creative force. His personal actions and his teachings have had a profound moral influence.

The moral aspect for him dominates even in theological or philosophical questions, as for example the problem of the attributes of God, that of prophecy, or that of freedom. This predominance of the moral side appears in particular in his commentary on the Quran. This fact is not astonishing. 'Abduh, like every thinker conscious of his mission, knew the importance of the moral and social rôle of thought.

The rôle of 'Abduh in Egypt, it seems to me, resembles that of the ancient moralists under the Roman empire. At Rome, writes Martha,[2] the philosophers, and in particular the Stoics who were concerned primarily with morals, influenced directly the manners and customs by personal teaching, of which the seriousness had something

1. *Târîkh*, I, pp. 943-945; *Al-'asr*, pp. 77-83; *Tafsîr al-Manâr*, I, pp. 152-3.
2. Martha, *Les moralistes sous l'empire romain*, 2e éd. 1866, pp. 1 seq.

religious. It was the same in Egypt at the end of the nineteenth century, where the influence of the Grand Mufti was exercised by example rather than by doctrine. The entire effort of 'Abduh was directed towards moral action. If he fought certain customs and practices, certain popular religious beliefs, if he denounced injustice and social and political abuse, and finally if he endeavored to modify the methods of teaching at the Azhar, it was always to reform the morals in Islamic society in general, and in Egyptian society in particular.

The movement of religious reform, with which the name of 'Abduh is associated in the Muslim world, was in his reformative mind only a *means* for the realization of an *end, i.e.,* moral reform in its proper sense. The Grand Mufti said expressly, "The object of religious reform is to direct the faith of the Muslim in his religion, so as to make him better, and to ameliorate his social condition. The task of the Muslim reformer is to elevate the religious beliefs, to put an end to the errors resulting from the misunderstanding of religious texts, so that once the beliefs are purified, the actions would be more in conformity with morals." Thus religion, for Muhammad 'Abduh, is the most adequate means, and the most efficient instrument for the realization of this moral reform. Because minds are not sufficiently ripe to replace the precise dogmas by abstract principles, one must begin by the reform of religion. "If the reformer," he says, "makes a direct appeal to a morality, or to a speculative philosophy which has no religious character, he must raise a new edifice for which he has neither materials nor a single builder. But if religion is capable of elevating the level of morality, of giving to actions a solid base, and of inciting, urging the believers to seek happiness by the most appropriate means, if the followers of this religion are very devoted to it, and if the religion is always present in their minds, if finally we have less difficulty in returning the people back to this religion than in creating something new, of which they haven't a clear conception, why should they leave this religion and seek other means?"

To use an expression of a French orientalist, 'Abduh hoped that "modern Islam would basically remain Islam, but would modernize itself." Nevertheless 'Abduh feared for the Muslim society, in the case of a complete secularization, "a moral poverty which nothing would support." As a matter of fact the moral system of the *fukahā'* (canonists) and the conservative *'ulamā'* seemed to him quite weak. But a mass of traditions had maintained up to that time among the people, "a certain moral behavior the social value of which cannot be denied."

Thus manifestly the aim of the reform of Muhammad 'Abduh is not, as it has wrongly been thought, the realization of the political

unity of Muslim countries, and still less the holy war against Christians. Muhammad 'Abduh formally refused to have pan-Islamic ideas which he considered in other respects as chimeric, and which only existed in the imagination of certain Europeans.

As has justly been said by an English orientalist, "In so far as pan-Islamism put forward a deliberate program for the Muslim world, it was guided by reactionary and absolutist aims, but any movement in that direction was already impossible; no matter how earnestly the Muslims might strive to exclude new trains of thought, how vigorously they might oppose their spread, it was a desperate and doomed cause. The intellectual and material predominance of Western Europe, to say nothing of its economic supremacy, was so enormous that it must inevitably have forced its way into the life of the Muslim community against all resistance. Thus the political doctrine of Pan-Islamism was destined to prove a discordant and weakening element rather than a strengthening force, in the task of readjusting the outlook and realising the aspirations of the Muslim world."

In fact for a long time 'Abduh had renounced all political reforms, as had his mentor Jamāl al-dīn al-Afghani. After the disappearance, at the end of 1884, of the journal *al-'Urwah al-Wuthkā*, and after the failure of their revolutionary projects, 'Abduh proposed to his mentor to consecrate henceforth their efforts to the education, and to the creation of a sort of special school, which, following a new method, would contribute to the regeneration of the manners and customs, and to the formation of an élite among Egyptian youth, which would better correspond to the moral idea which they pursued. Every result obtained by this means was certainly much slower than could be obtained by a revolution, but it is also more profound and certain. 'Abduh believed that only progressive and methodical reforms were susceptible of giving the desired results. That is why he early applied himself to the work of reform in education, an indispensable condition to his mind, of putting right the Muslim morality. The educational and moral aspect of the modernism of Muhammad 'Abduh explains, in fact, the profound and durable influence which he has had in Egypt and in the Muslim world.

OSMAN AMIN

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YUNUS EMRE

Yunus Emre, who lived approximately 1275-1350 A.D., ranks as the earliest of the Ottoman Turkish poets. Almost nothing is known of his life, other than what may be gleaned from his poems. Even the authenticity of many of these poems is doubtful.

The following is a translation, somewhat abridged, of four articles which were published in the Istanbul *Jumhuriyet* during June, 1943, written by Bay Burhan Toprak, head of the Academy of Fine Arts, Istanbul.

This author has for many years taken a deep interest in the poet, Yunus Emre. In 1943, after studying and collating many of the oldest manuscript collections, he published a two-volume edition of the Divan in which he included over three hundred poems which he judged to be the authentic work of Yunus. In so doing he eliminated hundreds more which carry the poet's signature but are presumed to be by other hands. He also re-arranged the poems, which are customarily published in alphabetic order, putting them in an approximate historical order which would show the development of the poet's thought. In reading carefully through the three hundred poems of this Divan one is sometimes conscious of such wide differences in feeling and workmanship that one wonders why the process of elimination was not carried through even more drastically.

In translating I have employed the word sonnet throughout in a very loose sense to indicate a brief poem rarely of less than ten or more then twenty lines. It is not to be confused with the fixed form of the Western sonnet.

Burhan Toprak's very interesting and ingenious attempt to reveal the course of the poet's spiritual development by means of arbitrary selection from his verses may not be entirely sound or justifiable. Since we lack information as to the circumstances under which these were written, other equally competent selections could lead to very contradictory results. But these selections are particularly interesting when read as a commentary on the thought and heart of Burhan Toprak himself. Also, the argument serves as a convenient vehicle for introducing a considerable number of excellent selections from the Divan.

This Divan is a little-explored mine of mystical teaching, experience and aspiration, much of which has the quality of awakening deep and sympathetic response in the Christian heart.

F. Lyman MacCallum

A book which appeared some twenty-five years ago contains the following: "When we read Yunus, we hear an artless, naive dervish singing with an inspired tongue. He opens his heart to us as he cries to God with tears and complaints that are charged with the most natural simplicity. Every hymn glows with his singleness of heart."

Were Yunus merely the artist suggested by these lines, he would be worth scarcely a moment's notice. But this is not Yunus. Yunus is that poet to the interpretation of one of whose sonnets Niyazii Misri devoted eight months of labour. Of Yunus, Ismail Hakki, the philosopher of Bursa, has justly said: "To no other writer in the Turkish tongue has it been granted to declare so much of truth with such poetic art. All who have followed him, proclaiming truth with the poet's tongue, have been guests at his table."

Yet how can it be that one for whom we claim the highest place in Turkish literature should be dismissed by others as a tiresomely simple folk-poet? The answer is obvious. We are in the presence of a man whose great talent refused to be bound by the strict canons and traditions of Oriental poetry. The schools disowned him because he used the common tongue which they scorned. And today, the same habit of thought in a different guise, praises him merely for using the common speech. They call him "Folk-poet," and make great play with such adjectives as, simple, artless, pure, clear. And again the real artist is overlooked. Yunus took the rude speech of his day and blended with it a divine melody and great naturalness. The resulting sonnets are like an atmosphere which all men may breathe. Yet this very miracle has been his undoing. The infinite pains he took in order to achieve naturalness, the obstacles he had to surmount in order to speak as he thought, all this time, this care, this discipline, these labours have earned him the epithets of folk-poet (in the dull sense), and propagandist for religion and morals.

Whereas Yunus, who called himself the little poor man *(miskin)*, was one who kept as far as possible from those who make a business of religion and morals. His *Divan* (collected poems) is almost like a private diary, yet it has become the "Divina Comedia" of the Turkish-speaking peoples. In it are to be found the grandeur of the human spirit, and the brevity of existence, the tragedy of man's inability to direct his destiny, the struggle between emotion and reason, all the greatness and misery of mankind, the torment and the consolation. Here art is not a mere play of words. Thought and reflection are induced by every line. The tragic contest between heart and head is revealed in all its intensity.

But who is this Yunus, whom I would thus acclaim as one of the main sources of Turkish thought and artistic feeling? Where was he born, and how did he live? What human tragedies brought him to a

fearful despair, and then at last into that consciousness of Divine love which is the most beautiful of hopes? Where and how did he die, or at least, where is he buried? To all these questions there is no answer. Our only authoritative source is the Divan into which he poured his aspirations. And his verses tell us almost nothing. A few years ago this great artist was thought to be Sait Emre. Then he was declared to be Ashik Pasha. Such conjectures are merely the writhings of a baffled curiosity. In this twentieth century, some who lack any feeling for things of the spirit have had the hardihood to debate whether or not Yunus was totally illiterate! To ignore all this is the only possible response to such speculations concerning this poet who gave to the Turkish language its supreme examples of flexible and dynamic expression and of spiritual music, and whose master hand revealed the constantly changing panorama of the inner world.

Some who take Yunus too literally may retort by quoting such lines as:

"What doth poor Yunus know, who ne'er read black nor white?"
Biçare Yunus ne bile, ne kara okudu, ne ak?

But here he is voicing his scorn and hatred for this world's knowledge. So intensely does he long to forget worldly wisdom that he tries to persuade himself that he has never known it. He would like to uproot and discard all head-won learning. In his effort to achieve maximum dis-instruction, to arrive at that pure stage of the spirit's innocency which is illiteracy, he constantly denies his learning.

And truly, when the spirit is in torment, what avail is there in accumulations of the non-spiritual? As Pascal has said: "In times of affliction, the knowledge of outward things does not compensate for ignorance of the soul; but knowledge of the soul will always console me for ignorance of what is extraneous."

If we are dissatisfied with our worn-out self, must we not disown the disappointing past and the old things, before we can be renewed? New life can come only by dying completely to the old. This transformation from a poor, sterile, rebellious, miserable, tear-filled existence to one that is rich, satisfied, outflowing, everlasting—this is the adventure narrated in these verses.

In the sonnets which I believe to be those of Yunus' youth, the underlying theme is an endless sorrow—complaints regarding his life and his sins, a feverish search, a fear of death so terrible and constant as to reach almost the intensity of a mania. In this period our poet has no established ties. He is alone and friendless as no one else in all the world. He believes in one thing only—that he must die. His poem which reminds us that not even Muhammad could live to enjoy the homage of eighteen thousand worlds expresses this anguish:

"Scorn not this earth, this earth in which so much lies buried
Where countless saints and myriad prophets sleep. . . ."

The entire poem, which is a roll-call of the mighty dead, is magnificent, and the final couplets in particular reveal the whole spirit of the poet:

"Think, then, of these, God's many faithful servants;
Would I might count the elect, and see His princes sleeping!
Yunus, thou too must die, thou too must black earth enter—
Black earth which closes o'er so many sinful servants."

His condition is one of indecision and confusion. For as yet the fires of faith are not alight in him. Death is full of terrors, extinction its sole meaning. He wishes to believe, to surrender himself, but as yet this is a vain longing. As he sees it, the truth is that all things are rushing by with frantic speed. The survival of man's soul is doubtful. All life moves towards an abyss. Therefore we should not scorn the earth. Treading on it we are trampling the heart of Mejnun, the eyes of Leyla, the lips of Shirin. Life is a dream within a dream. Since from the world of the dead no message returns to us, how can one believe in and be comforted by these dreams?

"Guests who have gone from this world of deceit
Say nothing, they give no sign.
Those o'er whose graves wave the grasses and corn
Say nothing, they give no sign."

The picture is drawn with stark reality, for which reason it is also a warning:

"Be not duped by this world's glitter,
Bane it is, taste not the honey."

But this counsel is useless, for with bitter anguish of conscience he confesses that despite all his efforts he is not yet dead to worldly pleasure:

"For naught has my life all been wasted,
I fed it to fires unnumbered;
May no one e'er do to another
The injury I to myself did.
For the price of a cracked water-pot,
My jewels most rare have I traded.
Of falsehood my deeds are compounded;
Why have I the truth so neglected?
The hour of his night-fall none knoweth,
Yet to ambition I gave a free rein;
I wagered my life on a gamble,
And losses have been my sole winnings.
I tasted not honey but poison,
And with bane have I seasoned my food.
The sins of poor Yunus are heavy,
Without cease to God's mercy I look."

Now we see Yunus standing in hesitation, whether to yield to his appetites or to Divine love, whether to submit to God's will or to live in determined rebellion. In another poem he can merely implore:

Seversen ol ulu Allahi, canan illeri kandadir?
"For God's sake, pray tell me, where lieth the land of true lovers?"

Not yet has he arrived at the stage of understanding the secret: "Turn where you will, there you shall see the face of God." He tries to lay hands on truth, and he cries out: "What shall I do? I am going mad. I must know how to live." He longs to be master of his soul, to have eternity in his grasp. But in this miserable world, of what can one say: "This is mine?" Of nothing. He longs, not for the play of intellect, but for light and certainty.

Wherever assurance is impossible, great spirits such as that of Yunus do not doubt, they boldly deny. To that which may perhaps exist they do not wish to give even a name. Rather than accept half-truths, which consist of hateful doubts by means of which opposites can be reconciled and cancelled out, they prefer denial, a sheer and frightful definiteness. So did Yunus; he denied all he knew. He realized that any lesser course would leave the vestiges of this conflicting knowledge clinging to his spirit forever. Stripping himself of worldly knowledge was easy. But from hope he could still not win free. When one has perceived the beauty that there is in the hope of eternity, nothing is more bitter than to bid it an endless farewell. He searches earth for a sign that will make possible belief in eternity, and finds it only in his rational being. Here he would base his belief, knowing well that the hour of choice is approaching. In "Has Ever the World Seen Such an Unsmiling Blemish as I?" he expresses his measureless sorrow, and begins to realize that so long as he remains an egoist, a slave to his habits and passions, there can be no progress. The ideal or the selfish—he must abandon this duality. Yet from afar he has caught the scent of the Beloved:

"Give me a love divine, that I the world may lose;
Myself may I mislay, where search shall naught avail;
From all self empty me, then fill me full with Thee;
Slay me in this world now, that I in that may live.
Fill me with great amaze, till day and night seem one;
Thyself my endless joy, no face but Thine my hope.
My soul has caught Thy scent, now be the world erased;
The dwelling few men know; where, where should I Thee seek?"

Even yet he is pursuing the imaginary. He begins to feel that one day he will have to give up his loves that he may accept the Unity of God, surrendering thenceforth to Him instead of to Satan:

"Submit thy way to the Unity, and turn thy face to God;
A day must come when the winding-sheet thy raiment sere shall be."

Some of his sonnets have almost the air of sermons:

"O thou that lovest the world, one day thou wilt leave all and go;
Not thine will be the intent, thou wilt do whatever is bid."

But suddenly the earlier tone changes, and the closing couplets take the form of a self-examination:

"Thou hear'st not the voice of God, nor heedest the word of the just;
Thou seest not the unseen world, nor know'st in what tongue thou should'st cry;
Thy guide, the voice of desire, thou art drown'd in the sea of sin;
Thy soul with filth hast thou smirched; henceforth thy repentance make good.
Yunus, say not: 'I love God,' if only thy tongue speak the word;
Who entreateth that King must bring gifts more costly than empty breath."

Here let us consider for a moment the theory that our poet was mild and innocent. For comparison let us take Baudelaire, doubtless the most outstanding as well as one of the most dissolute poets of our time. The innocent dervish and the author of the "Fleurs du Mal" accuse themselves in identical terms. Are not both poets brothers in spirit?

"This cruel self I did petition;
To gain the lying world I struggled;
Angels to write my sins are helpless.
Show mercy, Lord, show mercy!"

cries Yunus, while Baudelaire moans: "O my God, give me the courage and strength to survey my spirit and body without disgust." Both are men beset by God, yet, lacking a firm faith, they have regarded life as a brief opportunity set between two voids, and have so plunged into the ocean of sin that they loathe themselves. But in this parallel struggle, the great poet of ennui will continue to lie under the lash of conscience, while Fate will carry Yunus to the heights. For, despite all his waverings, Yunus, to use his own phrase, "was never more than a step from God." He knows that evil does not upbuild. He knows also that man, in whom God took pride as He created him in supreme perfection of form, was created for endless progress. Whatever the harvest we carry with us into eternity, it must be sown and reaped here. In the path of progress, the man who spends two days alike has wasted one. All this Yunus knows, and as a means to acceleration he considers death:

"O Lord, what my state, that night I enter the tomb,
If my works be not good, that night I enter the tomb?
Sear me not in the flames, drown me not in my sins,
My torch blot not out, that night I enter the tomb.
Lord, turn all to the best, with Muhammad our rest,
May my tomb be of light, that night I enter the tomb.

. . . .

May my friends stand by me, my profession and faith,
Nor take sense from my head, that night I enter the tomb.
Dervish Yunus pleads thus, tears of blood in his eyes;
Lord, withdraw not thyself, that night I enter the tomb."

After reaching this state, no course is left for Yunus but to attach himself to a dervish leader—possibly the legendary Taptuk Emre. We cannot doubt that Taptuk initiated his disciple into all the secrets of mysticism. But Yunus was not one who could readily surrender. Tradition has it that for years the poet lived in a state of insubordination. Yet this strong spirit was not one which could permit itself endless indulgence. Whatever is to be, whatever must be, he would wish it done and over with. He knows that the moment of yielding to God will be one of terrible anguish. Yet he says: "I must, I must, assuredly I must!" For the sake of this ideal he must give up many things which are utterly sweet and attractive. Life must be lived for progress, not for pleasure. When mental strife has reached this pitch, all things become vain. Life has lost its attraction and death its dread. Yunus is now the great pessimist, looking on life as darkly as did the Preacher himself:

"Suppose that the realms of this world were all yours,
That you gamed-for and won all the wealth they contain,
That on Solomon's throne you were seated as king,
With giants and spirits obeying your word;
Now add Pharaoh's gain, also Nushrivan's gold,
And Croesus' vast store to the wealth you possess,
'Tis all but a mouthful which you can but chew;
So why chew forever? gulp once and be done.
Your life is an arrow which strains on the string,
Such an arrow must fly, so consider it sped.
Each breath that you spend leaves one less in the purse,
Even now 'tis half-spent, so consider it gone.
You are plunged in the sea, the waves at your throat,
Struggle not like a fool, but regard yourself drowned.
Though in comfort you live long ages, Yunus,
Life must end with a breath; pay it now, and forget."

This poem marks a turning point in the Divan. Hereafter Yunus speaks with a different accent, as though truth were now in his grasp. He declares it with a sort of pride which sits ill on his sad face. Now come the sonnets which state that he existed ere the foundations of the world were laid, that the world has oft seen him come and go, that

the ocean is one drop of his substance, and that Law waits outside the gates of Truth. But among these poems are found some real jewels, such as:

"Count it not strange if madness touch the man in whom love burneth;
Thy distance keep from love if thy good name to thee be precious;
Who guards his name as something worth may not with love hold traffic;
Who hops too oft from branch to branch gets plucked of his wing-feathers."

Trying to free himself from the fear of death, he says in another sonnet:

"Count it not strange should I for Thee a thousand souls surrender;
That Thou dost live is soul enough, my joy now to be soulless.
While I Thee love no hand of Death can e'er approach this dwelling;
Dare Azrail snatch from this frame Thy soul, by which I'm living?"

For, "Ere I came into the world, my spirit loved Him," says the poet. Therefore Attainment, to be obliterated and lost in God, is his ordained end. Yet faith, which for others is a simple matter of judgment, decision and practice, presents him with the greatest difficulties. "I do not argue," indicates that even yet he has not escaped from the bonds of logic. "Go hang by the neck on the gallows-tree of trust," shows him still in strife with self-will.

"All eyes attend on Him, though none their gaze directs;
Which sees and which the seen? this riddle who can solve?"

is evidence that still he is in search. Following these are "Under my robe I wear my sin"; (in God's presence) "Wisdom is silenced"; "By day and night I burn"; and "At me they scoff." His sadness increases as he asks what to do with his runaway heart, or declares that he is "Neither drunk nor sober," and that life seems to have passed "In the twinkling of an eye." The poems of this period are filled with weariness, hopelessness and a boundless fear of death. For this rebel spirit is at the same time conscious of, and rejecting that true life of peace, beauty and harmony for which all men long, and which is the antithesis of the life we now live.

"I used to long for God, what if now I've found Him;
But yesterday I wept, what if now I'm laughing?"

That is, denial and faith, existence and non-existence have become equal, and in all sincerity he believes that his last hope, the Dervish way, is also closed to him:

" 'Gainst assaulter no hand,
'Gainst reviler no tongue;
No self-will in thy heart—
Thou canst not be a dervish."

Like a confession from a secret diary comes the following verse, which shows the degree of his spiritual attainment at this period:

"From myself Thy love hath drawn me; I need Thee, only Thee;
Day and night with love I'm burning; I need Thee, only Thee;
In plenty there's no joy, in dearth have I no plaint,
In Thy love my consolation; I need Thee, only Thee.

. . .

The Sophists seek discourse, the Ahis yearn for heaven,
Mejnun may his Leyla sigh for; I need Thee, only Thee.
My body they may kill, its ashes scatter wide,
Still my dust would not cease crying: I need Thee, only Thee.
They call it Paradise; those kiosks and houris few,
Give it all to who may want it; I need Thee, only Thee.
Yes, Yunus is my name, my fever daily mounts,
Thou my goal, here and hereafter; I need Thee, only Thee."

Enthused by this love, Yunus accuses himself of searching absent-mindedly for that which is already in his hand. You have found all that you need, what more do you seek? What is to be gained by constantly leaving port on fresh voyages?

"Make contentment thy friend, nor answer the call of desire.
Hast thou come to the truth? Stand fast there, for that is thy place."

But neither is it right to halt. He must move towards what is noblest in him, and center-down deep within. This longing finds expression in some of his verses:

"I long to enter for once the city within my frame;
I yearn to gaze on the face of Him who reigneth there.
His voice I hear day by day, His face I never may see;
At times I'd give soul and all His face to behold and love."

What is within, himself, his essence—that is to say, God—this is his constant search:

"Fill me with such amaze that I with love may burn;
May I where'er I look see naught but Thee alone."

If he is to yield so fully, he must strip himself of much which belongs to the world. Yunus has understood this:

"For many men their wealth is worse than want and need;
Where so much wealth abounds, the needy spirit pines."

To strip, to throw out ballast, this is now the one rule for progress. Come what may, he must now surrender to God:

"Risk all, if but it come to pass, what matter,
If but the spirit find his God, what matter?
For love will come, all wants shall be provided;
If not, let them remain with you, what matter?
One day the earth those eager eyes must cover,
Then welcome earth before its time, what matter?"

This hesitation, this duality has so shaken him that he supposes no other human being is so miserable as he:

"Can there be in all this world
Such a vagrant soul as I;
Breast a wound and eyes a fount,
Such a vagrant soul as I?"

It is obvious that a life so hemmed in on every side is not worth living. Yunus realizes that the period he allowed himself is now at an end, and that henceforth simplicity and singleness of heart must rule. The sonnets which follow are poems of acceptance, of making fast to the ideal. Thus does Yunus attain to his eternal aspect. For he has accomplished all that God has demanded of him. He has put out of his life all the things which, until now, he had feared to lose. For the sake of life eternal he has died to the pleasures of this passing world. He has shed and shaken off passions and desires, position and fame, pleasures and loves. He complains of nothing. Formerly he spoke often of poverty *(miskinlik),* but had not the will to follow it; now that he has set foot on that road, his anguish is relieved. He has become God's little, poor slave. Even should he suffer occasional assaults of self-will, from which while life lasts, complete immunity is impossible, these result only in a temporary crisis. The overture to Yunus' life of devotion begins with these lines:

"Thou art gracious, Thou art clement; God, to Thee my hand I give;
None there is to trust besides Thee; God, to Thee my hand I give."

That he has at last won to faith and trust is clearly shown in this sonnet and in those which follow:

"We have drunk the sherbet of Allah, Elhamdulillah!
We have crossed the ocean of power, Elhamdulillah!
Dry were we but now are we fresh; foot were we but now we are head,
Mounting upwards as birds have we soared, Elhamdulillah!
Condensing first, a spring were we; expanding then a stream we grew,
On we flowed and plunged in the ocean, Elhamdulillah!
In Taptuk's court our joy we find, within his gate his slaves are we,
Green was I, says Yunus, but ripe now, Elhamdulillah!

Now we see Yunus in the very moment of surrender:

"Soul of my soul art Thou, no resting place but Thee,
I crave not Paradise, I swear, if Thou'rt not there.
My eye sees only Thee, Thou art my every word,
I seek Thee everywhere, and hunt no game but Thee.
Since I myself forgot, and now to Thee have gone,
Whate'er my state or lot, no peace know I save Thine.
If, like Jerjis, Thou strike and slay me seventy times,
Shameless would I still turn and seek Thy face again."

At last Yunus has found union with the Object of his search:

"I have found the Friend of friends, let this my life be looted;
I've surpassed profit and loss, let this my shop be looted;
I have traversed endless thought, wearied am of heat and cold,
To the garden-head I've won, let other fields be looted.
Yunus cries: I know the sweet, I've sucked honey and sugar,
Honey, now, of honies found, let this my hive be looted."

If we consider what has gone before, we must suppose that a man so enlightened as the poet must understand before he can give assent. But it is becoming clear to him that he must follow the logic of his emotions, and believe without fully understanding. This he must do if he is to give eyes to his blind spirit, and every moment perceive that he is in the midst of a new way of life. The following fragment from one of his sonnets shows the degree of his absolute love for God:

"Who once Thy face hath seen shall ne'er that sight forget,
The tongue that praises Thee, shall sing no lesser worth.
Let but the man of prayer behold Thee with his eye,
Forgot will be his psalm, obeisance and shrine.
If one should ask the price for which I'd turn from Thee,
The wealth of both the worlds were insufficient fee.
Were both worlds filled entire with gardens and with flowers
No scent like Thine were there in all those rosy bowers.
Basil and rose are sweet, but sweeter, far, to love;
The Truly Loved shall ne'er from lover's thoughts depart.
When trump of Israfil all creatures shall collect
May I hear nothing then save Thine eternal fame."

On making this faith his own, Yunus becomes a moralist. Morals have attracted all great minds, and Yunus, who is attempting to build up for himself a new basis of life, does not shrink from propagating his ideals. For him the world within is everything. What matter the outer form, he says, and cries:

İçin imaret olmadan dişindaki mamur nedir?
"What means this outward show, if naught be sound within?"

He declares that truth is such a jewel that once it has been seen, to turn and look at anything of lesser value is impossible:

"The eye which once hath seen Thee, what else can satisfy;
The soul which once hath felt Thee, how still in flesh remain;
Who once of Thee hath tasted, what food shall him content:
The soul with Thee afflicted, what doctor may restore?"

Once he doubted his own existence. Now he speaks thus of the unseen world:

"This city hath a King whose gifts are unto all;
Who meets this King finds wealth, who else is nothing worth."

Or thus:

"How should death come to one in whom Thyself art life?
The spirit dead would live, if Thou to it shouldest come.
To die for Thee is life, is finding deathless life,
Since spirit dead will live when Thou to it dost come."

But this union which revives the dead spirit is not something to be cheaply purchased:

"The price to pay is thy life, no herds or wealth suffice;
Will He we love come to hand ere other loves we cede?"

To possess the truly Beloved one must abandon all earthly loves. For to employ Yunus' own simile, though love appears simple, it is a very long syllable. Almost every great mystic can enter into the meaning of Pascal, that great genius of physics and mathematics, when he wrote of "comforting, comforting, comforting tears" on the night in which he turned to religion. Even after entering upon the Way by the door of Humiliation and Resignation, we may still be hurled from the heights into the abyss by pride or accident. For this, the joy of every truly great man who abandons the world is mixed with sadness. To this feeling Yunus gives expression in the following words:

"If I tell thee of that land, wilt thou listen to my words;
Faring forth to find the Friend, wilt thou join me in that road?
In that land a vineyard is, bitter poison is its wine,
Poison which dissolves its cup—darest thou that poison drink?
Penance lasting all the way is that road's viaticum;
Canst thou give away the sweet and thyself the poison quaff?"

In a poem of boundless love for his spiritual counsellor (sheikh) are these lines:

"My Sheikh is the candle to which I the moth am,
O lovers, you're bidden, to burn who is ready?
Who for God will his goods give, give all he possesses,
For love's sake his pride shed, for this who is ready?

The martyr they bury with blood on his garments,
His life for the Comrade to give who is ready?
Now sighs and salt tears are poor Yunus' employment,
The meal cooked with poison to eat who is ready?"

This article began with a criticism of those who regard Yunus as simple. In quoting now one of the world's most exquisite poems, I shall at the same time try to show how complicated was his personality:

"I bear a love for Thee more inward than my soul;
I have a path to Thee more inward than my creed.
The Law, the Mystic Way are paths for him who walks,
But fruits of truth are gleaned more inwardly than these.
Who leaves religion's fold, his deed is blasphemy,
Yet blasphemy may be more inward than much faith.
Say not: I am in me! no longer am I so,
There is a Me in me, more inward than myself.
I cannot touch the One who took myself from me,
For who would dare intrude more inward than the King?
They say that Solomon with bird and beast could speak,
But there's a Solomon more inward than himself.
God hath Himself revealed to this one and to that,
But some desire a gift more inward e'en than this.
Thy love on me outpoured hath robbed me from myself,
Oh, what sweet ill is this, too inward far for cure.
Poor Yunus is my name, my eye on Thee did chance,
Thy slave am I, my rank more inward than all kings'."

Time and experience have now done their work. Yunus has fallen from scornfulness to entreaty, from intellectuality to repentance, from self-possession to nothingness, from caprice to the common speech, from arrogance to mortification, from pride to humiliation. He has learned that simplicity is the highest goal towards which the mind of man may strive. He no longer gathers grapes from the plum branch,[1] for true faith is now his, and he has begun to invite others to that clear spring from which he has drunk so copiously:

"All who ever valour won, reached it through humility;
He that looketh proudly round, down the stairs shall tumbled be.
Not a word the deaf man hears, thinks bright day is blackest night,
Oh, how blind the sceptic's eye, though the world is full of light.
In the heart God sets His throne, on the heart He looks in love,
Forfeit are both worlds to thee, if another's heart thou break.
Whatsoe'er thou think'st thyself, think the same of other men,
This is what the Four Books teach, if there's meaning in their word.

[1] A reference to one of Yunus' most baffling poems, set in the form of spiritual riddles.

It is said: There is a friend who than brother better is,
Sweeter also than a son, if he be indeed a friend.
Have you proved that he is true? at his feet, then, lay your head,
Take and give your very heart, if at all the means you find.
Have you learned that he is false? give your all and get you free;
This is wisdom from the great, if to hear your ears are apt.
Few words are a load for men, many words the load for beasts,
To the wise, one word's enough, if in you the matter lies.
May Yunus ne'er leave the way, nor in proud place take his stand,
Judgment, flame nor torment see, if his heart on God is set."

Now has come the period of unreckoning faith. Yunus sings in the purest simplicity of what he believes. With Goethe, who says: "The spirit commands, the body is compelled," so does Yunus declare:

Can bir ulu kimsedir, beden onun atidir
"Spirit is a man of might, and his horse the body is."

In other poems he affirms that all the Law, morals and the Mystic Way itself depend on integrity of the spirit:

"If man there be who curseth us, God grant him all for which he asks;
The man who would me hurt and strike, I'll fall before and kiss his feet;
On him who stoneth us with stones, may roses in abundance show'r;
While he who would my torch blot out, may God his torch make brighter still."

It is not surprising that Yunus proclaimed these doctrines. For every great creative spirit which, amid desperate fears, has once set foot in this path arrives in the end at these conclusions. Tolstoy is our most recent example. For ideals are created, not for singing and discussion, but above all to be lived, and to give life.

Bay Burhan Toprak
Translated by F. Lyman MacCallum

For another interesting article on Yunus Emre see the chapter by Dr. J. Kingsley Birge in The Macdonald Presentation Volume, Princeton University Press, 1933, pp. 43-60.

SHRINES ON THE NORTHWEST FRONTIER

No one can live long on the North West Frontier of India without hearing of *ziarats,* or shrines. Some of these are in the villages, some by the roadside or even in the streets of the towns. Others may be in a lonely spot on the mountainside, far away from any dwelling or road; but the well-worn path leads one right there. The fluttering flags and the collection of different colored rags soon tell the traveler how celebrated it is. Some shrines, of course, are renowned all over the Mohammedan world. Among these are the Prophet's tomb at Medina, that of Hussein at Kerbela, and that of Imam Reza at Meshed. It is safe to say, however, that there is hardly a village or hamlet on the Frontier which has not its own special *ziarat.*

Cemeteries are unenclosed, and the common graves, running from north to south and facing Mecca, are simply mounds of earth, covered generally with a few pebbles and having two standing stones to denote a man's resting-place and three to denote that of a woman. Trees are planted by the graves of holy men so that the virtue of the deceased may pass into the leaves of the tree. Only men follow a body to the cemetery. The grave is dug and a large, flat stone placed on it, leaving a space of about three feet to allow the corpse to sit up and be questioned by the two Angels of Judgment, Munkar and Nakir, as to his belief. Symbols are sometimes carved at the head of a grave, denoting the character of the deceased. A cypress of hyssop signifies unblemished character and righteous life; a banyan tree, friendship to the poor; trees in fruit, hospitality; a tamarind tree, musical tastes; inscriptions of poetry, literary ability; quotations from the Koran, or Firdusi, or Hafiz, statesmanship, and so on.

Many may have heard the story of the Zakkha Khels who, on being twitted by a Mullah for not possessing a *ziarat,* replied: "All right! You, a holy man, shall provide us with one!" And he was promptly shot and the shame of the un-shrined tribe wiped out!

Offerings at a shrine vary from one farthing to several rupees, but "with empty hands no one visits a shrine." The money is left in a special place made for it and, even though no one be there to receive it, it will be quite safe. The precincts of a shrine are always sacred. Even in the land of robbers, anything will be absolutely untouched if under the shadow of a *ziarat.*

There is a shrine at Pubbi for rheumatism, and one at Jellozai for bad eyes. Sheikh Haider Baba of the seventeenth century cures sore throats and helps babies' teething. Abdul Ghaffur's shrine on the Peshawar road dates from 1800. He was called "one whose prayers are heard ", and he advised people when they visited him: "Do not

let your hearts wander; keep them empty for God!" Abdur Rahman's grave is at Hazarkhana and dates from 1710. He was a Sufi and one of the few Pushtu poets. His songs are sung in every village. Sufi poetry is very beautiful and has a charming rhythm and deep meaning, such as: "Happy is the way that ends in Thee! Happy is the home where Thou art the Guest!" The poet's grave, renowned for spiritual healing, is a very small, insignificant one. Several attempts have been made to enlarge it, but it cracks, so each effort has to be given up.

Akhund Darwaza's shrine, dating from 1580, is in the tamarisk grove outside the Gunj Gate of Peshawar and is celebrated for curing dullness. Manakka Mullah from near Nowshera, his successor, made a good business out of the name of his celebrated forebear, and when he died in 1910 he left twenty *lakhs* of rupees, besides a considerable amount of land. His son never goes out but feeds about two or three hundred people daily in his *langar,* or almshouse. Chalgazi Baba's grave outside Martanni, in some miraculous way, grows bigger and bigger. It is good for crying babies and, living among the women and children of this region, one wonders why it is not more widely patronized! There are several graves nine feet long, such as the one in Peshawar Cantonments known as Naugaza Pirs.

The Dooley Rock in the Kohat Pass is well known. The story of its origin is told as follows. A wedding party was on its way to the new home. The little bride in all her finery was closely curtained in the dooley, . . . while girls and women in their gayest clothes and jewelry attended it, dancing and singing to drums and cymbals. The men, guns in hand, let off a volley of shots every now and then, and others came behind carrying the brightly painted bed, the wedding chest, baskets of grain and piled-up platters of saffron rice. Then, from the overhanging hills, they spied a robber band.

"Turn us into stone," they prayed, "but do not let us be shamed!" Their prayer was heard and they were all turned into the big, square rock which anyone can see to this day! The numerous flags show how popular it is, and now "you may pray for what you wish—protection from robbers, a husband, a baby, or anything else—and you will be sure to get it!"

An insignificant grave a little further on attracted a visitor's attention, but no one seemed to know much about it. If you want to know folklore, ask a woman! An old lady, passing just then, volunteered to tell the story, which turned out to be rather pathetic. "He was a poor traveler," said she. "No one knows from whence he came or whither he was going. A man from the hill, spotting him as a stranger, shot and killed him, but there was nothing on him worth a cartridge; so all that could be done to make up for his death was to call him a martyr and make him a shrine and put up some flags. Now

in floodtime the waters swirl all around, carrying everything else away; yet his grave stands untouched!"

The old lady was presented with two annas for her trouble and said, as she wrapped them firmly in the corner of her chaddar, . . . "I will buy a flag with this and put it up for you!"

To pass from the pathetic to the ludicrous is to tell the story of a little shrine below the Malakand hills, near the village of Dargai. Its origin is shrouded in mystery for the inhabitants around. Its history dates only from a few years ago when Khair Din, a Punjabi Christian, was working there with a band of coolies. . . . A poor Hindu lad died and, as he had no relations nor any of his special caste there, his body was left lying by the roadside where he had fallen. Khair Din, feeling it to be his Christian duty, took it upon himself to bury the lad. He dug a shallow grave, laid the body in it and erected a wooden slab to mark the spot. A short while later, while passing the place, to his surprise he saw a few sticks put up and bits of rags floating in the breeze. A few years passed and the grave was built up in proper style with stones, and there was quite a harvest of flags waving about it, showing it to be a respectable shrine. No doubt its mysterious appearance helps to make it doubly efficacious to the worshippers! . . .

The belief in the efficacy of shrines is universal. One has only to stand near Hajji Bahadur's shrine in Kohat City, or even at one end of the street in which it lies, in the Bazaar, and watch for a few minutes and, except for the townsfolk and shopkeepers, one will hardly see a villager or a Border person pass without uplifting his or her hands and the men stroking their beards or the place where the beard should be. Wandering by on a Thursday evening just after sunset, you will see the lights of the various shrines twinkling at you out of every corner and from many a little copse or palm grove, or even from far away on the hillside.

It goes to one's heart to see poor women who have trudged wearily miles and miles, with an ailing and perhaps dying baby in their arms, prostrating themselves at one of these shrines. They mutter long prayers, brush themselves down, present little oil lamps or a bit of cloth or food, at the grave of "who-knows-who," while the living Christ, the great Healer, His heart throbbing with love and compassion, stands by unknown and unrecognized.

Islam, a religion founded on a Prophet now dead and buried, on obsolete laws, sterile precepts, customs and practices of the Dark Ages, maintains and even fosters a belief in superstitions and the efficacy of graves and dead men's bones.

FLORA M. DAVIDSON

Peshawar, India

BOOK REVIEWS

East is West. By Freya Stark. John Murray, London. pp. 218. 12s. 6d. Illustrated.
The Arab Island: The Middle East 1939-1943. By Freya Stark. Alfred A. Knopf, New York. pp. 236. $3.50.

These two volumes are exactly the same in contents but differ in title, jacket and illustrations. The British edition has more than eighty full-page illustrations, the American only forty-three; the latter, however, is on better paper and has better type, with an excellent map of Arabia on the jacket. This latest work by Freya Stark tells of her war experiences as travelling diplomat in Arabia, Egypt, Palestine, Syria and Iraq. It is written with her usual felicity of style and remarkable sense of word-picturing. The book is profoundly personal in its human touches, its insight into oriental character, and its sense of humor. It is also an important contribution to a right understanding of the maze of political events during the past decade in the Middle East, and the major part Great Britain played on this chequer-board of international rivalries. The four parts of the narrative deal respectively with journeys and experiences along the Red Sea, Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Transjordan, and Iraq. The thesis and argument of the author is that the future belongs to the *effendis* where the air-roads of the world converge like the spokes of a wheel in Cairo and Baghdad, and brought to them wave after wave of western thought and invention of educators and commercial agents and diplomats, German, Italian, French, Turkish and British, during the disturbed pre-war period and in the dark days of the war itself.

Born in Paris, the daughter of an English sculptor, educated in Italy and in London, she has lived in the Near East and close to its peoples since 1927. Her achievements as traveller and author are known to our readers from earlier reviews of *The Southern Gates of Arabia* and *Winter in Arabia* which have taken their place among the classics of travel. Sir Ronald Storrs wrote, "At least the equal of Lady Ann Blunt and of Gertrude Bell as a traveller, as a writer, Miss Stark is superior to both."

In this book she is thoroughly English and unquestioningly in favor of the Empire. She is anti-Zionist, luke-warm toward the missionary enterprise in the Near East, and wholly convinced that London's policy toward the Arab world is both wise and helpful. The golden thread that binds the various chapters together is the scheme, fathered by her visits, of a "Brotherhood of Freedom" (pp. 61, 64, 65, 68, 92, 181-186, 198, 199 etc.). But she does not tell clearly what are the principles, the aims or the constitution of this brotherhood with its thousands of members, Moslem, Christian and Jewish, with its badge of V for victory and two hands of friendship joined. Democracy and loyalty to British aims during the war were apparently its slogans; but we find scarce mention of the crux of freedom in the Orient, religious intolerance based on Islamic law and culture.

The author states that three main factors produced a renaissance

and a new middle class in the Near East, namely, "the internal combustion engine, American education and British government." But she fails to state that Protestant or Catholic missionaries founded the earliest printing-press, translated the Bible and Christian literature into several languages, prepared the first modern educational textbooks on the sciences, opened the first schools for girls, built colleges and universities and hospitals, and were the real cause of *The Arab Awakening,* as George Antonius admits in his book with that title. A single page in the Introduction gives the credit for some of this intellectual and social revolution to American schools, but throughout this volume as in her *Letters from Syria* (written in 1927-28) Freya Stark still looks askance at missions, never seems to have penetrated to their real motive or aim and generally ignores their undoubted and abiding influence on the thought and life of the people.

Yet surely every missionary should read these fascinating pages of brave adventure, warm sympathy for people of all sorts, and wise interpretation of the social and political movements that are stirring the Arab world. Who can resist a writer when she puts a paragraph in a sentence and paints a picture in twelve words: "To anyone born to the climate of South Arabia the engine-rooms of ships are not unpleasant." "The little Gehennoms that go for Red Sea harbors." Arab women "who look eternity in the face with the birth of their children and time with the passing of their youth." "The art of advertisement —untruthfulness combined with repetition." "At the peak of Rommel's advance the British ambassador in Cairo arranged for new paint on his garden railings, more encouraging than many a public speech." "The Holy cities of Najf and Kerbela wrapped in theologic veils." The small towns north of Baghdad are "like an archipelago of islands each with its history, often infinitely long, each with its character, brought from who knows what far migration, scarce remembered but fostered by isolation—now threaded together by the ramshackle cars and ash-colored buses that tilt and rattle through the provincial dust." And Tripoli is seen from an air-plane as "neat fields squared and tended, Italy's derelict colonial dream." "In Iraq as elsewhere the result of the German fever is a ruined generation, though possibly less poisoned than elsewhere."

This new book by Freya Stark will be eagerly read by all who love the Near East and its diverse populations.

SAMUEL M. ZWEMER

New York City

A Manual of Hadith. By Maulana Muhammad Ali, M.A., Ll.B. The Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isha'at-i-Islam. Dar-ul-Kutub, Islamiya. Lahore, India. pp. 409. 20s/—.

The author of this useful collection of Moslem traditions is well known for his earlier books, especially his *English Translation of the Holy Koran with Commentary and Arabic Text.*

The Preface states that he has now written more than "six thousand pages in English and ten thousand pages in Urdu," of Islamic propaganda literature. The present work, we are told, is to fill the need of English converts to Islam and "it is a faithful picture of the culture of Islam at its source." It is, except for the great number of

omissions and the tendency of the abundant notes to mitigate the outspoken and crass features of the sections that deal with, e.g., purification, *jihād* and divorce.

The author has succeeded in furnishing an excellent compendium of the *Sahīh* of Bukhari and has drawn freely on the *Mishkāt,* rendered into English by Captain Matthews in 1870. The latter is now very rare but contained the whole of one celebrated collection of *ḥadīth.* The present volume has 690 traditions, of which 513 are taken from Bukhari. The rest are from fifteen other collections, all of them carefully noted. The contents follow those of the standard Arabic theologians, beginning with Revelation and *Imān* (Faith) and then covering the five pillars of witness, prayer, fasting, pilgrimage and alms-giving. Then follow sections on *jihād,* marriage, divorce, buying, selling, food, drink, toilet, ethics and the state. The Arabic text is vowelled and beautifully printed, opposite the English translation. Copious notes occupy the lower part of the page and we congratulate printers and proof-readers on the success of a difficult task.

A second feature of the book is unique. The author gives a brief note at the head of each section with parallel quotations from the Koran, that summarize its teaching, thus binding the traditions to the original revelation. As a useful compendium and as an introduction to the immense collection of *ḥadīth,* this is an admirable piece of work. But it is in no sense a critical study of Tradition in Islam; for this we must turn to Goldziher, Juynboll, Nöldeke and other Western scholars.

A word is necessary regarding the voluminous notes. These are not the voice of orthodox Islam nor of Turkish-Egyptian-Indian modern Islam; they are, as they were in the author's edition of the Koran, Ahmadiyya notes and based on the claims of "the great Muslim reformer of this age, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian." There are scores of striking examples, of which we select only two. On page 256 a tradition is given that "Allah will raise up in every century one who shall revive the faith." This, in a long footnote, is a prophecy of the coming of Mirza Ahmad! On page 267 we have an explanation of the Arabic word *nikāh,* which, after glossing over the root-meaning, explains the teaching of the Koran and Traditions in regard to marriage. "The rule is monogamy, it is a contract for life, it is means of moral elevation and spiritual exaltation"—all this "according to the *sunna* of the Holy Prophet." And on the following page: "temporary marriage, *mut'a,* was allowed by the Holy Prophet," only in war! To a Christian reader, the constant use of the words Holy Prophet and Holy Koran are offensive, because he is accustomed to the New Testament use of these words and their connotation. It is an innovation in Moslem vocabulary. The word *quddūs* (holy) is rare in the Koran. Three times it is applied to Jesus Christ (4: 69; 21: 91 and 66: 12), never to Mohammed nor to the Koran. There are other honorific words and titles that historically have been used for the Prophet, his book and his traditions. In fact, *Hadīth Qudsī* is the technical word only used for a collection of traditions referred back to God himself, outside of the Koran revelation.

It may be permitted to add that the notes in the section on *jihād*

are curious reading at a time when the green-banner is unfurled in Java. Holy war, we are told, means missionary activity by the press! Moslems fought only in self-defence. "The invitation to Islam was not accompanied by any threat of hostilities." "Muslims could not use the sword otherwise than in defence,"—and *that* is said to be the meaning of the famous tradition, "Paradise is under the shadow of swords!" Buy the book, but use the footnotes with discretion.

S. M. Z.

Makhzanol Asrar: the Treasury of Mysteries of Nezami of Ganjeh, translated for the First Time from the Persian, with an Introductory Essay on the Life and Times of Nezāmi, by Gholām Hosein Dārāb. London, 1945. Arthur Probsthain. 8vo. xvi, 258, with one illustration. Price 24 sh.

Few poets in any land can have enjoyed the popularity that Niẓāmī of Ganja has had, both in his own country and in the neighbouring lands where Persian is known and read for pleasure, and has maintained from his own lifetime down to the present day. There are several references in his own works which indicate that his verses were much appreciated by his contemporaries, and the present reviewer can well remember how the teachers of Persian in modern India would always insist that there was no author a student could read who would convey such an impression of the riches and elegance of the Persian language as this same Niẓāmī. It is difficult, however, if not impossible, to convey the peculiar merits of such a writer to readers in another language. What gives the peculiar charm to individual verses and groups of verses, and moves the Oriental reader to such rapture, is partly the choice and the arrangement of words, and partly the skill demonstrated in subtle allusion conveyed by the words and combinations of words used. Obviously this can only be appreciated by someone thoroughly familiar with the original language, and with the historical and cultural background. For example, a line may refer in its context to a purely mundane and contemporary matter, yet the first hemstich, by the way it is worded, is intended to call to mind a verse from the Qur'ān, and the wording of the second hemstich subtly suggests a famous passage in Firdawsī. Naturally, only readers familiar by long use with the Arabic text of the Qur'ān and with the poem of Firdawsī will catch the references, and appreciate the skill and elegance with which the combination has been made; and a translation into another tongue, while it may give quite accurately the meaning of the verse, can rarely, if ever, convey the other things that the wording of the original suggests.

The fame of Niẓāmī rests on his *Khamseh,* or collection of five epic poems, for though he wrote other types of verses, MSS. of any of his works other than the *Khamseh* seem to be rare, and were apparently little known. Each of the five epics, however, has had a fame of its own. The *Sikandernāmeh,* as its name implies, is based on the Oriental romance of Alexander the Great; the *Khusraw u-Shīrīn* is a romance in verse dealing with the loves of the Sasanian monarch Khusraw Parwīz and the beautiful Shīrīn; the *Lailā u-Majnūn* is a simpler love story based on the tales of the Bedouin poet Qais al-'Āmirī; the *Haft Paikar* deals with the even more famous Sasanian prince Bahrām Gūr and the stories related to him by the seven king's

daughters with whom he was in love. Of these the *Sikandernāmeh* has been translated by H. W. Clarke (1881), the *Lailā u-Majnūn* by J. Atkinson (1894), and the *Haft Paikar* by C. E. Wilson (1924).

The *Makhzan al-Asrār,* or Treasury of Secrets, is in many ways very different from the other four. It has no epic theme running through it, and while it has many stories, some of which have become the subjects of celebrated paintings by the Persian miniaturists, and thus given this member of the *Khamseh* greater celebrity in certain quarters than its more attractive companion poems, it is for the most part a didactic poem where the stories serve as illustrations of the lessons taught. It is much duller and prosier than its companion pieces, and if anything even more overloaded with learned allusion and reference. The poem is of 2262 verses divided into twenty-four sections of unequal length. There are four opening devotional sections, and then twenty "discourses," each on some subject for pious meditation, such as "On Contempt for the World," "On the Abandonment of Worldly Dignities," "On Devotion and Solitude," etc., each being somewhat in the nature of a homily, and leading up to a story to point the moral, "the Story of the Hajjī and the Ṣūfī," "the Story of the Ascetic who broke his Vow," "the Story of a Sage and his Disciples," etc., stories, which, as mentioned above, lent themselves rather well to the art of the illustrator, and a sample of which art from the Chester Beatty Collection is reproduced as frontispiece to the volume.

Gholām Hosein Dārāb, who is Senior Lecturer in Persian at the London School of Oriental Studies, has translated the poem in full from Waḥīd Dastgardī's edition printed at Teheran in 1934. The English idiom of the translation is somewhat peculiar in places, but on the whole it is remarkable how well he has succeeded in setting down in readable English the oft over-florid verses of his original. To the whole he has prefixed a lengthy Introduction, discussing first the Life, and then the Times, of Niẓāmī. The latter, in which he gives a very brief account of the situation in the poet's world under the 'Abbāsid Caliphs of Baghdād, of the Seljuqs and the Shahs of Kharazm, of the Atābeks and the Fāṭimids, of the Assassins and the Ghaznevid Empire, covers well known ground and is remarkable mostly for the author's curious system of transliteration, whereby names ancient and modern, Arabic, Persian and Turkish, are all reproduced as they are pronounced in modern Persia, which may give satisfaction to the author, but will probably be only an annoyance to readers accustomed to the standard forms of transliteration. In the section on the Life of Niẓāmī he breaks new ground, seeking to establish accurate dates for the various events in the poet's life by carefully combing the poems for all possible references which may be used to establish such dates. As a result he differs sharply from the dates suggested by previous scholars, but his conclusions, based often on interpretation of words and phrases in the poems, seem at times, to this reviewer at least, to be extremely dubious.

Like some of his predecessors he insists that this poem of Niẓāmī is highly mystical. One may be permitted to doubt this. That the poet was a very religious man is undoubtedly true, and that the poem

bears witness to his sincere piety is even more obviously true. It is undeniable that a great number of the pious reflections scattered throughout the poem can be used as texts for Ṣūfī meditations, just as verses from that most unmystical book the Qur'ān have been. There is nothing, however, of the quality of mystical experience here that we find, for example, in Jalālu'd-Dīn Rūmī. If the meaning of mysticism is watered down till it means no more than deeply religious feeling, then this poem may be regarded as mystical, but if mysticism is the high doctrine of the Ṣūfīs it is hard to find any of it here.

The translator has an enthusiastic admiration for his author and speaks of him in somewhat extravagant eulogy. It is a pity that he has not been able to utilize the best European work on his author, Wilhelm Bacher's *Niẓāmī's Leben und Werke* appears only in quotations by E. G. Browne, and the more recent work of Hellmut Ritter, *Über die Bildersprache Niẓāmīs,* not at all. The work appears as No. XXVII of Probsthain's Oriental Series, and has been printed with all the care usual in their work. Its usefulness to students of Persian reading the poet will be great, and for this reason alone it is assured of a good reception. Its price, however, is formidable.

ARTHUR JEFFERY

New York City

Al-Katib al-Misri. Vol. 1, No. 1 (October 1945). Published by Dār al-Kātib al-Miṣrī, 5 Sh. Qantarat al-Dikkah, Cairo. Annual subscription, Egyptian Piasters 120, or equivalent.

This first number of al-Kātib al-Miṣrī (The Egyptian Bookman) is edited by Dr. Taha Hussein Bey, foremost littérateur of the Arabic world. It is to appear each month and deal with cultural subjects. Articles by eastern and western authors will appear first in this magazine, together with translations of articles. Professor Hasan Mahmoud, librarian of the Fouad I University, is the editorial secretary. The fourteen articles of the present issue include one by the accomplished writer, Mme. Suhair al-Qalamawi, who already has three books to her credit.

E. E. C.

Kreuz und Halbmond: Der Islam als missionarisches Problem. By Fritz Blanke, Missionsbuchhandlung 1941; pp. 16.

This is first of a series on Islam and missions of which two others have also been published—*Evangelium und Islam* and *Zeugendienst für Christus.* They are a popular presentation of the validity, necessity and method of pressing the claims of Jesus Christ on Moslems. The present writer, Blanke, with Blum-Ernst and Kellerhals, are evangelical in their approach and each has had experience with Moslems. Islam may be disintegrating in its old dogmas and traditions, but Nationalism has given it a new lease of life and a new angle of fanatic opposition to the Gospel message. The deepest reason, however, why Islam is everywhere so recalcitrant to Christ's message is put into these pregnant words: "Islam corporately has become immune to evangelism because Mohammed inoculated all his followers

with a weak Christology, a very diluted form of the Christian cult and message. Now they are unaffected by the fullness of its glory." Meanwhile Mohammed has received his apotheosis, pre-existence, power of intercession, sinless example, etc., and eclipses our Saviour. It is a very thoughtful brochure although its view of the present political and social state of the world of Islam dates from 1940.

Z.

New York City

L'Europe et l'Islam. By Prince Aga Khan and Dr. Zaki Ali; Publisher, Annemasse, Genève. pp. 76. Fr. 3.

This is the second small volume by these joint authors. The earlier one, *Glimpses of Islam,* was reviewed in our last issue. This has a similar aim, namely to plead the cause of Islamic peoples before the court of western opinion. Aga Khan believes, as in the first chapter, that panislamism is the expression of group and faith loyalty of all true believers and has social and religious, not political significance. It goes back to the Koran statement (49: 10) "all believers are brothers." This brotherhood of Islam does not constitute a menace to Christendom but may even be a directive for the war-torn and distracted nations of Europe. Dr. Zaki Ali again draws a picture of the great cultural debt that Europe owes Islam in science, medicine, philosophy and geography. It is an excellent although a somewhat over-statement of that legacy of Islam to which western scholars have often called attention. The third and last brief chapter appeals to the UNA and other international groups to pay this debt by fair dealing and granting political liberty to Moslems everywhere. The barrier to reconciliation between Islam and Christianity is lack of understanding of the former by the latter. "The peoples of Islam extend to Europe a sincere and friendly hand, but the condition for confidence and cooperation is that there be equality and liberty and sovereignty with absolute respect of their religion and that their institutions be preserved intact." There is no discussion of religious liberty for minorities who are under Moslem rule.

Z.

New York City.

CURRENT TOPICS

The Aga Khan Once Again

Our Current Topics have frequently during the past decades referred to H.H. the Aga Khan. Here is more light on his astonishing place in the estimate of the Ismailiyah sect, of which he is the head.

London, Nov. 16 [Reuters]—The Aga Khan, head of millions of Indian Moslems, next year will give to charity the value of his weight in diamonds. The weighing ceremonies at Bombay on March 20 and Dar-es-Salaam April 17, will mark the diamond jubilee of the 245-pound leader of the Moslem community at Ismali-Khoja.

His value in diamonds will be approximately $1,600,000. His weight in gold at the time of his golden jubilee was only $80,000.

More than half a million carats of rough diamonds will be brought from London for the occasion.

Post-War Plans and Needs in North Africa

The Rev. T. J. P. Warren, Superintendent of the North Africa Mission, said in a recent address:

One of the important features of the future will be the opportunity for the creation and spread of literature both in French and Arabic. We must learn what is at our disposal in the way of existing material and then seek to furnish what is lacking. There is an enormous supply of material available, so we must find ways of circulating it. This may require special study and preparation. We have specialists in this kind of work, and we must use them to teach others.

We need more book shops, not merely Bible depôts. The very term savours too much of deposited stocks; they must be put into circulation. An attractive display is a great help, but, as will be readily seen, this can be no haphazard, spasmodic service. A book shop with a comfortable reading room might be much better than a public hall, and in any case a valuable adjunct to it.

We need writers and translators; we need people of artistic gifts and training to illustrate books, to study and teach arts and crafts. We need distributors, salesmen and saleswomen for the dissemination of literature and the exposition, but above all the demonstration in daily life of Christian ethics, in peace and joy, in truth and love.

We need partners at home, who will pray and give so that the work may be done. It will probably cost twice as much to do the work after the war as it did before. To our supporters we say, as Mr. Churchill did: "Give us the tools, and we will finish the job!"

We need sympathy and understanding on the part of our friends at home. It is difficult to convey an accurate picture of the situation; it is so easy to make it too optimistic or too pessimistic, according to our own temperament. God uses all kind of people in His work, and blesses all kind of methods, providing that all is done for His glory and in the fulfilment of His Will.

Work for Educated Moslems

A Jesuit Missionary writes:

In no groups, whether racial or national, does the educated class enjoy so much prestige or exercise so much positive influence for good or bad, as on backward or frustrated groups who have suddenly awakened to a consciousness of their own importance and regard with a jealous eye all that seems to touch their new-found dignity. This newly awakened consciousness makes them susceptible to all that their "emancipated" brethren are willing to propose. The danger lies in the fact of an indiscriminating receptivity joined to the youthful ardor that usually characterizes such beginnings.

Islamic groups are a case in point. The nearly quarter of a billion (221 million) beings who compose them are suddenly awakening from their lethargy. The old consciousness of racial superiority and contempt of things western that wrapped them up in a smug, impenetrable conceit is disappearing. This smugness accounted for the stagnation in the fields of art, culture and literature that hitherto characterized Islamism. Atatürk particularly gave the movement an impetus in Turkey that has communicated itself to other Islamic countries. His methods were certainly radical but he impressed upon his people the necessity of education for their survival and as befitting their racial dignity.

The need for an apostolate among the educated Moslems is evident, the time propitious. What we need now are methods and especially means: more schools, more literature. The spoken and written word is like a seed planted in the mind. We are not always certain it is going to germinate or when. Ideas usually make their way slowly, but once they have gathered momentum, proceed with terrible force. Its time of incubation is uncertain, but matured, its power is difficult to gauge. It can be an ennobling thing or it can be devastating. This war has shown us the considerable amount of latent danger in perverted ideologies. We must bend our efforts towards the widespread dissemination of correct ones among the Moslems. They are a group too important to be ignored. And when Christ spoke of feeding the hungry, He was not thinking merely of their bodies but particularly of their souls.

The White Fathers, realizing the necessity and importance of a work of this kind, established an Arabic Institute of Higher Studies, IBLA, at Tunis. Its work is twofold. First, its specially chosen and highly trained staff is giving a full course in Islamology, language, customs, literature, psychology, etc., to younger priests. Secondly, these men have already begun to make contact with the educated Mohammedans. Arabic professors, professional men, sheikhs, students and others are frequent visitors at IBLA where conferences, discussions, informal talks and open forums are held.

Organizing a work of this kind even on modest lines was not child's play. There were tentative programs, revisions, adaptations and all the consequent but necessary effort that experience exacts if it is to be profitable. The difficulties of the start overcome, it can now envisage expansion and development. We may justifiably look with pride to the foresight that prompted its foundation, the courage

that carried it through its critical beginnings and wish it a glorious future.

It is for this effort, one example among many of the "missionary works among educated Mohammedans," that your prayers are asked during this month. God always listens to prayer.

—*White Fathers Missions*

In the Bookshop at Khartoum

Bishop Gwynne of the Sudan gave a vivid picture of what goes on through books and reading:

In the Sudan people are only now learning to read. In the Gordon College the young men are really well educated, but have yet to learn to read in their leisure time. The newspaper instituted an enquiry as to whether the young men went on with their education and reading after they left school and college. The general reply was, "After my work I eat, then sleep a while, then get up and sit and think of many things, and spend the rest of the time in the café!" We have to develop in them the love of literature. As I said, we have in Khartoum a bookshop, but most of the sales go through the colporteurs who sell the books of this society and our own. I myself do a bit of colportage sometimes. I used to take copies of the Life of Gordon round with me. Once I went to El Fasher and while there asked a Syrian merchant to take some copies and sell them. He took them, but thought he would not sell one. He said, "If I ask 5 piastres for a book, people will say that is too much. I can buy a bucket for 2 piastres." The Japanese were flooding the market with cheap goods and they could buy a native bath for 2 piastres.

We have also quite educated men among the Moslem officials, and their education leaves them very little faith in Islam. They do not talk about it at all, but their faith in Islam decreases. They order from our bookshop Fabian books, books leaving out religion. They fight shy of any publication mentioning religion, but they will buy biographies. At Omdurman where the people are nearly all Moslems, hundreds of young students in the Government school will buy biographies. The Life of Aggrey was put on sale, and though it was expensive we sold a large number of copies. We are trying to persuade both the societies to produce good stories with good moral teaching. Mr. Hamilton, the Bible Society Agent, says he sells hundreds of little Gospels in Arabic. One day recently I was visiting a friend of mine who used to teach me Arabic, and who is dying now in Omdurman, and had asked me to visit him. He asked me to pray for him, and I found that he had the Gospels under his pillow and read them, but would hardly like to tell his friends so.

Changing Arab World

Anne O'Hare McCormick, widely known correspondent for the *New York Times,* wrote an article for the *Times* under the caption "New Currents Stir the World of Genesis," pointing out that this land "long a back-water choked with the driftwood of dead civiliza-

tion is stirred by new currents that will make it a 'problem area' for a long time to come." Those who follow the news realize that there is a new spirit of nationalism and racial consciousness among the Arabs. The long talked of Arab League has become a reality. The Arab States today stand together and can become a powerful force in world affairs. These countries occupy a strategic position in relation to world trade routes by land, by sea and by air. This being the case, reports from the mission agencies are of great importance. Dr. Paul Harrison says: "Demands on the Mason Memorial Hospital have grown beyond all previous dreams. Wards are always crowded: a 75-bed hospital houses 127 patients, including members of the royal family, Bedouin from the desert, pearl divers and fisher folk, merchants from the Pirate Coast, Indians and Americans. Last year 1,100 major and 1,700 minor operations were performed. Special 'eye tour' was undertaken in Hassa where only eye cases were seen. Thousands were treated. The clergyman accompanied the doctor and was accepted cordially by the King and the people."

Bahrein Women's Medical Centre reports that Dr. Esther Barny Ames had received a personal invitation from the King of Arabia to come for a month every six months, as a standing order, to be the official doctor to the palace women. Kuwait and Amarah report increased opportunities in both men's and women's work. Mission Schools have played no small part in the growing thirst for education throughout the country; even the most primitive Moslems are anxious to become literate, and the Koran schools are dwindling. Dr. John Van Ess writes: "Thousands of men and boys have met Christ face to face from two to eight years each, every school day in the year. Many of them now hold positions of responsibility and trust in state and society. The sons of many of them are now in school profiting by their fathers' newer outlook and by the changed home environment of at least a friendly attitude towards the Gospel, and the promise of an early arrival of the time when a convert's enemies shall not be those of his own household."

On the Northwest Frontier of India

Never, perhaps, has medical missionary work in India, particularly on the North-West Frontier, faced so critical a situation as at the present time. Whereas some lands are practically closed to the Gospel, here the door stands wide open, but, through lack of personnel, irrecoverable opportunities to win the land for Christ are slipping away. This is the distressing story which Sir Henry Holland, the world-famed eye specialist, now on a brief furlough in this country, has to tell. Although over seventy years of age, he is returning to India early in December, rejoicing in the health which God has given him, that he may resume his work, which by his own skill and that of doctors working under his direction, has given sight to some 70,000 of India's blind. It was for this distinguished service that he received his knighthood in 1936.

Throughout his missionary career, which began in 1900, Sir Henry has been attached to the C.M.S. Hospital at Quetta, which, it will be remembered, was destroyed by earthquake in 1935, many

patients and some of the staff losing their lives, Sir Henry himself having to be rescued from the ruins, his injuries, in the mercy of God, being but superficial. At the end of his last furlough, nine years ago, he went back to rebuild the hospital on an earthquake-resisting basis, and in 1940 it was opened as a hospital jointly conducted by the C.M.S. and C.E.Z.M.S. by Lady Linlithgow, wife of the then Viceroy, with 200 beds—120 for men and 80 for women.

Recently the hospital buildings, consisting of a series of sheds, were rendered uninhabitable by excessive rains. Undaunted by this new difficulty, Sir Henry obtained thirty military "E.P." tents in which to accommodate his patients. These were visited by Lady Dow, wife of the Governor of Sind. Horrified that one who was doing so much for the people of Sind should be expected to perform operations in such unsuitable conditions, she immediately opened a fund and in six months collected £9,000. The Government, which has always given Sir Henry sympathetic support, voted between £60 and £70. British officers also gave generously, and as the result of interest aroused and help given, a fine new hospital in reinforced concrete is now in course of erection. Thus, when the time comes for Sir Henry to retire, his two sons, each of whom offered himself quite independently for medical missionary service in India, will have a modern building in which to continue the work.

SURVEY OF PERIODICALS

By Sue Molleson Foster
Union Theological Seminary Library

I. GENERAL

Christians as Zionists. M. Z. Frank. (In *The Chicago Jewish Forum,* Chicago. Winter, 1945-46. pp. 86-91).

Résumés of the lives of men like Henri Dunant, the Prince de Ligne and Anthony Ashley Cooper who strove for a Palestinian home for both Jews and Arabs.

Libraries during the Muslim Rule in India. S. A. Zafar Nadvi. (In *Islamic Culture,* Hyderabad. October, 1945. pp. 329-347).

Lists and describes various collections—some still in existence—containing great bibliographical treasures.

Modern Turkish Literature. His Excellency Ruşen Eşref Ünaydin. (In the *Royal Central Asian Journal,* London. July-October, 1945. pp. 314-319).

Although no bibliographical data are given, many authors and titles are listed and some critical material is supplied.

Music and Musicians of the Court of Shāh Jahān. Dr. A. Halīm. (In *Islamic Culture,* Hyderabad. October, 1945. pp. 354-360).

Faqīrullāh's Rag Darpan and Mān Kautuhal (1661 and 1665) furnish a full account of musical achievements of an epoch during which Indian and Persian music coalesced.

War-Time Exploration with the Sudan Defense Force in the Libyan Desert, 1941-43. Capt. J. W. Wright. (In *The Geographical Journal,* London. March-April, 1945. pp. 100-111).

Well illustrated article about a region which is now so completely mapped that it can be travelled without danger or difficulty.

II. ARABIA

Three Documents on the History of Christianity in South Arabia. Arthur Jeffery. (In the *Anglican Theological Review,* Evanston, Illinois. July, 1945. pp. 185-205).

Presents translations of and comments on a selection on Phemion from Ibn Hishām's Sīrat-an-Nabī, the Acts of Azqīr, and a letter by Simeon, Bishop of the Persian Christians, giving an account of the Himyarite martyrs.

III. HISTORY OF ISLAM

The Arabs' Knowledge of Ceylon. Professor Nafis Ahmad. (In *Islamic Culture,* Hyderabad. July, 1945. pp. 223-241).

An historical survey showing Moslem contact with the island as early as the days of the Pious Caliphs.

THE BATTLE OF AL-QĀDISIYYA. Dr. S. M. Yusuf. (In *Islamic Culture,* Hyderabad. January, 1945. pp. 1-28).

Describes the historic encounter in which the Arabs, under the command of that superb military genius 'Umar, broke the might of the Persians.

MARAKISH, THE HEART OF THE MAGHRIB. (In *The Arab World,* New York. Autumn issue, 1945. pp. 62-69).

Sketches part of the early history of this vital city, whose thinkers exercised considerable influence on the development of European culture.

OPHEL AGAIN. J. W. Crowfoot. (In *The Palestine Exploration Quarterly,* London. July-October, 1945. pp. 66-104).

Offers a general survey of Roman, Byzantine, Arab, Latin, Egyptian, and Turkish occupations, accompanied by plans and photographs.

IV. KORAN. TRADITION. THEOLOGY

THE NATURE OF LAW IN MUGHAL INDIA AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE. (In *The Calcutta Review,* Calcutta. October, 1945. pp. 4-8).

An historical study.

V. RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL LIFE

BAHRAIN: PORT OF PEARLS AND PETROLEUM. Maynard Owen Williams. (In *The National Geographic Magazine,* Washington, D. C. February, 1946. pp. 195-210).

Tells of customs, social conditions and economic prospects of an island possessing archeological remains thousands of years old.

THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT IN TURKEY. John Sutherland. (In *The Asiatic Review,* London. October, 1945. pp. 385-386).

Outlines the history and scope of the movement which has just held its first National Congress in Ankara and which has four main lines of development—agriculture, handicrafts, building and consumer activities.

FEEDING THE MIDDLE EAST IN WAR-TIME. Keith A. H. Murray. (In the *Royal Central Asian Journal,* London. July-October, 1945. pp. 233-247).

Describes the work of the Middle East Supply Centre in caring for the needs of about eighty-one million people scattered over an area of four and three quarter million square miles.

THE WATERWAYS OF 'IRAQ. Lieut.-Col. Lionel Dimmock. (In the *Royal Central Asian Journal,* London. July-October, 1945. pp. 307-313).

Discusses possible development of the marshlands lying between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and points out the difficulties to be met in dealing with the inhabitants of the region.

VI. POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS

A Brief Sketch of the Policy of the Turkish Republic. Admiral Sir Howard Kelly. (In the *Royal Central Asian Journal,* London. July-October, 1945. pp. 248-257).

Praises the moral courage of Turkey in refusing aid to Germany in the recent war and suggests many commercial opportunities now open to Britain.

India: The Wavell Plan. (In *The Round Table,* London. September, 1945. pp. 344-350).

Analyzes the pros and cons and finds lack of acceptance due to Moslem fear of Hindu domination.

The Netherlands East Indies after Three Years of War. (In *The Asiatic Review,* London. October, 1945. pp. 383-385).

A grim picture of the devastating results of Japanese cruelty and oppression.

The Soviet Union and the Mediterranean. Maurice Pernet. (In *The Fortnightly,* London. December, 1945. pp. 363-368).

An historical survey of Russia's previous activities in the area and a consideration of her present demands for air bases and ports of call and for her share in controlling Gibraltar, the Suez Canal and the Dardanelles.

The Palestine Reality. Jabir Shibli. (In *The Catholic World,* New York. January, 1946. pp. 301-310).

Presents a detailed study of the problem from an Arab point of view and indicates possible solutions of the existing deadlock.

VII. THE NEAR EAST

Bilan de Notre Prestige au Levant. Louis Barjon. (In *Études,* Paris. Juillet-Août, 1945. pp. 88-104).

The "balance sheet" shows that although political mistakes have been made and much honor was lost in the débâcle of 1940, France can still reestablish herself because of the love and esteem she has built up through generations.

Conflict Patterns in the Near East. Werner J. Cahnman. (In *The Chicago Jewish Forum,* Chicago. Winter, 1945-46. pp. 81-85).

Studies Anglo-Soviet aspirations in the region and finds in them material for another world war unless power politics give place to genuine world-mindedness.

The Empire and the Middle East. (In *The Round Table,* London. December, 1945. pp. 26-34).

Attempts to show how vital domination in the Middle East is to the security and moral standing of Great Britain and how it can be realized by fair and imaginative political practices.

French Difficulties in the Middle East. Charles-André Julien. (In *Foreign Affairs,* New York. January, 1946. pp. 327-336).

Offers a survey of the "perverted" situation from the beginning of the Syro-Lebanese mandate after World War I to the complete collapse of French rule in 1943, when the British Army

assumed a control which the British Government appears in no haste to abandon.

RECENT POLITICAL TRENDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Mohammad Habib. (In *India Quarterly,* London. April, 1945. pp. 134-139).

Describes the shift from Pan Islamism to nationalism.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Commander R. G. J. Jackson. (In the *Royal Central Asian Journal,* London. July-October, 1945. pp. 258-268).

Presents a case for continuance of British dominance in the Levant with well-trained men appointed to carry out British policies as advisers to local governments.

VIII. MISSIONS TO MOSLEMS

ACCEPTABLE INVASION. G. E. DeJong. (In *Neglected Arabia,* New York. July-September, 1945. pp. 9-11).

The Mission House at Kuwait received many American and British service men and interested some of them in mission work.

THE ARABIAN MISSION AND SERVICE MEN. W. H. Storm. (In *Neglected Arabia,* New York. July-September, 1945. pp. 1-8).

Letters from grateful soldiers and sailors and accounts of the activities in the various mission stations.

CROSS AND CRESCENT: A Peaceful Crusade. (In *The East and West Review,* London. October, 1945. pp. 100-108).

Two articles, one by the Rt. Rev. A. M. Gelsthorpe, Bishop of the Sudan; the other by the Rev. J. S. Trimingham, a C.M.S. missionary in Omdurman, describing the conflict of spiritual forces in the Middle East and stressing the need for discerning Christian witness.

YEAR OF GRACE 1945: THE NEAR EAST. The Editors. (In *The International Review of Missions,* London. January, 1946. pp. 3-6).

The survey is contributed by Mr. S. A. Morrison who reports the area gripped by nationalism, materialism and a resurgence of interest in Islam, while the development of governmental social service and the increasing threat to religious liberty offer a challenge to constructive missionary thought and courageous missionary action.