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THE SWORD OF MOHAMMED AND ALI

"Islam alone of all the great religions of the human race was born sword in hand. Islam has always relied on the sword, and for thirteen hundred years the mullah who reads the Friday prayers in the mosque wears a sword, even if only made of wood, as a symbol of his creed."

—Sir Valentine Chirol in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 1, No. 3

In the concluding chapter of Sir William Muir's "Life of Mahomet" he speaks of "the sword as the inevitable penalty for the denial of Islam" and continues, "The sword of Mahomet and the Coran are the most fatal enemies of civilization, liberty, and truth, which the world has yet known."¹ That is a very strong and a very sweeping statement. What did he mean by the sword of Mohammed? Where did Mohammed get it, and how did he use it? It was Thomas Carlyle who first asked that question: "Much has been said of Mahomet's propagating his Religion by the Sword. It is no doubt far nobler what we have to boast of the Christian Religion, that it propagated itself peaceably in the way of preaching and conviction. . . . The sword indeed. But where will you get your sword! Every new opinion, at its starting, is precisely in a *minority of one*. . . . You must first get your sword."²

However he got it, Islam has made much of it and woven legends around the battle-field of Badr, where, as far as we know, the Prophet first used it to shed the blood of unbelievers in his mission.

¹ Vol. IV, p. 322.

² "Heroes and Hero Worship," p. 56. Carlyle modified his ideal portrait of the Arabian Prophet in his lecture on the *Hero as Poet*, pp. 103-4.

It is a long and interesting story and less known than other details of his life; also one which has left a permanent influence on his followers. When Khalid won his victory over the recalcitrant tribe of Bni Jazma, who dwelt a day's march south of Mecca, and butchered most of his prisoners, he got for himself the title "The Sword of God" from the lips of Mohammed, although he did not altogether approve of the act.³ Among the ancient Arabs the sword was always a type of personality. Thus Zaid ibn Ali boasts:

"The wielded sword-blade knows my hand,
The spear obeys my lusty arm; "

while Ali ibn Abi Talib, the greatest hero of Islam, has some famous verses attributed to him, which are everywhere in Arabia quoted to indicate his renowned prowess in battle:

"Our flowers are the sword and dagger,
Narcissus and myrtle are nought;
Our drink is the blood of our foemen,
Our goblet his skull when we've fought." ⁴

To those who have lived with the Bedouin of the desert and know their daily life, it is not surprising to hear them quote the proverb, "The history of the sword is the history of humanity," and again,— "If there were no sword there would be no law of Mohammed." The latest traveler in Yemen, Ameen Rihani, writes: "I am not exaggerating when I say that a permanent state of war, with short intervals of peace, is the prevailing condition in Al-Yaman. It was an open field always for one *Saif-ul-Islam* (Sword of Islam) or other during Turkish régime."⁵ Arabic dictionaries boast that the language has a thousand words for sword, and Arabian dynasties from the first century of the Hegira to the present day have risen and fallen only by the sword.

It is at the battle of Badr that we first meet Mo-

³ Muir's "Life of Mahomet"—Vol. IV, 135, 193.

⁴ *As-Saif wa'l kharjar rihānuna,
'Uffun ala'l narjis wa'l ās
Sharābuna dam a'adāuna,
Wa jumjumat ras al kas.*

⁵ "Arabian Peak and Desert," p. 109.

hammed with a sword. According to the Arab chronicles this was one of the decisive battles of history. What part the Prophet himself took is not clear. Some traditions represent him as moving along the ranks with a drawn sword, but this is not likely.⁶ He probably contented himself with inciting his followers by the promise of divine assistance and the prospect of paradise; for he had no sword, as far as we know, until he received a sword which has become famous as part of the booty at the end of the battle of Badr. Without going into detail, we quote an account of the distribution of that booty from Muir (p. 113):

"In accordance with these commands, the booty was gathered together on the field, and placed under a special officer. The next day it was divided, near Safra, in equal allotments, among the whole army, after the royal fifth had been set apart. All shared alike, excepting that the horsemen received each two extra portions for their horses. To the lot of every man fell a camel, with its gear; or two unaccoutred camels; or a leathern couch, or some such equivalent. Mahomet obtained the famous camel of Abu Jahl, and a sword known by the name of *Dzul Ficar*. The sword was selected by him beyond his share, according to a custom which allowed him, in virtue of the prophetic dignity, to choose from the booty, before division, whatever thing pleased him most." (Cf. *Sahih* of Muslim, Ed. Constantinople, 1329, Part IV., p. 146.)

This famous sword is, in some traditions, said to have been given to Mohammed by the archangel Gabriel, and bequeathed by him to his son-in-law 'Ali, who cleft with it the skull of Marhab, the giant Jew warrior of Khaibar fort.⁷ Its peculiar shape seems to be traditional, and pictures of the sword are found in every part of the Moslem world from Morocco to China. It appears upon the arms of the Zaidite princes of Yemen, and there is a representation of it on a Turkish standard, some twenty feet long, taken by Don Juan of Austria from the Turks at Lepanto.⁸

Our frontispiece is a reproduction of a Chinese picture of this sword of Mohammed, and was printed at

⁶ Margoliouth's "Mohammed," pp. 259, 269.

⁷ Richard Burton, "The Book of the Sword," London, 1884, p. 141.

⁸ *Idem*, p. 142.

Peking.⁹ Toward the left there is an account in Chinese, summarized as follows:

"There was a rebellious person named Abu Sufyan who led an army of seven thousand men. He desired the imperial robe of Medina which was received by Mohammed from Allah. In accordance with the will of Allah three thousand infantry stood true and protected Mohammed in a bloody fight. The most worthy 'Ali was sent to lead the believers, but his valuable sword suddenly broke, but Allah in a decree sent the angel Gabriel to fetch a magical two-edged sword, *Dhu'l-Faqar*, from heaven, which was abundantly ornate. This he handed down to the Prophet, who in turn gave it to 'Ali, the most worthy. Thus with this sword he was able to aid the infantry to destroy the enemy, and moreover, to defeat them completely. Hereafter he was able to cut down and exterminate any violent revolt, and to open the road for truth through all hidden and uncertain country."

The two Chinese characters on the side of the sword read: "to avoid uncanny influences," which would seem to indicate the use of this picture of the sword as an amulet. On the blade of peculiar shape are the familiar words "*La fata mithl 'Ali, wa la saif mithl Dhu'l-Faqār*," that is, "There is no hero like 'Ali, and there is no sword like the *Dhu'l-Faqār*." To the left of the sword in the picture is the Prophet's rosary, and to the right his seal of office. The two solar discs contain the Arabic mottoes: "to God belongs mercy," and "to God belongs blessing." The crescent and the seven stars are symbolic. The brief words in Chinese are the name of the printer.

In Persian art there is no more familiar figure than 'Ali with the famous sword, *Dhu'l-Faqār*. A reproduction of it, taken from a Persian mirror-case is given in the Encyclopedia of Islam (Vol. I, p. 961). From the accompanying article by E. Mittwoch we learn that, according to tradition, the sword previously belonged to an infidel named Munabbih b. al-Hajjaj. The name of the sword is connected with the expression *Saif Mufaqqar*, "sword with the notch." It is mentioned in several *hadiths*, which have been collected, for example by Ibn Saad, ii.2 (near the end; not yet printed) among the

⁹ The translation of the Chinese is by Rev. Claude L. Pickens. It indicates that the Chinese-Moslems probably use it as an amulet. Islamic Magic gives this sword a place, as does Jewish Magic the sword of Moses. (R. C. Thompson, "Semitic Magic," p. xviii). I have seen pictures of it on walls of houses and mosques in Egypt, Persia and India.

Shama'il in the section *fi Suyuf al-Nabi*. According to one of these traditions the sword bore an inscription referring to the blood-money, which ended with the words *la yuqtal muslim bikāfir* "no Muslim shall be slain for an unbeliever."

According to tradition and Moslem art, the sword was not only two-edged, but had a forked or swallow-tailed blade. This particular form of sword, according to Burton, may have been derived from the Greeks and the Latins, or from the double-pointed chisels still common in Egypt to-day. I have seen examples of such forked daggers in Yemen; and there are instances of them on the monuments of Assyria. Illustrations may also be found of similar forms in Indian daggers.¹⁰ This would seem to give the true derivation of the word *Dhu'l-Faqār*, which Burton rendered "the Lord of Cleaving," but which might perhaps be rendered the Cloven Blade. Lane, in his Dictionary, says (p. 2426) "It was thus named because there were in it small, beautiful hollows, meaning, small scallops in the edge, such as some modern swords have, for the more easy cleaving of coats-of-mail." But the same root-word is used for the vertebræ of the back, and it would seem that the sword received this name not only from its shape, but from its power of execution. A man whose back is broken is called *mafqūr*.

According to many traditions, this sword became one of Mohammed's most precious possessions, and is mentioned among the things which he bequeathed at his death. The reliques of Mohammed form a special subject of legend in the collections of traditions.¹¹ None among the companions of Mohammed would seem to be more entitled to inherit his sword than 'Ali. He was both a cousin and a son-in-law of the Prophet, and became the fourth orthodox Caliph. Some say he was the first male

¹⁰ Richard Burton, "The Book of the Sword," p. 41. Cf. Schwarzlose, "Die Waffen der Alte Arabieren."

¹¹ Cf. on the booty of Badr, Kitab-al-Maghazi of Waqidi (Wellhausen) p. 83; on what those received who took part, Bukhari (Krehl) 64:12; and on Mohammed's legacy at his death, the references in Wensinck Handbook of Early Mohammedan Tradition, p. 162. Also *Sahih* Bukhari with the Commentary of Qastalani. Vol. V, p. 200, near the bottom.

convert to Islam, and the Prophet promised him paradise as a special portion. He received sixteen wounds at Ohod, and carried the banner on the day of victory at Khaibar. He smashed idols, destroyed images and levelled graves in Medina.¹² He is pictured as the great warrior of early Islam, and is said to have punished infidels by death through fire.¹³ From the earliest time legends gathered around him, as hero-warrior and saint. In the battle of Siffin, he is said to have killed five hundred and twenty-three men in one day with his sword. Afterwards, extraordinary feats were told of him; how he had severed heads from bodies and hewn bodies in two with his saber, *Dhu'l-Faqār*.¹⁴

Because 'Ali was the second proud possessor of this magic weapon, we are not surprised that Shi'ah tradition magnifies the sword of Mohammed. In "*Hyat-ul-Kuloob*," a famous account of Mohammed's life and character, translated from the Persian by the Reverend James L. Merrick (Boston, 1850), there are the following embellishments (pp. 88, 253, 255). We retain the peculiar spelling:

"Authentic traditions declare that Mohammed had three caps, one of which was white. One of them having ear-pieces he was accustomed to wear in battle. He had a slender staff, on which he leaned while addressing the people. He had likewise a walking-stick called *Memshook*, a tent named *Akan*, and a cup denominated *Matbah*, and a vessel entitled *Rayy*. He had two horses, one called *Merbaz*, and the other *Sekeb*; and two mules, *Duldul* and *Shahba*, and two she-camels, *Ghasba* and *Jedan*. He possessed four swords, *Zoolfakar*, *Aun*, *Mejzim* and *Rasoom*. He owned an ass called *Yafoor*. His turban was named *Sahab*, and his coat of mail *Zat-ul-Fazool*. His banner was entitled *Akab*, and his pack-camel *Deebaj*. He had a flag called *Maloom*, and a helmet named *Asad*. At his death he gave all these articles and animals to Aly, and also took off his ring and put it on Aly's finger. The commander of the faithful says that in the scabbard of one of the swords he found a writing that contained much wisdom, of which were these three sentences: Adhere to those that forsake you; Speak the truth though to your disadvantage; Do good to every one that does ill by you."

"At the battle of Ohod, Ibn-Kimyah assaulted Mohammed, and aiming a blow at his shoulder, shouted that he had killed him. The Prophet's glance now fell on a cowardly fellow of the *Muhajerees*, who

¹² Musnad, Vol. 1: 87, 110, 128, 138.

¹³ Bukhari, 88: 2.

¹⁴ Art.—'Ali, Encyc. of Islam, p. 284.

was running away with his shield hung on his back. 'Throw down your shield and go to hell!' cried Mohammed. The fellow actually dropped his shield, which was taken by Neseebah and borne in defence of the Prophet, who declared her reward for the day greater than that of Abubekr, Omar and Osman. Aly fought till his sword was broken, and then the Prophet gave him his own sword, *Zoolfakar*, by which he sent every wretch that ventured to attack the Prophet, to the lowest hell. Mohammed retired to Mount Ohod, which protected him in the rear and prevented his being surrounded by his enemies. Aly received ninety wounds, all in front, in defending the Prophet, and often charged and routed the idolaters that advanced to the attack. The Musulmans heard a voice from heaven, saying, There is no sword but *Zoolfakar*, and no hero but Aly."

But in the same book there is a discrepancy, for again we read:

"Aly, according to some traditions, received forty wounds at the battle of Ohod. The Prophet took water in his mouth and ejected it on the wounds, which were so completely healed that not a trace of them remained. When Aly's sword was broken in the battle, Mohammed took a dry branch of a date-tree, which became *Zoolfakar*, and gave it to Aly."

It is in the famous Miracle play of Hasan and Husain, as collected from oral tradition by Colonel Sir Lewis Pelly, that we have the legend of *Dhu'l-Faqār* fully developed. In this drama and tragedy of the plains of Kerbela, annually re-enacted in every city of Persia, 'Ali is the central figure, the hero and redeemer of his people. In the fourth scene he offers to sacrifice his life for a fellow-creature. The scene opens with "the holy family" of five (Mohammed, 'Ali, Fatimah, Hasan, and Husain), seated in dire want, kept from starvation by heavenly nymphs who bring down trays of fresh dates.¹⁵ "Then in anguish of mind 'Ali goes out for a ride on his mule, partly with the view of seeking employment, and partly with the idea of driving care from his mind. On his way he meets with a young man anxious to slay him, and thereby obtain as wife a certain lady, whose father desired the head of 'Ali as a dowry for his daughter. 'Sever my head from my body, thou foolish young man, and return to thy country rejoicing,' was the ready rejoinder of the Bayard of Islam, who made no scruple to sacrifice his

¹⁵ The Miracle Play of Hasan and Husain, Vol. I, p. 51.

own life in order to benefit a fellow-creature. The eyes of the youth, however, were suddenly enlightened, and he begged forgiveness." Such is a summary of the plot. There follow the passages that deal with the famous sabre of Mohammed:

The King (to the Youth):—There is no refusal to what thou sayest, but I have a request too; I demand a good dowry for her. If thou canst get me the head of 'Ali, the chief of the true believers, as a dowry for thy cousin, thou mayest have her for a wife.

The Youth in Love:—O uncle! I have heard many say that 'Ali has a sword which in fact is a dragon. Its name is *Zu'l-faqar*; it has two points in reference to life and death. It is not an easy thing in the world to cut 'Ali's head, nor can it be performed by human agency.

The King:—There is no other way of attaining her.

. . . *The Youth (seeing the Zu'l-faqar):*—What precious and beautiful weapon is that? I think good luck attends me on this my journey. What have this horse and scymetar to do with a slave? Royal weapons are fit for royal persons only. O young Arab, whose are this horse and sword which cannot be equalled in all the world? . . .

. . . *Gabriel:*—Thou prince of the two worlds, thou protector of the faithful, thou leader of men and jinns, O chief of believers! it is engraved on the seal of the universe, "There is no youth but 'Ali, and no sword but *Zu'l-faqar*." . . .

. . . *Michael:*—The breasts of jinns and angels are ravished with joy and delight. God and His Prophet are witness of the truth of what I say. The Creator of the world has declared that there is none like 'Ali, no youth but 'Ali, no sword but *Zu'l-faqar*. . . .

. . . *'Ali (putting down the Youth):*—Thou unbelieving wretch, ignorant of God and his religion, bare thy neck quickly to the edge of the dagger. If thou become a Musulman thou shalt obtain quarter; if not, thou shalt at once receive a blow from my soul-destroying sword.

And then the Hero-warrior relents at the cry of the lovelorn youth and offers to die in his stead, while Gabriel exclaims: "O Holy ones! 'Ali is offering his head for the sake of the people of the Prophet's family."¹⁶

So much for the Sword of Mohammed and 'Ali in the Shiah tradition.

Entirely apart from these sanguinary legends we have the fact that from the very earliest times the preacher in the mosque was accustomed to hold a sword in his hand while addressing the people. In the commentary on Al-Ghazali's book of Worship by Al-Murtada,¹⁷ it is stated that the preacher in the Mosque occupies his hands

¹⁶ Idem. pp. 65, 67, 68.

¹⁷ Al-Murtada on the *Ihya*, Vol. III, p. 229

with the hilt of a sword or a staff when he delivers the two addresses. Both the sword and the staff are mentioned, we are told, because the sword indicates that the city was taken forcibly by the sword, like, e. g., Damascus. "So if you turn back from Islam it is still in the hands of the Moslems to fight against you with it until you return to Islam." In every city that was taken peaceably, e. g., Cairo and its districts, the wooden staff is used. "But the learned differ, and say that half of Cairo was taken forcibly and half peaceably, and so the present practice is to adopt a sword of wood so as to combine both statements."¹⁸

As it is not generally known that this custom of carrying a sword or a staff into the pulpit of the Mosque every Friday is universal, we give the account in full from Lane's careful observations in Egypt.¹⁹ He says, that as soon as the call to prayer is finished, the congregation stands and then

"a servant of the mosque, called a '*Murakkee*,' opens the folding-doors at the foot of the pulpit-stairs, takes from behind them a straight, wooden sword, and, standing a little to the right of the door-way, with his right side towards the *qibleh*, holds this sword in his right hand, resting the point on the ground. In this position he says, 'Verily God and his angels bless the Prophet. O ye who believe, bless him, and greet him with a salutation.' Then, one or more persons, called '*Muballighs*,' stationed on the *dikkeh*, chant the following, or similar words: 'O God, bless and save and beatify the most noble of the Arabs and 'Agam (or foreigners), the Imam of Mekkeh and El-Medeeneh and the Temple, to whom the spider shewed favor, and wove its web in the cave; and whom the *dabb* saluted; and before whom the moon was cloven in twain; our Lord Mohammed, and his Family and Companions.' The *Murakkee* then recites the *adán* (which the *Mueddins* have already chanted); after every few words he pauses, and the *Muballighs*, on the *dikkeh*, repeat the same words in a sonorous chant. Before the *adán* is finished, the *Khateeb*, or *Imam*, comes to the foot of the pulpit, takes the wooden sword from the *Murakkee's* hand, ascends the pulpit, and sits on the top step or platform. The pulpit of a large mosque, on this day, is decorated with two flags, with the profession of the faith, or the names of God and Mohammed, worked upon them: these are fixed at the top of the stairs, slanting forward. The *Murakkee* and *Muballighs* having finished the *adán*, . . . the *Khateeb* rises,

¹⁸ Cf. E. E. Calverley—"Worship in Islam" (p. 148) Madras, 1925. In the Futuhal-Buldan of Baladhuri we read that Mohammed said: "All cities or districts were conquered by force, but Al Medina was conquered by the Koran." (Hitti's translation, p. 21).

¹⁹ Lane's "Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians," pp. 86, 87.

and, holding the wooden sword in the manner as the *Murakkee* did, delivers an exhortation, called *khutbet el-wa'az*."

The German Orientalist, C. H. Becker, in his monograph on the pulpit in early Islam, gives further information regarding the significance of the customs described by Lane.²⁰ "Der Prediger betritt die Kanzel mit einem Stab oder Schwert oder Lanze oder Bogen in der rechten hand." The preacher ascends the pulpit with a staff or sword or lance or bow in his right hand. In his historic investigation of the origin of this custom he concludes that the earliest *mimbar* (pulpit) was really a *bema* or judgment-seat for the Prophet when acting as judge and dispensing justice. He began the custom about A.H.7. The sword or staff and the pulpit always go together as symbols of authority. They are called *al-'udāni* i. e., the two pieces of wood, and explained as being originally *mimbar an-nabi wa-'asahu* i. e., the Prophet's pulpit and staff. Becker rightly concludes, therefore: "The staff or stick is considered by primitive races as an expression of superiority over against those who do not possess one. He who has a stick as weapon can strike, can punish. Thus the staff became the symbol of power in God's hand or in that of His three representatives (prophet, priest or king) . . . Later on the staff became the sword."

Whether it be sword or spear, the public service on Friday is not complete unless some weapon be in the hand of the *khatib* when he delivers the sermon in the pulpit. This custom, as we have seen, is universal and goes back to the example of Mohammed himself in the earliest mosque-pulpit of Medina. Later on the early Caliphs often established their right by the act of ascending the *mimbar* and wielding the staff or sword.²¹

The pulpit and the sword go together in the history of Islam. The preaching of Islam and the power of its

²⁰ "Die Kanzel im Kultus des alten Islam" (Islam Studien, Leipzig, 1924), pp. 451, 456, 457, 469. Cf. Ghazali, *Ihya* 1: 130—Juynboll, *Handleiding t. Moh. Wet.*, pp. 80-81.

²¹ Becker, "Die Kanzel im Kultus des alten Islam," pp. 459, 461, 462. If the use of the sword on the pulpit were among the innovations it would have been mentioned as such in *Kitab al-Madkhal*, which deals with all later developments of the Islamic cult.

warlike propaganda were wedded together by its founder. In the words of Charles M. Doughty (than whom no European better understood the soul of Islam), "The sword is the key of their imagined paradise. The unwarlike but frenetic Arabians, inflamed with the new greediness of both worlds, ran down like wolves to devour the civil borderlands. . . . The Mohammedan chain-of-credulities is an elation of the soul, breathing God's favor only to the *Moslemin*; and shrewdness out of her cankered bowels to all the world besides. The Arabian religion of the sword must be tempered by the sword: and were the daughter of Mecca and Medina led captive, the *Moslemin* should become as Jews."²²

We turn to the Koran. The word sword (*saif*) does not occur in the book; yet there are many references to *jihād* or holy war, and there is one of these references which is generally known as "The Verse of the Sword" (*Ayat-us-Saif*).²³ This celebrated verse occurs in one of the latest *Surahs*, that entitled Repentance, (ix: 5) and reads as follows:

"And when the sacred months are past, kill those who join other gods with God, wherever ye shall find them; and seize them, besiege them, and lay in wait for them with every kind of ambush; but if they repent and observe the prayers, and pay the obligatory alms, then let them go their way, for God is gracious and merciful."

In his book on the Historical Development of the Quran, Canon E. Sell says:

"It has been said that this famous verse, known as the *Ayat-us-Saif*, or 'verse of the sword,' abrogates the restriction which did not allow the Muslims to commence a war and which is recorded in the verse:—

'Fight for the cause of God against those who fight against you: but commit not the injustice of attacking them first.'

Suratu'l-Baqara (ii) 186.²⁴

It even does more, for it also abrogates²⁵ the kindly words of an earlier Meccan revelation:—

'Dispute not unless in kindly sort with the people of the Book. Suratu'l-Ankabut (xxix) 45.' . . ."

²² "Arabia Deserta," Vol. II, p. 379.

²³ For the teaching of the Koran regarding *Jihad*, or the holy war, see Dr. H. T. Obbink's "De Heilige Oorlog," Leiden, 1901; The articles by W. R. W. Gardner, *Jihad* (M. W. II: 347) and S. V. R. Trowbridge, Mohammed's view of Religious War (M. W. III: 290); especially article *Djihad* in Encyclopedia of Islam.

²⁴ This order which restricted fighting to defensive warfare is, according to Husaini and Baidawi, abrogated by the *Ayat-us-Saif*.

²⁵ Baidawi, Vol. ii, p. 98.

So important did the "Verse of the Sword" become in Islamic dogma that this verse abrogated not one or two, but a whole list of passages in the Koran, all of which teach a measure of leniency and good-will toward unbelievers. Indeed, there is not a single verse of greater importance in the whole Koran as regards its power of abrogation (nullification) of earlier teaching.

The passages are given by the Reverend Anwar-ul-Haqq, as follows:²⁶ 2: 133; 2: 188; 2: 214; 2: 257 ("Let there be no compulsion in religion"); 3: 19 ("Thy duty is only preaching"); 4: 66; 4: 82; 4: 92, 93; 4: 86 and 90; 5: 2; 5: 99; 6: 66; 6: 91; 6: 104; 6: 106, 107, 108, 112, 136, 138; 6: 159, 160; 7: 179, 198 ("Make the best of things and withdraw from the ignorant"); 8: 73; 9: 7; 10: 99 ("What, wilt thou compel men to become believers"); 10: 102, 108; 10: 42, 47; 11: 15 ("Thou art only a warner"); 13: 40; 15: 3; 15: 85, 89, 94; 16: 84; 16: 126, 128; 17: 56; 17: 110; 19: 40; 19: 76, 87; 20: 130, 135; 22: 48, 55, 67; 23: 56, 98; 24: 53; 25: 64; 27: 94; 28: 55; 29: 49; 30: 60; and fifty other passages all carefully marked as abrogated by the "Verse of the Sword"! *That is, a total of over one hundred and ten injunctions or teachings are abrogated by the command to use the sword—the sword of Allah and of Mohammed.*

At the beginning of his career Mohammed propagated the religion of Islam by teaching, by preaching, and argument. In the earlier Surahs he said he was only a warner. But when he came to power he also felt conscious of a new authority and sanctioned the use of the sword. We are not surprised, therefore, that in the same short chapter that contains "the Sword Verse" he uses the astonishing phrase "God and His Apostle" no less than sixteen times. The evolution of this doctrine of the sword is accurately traced by a Mohammedan writer

²⁶ "Abrogation in the Koran," Lucknow, 1925. His excellent monograph is based on the Koran commentary of Jalalain, and the standard work of Abu'l Qasim Hibatallah b. Salama of Bagdad (died 1019)—*Al-Nasikh wa'l Mansukh*. This book is one of the standard authorities and discusses 201 verses of the Koran that are abrogated on the basis of 95 different commentaries (Brockelmann, Vol. I, p. 192). On the doctrine of abrogation see the commentaries on Surah 2: 105 or As-Siyuti's Itqan, Vol. II: 20-27.

(Ibn 'Abidin iii: 237 quoted by F. A. Klein, "The Religion of Islam," p. 174) as follows:

"Know thou that the command of fighting was revealed by degrees, for the Prophet was at first commanded to deliver his message, then to discuss and dispute and endeavor to convince the unbelievers by arguments; then the believers were permitted to fight; then they were commanded to fight, at first at any time, except the sacred months, then absolutely, without any exception."

The Rev. C. C. Adams, Ph.D., in his thesis on "The Modern Reform Movement in Egypt" gives the summary of an article that appeared in *Al-Urwah al-Wuthqah* from the *Tarikh* of Muhammad 'Abduh (Vol. II, pp. 250 seq.) as present-day teaching:

"It is a duty incumbent upon all Moslems to aid in maintaining the authority of Islam and Islamic rule over all lands that have once been Moslem; and they are not permitted under any circumstances to be peaceable and conciliatory towards any who contend the mastery with them, until they obtain complete authority without sharing it with any one else."

And so it remains to this day, at least in theory. Holy war is "a duty in general on all male, free, adult Moslems, sane in mind and body and having means enough to reach the Moslem army. . . . So it must continue to be done until the whole world is under the rule of Islam . . . Islam must be completely made over before the doctrine of *Jihad* can be eliminated."²⁷

It would be interesting to compare the teaching of the New Testament with the Koran verse quoted; but we refrain.

"For not with swords loud clashing,
Nor roll of stirring drums;
With deeds of love and mercy,
The heavenly Kingdom comes."

Princeton, N. J.

S. M. ZWEMER.

²⁷ D. B. Macdonald Art. *Djihad* in *Encycl. of Islam*.

FULFILMENT NOT DESTRUCTION ¹

The problem between the Moslem and the Christian has been one of the acutest problems in human relationships. It was acute in the early centuries of Islam, and today it is as acute as ever. Events like the persecution of Christians in Turkey, and the recent disturbances in Palestine are clear indications of this fact. Who knows what may happen in other Moslem lands? There is a big gap, a deep chasm separating the two. An attitude of animosity, a mentality of hatred and bitterness is evident in mutual relationships. The Moslem looks down upon the Christian, and hates him. He wants to dominate the Christian, to overrule him, to absorb him, if possible. The Christian also hates the Moslem, scorns him, and regards him a curse to humanity. The Moslem mind is on fire against the Christians; so it is with the Christian. Thus they are set against each other. They are standing like two hostile forces ready to fight, without the slightest possibility of peace. Some years ago the present writer tried to bring a small group of Moslems and Christians together for contact and fellowship. He could succeed in convincing some Moslems for this purpose, but sad to say, he found no Christian to take part in such an adventure. The Christians have tried to meet the Moslems by their own weapons; an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. At least that is the universal impression left upon the Moslem mind regarding the Christian attitude toward them.

Politically this has been the attitude, and no peace has been secured. That same attitude of conflict has been carried even into the religious sphere, and the attitude of

¹ Based on an address delivered at the Cairo Conference of the Indigenous Churches, Dec. 5, 1929.

animosity has been the dominant spirit there also. The Moslems have tried to convert all Christians, namely, to circumcise them, to change their names, and thus initiate them into the Moslem community. The Christians have tried to do the same. This has been true to a certain degree in the missionary activities also. The missionary has gone to the Moslem peoples with the purpose of absorbing them and moulding them into an alien fashion. Thus in the religious sphere, everything Christian has seemed devilish to the Moslem; and to the Christian, everything Moslem has seemed false and impure. The result has been severe opposition, and conflict. So the Moslem believes that the Christian intends to annihilate his religion and faith. He calls the Christian, the "enemy of his religion." This is a strong conviction of the Moslem mind regarding the missionary activities. This is very unfortunate indeed! I believe there is at the present time an urgent need for a new and clear expression of missionary ends in Moslem lands. This will help immensely to clarify the atmosphere from confusion, which will lead to an openness of mind, a closer contact, and consequently to more efficient service.

What are we to do then if this is the case? What should be the right attitude in this problem? The answer is found in Christ's words in the Sermon on the Mount: He said, "I came not to destroy, but to fulfill." Christ's end was fulfilment, not destruction. That should be the end, the goal, the motive principle in the relationship between the Moslem and the Christian also. The end is harmony, not conflict; reconciliation, not animosity; redemption, not destruction. In Christ all the promises of God are "yea" and "Amen." Christianity is life, it is not death. The Moslems must be redeemed, so they and Christians must be reconciled in a new life which is the Kingdom of God.

Here the Christian will immediately object that Islam will never yield in this way. As a religious system Islam has no room for the Christian. Perhaps that is true, but

there is another factor to be considered in this respect, namely, the exigency of the political and economic conditions of the present age; the pressure of social and cultural demands on the Moslem peoples, forcing them to a new attitude, if you like, in spite of their traditional beliefs. The Moslems are coming to see that they cannot after all rule the world! They must acknowledge the existence of other people, who are even stronger than themselves. So politically Islam feels compelled to revise its teaching. Perhaps the pressure of economic conditions is stronger still in its effect. The Moslems come to see that exclusiveness and separation is death economically, and that they must find a way of cooperation with others. They see that for true progress they need the help of others, of women, of peasants, of other peoples; otherwise, they will go to ruin. Thus the exclusiveness of Islam, the all-sufficiency of Islam, is being shattered before the political, social and economic pressure of the present time. The Moslem cannot remain a follower of the Mohammed of the *Hijrah*; he cannot be a Mohammedan at the present time in that sense. That seems certain, and so he is seeking for a new way, at least for a new interpretation of his faith.

This much on the Moslem side; but what on the Christian side? What about the attitude of the Christian at this juncture? Is there a need for a change of attitude, and a readiness for it? What ought we to do?

The first thing we need is repentance. Some have taken a wrong attitude in the past, and the sooner we admit it the better. We have not all been faithful and true to the Spirit of Christ in our relationship with the Moslems. We have been timid spiritually.

Again we must break down all exclusiveness. For fulfilment and reconciliation we must approach the Moslem. We must come near and touch him. Some of us have considered him as "unclean" and "untouchable." We have kept separate from him; we have been "Pharisees." Thus we have been cynical. It was this separation

and cynicism that killed the very soul of Israel, and brought in Judaism instead. In the early Church, this spirit of exclusiveness threatened to kill Christianity also, making it merely a Jewish sect. No Christian Church can live in that way. Christianity is inclusive in its essence, otherwise it cannot live. This is true also with us who live in Moslem lands. We shall be obliged either to redeem the Moslem, or we shall be destroyed together. We must lose ourselves, in order to find life. That is the way of "fulfilment"!

Again we must have faith. Faith in God and His Power. God works in mysterious ways. Let us realize this and not be impatient. Let us have also faith in man. "The spirit of man is the candle of the Lord." Each Moslem soul is a candle of the Lord; dim, it is true, but capable of shining forth in full splendor.

Lastly, we must have love, the greatest of all things. Without love we are as sounding brass. God is love, let love be our nature also. Let the Moslem know that we love him; that our attitude is not that of destruction, but fulfilment; not annihilation, but redemption.

In this conflict of Islam and Christianity it falls to the Christian to take the first step forward. Justice solves nothing in the world. Love can solve everything. That should be our moving spirit in this problem. Then a new era will arise in these lands of the Near East, already sanctified by the very blood of Jesus Christ. Let us work for this end.

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LOOTFY LEVONIAN.

IS SALE'S KORAN RELIABLE?

The Koran is an extremely difficult book to translate. That is universally conceded by those who know anything of the subject matter of the book or of the language in which it is written. The immense number of different commentaries written in the Arabic language for the purpose of explaining the meaning of the text are themselves an indication that even the Arabs from the earliest times have been very far from being agreed as to what the words mean. Marracci's *Refutatio Alcorani*, published in 1698, contains a complete and astonishingly accurate translation of the Koran into Latin, and Sale's English translation, published in 1734, is based very largely on the Latin version of Marracci, relying also frequently upon Marracci's notes. The subsequent English translations, by Rodwell in 1861, and by Palmer in 1880, were undoubtedly influenced to some extent by Sale's work, and both these later translators admit that Sale deserves the high reputation which his translation has always borne.

Ten years ago there appeared the first English translation of the Koran made by a Moslem, the work of Maulvi Muhammad Ali of Lahore, India, with a long Preface occupying ninety-five pages, and 2822 foot-notes explaining the text, the Arabic original being printed alongside of the English translation. In the year 1930 two other English translations by followers of the Arabian prophet appeared, the first of these being the work of another Indian Mohammedan, Mr. H. G. Sarwar, whose work was reviewed in the last issue of this Quarterly; and the second being entitled "The Meaning of the Glorious Koran: an explanatory translation," by an

English Moslem named Mr. Marmaduke Pickthall, who has had the help of Prof. M. A. Ghamrawi and Fuad Salim Bey during his final revision in Egypt. In the translation of Maulvi Muhammad Ali no attempt has been made to detract from the value of previous translations, but Mr. Sarwar, in the introduction to his work, has written quite a violent tirade against the translations of Sale, Rodwell and Palmer, and seems to wish to give the impression that none but a follower of the Arabian prophet is capable of making a fair or unbiased rendering of the words of the Koran. He says, "Sale had the prosecuting lawyer's bias, Rodwell had the missionary's bias, and Palmer had the author's bias." Sale has to bear most of his vituperations, and is said to be "an imposter. God save us from the consequences of his lying." Sale is said to add certain words "with the positive intention of distorting the sense." In another place "he purposely mistranslates." Again—"There is no doubt that Sale knew Arabic, because if he did not, he would not have been able to choose the worst translation in most cases as he does." Again—"He has purposely chosen the wrong meaning in the verse under discussion to confuse the sense of the original, because his psychology led him to choose such equivalents as would enable him to overthrow the Qur-ân. The Qur-ân overthrows him." There are many such expressions. Towards the end of his remarks on Sale, Mr. Sarwar writes: "Sale has left no stone unturned to represent the Holy Qur-ân as preaching the very opposite of what it does. But he has not succeeded in his attempt. All scholars have now recognized his limitations and his bias. His translation is biased, wrong and antiquated. As to his notes, they are a mixture of honey and filth. There is no other way of describing them. He has distorted his authorities (the commentaries mentioned in his notes) far more extensively in the foot-notes than he has done in his translation. His account is with God."

As to Rodwell's translation, Mr. Sarwar's main ob-

jection is that "He has taken the 114 chapters of the Holy Qur-ân, disrupted their order and rearranged them according to what he calls the chronological order." As to the work itself, he says, "Rodwell's translation is a most careful piece of work done in an extremely scholarly way, and although there are many mistakes, they are not of such a nature as to call for adverse criticism. Any one may make a mistake. But the man who purposely introduces forgeries into God's word is an intolerable beast." Later on, however, he says, in regard to Rodwell, "I feel as if my bias in his favor has not allowed me to expose him as I should have done. May Allah help me."

Against Palmer's translation the chief complaint seems to be that "Palmer took it into his head that the language of the Qur-ân was like the talk of the ignorant Bedouins of to-day and was to be translated as such. He says, 'The language is noble and forcible, but it is not elegant in the sense of literary refinement.'" Another complaint is that "The work seems to have been done with such haste and hurry that it is almost beyond my power to narrate its defects. . . . Palmer had not the decency to treat the original with the respect due to it." On the other hand Mr. Sarwar recognizes some merit in Palmer's translation, for he says, "As for Palmer, in spite of all that I have said against him, there is this merit in his work, that it is, *so far as it goes*, very nearly word for word the Holy Qur-ân in the English language. . . . Whenever Palmer happens to be in a serious mood, and when he does not make any omissions, his translation rises to a great height. Occasionally it is almost sublime. But it has its falls."

Some of our readers will probably feel that any author who uses such intemperate language in regard to other writers who have undertaken the same task which he himself has just completed has thereby weakened his own case, and has shown that he himself is as much biased in favor of his own views as he complains that his

predecessors have been on the other side. But although Mr. Sarwar has spent some years at Cambridge University, we can hardly expect from him the same literary standards that we would look for in these days from those who engage in religious discussions in countries where we strive to maintain an impartial attitude and to make use of historical criticism even in the most sacred questions of our faith. Our Mohammedan brethren, even those of the most highly educated races, have evidently not yet acquired the habit of putting on one side for a time their religious convictions in order to see and understand their opponent's point of view and to make a thoroughly impartial investigation. We cannot blame those who have such strong religious convictions for using strong language, even though we regret that they seem to be unable dispassionately to consider the other side. We shall try to show that Mr. Sarwar is mistaken as to his opinion that Sale was *intentionally dishonest*, not in order to convince him of his somewhat uncharitable judgment, but in order to show to those who are prepared to look at both sides of the question that it is quite possible that Sale, when he did make a mistake (as Mr. Sarwar justly says we are all liable to do) had probably no such dishonest intention as has been imputed to him; and also we desire to show that in general Sale's translation is not so far from being correct as Mr. Sarwar would have his readers believe.

We will now proceed to take up the most important passages in Sale which Mr. Sarwar has selected for criticism, giving in each case for comparison the translations of Sale and Marracci, the Arabic text, and Mr. Sarwar's version, in parallel columns.

PASSAGES QUOTED FROM THE KORAN

Bi'smi'llāhi'r - Raḥmāni'r - Raḥīm
(1:1).

(We commence) with the name
of God, the most merciful (to
begin with), the most merciful
(to the end) (Sarwar).

In nomine Dei Miseritoris, Misericordis.

In the name of the most merciful
God (Sale).

Mr. Sarwar says, "Sale has intentionally left out a part of the Bismillah . . . the mistake is repeated at least 114 times." In this instance Sale did not follow Mar-racci, who seems to have understood *ar-Rahmān* as a noun, and *ar-Rahim* as a qualifying epithet, which is perhaps more correct than Mr. Sarwar's two epithets.

Al-hamdu li'llāhi Rabbi'l-'ālamīn Laus Deo, Domino Mundorum.
(1:2).

All praise belongs to God, Lord of Praise be to God, the Lord of all
all the worlds (Sarwar). creatures (Sale).

Mr. Sarwar complains that Sale has not translated the definite article in *al-hamdu*; but some will think that the author goes too far in translating the definite article by the word "all."

Iyyāka na'budu wa iyyāka nasta'in Te colimus: & te in auxilium im-
(1:4). ploramus.

Thee alone do we serve, and thee Thee do we worship, and of thee
alone do we ask for help (Sar- do we beg assistance (Sale).
war).

The criticism here is, "The force of *Iyyaka* (thee alone) is left out by both Sale and Palmer. Rodwell has put it in." (Rodwell has, "Thee *only* do we worship.") The word *iyyā*, however, does not mean "only" or "alone," and is used here merely because the object pronoun is placed before the verb for the sake of emphasis, for in Arabic an object pronoun cannot stand alone, as it can in English. This emphasis is *fully* expressed in English by placing the pronoun before the verb, as Sale has done.

Alladhīna yu'minūna bi'l-ghaib Qui credunt in Arcanum.
(2:3).

Who believe in the (Great) un- Who believe in the mysteries of
seen (Sarwar). faith (Sale).

Mr. Sarwar says, "He translates *al-ghaib* as 'mysteries of faith.' This is utterly wrong. The words 'of faith' are unnecessary, and *al-ghaib* means the unseen, not 'the mysteries,' . . . and Sale knows that, for in his foot-note he has got the correct version, but in the text he has distorted it." Sale's foot-note is, "The Arabic word *gheib*, which properly means a thing that is *absent*, at a

great distance, or invisible, such as the resurrection, paradise and hell. And this is agreeable to the language of scripture, which defines faith to be *the evidence of things not seen.*" Sale followed Marracci's Note: Arabici (al-ghaib) proprie significat id, quod abest, nec videtur, sed creditur, qualia sunt Fidei mysteria. Exponit hic Gelale-dinus: . . . id, quod longe remotum est ab eis, nempe resurrectio mortuorum, paradisus et ignis Gehennæ.

Mathaluhum kamathali 'lladhī' stauqada nār^{an}, falammā adā'at mā haulahu dhahaba'llāhu binūrihim wa tarakahum fi zulumātⁱⁿ lā yubsirūn (2: 17).

Similitudo eorum *est* sicut similitudo illius, qui studuerit accendere ignem postquam autem ignis illuminaverit, quod est circa eum, auferat Deus lumen eorum, & relinquat eos in tenebris: non videbunt.

Their case is like this:—There is one who kindles a fire, but when the fire has lit up all around him, God takes away their light, and leaves them in utter darkness—they cannot see (Sarwar).

They are like unto one who kindleth a fire, and when it hath encircled all around him, God taketh away their light and leaveth them in darkness, they shall not see (Sale).

Marracci refers in his note to the change in number of the pronouns in this simile, which he does not profess to be able to understand. Mr. Sarwar explains by saying that he who kindles the fire is Mohammed, and those left in darkness are unbelievers; in this he follows Muhammad Ali; but this is comment rather than translation.

Yā ayyuhā'n-nāsu 'budū Rabba-kumu'l-ladhī khalāqakum wa'l-ladhīna min qablikum la'allakum tattaqūn (2: 21).

O homines servite Domino vestra, qui creavit vos, et eos, qui *fuerunt* ante vos; ut vos timeatis *eum*.

O ye men! in order that you may practice reverence, serve your Lord, who made you and those before you (Sarwar).

O men *of Mecca!* serve your Lord who hath created you, and those who have been before you: Peradventure ye will fear *him* (Sale).

In the addition of the words "*of Mecca*" to which Mr. Sarwar objects most strenuously, Sale was following Marracci's note on verse 21, in which he says that in his introduction to the Koran he has shown from the teachings of the Mohammedans themselves that these words must be addressed to the idolatrous Meccans, and that therefore this *sura* must have been revealed at Mecca. It seems to be quite unnecessary and unfair for Mr. Sarwar

to say of Sale, "Wherever he does put in his addition of the words 'of Mecca' it is with the positive intention of distorting the sense."

Inna'llāha lā yastahyī an yaḍriba mathal^{an} mā ba'ūdat^{an} famā fauqahā (2: 26).

Indeed! God is not ashamed to set forth any parables—that of a gnat, or of something superior thereto (Sarwar).

Porrò Deus non erubescet, ut proponat in parabolam aliquid vile, velut culicem: atque etiam aliquid, quod sit supra illam.

Moreover God will not be ashamed to propound in a parable a gnat, or even a more despicable thing (Sale).

Here again Sale is following Marracci's note on verse 26, which says, non dedignabitur proponere parabolas etiam in rebus vilioribus, qualis est culex; and Sale's note on Yahya is also from the same note of Marracci.

As it would make this article too long if all the passages criticised by Mr. Sarwar were to be dealt with, we will now select those with which he finds the most serious objections.

Wa ātainā 'Isā'bna Maryama'l-baiyyināti, wa aiyyadnāhu bi rūhi'l-quḍus (2: 87).

And we gave Jesus, son of Mary, clear proofs, and we helped him with the Holy Spirit (Sarwar).

Et attulimus Jesu filio Mariæ demonstrationes (*idest virtutem miraculorum*) & roboravimus cum Spiritu Sanctitatis.

And gave evident miracles to Jesus the son of Mary, and strengthened him with the holy spirit (Sale).

Mr. Sarwar objects that Sale should use the word miracles here in connection with Jesus, whereas in verse 92 he translates the same word (*baiyyināt*) "evident signs" in the case of Moses. Sale got the word miracles from Marracci, who has *miraculorum* in brackets; but in verse 92 Marracci has, cum demonstrationibus *miraculorum*. Therefore in this case Mr. Sarwar may be justified in his complaint that Sale was not impartial; but in English the distinction between miracles and signs is so slight that the question is of little importance.

Wa'qtulūhum haithu thaqiftumūhum, wa akhrijūhum min haithu akhrajūkum; wa'l-fitnatu ashaddu minā'l-qatl (2: 191).

192. Et occidite eos, ubi inveneritis eos: & ejicite eos, unde ejecerint vos: nam tentatio (*idest periculum perversionis vestrae ab illis*) gravior est, quàm cædes à vobis illis inflicta.

And kill them where you find them, and turn them out from whence they have turned you out, for persecution (in faith) is worse than war (Sarwar).

And kill them wherever ye find them, and turn them out of that whereof they have dispossessed you; for temptation (*to idolatry*) is more grievous than slaughter (Sale).

Mr. Sarwar's comment on this is as follows—"The interpolation of the words '*to idolatry*' being intended by Sale to insinuate the intolerance of Islam to other religions, whilst God says, 'Let there be no compulsion in religion' (v. 256, ch. 20). It is these poisonous interpolations and still more poisonous notes which make Sale's translation a most mischievous book to be placed in the hands of people who are ignorant of Islam, as most Europeans are." That he should quote this text "Let there be no compulsion in religion" immediately after referring to verse 191, in which we have the terrible words "kill them wherever ye find them," seems to indicate that Mr. Sarwar has a "blind spot" in regard to the "holy war," which will be still more evident later on. Our readers who know Arabic can judge for themselves whether Mr. Sarwar's translation of *fitnah* is any better than Maracci's. It is doubtful whether it can mean "persecution." (Cf. Muhammad Ali, Note 241.)

Fa qātil fi sabili'llāhi, lā tukallafu illā nafsaka (4: 84).

Fight thou then in God's way, thou art not burdened except with regard to thyself (Sarwar).

83. Pugna ergo pro via Dei: non laborabis nisi pro anima tua.

Fight therefore for the religion of God, and oblige not any to what is difficult, except thyself (Sale).

Mr. Sarwar says, "The sense of verse 84 is utterly destroyed by Sale . . . throughout this chapter (4) and elsewhere where the Holy Qur-ân mentions the words *fi-sabilillahi* (in the way of God), Sale renders them 'for the religion of God.' I can only suppose that his idea is to show the Western world that fighting is made compulsory in the Holy Qur-ân for the sake of religion, whereas the truth is that prayer, fasting and almsgiving are included in the words 'in the way of God,' and fighting may, in many cases, mean nothing but a struggle with one's self in God's way. Sale's translation, however,

would make it a religious war with the unbelievers in every single instance where 'God's way' and 'fighting' are mentioned together."

This is another example of Mr. Sarwar's "blind spot." It is interesting to read the context, beginning verse 71, in Mr. Sarwar's own translation, or in that of Maulvi Muhammad Ali, who also holds the Ahmadiya views on the "holy war." Even in these two Ahmadiya translations the whole passage is obviously concerned with fighting and being killed (verse 74); and Muhammad Ali in his headlines summarizes the verses thus, "77-80. Hypocrites refusal to fight . . . 84. Prophet commanded to fight even alone." Moreover Baidāwi's commentary on this passage fully justifies Sale in his translation; these are Baidāwi's words—(fa qātil fī sabīlī'llāh) in tathbuṭū wa tarakūka wahdaka (lā tukallafu illā nafsaka) illā fī'la nafsika, lā yaḍurruka mukhālafatuhum wa taqā'uduhum, fa taqaddam ilā'l-jihād wa in lam yuṣā'iduka aḥad^{un}, fa'inna'llāha nāṣiruka, lā'l-junūd; which may be translated, "(So fight in the way of God)—if they delay and leave thee alone—(no responsibility is laid on thee except for thyself)—except for thine own action, their contradiction and their delay do thee no harm, so advance to the holy war, even though no one aids thee, for Allah is thy helper, and not the armies."

Qul, Lā yastawā'l-khabīthu wa't-ṭayyibu wa lau a'jabaka kath-ratū'l-khabīthi (5: 100).

Say: Equal are not the impure and the pure, even though the abundance of the impure may surprise thee (Sarwar).

109. Dic, Non adæquabitur malum, & bonum, etiamsi placuerit tibi multitudo mali.

Say, Evil and good shall not be equally esteemed of, though the abundance of evil pleases thee (Sale).

Mr. Sarwar complains of Sale that "this translation, which is followed by others, makes Muhammad (peace be with him) pleased with the abundance of evil." The reader will see that Sale follows Marracci, and the same word "please" is used by Rodwell, Palmer and Muhammad Ali; the new English translation by Pickthall has "attract thee"; in fact Mr. Sarwar's is the only English

translation which gives the rendering of "surprise" for this word *a'jaba*, which is the 4th stem perfect from the root *'ajaba*, and may mean (Lane's Lexicon) "to excite to wonder, admiration, pleasure or joy." In explanation of this verse, the commentary of Zamakhsharī (al-Kashshāf) has as follows—Fa lā tu'jibū bi kathratī'l-khabīthi, ḥattā tu'thirūhu li kathratihī 'alā't-tayyibī'l-qalīl, "So do not be pleased with the abundance of evil, so as to prefer it on account of its abundance to the good which is few." The Malay translation of 'Abdu'r-Ra'ūf has a word which means to be pleased with. So as far as I have investigated, this leaves Mr. Sarwar in a minority of one.

Wa mā kāna'l-mu'minūna li yanfirū kāffat^{an}, fa lau lā nafara min kulli firqatⁱⁿ minhum ṭa'ifat^{un} li yatafaqqahū fi'd-dīn wa li yundhirū qaumahu, idhā raja'ū ilaihim, la'allahu yaḥdharūn (9: 122).

And it is not possible for the faithful to come out altogether; then why should not a party from each tribe set out to get an understanding of the faith, and in order that they should warn their people when they return to them that they might be cautioned (Sarwar).

124. Et non est *conveniens* fidelibus, ut egrediantur *ad pugnam* omnes simul. Quòd si non egressa fuerit *ad prælium* ex omni agmine ex ipsis *una tantum* pars, *remanentibus reliquis*, ut instruuntur, *qui remanent* in religione & ut commoneant gentem suam, quandò redierint ad eos à *prælio*, *de, eo in quo ipsi instructi fuerint*, ut ipsi sibi caveant à *divina ultione*: non erit *rectè factum*.

The believers are not *obliged* to go forth *to war* all together: if a part of every band of them do not go forth, *it is* that they may diligently instruct themselves in *their* religion; and may admonish their people, when they return unto them that they may take heed to themselves (Sale).

Here we have another example of Mr. Sarwar's "bias" on the subject of the "holy war," for he objects to "the interpolation of the word *war*," and says that Sale "would make those who stay behind teach those who go out to war, thus making war the occupation of the majority of the Muslims, a people who, by their name and profession, are 'The Peaceful.'" Now as Mr. Sarwar is a *Hafiz*, he must know perfectly well that the very next verse to the one quoted above reads, as he himself trans-

lates it, "O ye who believe! fight those of the unbelievers who are near you." Maulvi Muhammad Ali also (in his foot-notes) makes desperate efforts to eliminate as far as possible from the Koran the idea of aggressive warfare; and in this case (Note 1105) he says, "Here there is a plain injunction to fight only against those unbelievers who are *near to you*, because it was they who persecuted the Muslims." Believing, as they do, that these "injunctions" are not merely the prophet's directions to his followers, but actually the very words of God himself, we can not wonder that in these days when aggressive war is discredited there is a movement to explain away *jihād*; but non-Moslems are more concerned with the verdict of history as to the effect on his followers of Mohammed's teachings and practice in the matter of aggressive warfare than they are with the actual words of the Koran, and we see no adequate reason to put a new interpretation on Koranic expressions which have hitherto been understood in a militant sense by all Mohammedan commentators. In this instance Baiḍāwī shows clearly the usual interpretation, as follows—(Wa mā kāna'l-mu'minūna li yanfirū kāffat^{an}) wa mā'staqāma lahum an yanfirū jamī^{an} li naḥwi ghazwⁱⁿ; which means, "(The believers should not go forth all together)—it is not well for them to go forth all together for such a purpose as a raid."

Qul, Allāhu a'lamu bi mā labithū, lahu ghaibu's-samāwāti wa'l-ardi; abṣir bihi wa asmi' (18: 26).

Say: God knows best how long they tarried. To Him belongs the secret of the heavens and the earth. How excellent his sight and how excellent his hearing (Sarwar).

27. Dic: Deus scientissimus est, quantum commorati sint. Ipsius est arcanum Cœlorum, & terræ. Fac videre in eo, & fac audire.

Say, God best knoweth how long they continued there: unto him are the secrets of heaven and earth known; do thou make him to see and to hear (Sale).

In regard to this passage Mr. Sarwar says, "But I now come to a real gem in Sale's translation. Sale has been caught in his own net of imposture. . . ." Then he quotes Sale's translation, and gives Sale's foot-note as fol-

lows, "This is an ironical expression, intimating the folly and madness of man's presuming to instruct God. (Al Beidawi, Jallalo'ddin.)" Mr. Sarwar then says, "Now the irony in this case consists in the fact that Sale did not understand, or would not understand, the meaning of the Arabic idiom, and has translated it wrongly and supported himself by a forged authority, because Beidawi and Jalalain give the correct meaning and the meaning given by Sale is not theirs, but his own forgery." Mr. Sarwar then quotes Palmer's foot-note on this passage, which says that both Sale and Rodwell missed the force of the idiom and the explanation given by the commentators to whom Sale refers; and Mr. Sarwar then quotes from Lane's Lexicon (vol. i, p. 210) where this peculiar idiom is explained, and adds, "God be praised! In this way does he permanently nail the lie on the head of George Sale, who imposed on former generations but has now been found out by his own people. God be praised for all that, and peace be with his own noble messenger!"

After reading this violent denunciation of Sale, the reader will be surprised to find that Marracci's Note on verse 27 shows very clearly that Marracci understood the idiom correctly and gives the very words of Jālālāin, although (for some unexplained reason) he has made his translation so literally word for word as to obscure the actual sense intended, and in this respect Sale followed Marracci; and he added the authority of Baiḍāwi probably because he saw that Baiḍāwi's interpretation of the meaning of the passage is the same as that of Jālālāin. Here is the entire Note from Marracci. The words in square brackets, having been omitted by Marracci, are supplied from my copy of Jālālāin.

XXVII. *Fac videre in eo, et fac audire.*] Idest, effice, ut ille videat, et audeat. Arabice abṣir bihi wa'smi': Explicat Gelal: [Abṣir bihi, ai bi'llāhi] hiya sīghatu ta'ajjubin [wa asmi' bihi kadhālika] bi ma'nā mā abṣarahu wa mā asma'ahu, wa humā 'alā jihati'l-majāzi, wa'l-murādu annahu ta'ālā lā yaghibu 'an baṣarihi wa sam'ihi shai'un: *Hæc*

est formula admirationis significans: O quantum videt: O quantum audit; Et utraque loquutio est metaphorica, seu ironica; & significat, nihil abscondi ab oculis, & auribus Dei. Eo scilicet modo quo quis diceret alicui: Doce tu Deum: vel adjuva Deum: ut ostenderet, Deum non egere, ut ab aliquo doceatur. (The Arabic in Marracci is printed in the Arabic character.)

Now it is quite obvious that if Palmer had had access to Marracci, and if he had understood the extent to which Sale was dependent upon Marracci, then he would not have written as he did in his foot-note to this verse. It is also obvious that Mr. Sarwar is incorrect in his statement that Sale "supported himself by a forged authority," for his authority from Jalālāin is there in black and white on the pages of Marracci; and by comparison with my own copy (which is a Cairo edition of 1345 A. H.) it is evident that the quotation is essentially correct. It is unfortunate that Mr. Sarwar's accusation of lying and forgery against Sale, and his statement that "The Christians know the truth but go on repeating a lie in the hope that it may take the place of the truth" (page xvi), should go forth among Moslems, who are already strongly prejudiced against Christians, and are for the most part unwilling to accept the results of European scholarship even if it is not distinctly Christian. Mr. Sarwar's violent and unjustifiable condemnation of Christians in general and of Sale in particular is not the best means of producing better relations between the followers of these two great religions. If Mr. Sarwar's translation of the Koran runs to a second edition, we would strongly urge upon him that he should correct his unfair criticisms, and modify his violent abuse.

Wa mā arsalnāka illā raḥmatāⁿ lil-
'ālamīn. Qul, innamā yūḥā
ilaiya annamā ilāhukum ilāh^{un}
wāhid^{un}, fa hal antum musli-
mūn? Fa in tawallau, fa qul,
ādhantukum 'alā sawā'ⁿ (21:
107-109).

107. Et non misimus te, nisi ad
misericordiam omnibus creaturis.

108. Dic: Certè revelatum fuit
mihi, quòd Deus vester Deus
unus est: an ergo vos *eritis* Mos-
lemi? 109. Quod si tergiver-
sati fuerint, dic *illis*: Notificavi
vobis æqualiter bellum (*idest in-
dixi illud vobis omnibus*).

And we have not sent thee (O Muhammad) save as a mercy for the people of the world. 108 Say: "What I have been ordered is that your God is only one God. Will you then obey (be Muslims)?" 109 But if they turn back, then say: "I have informed you all equally" (Sarwar).

We have not sent thee, *O Mohammed*, but as a mercy unto all creatures. Say, No other hath been revealed unto me, than that your God is one God: *will ye therefore be resigned unto him?* But if they turn their backs *to the confession of God's unity*, say, I proclaim *war* against you all equally (Sale).

Mr. Sarwar calls this passage "another forgery of Sale's," but what he says subsequently does not justify the use of the word "forgery." He says, "There is no justification whatever for the insertion of the word *war*, and the translation of '*ala sawa*' (against you all equally) is an absolute lie. The preposition '*ala*' (which has been translated as 'against') does not govern *you*, but *sawa* ('equality'). The 'you' in the sentence is the object of the verb *azantokum* ('I have informed you'): '*ala sawai*' = equally or with justice (vide Lane's Lexicon, p. 1479). In the days when few Arabic-knowing Muslims knew English, such forgeries as are perpetrated in Sale's translation, notes, and Preliminary Discourse might have passed unnoticed, but the attempt to repeat them is much to be regretted."

In this passage it is quite clear that Sale copied Marracci's interpolation of the word *bellum*; but the question naturally arises, why should Marracci have put this word in, unless there was some reason for doing so. In view of his frequent references to Jalālāin, one naturally turns to that commentary, and we find—Fa qul ādhantukum, a'lamtukum bi'l-harb; the Latin—Notificavi vobis bellum, is therefore a faithful translation of Jalālāin. Mr. Sarwar does not mention that Sale has also a foot-note, as follows: "Or, *I have publicly declared unto you what I was commanded;*" this is a translation from Baiḍāwī's commentary, in which "war" is also mentioned as an alternative meaning. This passage is therefore another example of Mr. Sarwar's desire to eliminate, as far as he can, any references to war and fighting, and his accusation of forgery on the part of Sale falls to the ground.

Wa mā arsalnā min qablika min rasūlⁱⁿ wa lā nabiyyⁱⁿ illā idhā tamannā alqā'sh-shaitānu fī um-niyyatihi (22: 52).

And we have not sent before thee, (O Muhammad) any messenger or prophet but when he had any longings, the evil-one mixed (something) in his longings (Sarwar).

53. Et non misimus ante te ullum legatum, neque prophetam, quin, cū legeret, conjecerit satanas aliquem errorem in lectione ejus.

We have sent no apostle, or prophet, before thee, but, when he read, Satan suggested some error in his reading (Sale).

Here Mr. Sarwar says, "Let all the readers of the Holy Qur-ān be aware of Sale's forgeries. The following is a most wilful mistranslation of Sale's. . . . All Christian writers have harped upon this verse and the fancied occasion on which it is said to have been revealed, but I have no space to enter into a discussion of that subject. What I say is that the translation given above is entirely wrong, for the words 'read' and 'reading' are not in the original text."

Now this looks like a serious charge, until we come to examine into it, and then we see at once that in this instance, as in the previous one, Marracci followed the commentary of Jalālain, and Sale followed Marracci. Jalālain gives *qara'a* (recite, read) as the equivalent of *tamannā*, which Mr. Sarwar has translated "had longings," and gives *qirā'atihi* as the equivalent of *umniyyatihi*, which Mr. Sarwar translates "his longings." In a Note on this verse, Marracci gives the entire passage from Jalālain in regard to the words in *Surat an-Najm* (53:20) which Ṭabari (i.1195) and Ibn Sa'ad (p. 137) both state to have been suggested to Mohammed by the devil and given out by the prophet as a revelation, but afterwards disowned by him, other words being substituted in their place. The words, as they are given in Jalālain, are as follows—"after verses 19 and 20 of Sura 53, namely, Afara'aitumu'l-Lāta wa'l-'Uzzā, wa Manāta'th-thālithata'l-ukhrā, Satan put on his tongue without his knowledge—tilka'l-gharāniqu'l-'ulā, wa inna shafā'atahunna latartajī." The whole passage may be translated, following Rodwell in part, "Do you see Al-Lat and Al-Ozza, and Manāt, the third idol besides? These are ex-

alted females, and verily their intercession is to be hoped for." The words after "besides?" were afterwards cancelled, and the following words substituted (Rodwell) "What? shall ye have male progeny and God female? This were indeed an unfair partition."

We have quoted Mr. Sarwar just above as saying that "All Christian writers have harped upon this verse and the fancied occasion on which it is said to have been revealed, but I have no space to enter into a discussion of that subject." We therefore desire to refer our readers to what another Muslim translator, Maulvi Muhammad Ali, says on the subject in his note on Sura 22, verse 52 (No. 1701)—"The story which is suggested as explaining this verse is absurd and altogether baseless. That the story of praising idols and of according recognition to any power or privilege of intercession in their behalf is a pure forgery is shown in 2382. Here I may only note that all learned commentators have always rejected it." Now this last statement that "all learned commentators have always rejected it" is obviously not correct. The commentary of Jalālain is recognized by all orthodox Moslems as an authoritative and learned work, and we have shown above that the story is given without questioning its truth; it is also given in the commentary of Zamakhshari, which formed the basis of Baiḍāwi's popular work; and Ṭabari, to whom we have referred above with Ibn Sa'ad as giving the story, was himself a learned commentator on the Koran. It is therefore not quite honest for Maulvi Muhammad Ali to say that "all learned commentators have always rejected it." As a discreditable story, there was every reason for the commentators to suppress it, and if there were not some truth in the story it is very difficult to account for the fact that it has been mentioned by so many Mohammedan writers whose general reliability is not questioned. But in any case, whether the story be true or false, Sale and Maracci should not be blamed for having followed the commentary of Jalālain.

We have now given enough examples from among the Koran passages in Sale's translation which are so severely criticized by Mr. Sarwar to convince any fair-minded and unprejudiced person, be he Christian or Moslem, that for the most part Sale's translation fairly represents the meaning of the language of the Koran as it is interpreted by such commentators as Baiḍāwī and the two Jalāls. The meanings attached to many passages in the Koran by such translators as Maulvi Muhammad Ali and Mr. Sarwar, both of whom are connected with the Ahmadiya Movement, are different from the interpretations to be found in the orthodox commentaries, especially with reference to the "holy war" and the exhortations to fight in the Way of Allah. When Sale's translation was made and first published, the doctrines held by the above-mentioned gentlemen were unknown in Islam, for the Movement which they represent had not yet begun.

Incidentally, our examination of these extracts from Sale's translation and the comparison of them with the Latin translation of Marracci have shown what a very careful and accurate piece of work was done more than two hundred years ago, at a time when students of the Arabic language had practically none of the equipment in the way of dictionaries and grammars which are available in the languages of Europe to-day. The writer of this article has found the study of the above passages and the comparison of the translations of Marracci and Sale with the Arabic of the Koran and the comments of the orthodox writers thereon intensely interesting, and his admiration for the work of the translators of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has been greatly increased.

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ARAB AND HINDU: A STUDY IN MENTALITY

"A fierce and treacherous people gaining as much by fraud as by merchandise, and to make it worse they give you the most pious reasons for every villainy they commit. If you are their captive and offer all to save your life they say, 'No! It is written in the Koran that it is not lawful to plunder the living, but we are not prohibited from stripping the dead.' So saying, they knock you on the head!"

Such was a seventeenth century traveler's¹ outspoken opinion of the people of Oman. Whether or not the characterization was a fair one at that time, we will not venture to say. The author might have had in mind the Bedouin beyond the Hajar mountains or the dwellers of the Trucial Coast. At all events, it would be manifestly unjust to take at its face value such an estimate of this people to-day. True, one has not to stay long or travel far in East Arabia without seeing abundant evidence of the vitality of the old Adam,—the ubiquitous *khanjar*, ugly even when ornate; the frequent rifle, fingered most familiarly; the look or act that betrays suspicion, not to mention the more substantial memorials of an age of strife and hate in the form of crumbling forts. Undeniably there is a coercive air about the place which inclines one to suspect a measure of truth in that ancient judgment. But life is decidedly more secure now than it was two or three centuries ago. It was inevitable that it should be so. Just as the rigor of Roman rule was softened, and the barbaric soul of the Teuton sensitized by the influence of the Christian Church, so Arabia in common with the rest of the world is destined to become less

¹ Dr. J. Fryer, "Letters of a Nine-year Travel in East India and Persia," 1677.

pitiless as the power of the Life launched into the world two millenia ago is felt. It is therefore not with that aspect of Arab character uppermost in mind that the writer looks back to a brief stay among the peoples bestrewn the littoral of Oman and the Persian Gulf.

Appreciation is contingent on contrast, and Arabia is better understood against the background of India. Comparisons are odious, and invidious distinctions are to be avoided, for were it possible to tabulate the virtues and vices of the various races, it is an open question whether one would not be more impressed with their close correspondence rather than their divergences, and the smallness of the balance struck. Between "jet and ivory" the range is large in respect to appearance, custom and culture, yet certain unifying traits underlie all, and in our common responses bind us together. Equally appropriate from the lips of a Hindu or a Moslem would have fallen the words which Shakespeare put into the mouth of the Jew,—“fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer as a Christian is.” Unity in diversity and diversity in unity,—it is one of the riddles of the race. Cohering by race and religion, Arabia answers to the first; divided by the same yet subtly united as to disposition, India to the second.

There is a school of historians who hold that the deepest causes of historical events are to be sought in the necessity of mankind to subsist—"bread and butter" theorists they have been nicknamed—to whom geography is the basis of history. As a river or a range will deflect a railway, so, they say, the same factors determine the route the race will take down the corridors of Time. Whether or not the explanation is adequate, that different peoples have pursued divergent cultural routes, and that there are radical contrasts is plain.

In that notorious book "Mother India," the authoress spoke of the "slave mentality" of the peoples of that land.

The epithet came from an unsympathetic mind, yet it does suggest something in the make-up of the Hindu which, seen against the character of his Semitic neighbor, becomes acutely evident. The cause of this submissiveness is not far to seek. Fundamentally the root is not political but religious. The Aryan, brooding over the enigma of existence, took refuge from the mystery in a philosophy of denial. There is something elusive and equivocal about the First Cause, the nature of whose existence can only be affirmed, paradoxically enough, by negation. Is He this or is He that? "Neti, Neti!"—not so, not so! Whatever He is, He is not that but something different. Like the musings of Christopher Robin trying to locate himself as he squatted "half-way down the stairs," the mind can come to no more certain conclusion regarding the character of the Absolute than this child did concerning his own whereabouts.

"It isn't really
Anywhere,
It's somewhere else
Instead."

And so it is with the phenomenal world; it is but the sleight of the Cosmic Conjurer. The only reality that can be affirmed in regard to it is its elusiveness. And what of the hereafter and end of all? There Hindu thought is equally non-committal and Hindu hope equally vacuous. The "consummation devoutly to be wished" is a state of lost-ness where personality is non-existent, activity is suspended and responsibility at an end. Nobody denies that philosophically there is much more depth to Hinduism than to Islam. But mere depth is a poor foundation on which to found a state or build a life. For some purposes the ocean's abyss may prove less serviceable than a foot of land.

How different Islam, both as to content and as to achievement! Like Judaism and Christianity, it is a religion of affirmation. Allah is, and his will is paramount. The world is good and appearance is precisely what it seems to be. The eye of man may not "pierce beyond

the grave," yet in the mind of the believer there is no room for ambiguity,—the life to come is certain and the nature thereof equally definite. Not upon the quicksands of dubiety is one asked to stake his life, but upon a foundation firm and solid; not upon the chasms of caste to establish a state, but upon a limited brotherhood whose ranks are closed. The positiveness of this faith (I do not speak now of its social practices) is integrating in its influence. The prohibitory precepts of the *Silas* yield to definite obligations, and for "Do not steal," "Do not kill," the believer is enjoined to give alms, pray, fast, fight, while doubt is cut short with the repetition of the *Kalimah*. In other words, Indian vagueness is supplanted by a sort of virility; the mystic stillness of the *rishis*, like the lotus-life of the Buddha, loses its appeal in the more congenial vigor of Mohammed, whose was the mind, not of India, but of Arabia.

It is this sense of firmness and decision, this spirit of authority and action, which impresses the traveler as an outstanding characteristic of the Arabian as he makes the transition from one land to the other.

The point might easily be pushed too far, but perhaps a few illustrations varied in their nature might serve, for this trait, in the judgment of the writer, is not merely a question of mental intelligibility. At times it seems to be reflected to a certain degree in moral resoluteness.

A wholesale appraisal or indictment of a people carries within itself its own disproof, and yet one cannot help inferring directions from floating straws. As part and parcel of the amorphousness of Hinduism as a philosophy (wherein in part lies its lure) and its omnivorousness as a religion (wherein in part is the secret of its strength), one finds this inexactness of language intruding in the realm of ethics, which finds expression in a correspondence of conduct. With the Indian the language of ethics is freely used, but at the same time the concept behind the phrasing is likely as not to be so different from our own as to be very misleading.

This aspect of the Indian character has worked unfortunately for him, impugning his veracity and placing him in an unenviable light. Here is the reason why missionaries of long experience among both groups sometimes confess to an ethical stringency and to "more conscience" in their Moslem than in their Hindu students in our schools and colleges.

Again. A rising tide of race consciousness with its accompanying nationalistic aspirations is one of the characteristics of our age. Arabia in this respect is hardly to be grouped with Korea, India or the Philippines. Beyond permitting his home-land to fall to the level of "a sphere of influence," the Arab, like the Afghan, has never surrendered his political birthright. Nevertheless, Arabian politics is in the crucible, and Arabian sentiment is in flux, though perhaps not after the fashion of India. The attitude of these two peoples presents interesting parallels and contrasts. The Indian in his struggle is appraising himself anew; the Arab, however, is not, for he has never lost sight of his own worth; but the Arab both of Oman and Hasa, like the Indian, appears to be developing a critical faculty toward the west. Indian nationalism is in reality a patchy affair, unavoidably so with such a vast uninformed village population, to a certain degree co-extensive with, dependent upon, if not proportionate to education. The same sensitiveness in the Gulf Arab, however, has nothing to do with formal training, and is hardly to be interpreted as the birth throes of a new political era. It is merely the normal expression of a proud spirit as natural to him as the salty desert air. The Indian looks back upon an ancient culture, which, during recent generations, has been slipping imperceptibly from him, and which he now realizes he is in danger of losing altogether, and his own soul to boot. It is in an effort to recover that and his self-respect, that he is willing to stake his all. The Arab looks back on no such cultural past, and is less concerned about the recovery of prestige than he is deeply determined to maintain the

status which he has never lost. His notions of freedom were never taught him by a liberty-loving West, nor are his aspirations a matter of imitation, or his love of independence the result of contagion. The world could be slave, but he would be free.

In short, the Arab is an individualist, and his is a virile spirit which the open desert and the hazard of life thereon has done much to develop. It illustrates itself in a thousand ways, from the patient's refusal to take his medicine because he doesn't like the taste, to the dispatch and finality with which a desert *mejlis* will render judgment. His very conversation will betray the trait. Get him talking politics and he'll prove to be no sycophant. Nor will he waste words in circumlocution. He is more likely to surprise one with his frankness. He is straightforward enough to admit his likes and dislikes, though the admission carries in itself his own condemnation, which, however, he does not always suspect. If he has a grievance, and many of them have, against that power which is interfering with his notions of liberty, in an effort to maintain peace and inculcate a respect for law among the lawless, he will not be slow in stating his resentment and the ground thereof. Writing recently of conditions as he found them on the Pirate Coast, that good friend and servant to the Arab, Dr. Louis P. Dame, remarks that "in order to keep the institution of slavery, all foreigners, especially white men, are kept out. . . . With the white men would come the British Consul, and then slaves would be set free." The feeling is widespread, and testimony to it equally outspoken. Echoes of the same complaint come to us across the marshes of Mesopotamia. In that little-known but illuminating book "Haji Rikkan," the author tells of a greeting he received from a *sheikha* (singularly enough in this instance an old woman) on the occasion of one of his official visits to the people of these reed-swamps.

"I dislike the English," she said abruptly after the conventional salutations were over. "Before they came I

had thirteen slaves. Eleven ran away to the English, and I could not get them back. Is that not reason enough?"

And again, another Sheikh elsewhere, execrating the British attempt to inaugurate a better way to right a wrong than the traditional method of reprisal, exclaimed: "By Allah, if it were not for the English our (stolen) sheep and as many more besides to wipe out the insult would be in our hands before to-morrow night!"

It has ever been so. The same inability to appreciate the strange standards of Christ and the same resentment over individual restraint or the curbing of the Islamic spirit were evident a century ago, when an Ashanti king confessed that the cessation of the slave trade puzzled him, and that "he would give his brother in England (George IV) ten thousand slaves if he would let it be resumed." ²

The writer recalls a sociable evening in Bahrein with the Mission doctor and a couple of Arab guests, one of them of a sheikhly family from inner Oman. The political proclivities of the last-named were pronouncedly pro-German. We sat around a table, and as we dipped the hand into a common dish, reaching now for the water-melon, or the walnuts, or the candy, or as we sipped our coffee, the conversation played around Arabian politics and Ibn Saoud. One of the company ventured the hope that in due time the tribes of Hasa now engaged in blood-shedding would grow quiet, and peace once more reign. Immediately the Omanee spoke up: "No! If God wills they'll be always fighting." Then, the match having touched the train of his thoughts, his imagination began to sweep a wider horizon as the slumbering embers of enmity burst into flame. The Sultan of Muscat and the Sheikh of Bahrein alike, he despised. They were slaves to the British, who were "spoiling the country."

"We could take Muscat to-morrow," he boasted, "but what's the use? Britain would make us give it back to Taimur. And Ibn Saoud would take Kuwait and even

² "Sons of Africa" by G. A. Gollock, p. 41.

Iraq, but for the British." Because of British influence his country, in his eyes, was falling from her pinnacle.

"But don't you think that Arabia is quieter and in a sense more prosperous now by reason of British power in these waters?" asked the Doctor.

He confessed that it was.

"But what you want is freedom, freedom, freedom!"

"Yes, that's it," was the ready rejoinder.

"And that is what the African wants when you Arabs enslave him," was the Doctor's gentle thrust.

"Ah, but that's different," retorted the Omanee noble.

And there we touched the root of his Teutonic sympathy. "England is releasing our slaves," he parried, and then rightly or wrongly added, "But Germany doesn't meddle with those things."³

Whether we approve of or deplore a social theory which provides for slavery, or a religion which defends it, is beside the mark. The simple point is that in these cases, as in many others, we are constantly being reminded of the type of man we confront in the Arab—a self-confident fellow who, by virtue of his faith in himself and his ways, will leap with alacrity unabashed to the defense of conduct, which a truer appreciation of human nature and life's values might cause him to deprecate. But has not the Indian in embracing the principle, not of *jihad*, but of *ahimsa*, come closer to life's true way and more faithfully interpreted its inner meaning? Granted—but this rather enhances the contrast between the two peoples. However much we might regret in our hearts the social wrongs involved in Islamic philosophy, it does not affect the fact that traditionally and temperamentally the Arab is a man of singular spirit, of which stuff masters are made. We may not always like him, much less concur in his judgments, but we may understand him, and to understand is to love.

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³ When pressed for the source of this opinion he confessed it came to him from newspapers (probably propaganda sheets) from Egypt and Zanzibar, which drifted his way.

ISLAM IN INDIA TODAY ¹

Islam in India as distinct from other Moslem countries.

It is neither my object nor my duty to give a survey of the history of Islam in India or of the many sections into which this religion is divided in India. It would be extremely interesting to do so, but it is outside my scope and above my ability. The literature available on Indian Islam is very bulky, but nevertheless very unsatisfactory. Mr. Titus' new book is therefore most welcome. I intend only to offer some general considerations bearing on the peculiar position in which Islam in India finds itself.

Since the beginning of its appearance on the stage of the history of the world, Islam has had relations with India. For a couple of centuries it had the character of raiding expeditions and of mercantile settlements. In the seventh century, during the reign of Khalif Omar, Arab pirates attacked the West coast of India; some decades later an army penetrated into Sind and the Panjab, without leaving distinguishable traces. In 711 an army, commanded by Imad ud-din Muhammad ibn Qasim, was sent by the well-known governor of Basra to Sind. From that time Islam began to win adherents. Until 1193, however, when Delhi was conquered by the slave-general Qutb ud-din Ibak of Muhammad Ghori, Islam as a factor in the life of India maintained its character of destructive and bloody incursion, symbolized in the surname of Mahmud of Ghazni (999-1030), the "idolbreaker." In 1193 Islam established itself as a religious and political power in the country, to stay forever. With few exceptions the Moslem conquerors showed themselves either inimical or indifferent to the Hindus and their religion. Some noted exceptions may be mentioned. Abu Raihan al-Biruni's "Ta'rikh al-Hind" (973-1048) is a marvelous, but solitary testimony of deep and intelligent interest in the country and its inhabitants. His purpose was to bring Sanscrit culture and science to the Moslem world and Moslem culture and science to the Hindu world, an exponent of mutual understanding without posterity. The great Moghal emperor Akbar, on account of his syncretistic and eclectic leanings, took great interest in the spiritual life of the country and had the Mahabharata and Ramayana translated into Persian. His friend and helper Faizi wrote a treatise on the philosophy of the Vedanta. Dara Shikuk took refuge in the cosmopolitan regions of mystical religion to prove in his clumsy way the identity of Moslem and Hindu mysticism, in his "Madjma' al bahrain" (i.e., the mingling of the two seas), which, among other things, caused his tragic death through the instrumentality of his younger brother Aurangzeb. Just as monastic mysticism may be called the superdenominational domain of religion, popular religion may be termed its sub-

¹ The substance of a Report after a three months' visit to India and a careful study of the present situation. This report is too valuable to admit any abbreviation, so want of space compelled us to put it in smaller type.—*Editor*.

denominational region. In the course of the ages Islam and Hinduism have met each other there in this way, that Moslem saints had and have Hindu disciples and devotees, and *vice versa*.

Islam has been propagated in India by the sword, by pressure, by intermarriage and to a great extent by preaching, mainly by the zeal and activity of holy men, who received thousands and thousands of Hindus into the fold of Islam without measuring too critically the quality of the confession and practice of Islam in their new converts.

Nowadays the Moslems of India number about seventy millions. As to numbers therefore India is the most important Moslem country in the world, undoubtedly a fact of great significance. Moreover, India always has been one of the most creative countries in the field of religion. Still I doubt very sincerely whether this numerical consideration can give the right clue to estimate the position and significance of Indian Islam. In order to gain a true insight into this matter, we must review the different factors that determine the situation.

The countries of the world in which Islam is represented, either exclusively as a majority, or as a minority, may be divided into two main groups. In the first place those countries in which Islam has been the paramount or most important political power. In the second place those in which this is not the case. This second group comprises Islam in countries such as China, Russia and its Asiatic dependencies, and the many parts of the world nowadays in Africa and Asia where Islam is established and spreading because of the political and economic expansion of European powers, all places where the Moslems are in greater or smaller numbers subject to non-Moslem rule and never have known Moslem rule. This last addition must be taken into account, because nowadays a great many of the countries falling in the first group are politically dependent on non-Moslem rule, but, and that is the point to be kept in view, have known for the greater part of their history Moslem rule. Such is the case with Indian Islam. For about six hundred years the foremost princes of India have been Moslems. Except the parts south of the Kistna, Moslem states have covered the whole of the country. The Moghal empire under Akbar, Jahangir, Shahjahan and Aurangzeb has been one of the most splendid examples of Moslem domination in the world. That is a very significant fact. Political supremacy in Islam is synonymous with religious supremacy, because Islam is at once a religious, social and political system. Yet, and this it is to which I desire to call attention, India is the only country in the world in which Islam has had for centuries such a strong and predominant political position without conquering it religiously. Political extension and religious extension have always coincided in the history of Islam. That has been the case in the Mediterranean area, Asia Minor, North Africa, Persia, Central Asia. The still-existing minorities which confess other religions in those countries belong to the *ahl al-kitāb*, who, according to the principles of Islam, have a right to remain loyal to their religion. Not so in India. Islam came to meet in India a religious and social polity, entirely different and antagonistic in spirit and outlook, a luxuriant and deep-rooted civilization, one of the subtlest and highest growths in human history. Probably the caste-system and the Brahmanical supremacy are the main factors that have proved successful against the conversion of Hinduism to Islam. To borrow a phrase from the well-

known Hindu historian of Islam, Sir Jadunath Sarkar, in the domain of religion provincial Hinduism has withstood imperialistic Islam. In India, Islam has been compelled to come to terms with Hinduism in this sense, that it, with occasional interruptions, treated the idolatrous and polytheistic Hindus as *dhimmis*, the status belonging to *ahl al-kitāb*. Only occasionally this policy sprang from lack of religious zeal; it has mainly been dictated by political sagacity and the fact of the unconquerable stubbornness of Hinduism. Immigrants of Arab, Persian, Afghan and Central-Asian extraction, whose descendants are now still the aristocracy of Islam, originally out-castes and low-castes, have contributed mainly to the millions of Islam in India. Rajput clans in Rajasthan and the Panjab are an exception to this rule.

Viewed as a part of the whole Moslem world, Indian Islam has always held a rather isolated position. Gujarat and South-India were instrumental in the initial Islamization of Java and Sumatra, but later on the connection was not continued; these two islands became more closely related to Arabia and Egypt. Even in the glorious days of the great Moghal emperors Indian Islam did not loom large in the world of Islam. Its cultural and linguistic background was mainly Persian, not Arabic, as in other representative Moslem countries. Although it has produced many able and learned men, it is difficult to find many purely Indian scholars whose names are known or whose books are used throughout the international community of Islam. Indian Islam has produced a great amount of theological literature (for my purpose I do not speak of poetry and other forms of literature), chiefly in Persian and Urdu, to a small extent in Arabic, but mostly the names of such authors and books have remained confined within the boundaries of India. Linguistic boundaries, absorption in the huge and self-contained world of India, and political decline have contributed to this noteworthy fact. Indian Islam, although living in the country of religious fertility, has never been creative. The only field in which it has been creative, astoundingly creative, by dint of the thirst for magnificence and beauty of its princes, has been that of architecture. Although politically the most powerful, it has been obliged to live together with religions that were numerically far stronger and spiritually far deeper and wider. A unique situation, which accounts for much in its present condition, and which will render us some help in venturing some suggestions as to whether Indian Islam in the future will play a decisive rôle in the Mohammedan world, and in emphasizing the shifting of the range of possibilities that has come as the result of modern conditions.

This much as to the general outline of Indian Islam before the coming of British rule and European influence. My purpose in sketching it was merely to draw attention to the fact that of the highly civilized sections of the Moslem world, Indian Islam has been a definitely marked unit in the great commonwealth of Islam, more vitally connected with Persia and Central Asia than with that important part of the Moslem world which may be styled Mediterranean and which is influenced by Arabic. It has been a special province in the empire of Islam as well as in the world of Hinduism. This fact will always distinguish Indian Islam from all other influential sections of the Mohammedan world.

The conditions of Islam since the establishment of British rule.

The constantly increasing power and influence of England has become one of the most eventful facts in Indian history. In some respects, however, it has cut deeper into the life of the Moslems than into that of the Hindus, although they have changed less than the latter. Since many centuries the Hindus had become accustomed to foreign rule, and for this same reason had gained a mastery in adjusting themselves to new conditions. With characteristic subtlety and swiftness they grasped the change of the times, notwithstanding the strong conservatism of their social system. To them it meant only a change of masters. To the Moslems it meant a different thing. From the ruling race they became a ruled race, on the same level as the Hindus, to whom they had always felt themselves superior in position. English rule had risen out of the general dissolution of the old Moghal empire. This dissolution not only affected the political conditions, but also the cultural and religious condition of the country. Power, wealth and influence fled from many members of those classes of Moslems who during centuries had learnt to consider their superior position in the country as a natural thing. A general sullenness of mind pervaded the whole community. Whereas in the first quarter of the nineteenth century the Hindus manifested a great avidity for European learning, the Moslems kept aloof. Syed Mahmood, in his "History of English Education in India," sums up as reasons for this aversion: "pride of race, memory of bygone superiority, religious fears and a not unnatural attachment to the learning of Islam."

As a deeper reason for the great difference of attitude of Hindus and Moslems than the political or social one, may be mentioned the entirely different attitude and appreciation of Hindus and Moslems towards the doctrinal side of religion. By his rigid, clearly defined doctrinal faith and formulated religious law, the Moslem by nature has a strong consciousness of fundamentals, serving as infallible guides and inescapable tests of right thinking and action. Not so the Hindu. To his all-embracing and elusive mind all doctrine is acceptable. Moslem doctrine and law act like a severe sentinel, the Hindu mind may be compared to a kindly beckoning host, trying to find a proper place in the house for the new guest.

The most important decision that has ever been taken by England during its rule in India, viz., its European educational programme on the basis of Macaulay's Minute, had disastrous consequences for the Moslems. In the first place, because it ushered in the cultural conquest of England, to which the Moslems consistently refused to submit on account of their distrust and their devotion to the past; in the second place, because it was followed by the abolition in 1837 of Persian as the official language in court and administration, from then onwards to be substituted by English and the vernacular. This meant not only, and not in the first place, a new economic blow to the Moslems. Undoubtedly it put them at still greater disadvantage economically, because where they had lost before 1800 the higher posts, they now lost the lower posts; but it involved a more important thing, namely, an irreparable loss of historical and cultural consciousness and a general weakening of their morale, as the irrevocable passing of the cherished glorious past was staring them in the face, stiffening them to a sterile conservatism and without giving birth to a new orientation. A highly

educated and representative Moslem, with whom I was talking about this point of history, tried to explain to me that the attitude of the Moslems then had been an unorganized form of non-cooperation, by which they hoped to influence and alter the policy of Government. I am afraid, however, that he was antedating Gandhi's invention, in contradiction to plain historical and psychological facts.

The religious leaders (*mullahs*) inculcated in the mind of the people the idea that pursuance of the "New Learning," as it was called by those who accepted European sciences with enthusiasm, was "*kufr*" (unbelief). They raised the cry of "religion in danger." C. F. Andrews' book, "Zaka Ullah of Delhi," gives many interesting facts on this aspect of Moslem life in the years before the Mutiny. It is unmistakable that the well-known agitation of the "Wahhabi" Sayyid Ahmad of Rae Bareli (1782-1831), who declared India to be "*dār al-ḥarb*" (abode of war, i.e., a country in which the holy war, *jihād*, has to be waged) and who was killed in his *jihād* against the Sikhs; the many discussions and *fatwas* that were held and issued in the time between 1840 and 1870 on the question whether India belonged to "*dār al-ḥarb*" or to "*dār al-islām*"; the Puritanic movement with a similar aggressive strain of the Farā'id-sect in Bengal and other similar movements, which moved Sir W. W. Hunter to write his book "The Indian Musalmans: are they bound in conscience to rebel against the Queen?" must be appreciated as the natural reaction against the sudden changes and the new age, as well as a sign of fresh awareness of the sloth into which Islam had fallen.

Besides sullenness and enmity, there undoubtedly was also in the minds of many far-sighted men a reasonable appreciation of the beneficent effects of British rule, or as it was called, "English peace." For this purpose the recollections of the venerable Maulvi Zaka Ullah in Andrews' book are very enlightening. Notwithstanding all conservative opposition, many a young man became intoxicated by the wine of the "New Learning," and experienced his initiation in the world of English literature as a dazzling revelation. In M. Garcin de Tassy's "Histoire de la Literature Hindoue et Hindoustanie" one can find many instances that testify how many Moslems had learnt to accept the inevitable and to see the good sides of it.

The Mutiny was not only a critical time in the history of British rule, but also in the life of the Indian people. Without minimizing or forgetting the many causes that have been adduced to explain this far-reaching event, it seems wise to accept as the general explanation at the root of the whole thing, the view that it was after all the convulsory reaction of an old and great political, social and religious body against the first impact of a new and antagonistic world. Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, the most outstanding reformer in Indian Islam, who was conspicuous during the Mutiny by his unswerving and self-sacrificing loyalty to the British, wrote a pamphlet about "The causes of the Indian Revolt." It serves no purpose to enumerate here the many reasons he adduces. The main point on which he lays great stress is, that the constantly growing distance between rulers and ruled, the bewilderment of the Indians as to the reasons of many new measures, were chiefly responsible for this sudden and dangerous outbreak.

For the development of the Moslem community the Mutiny has been

of great significance. The ardor, howsoever subdued, of the young enthusiasts for the "New Learning," was quenched. The merciless suppression of the Mutiny by the British Army widened the gulf between rulers and ruled and gave rise to deep mutual resentment and suspicion. Especially the Moslems became the black sheep in the eyes of the Europeans, a situation certainly not favorable to instilling new and fruitful life into the Moslem community. All seemed to conspire to strengthen the Moslems in their attitude of barren pride, aloofness and despondency.

On this background, that in my opinion cannot be painted too black and melancholy, the greatness of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (always called by abbreviation Sir Sayyid) gets its due and amazing proportions. Present-day Indian Islam is unthinkable without him. His inspiration, his impact, his farsightedness, his strength of mind and purity of purpose and intention one meets everywhere. In my opinion, among the few great men who have appeared in the world of Islam during the last century, Sir Sayyid undoubtedly ranks highest. The two great Moslems who are his competitors, are Sayyid Djamāl ud-dīn al-Afghāni and Sheikh Muhammed Abduh. The volcanic and revolutionary-minded Djamāl ud-dīn stirred to the very depths the world of Islam, revitalizing the natural Moslem instincts of cultural and political consciousness, harping on the feelings of Moslem pride and superiority.

Abduh was quite another type. A sincere theologian, reformer and apologist, touched by the new age, honestly trying to adjust Islam to modern ideals, as they were current in his day, but always with the characteristic reserve of the man, whose emancipation is more a matter of the intellect than of the inner man. Sir Sayyid is, in my opinion, of another and greater stamp. In connection with what I have said in the first paragraph, it is significant to note that he is not universally known in the Moslem world as are Djamāl ud-dīn and Abduh, even although he was a voluminous writer in the field of apologetics too; another proof of the comparative isolation of Indian Islam. He devoted himself to the educational and social uplift of the Moslem community of India with astounding courage, great singleness of purpose, and an openmindedness that is very rare in a Moslem. In my opinion, this man deserves unreserved and enthusiastic admiration. His strength and equilibrium of mind, his self-restraint and capacity for taking the long view, must have been amazing. He accepted the irrevocable passing of the old structure as an established fact, however, and (this is important) not reluctantly, but creatively. He saw visions of a new future. His synthetic and constructive mind had a genuine admiration for the freedom of spirit and widening of knowledge that was to him the gift of Europe. One feels this attitude of mind in the noble words with which, when in 1877 after many difficult struggles he opened the Mohammedan Oriental College at Aligarh, he described his purpose in this institution: "that this college may expand into a university whose sons shall go forth throughout the length and breadth of the land to preach the gospel of free inquiry, of large-hearted tolerance and of pure morality."

His activity had to be many-sided. I will mention only some important points. In order to remove the suspicions of the British, whose cooperation and appreciation he sorely needed, he wrote in 1860 a pamphlet entitled "The loyal Mohammedans of India." He started translation-agencies to translate English books into Urdu in order to afford

access to the new ideas and outlook on life. He published a magazine "*Tahdhib al-akhlāq*" (*Moral Reform*), in which he later on, with the intelligent help of gifted friends, pleaded for social, religious and moral reforms in the Moslem community. He wrote his large "Commentary on the Holy Bible," in which he maintained the Christian Scriptures as genuine and not as corrupted revelations, with the purpose of building up a spirit of new appreciation and toleration.² At the same time he was an ardent defender of Islam and became, by writing his "Essays on the Life of Mohammed," one of the forerunners in the rationalizing and idealizing of Islam and its prophet. His main object, however, was the foundation of a College, in which European learning should be taught in the atmosphere of Moslem culture and religion, because the Moslems feared, as a result of English education with its absence of religious education, disbelief in the old faith. In his opinion, education was the only effective solution of the problem with which the Moslem community was confronted. In his own words: "All the socio-political diseases of India may be cured by this treatment." In the face of stubborn resistance and calumny he succeeded in starting the already-mentioned Mohammedan Oriental College at Aligarh in 1877, now since 1921 the Moslem University of Aligarh. In order to widen his outlook, he had previously gone to England, and had selected Oxford and Cambridge as the model for his own institution.

One of the most amazing things in this great man, (to which sufficient attention was not given in books on modern Indian Islam) was his magnetic and inspiring personality. I will dwell on it briefly, because it has had a moulding influence on the modern educated Moslems up to the present day. He gathered around him a band of exceedingly able men, some of them formerly his bitter enemies, and stimulated them to a quickened and purified Islamic consciousness and enthusiasm. I mention Nawab Muhsin ul-Mulk, who took over, after Sir Sayyid's death in 1898, the management of Aligarh and by his propaganda made the Mohammedan Educational Conference the meeting-place of all enlightened Moslems. Maulvi Cheragh Ali was another friend of Sir Sayyid, an ardent, but now undeservedly forgotten defender of Islam. What strikes one in this man is a far greater amount of daring and spiritual freedom than the present-day Indian apologetic writers ever show. He defended in his "The proposed political, legal and social Reforms in the Ottoman Empire and other Muhammadan States" a position exactly identical with that maintained in the universally-condemned book of the Egyptian Sheikh Abd al-Razzāq "*al-hukm fi'l-islām*" (Government in Islam), viz., that Mohammed never intended to reveal unchangeable rules for civil and political institutions and that he has only given to the world spiritual doctrines and moral reforms. Maulvi Nazir Ahmad and Maulvi Zaka Ullah, encouraged by the inspiration of Sir Sayyid, became able and influential Urdu prose writers. By his own example and the encouragement of others Sir Sayyid has become one of the most influential builders of modern Urdu prose and literature. Maulana Shibli Naumani, famous as one of the best modern Indian Moslem historians, theologians and writers, friend of the well-known Orientalist Sir Thomas Arnold, only reached the height of his activity after he had become a member of the Aligarh-group. He

² One part only appeared in print.—*Editor*,

wrote a series of biographies on Moslem heroes, such as al-Ghazali, al-Faruq, etc., to evoke before the eyes of Moslem youth the glorious past. In his poem, a *mathnavi* in Urdu, called "Subah-i-Umed" (Dawn of Hope), he described the lethargy of the Moslems of India and the endeavors of Sir Sayyid to break it down. One of Sir Sayyid's most precious followers has been the famous poet Altaf Husain Hali, who became after Sir Sayyid's death his biographer. The daily intercourse with Sir Sayyid inspired him to write his "Musaddas" (a sextet), by which he rose to the rank of the national poet of the Moslems. It describes the ancient glories of the Moslem empire in Spain and Bagdad, its progressiveness in learning and tolerance of spirit, and contrasts it with the prevailing decadence and lethargy, appealing to the Indian Moslems to awake and manifest once again the spirit of adaptability, that, in his opinion, was one of the outstanding characteristics of Islam in olden times. This poem has been sung and recited in mosques, meetings and conferences, calling forth streams of tearful emotion, and is still a source of inspiration.

I consider this one of the most fascinating periods in the dismal history of Indian Islam, and the background on which all modern developments and achievements, its relative strength and weakness, must be judged. Aligarh, with all the forces it organized, was the starting-point of a slow awakening of the Moslem community out of its listlessness. It has been the most potent factor in the breaking down of the crushing feeling of backwardness and despondency, which is still a living sentiment in the Moslem community. It has mobilized the forces that changed the attitude of fatalistic acceptance to that of determined revolt.

Let us now review in outline the developments that have taken place since this first awakening, political, social and religious.

In a political respect the Moslems were listless. Sir Sayyid was not a political nationalist in the modern sense of the word. He dreamt no dreams of political freedom, and was deeply convinced of the benefits of British rule. All his energy was concentrated on the social, cultural and educational uplift of the Moslem community. The mysterious urgings of national passion were unknown to him, or perhaps were consciously suppressed by his intellectual insight into the inadequacy of his community to meet the requirements of the modern world. When educated Hindus in 1885 founded the National Indian Congress to vindicate political rights and influence, he declared himself opposed to it. By his domineering personality, the few Moslems who were able and cared to participate in it were kept aloof. In his opinion, cooperation with and support from the British Government was the only salvation for the Moslems. Doctrinally he was a broadminded and tolerant man, sincerely appreciative of the Hindus, but as a political and social unit he was of the opinion that the Moslems of India had to work out their own salvation. He was a communalist in this sense, that he was sincerely afraid of the numerical, intellectual and economic superiority of the Hindus. Political agitation, especially in alliance with the Hindus, was to him wandering in the dangerous fields of sterile emotionalism, although he never hesitated to criticise policies of the Government which seemed mistaken, in his opinion. Over against the National Congress he founded

the Mohammedan Educational Conference as a rallying point for Moslems.

The growing political awakening of the Hindus, however, led the Moslems more and more, however hesitatingly in the beginning, into the political field. In 1892, with Sir Sayyid's consent, the Anglo-Mohammedan Defence Association of Upper-India was founded for the promotion and defence of Moslem interests by means of representation to the Government. As a special item it was stipulated that public agitation would be scrupulously avoided.

I mention this fact because it offers a good starting point in elucidating the important problem of Hindu-Moslem relations, one of the gravest problems of modern India, and deeply affecting the whole mental outlook of Indian Moslems.

In my opinion the Hindu-Moslem conflict is not merely on the surface, but has very deep roots. It is, however, very difficult to give every factor its due weight, and I am very diffident as to whether I am able, after such a short study, to give an accurate estimate of the problem. As far as I understand, the essential point in the whole problem may be formulated in this way: the Hindu-Moslem relation as a *conflict* is *always latent* and *occasionally manifest*. The latent conflict is due to abiding factors, the manifest conflict is due to changing circumstances. Such a latent conflict, going back to ultimate foundations, is not peculiar to India. It exists everywhere in the world, *e. g.*, Protestantism *vs.* Roman-Catholicism in Europe and America. Up till the present day mankind has not yet produced the sagacity necessary to *remove* such a latent conflict. In practical life, however, such a latent conflict may be rather irrelevant. What matters is the manifest conflict and the changing circumstances by which it arises. In modern times all latent conflicts tend to become manifest, because the dynamic, organizing and critical spirit of the age leads to conscious reflection on principles and methods. Therefore it is of importance to enumerate some of the abiding factors of the Hindu-Moslem problem, because they exercise a considerable mental influence.

Hindus and Moslems are poles asunder. Their *religion* is entirely different. Hinduism is a wide, pervasive and elusive mass of mystical religion, intellectually indefinable and allowing all possible definitions through the range of unqualified and intransigent monism, emotional theism, exuberant polytheism and symbolism and frank superstition. The only things in which it is rigid and "touchy" are religiously-sanctioned institutions and the veneration of the cow. Islam is a rather narrow and rigid theism, not distinguished (as the *bhakti*-theism of the Hindus) by the longing for grace and salvation, but by a jealous defiance of all competitors of God's unique and sovereign majesty and a genuine feeling of the fundamental difference between God, the omnipotent Creator, and His creatures. Doctrinally, Hinduism is all-inclusive, at least in tendency and intention, if not in reality; Islam, on the contrary, on the doctrinal side, is all-exclusive. Hinduism, although in countless respects at war with the ideals and institutions of the modern world, has theoretically no difficulty whatever in Hinduizing every new idea or justifying it in the all-embracing comprehensiveness of its spirit. Islam, with its precise and clear religious law, an outgrowth of the mediæval spirit, is coming constantly and immediately to grips with the modern world.

Every moment it has to answer the insistent question: "is this '*dīn*' (religion) or not?"

Their *outlook on life, on the world and man's place in it* (what the Germans call "*Weltanschauung*") is entirely different. To Islam the world is God's creation, man is his '*abd* (servant), destined to bear the vicissitudes of life, ordained to do his duty, responsible for his deeds and expecting God's reward. His attitude has a stamp of simple, unbroken manliness. To the Hindu the world is unreal or only partly real, a factor in the process of transmigration and *karma*, just as man himself. Life is enveloped in a spirit of soft and feminine mildness. Taking into account the fact that the bulk of the Indian Moslems are of the same race and environment as the Hindus, one can make a strong case for the decisive influence a different religion and world-conception has on the character and tastes of a certain group of men by the evidence which is given by Hinduism and Islam in India. The frugal and subtle Hindu is obviously distinct from the more extravagant, naïve Moslem.

In Lahore I attended a meeting in which Sir P. C. Ray spoke on the subject of the Moslem contribution to the civilization of India. Sir Muhammad Iqbal, the well-known poet, was in the chair. He gave a very delicate hint, in his philosophical way, of the differing Hindu and Moslem temperament by saying: "Islam has given to India a dose of Semitic concreteness. After that the British, a race of practical men, have come and given to India a second dose of concreteness. Apparently India needed this concreteness to come to its true stature."

Their *historical background* is entirely different, and in this case, the Moslems being the conquerors of the country, largely conflicting. The Moslems have no national history in the modern sense of the word. If they have it, it is to them of secondary importance. Their real history is supranational. Their pride is most deeply stirred by the glory of the days of the first four *khalifs* or by the splendor of Bagdad and the world-conquest of Arabian armies. As to India the case has been succinctly described by the editor of a Hindu newspaper, Bhai Parmanand, in a pamphlet called "The Hindu National Movement": "In history the Hindus revere the memory of Prthi Raj, Partap, Shivaji and Beragi Bir, who fought for the honor and freedom of this land (against the Moslems), while the Mohammedans look upon the invaders of India, like Muhammad ibn Qasim and rulers like Aurangzeb, as their national heroes."

The *cultural background* of Hindus and Moslems is entirely different. Sir Abdul Qadir in an interesting booklet on "The New School of Urdu Literature" calls attention to an important fact. He says that India, as distinguished from England, lacks *one* language, *one* literature and *one* civilization. The British in their own country may be divided into many sects and parties, but they are united in their esteem of their great poets and authors. In India it is not so. In this sense India has no national poets and authors. Even Tagore is not national. He may be a world-asset or a Hindu asset, but he is no Moslem asset. Sir Abdul Qadir, who wrote this in 1896 (!), goes so far as to say: "Had we any national poets and national poetry, the great question of the day of union between Hindus and Moslems would have been a solved problem."

Urdu, the "national" language of the Moslems, is of the same stock and structure as Hindi, the Hindu *lingua franca* of the North. Virtu-

ally they are one and the same language. Urdu, however, is saturated with Persian and Arabic, Hindi with Sanscrit; the one is written with Persian, the other with Devanagari characters. The fight for Urdu is considered to be a fight for Moslem cultural supremacy, that for Hindi for Hindu cultural supremacy. The case seems futile, but is important, as Urdu represents by its Persian background a totally different world of spiritual ideals and modes of expression than Hindi with its Hindu and Sanscrit background does. In the existing circumstances propaganda for Urdu means Moslem self-assertiveness, and for Hindi Hindu self-assertiveness.

Their *social environments* are entirely different, because they rest on different ideals. The cleavage between the Hindu caste-system and the *égalité*-ideal of Islam is so obvious, that it only needs to be mentioned in passing. The essential point, however, is in another direction. It was vividly expressed by one of the most prominent Moslems of the present day, who said to me: "I am a Moslem. When I go to Syria, Egypt or Morocco, I feel at home in the mosques, in society, in their homes. We have the same interests and tastes, the same ideals and in many respects the same modes of expression for all those regions of the human mind, because they are modelled, notwithstanding the ethnical variations, on the same Moslem pattern and standard. When I go to this town, only a half-hour's walk, in one of the Hindu quarters, I find myself an absolute stranger, foreign to their tastes, their home life, their atmosphere and their habits." There is of course in this statement a certain amount of exaggeration, but on the whole it holds true and constitutes a serious fact, that must be faced by all who sincerely desire to free India from its Hindu-Moslem conflict.

In closing this short consideration of the abiding factors in the Hindu-Moslem conflict, in order to emphasize that this conflict is not ephemeral and superficial, I call attention to the fact, that even in the days when there were no riots or manifest mutual embitterment as nowadays, the Hindu-Moslem problem was always felt as a never-absent danger. I have quoted already Sir Abdul-Qadir's dictum of 1896. Mr. Gandhi tells us in his autobiography, that in the period between 1890 and 1900, when he was working in South Africa, he "realized that there was no genuine friendship between the Hindus and the Musalmans." In the speeches of Indian public men of the last fifty years, the Hindu-Moslem conflict is never left out, as one of the grave national problems. Sir Akbar Haidari of Haiderabad, one of the finest men of India, told me that the first article he wrote when he was a youth of eighteen years, treated the theme of Hindu-Moslem relations.

To treat of the Hindu-Moslem conflict, which is now peculiarly acute, as a grave national problem of India, does not fall within the scope of my article. The side of it that interests me is, where and how does it affect the spiritual outlook and interests of Islam and of Moslems? I can imagine that many people will be inclined to consider the above-sketched factors of latent conflict too theoretical and exaggerated. They can strengthen their case by pointing to the Native States, where "communal" troubles are very rare or non-existent. I myself have only some experience of Haiderabad. This state is governed by a Mohammedan ruler, the Nizam. The population, numbering more than twelve millions, is largely Hindu, the Moslems being only about ten per cent. of

this number, mainly concentrated in the capital and the surrounding districts, the so-called "Atraf-i-Balda." The Moslems are therefore a very small minority, but the ruling minority. The *mulkis*, i. e., the born Haiderabadis, who sharply distinguish themselves from the *ghair-mulkis* (i. e., those, especially Moslems, who have come from outside) call their country a "*moghali* country." Rightly so, because in many respects Haiderabad represents the only continuance in India of the days of the Moghal emperors. The small Moslem minority is here the ruling race and is accepted as such, although many Hindus, just as in Moghal times, have risen to high posts, sometimes to the highest post, that of *Diwan*. The present prime-minister is a Hindu.

Although Telugu, Kanarese and Maratha, as to numbers, are by far the principal languages of the country, Urdu, the language of Islam, is the official language. Haiderabad is the only place in the whole of India that can boast of a university employing a vernacular and not English as the means of instruction. I mean the Osmania University. This is a bold experiment, chiefly due to the enthusiasm and energy of such a man as the high-souled Sir Akbar Haidari. The experiment is not only bold, it is deeply interesting to everybody who sincerely desires the oriental-ization of modern higher education. It is, however, a thing worthy to be noted, that the vernacular employed in this university is Urdu. In the existing circumstances, by this fact (and by some others) this university is stamped as a Moslem university and not as a university of Haiderabad. Not only is communal friction absent, but there are instances in this State of a tolerance and latitudinarianism, that does not fit into the habitual picture of Islam. For instance, not only mosques, but some churches, and a great number of Hindu temples, get grants (often substantial) from the State. The administration of this branch is conducted by a special department, the Ecclesiastical Department. Indeed an interesting spectacle, a Moslem prince (in Haiderabad the revenues of the State are virtually considered to be the income of the ruler) subsidizing idolatry and polytheism. It would be a mistake to explain this curious fact as a result of well-thought-out and conscious religious tolerance, whereas it is a result of that humane easy-goingness and charity of mind, that in its combination with capriciousness and arbitrariness, is to the occidental mind one of the puzzles of oriental life.

In British-India proper, cow-slaughter by the Moslems and playing of music before mosques by the Hindus are the most frequent occasions that set the latent conflict astir. Laborious negotiations on these points are seldom of any avail. In Haiderabad the Nizam ordered, some years ago, that during the so-called *Bakr' Id* in the last month of the Moslem year, when it is the general custom of Indian Moslems to slaughter cows, goats instead of cows should be taken as sacrifices in order to respect the susceptibilities of the Hindus.

It is unnecessary to multiply instances to show how utterly different conditions are in British India from those in a Native State such as Haiderabad. In my opinion it would, however, be a mistake to consider such a Native State as the place where the problem of Hindu-Moslem relations has been solved. It has not so much been *solved*, it has *not yet been properly propounded*, either in the field of ultimate principles, or in that of practical life, but it certainly will come. In spiritual matters Haiderabad is a stagnant country. Not vigorous life, but walking in

the old ruts, is the order of the day. Besides that, a Native State possesses one thing of far-reaching importance, in which is expressed all the difference between a colonial government and a normal government, viz., a Native Ruler and personal loyalty to him. Garratt in his "Indian Commentary" says rightly: "The comparative immunity of the Indian States from communal outbreaks is chiefly due to the uselessness of organizing and pressing the rival claims of groups before an autocratic ruler, who probably belongs to one of them. . . . The community professing a religion which is not that of the Prince, takes thankfully whatever is given, and usually the Prince can afford to be generous. He is glad to show his impartiality by an appointment or a gesture."

The future, if it means the transition from stagnation to dynamic movement, will undoubtedly set the problem before the Native States too. And then it will happen that latent and dormant antagonisms with deep roots will become manifest, and will only be overcome by a deeper and purer conception of religion.

This brings us back to the political development of the Moslems and to the discussion of the changing circumstances by which the latent conflict becomes manifest. We made our digression when we mentioned the Anglo-Muhammadan *Defence* Association of Upper-India in 1892. I underline the word: *defence*. Since British rule exists in India, the overpowering feeling of the Moslems has been that of backwardness and weakness. That is accentuated rather than weakened by their obstinate preservation of ruler-pride, which gives it a still more pathetic note. The new political principles, introduced by England, and their consequences in public life are a revolutionizing solvent and ferment in a world which had been accustomed for ages to fixed conditions. The Hindus availed themselves of this new instrument of power and influence. The Moslems, however, out of their feeling of weakness, naturally reacted in the way of the weak—they took a defensive attitude.

The formation of the All India Muslim League in 1906, the next important step in the political organization of the Moslems, was again primarily, almost wholly, an act of *defence*, not an outcome of nationalist consciousness. The rumors about important changes in the legislative and administrative machinery of India, afterwards embodied in the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909, led the educated Moslems to a clear and definite pronouncement of Moslem demands and to organized action in defence of the community's rights and interests. Therefore, in distinction from the Hindus, they leaned on the Government for the safeguarding of their rights and interests, as they understood them. On their persistent demand, the principle of separate electorates was introduced in the Morley-Minto scheme, which principle is now wrecking the spirit of democratic and representative government. Only temporarily this defensive attitude has been given up, owing to the unnatural influence of the war, which laid the sentiments of the Moslems under a severe strain, as they had to combine loyalty to British rule with a reluctance toward fighting against Turkey. This confusion explains why in Lucknow in 1916 the Indian Congress and the All India Muslim League became temporary allies.

The post-war policy of England against Turkey, and the violent agitation into which India was thrown by the stupid atrocity of Amritsar in 1919, also led to this confusion of issues. The Khilafat agitation

swept the Moslem community out of its natural position. Just because Mr. Gandhi from his standpoint of wide nationalist outlook and passionate desire for freedom saw the Hindu-Moslem problem as *the* obstacle to a united India, he seized this opportunity to bring Moslem and Hindu in line with each other. Even then, only a small minority of the Moslems were convinced nationalists, merging their communal consciousness in the blazing fires of nationalist passion, fanning them to even a higher flame by their feeling of international Moslem solidarity. The alliance was, however, utterly unnatural. Mr. Gandhi is a great man, but, notwithstanding all his acuteness of mind, a naïve politician. He wrongly took *excitement* as a sufficient cement for the structure of mutual understanding and forbearance, whereas it has to be built up by a laborious process of moral and religious regeneration. Intellectual schemes of spiritual unity were rampant, but pathetically unreal. The unnaturalness of the alliance is laid bare by one interesting fact. The temporary unity of Hindus and Moslems, the passing wave of mutual sympathy and suppression of the ever-present Hindu-Moslem problem, was effected just by that Moslem sentiment and attitude which is the object of constant reproach from the side of the Hindus. What exasperates the Hindus in the Moslems is, that India does not rank foremost in the opinion of Moslems as the highest object of loyalty, but the Moslem commonwealth. The Indian Moslems are, in the world of Islam, specially conspicuous by their interest in international Islam. This certainly is not due merely to pure international Moslem idealism, although it is a genuine sentiment. There are two reasons, which make the Indian Moslems particularly interested in the Moslem world outside of India, both having their source in the same fundamental feeling of weakness, of which I have spoken already. The consciousness of belonging to a world-wide community constitutes a welcome infusion of self-respect and energy in the prevailing sentiment of weakness over against the Hindus. In the second place, being a strong minority of seventy millions in the British Empire, which has so many vulnerable points in the Moslem world, it is to them a powerful instrument to strengthen their position against the British government.

Now, this international interestedness of the Moslem was the rock on which the unity of Hindus and Moslems was built, whereas in reality it is the shifting sand in their mutual relations. The highly-praised unity is a matter of the past. The forms of representative government have revealed the deep cleavage between Hindus and Moslems. In the daily struggle it appears as a clash of economic and political interest, namely, about the share of seats and posts. This is undoubtedly a very serious aspect of the case, that embitters the life of the two communities, especially in the North. It sometimes affects one as a nightmare. In the habitual drudgery of practical life and in the political issues that are at stake, it is *the* aspect, because the Hindus are not only numerically and educationally, but also economically far superior to the Moslems. Humanly speaking, the unchained passions will abate only when the educational backwardness of the Moslem community is removed and the natural competition of material interests becomes more healthy.

The Spiritual Condition of Indian Islam

This at last brings us to the point where we can try to answer the question about the spiritual outlook of Indian Islam, which constitutes

the main problem of our investigation. This long digression was inevitable. The recalling to memory of the position of Islam in India in the days of Moslem rule and of the happenings since the British came to rule the country, yields the indispensable material for forming a broad-minded estimate of the present condition and prospect of Indian Islam. The emotional atmosphere in which Indian Islam is living is that of weakness, suspicion, fear, irritability, as far as the political and economic situation is concerned, mingled with sloth, aggressive self-defence and propaganda, intellectual (not religious) reinterpretation of Islam and indifference toward it, as regards the spiritual situation. The results of this condition are apt to be very conflicting.

Generally speaking, Islam in India is marked by a conservative and prudent spirit, having a predilection for steering the middle course. Of Turkey it is frankly critical and diffident, with Egypt it has scanty intellectual relations. This fact alone is already sufficient to show that the international interest of Indian Islam is not dictated by any desire for intellectual and spiritual exchange, but by communal policy, which in the existing circumstances is perfectly understandable. Every great religious community in the East has nowadays the natural tendency to adopt an attitude of defence against the impact of the West. For instance the adoption of Christianity, i. e., the religion of the West, implies acknowledging the superiority of Western religion and culture (at least it is, generally speaking, felt in these terms), and it is just the consciousness of their own religious and cultural superiority amidst the many inferiorities (organization, technical skill, methodical sense, energy, etc.) that are forcing themselves on the mind, that is one of their most cherished possessions. This is the case with Hinduism as well as with Islam. This situation is still more accentuated by the fact of colonial rule, as all self-respect becomes now concentrated on those domains of life which are exempt from the touch of the foreigner. For Indian Islam there exists a second reason for this attitude of defence, namely, its relation to the great Hindu community, which has been amply discussed. It seems to me that these two conditions yield a satisfactory explanation for the conservative and prudent tendency of Indian Islam.

The mass of the common people is of course conservative, devoted to *pir* (saint)-worship and veneration of tombs, in many regions practising popular mysticism and black magic. Their religious leaders are the *mullahs*, the more or less theologically-trained products of old, conservative *madrasahs*. The so-called university of Deoband, a small town near Saharanpur, is typical of this kind of institution. It is always mentioned as the Indian al-Azhar. The comparison with al-Azhar furnishes a good instance of the conservative strain of Indian Islam. It is, unlike al-Azhar in Cairo, unaffected by constant endeavors for reform. The spirit of the Middle Ages thrives there in a somewhat abject form. Because of dissensions among the professors it finds itself now in a crisis, which may affect the prestige and influence of the institution. However, our appreciation of its stagnant and deadening atmosphere does not give the right key to the evaluation of its significance. By the number of its students and by the fame of its name and its professors, it still has a great influence, and therefore must be considered one of the bulwarks of unprogressive Islam in India. The derisive tone of educated Moslems and their bitter criticism of the *mullahs* denote the great influence of the latter on the mass of the people.

The new movements and associations that have arisen in Indian Islam are mainly of a defensive character, the natural reactions toward new conditions and surroundings. This statement needs some elucidation. A European who is religiously interested, and especially a missionary, always takes the word religious in its modern, stringent sense of religious questioning, a preoccupation with one's personal relation to God and the world of spiritual things, an attempt to come to unshakeable certainty in the field of religious life and thinking. It always presupposes a searching of fundamentals, a fostering of the inner life. From this standpoint one cannot speak of religious movements. "Religious" to the Indian Moslem signifies: the preservation and maintenance of the integrity of the doctrines and customs of a social group, that finds its solidarity and cohesiveness in this religion. One may even be, religiously speaking, lukewarm or indifferent or negligent, but one can be at the same time fervently loyal to the community. Such a situation and attitude is very frequent among many Moslems prominent in public life. They defend Islam, and they readjust it in a more or less superficial way to modern conceptions, however, not because they are "religious" thinkers, but because they are "communal" thinkers. It seems to me that many missionaries, because they do not account for this complicated situation, are sometimes too hastily inclined to call such men insincere and conscious liars. I regret such a judgment, not because it is severe and uncharitable (severity may be a sign of true charity), but because it is mistaken. As instances of Islamic reaction in India toward the modern world I take the *Anjuman-i-Himayet-i-Islam* in Lahore, the *Ahl-i-Hadith* and the *Ahmadiyya Movement*. The *Anjuman-i-Himayet-i-Islam* connotes in its name clearly its object, viz., defence, protection. It works through schools, through the press and through religious propaganda. It has no startling reform-movements, nor any critical or questioning attitude toward Islam as a religion, nor any program of deepening religious life. It accepts Islam as an undisputed fact, and simply tries, with modernized means, to perpetuate the hold of Islam on the minds of the people.

The *Ahl-i-Hadith* are a curious mixture. One can hear about them the statement that they are conservative and also that they are liberal-minded. Both statements are true. Another name of the *Ahl-i-Hadith* is "*ghair muqallid*" and in this name lies the possibility of conservatism and a certain progressiveness. They are the modern representatives of the Wahhabis of the time of Sayyid Ahmad of Rae Bareli. They pay no allegiance, no *taqlid*, to any of the four schools of Moslem religious jurisprudence. They go back to the Koran and the traditions (*hadith*), and are therefore opposed to saint-worship. They are the Indian duplicate of the Egyptian and Arabian "*Salafi*." A section of them is deeply conservative. They look back passionately to the past, entirely indifferent to the modern world and its implications. In this attitude there is much religious fervor of the bigoted, fanatical type, but there is no future in it, because it is bound to remain sterile. Maulvi Sana-Ullah of Amritsar is the exponent of this attitude. My conversation with him belongs to one of the most interesting peeps I had into a world of unyielding rigidity.

On the other hand there are many educated, modern-minded men, who style themselves *Ahl-i-Hadith*. Their main object is to get rid of the authority of the four schools, in order to adjust Islam to modern

conditions. They go back to the Koran and the Traditions, not out of blind veneration for the past, but in order to vindicate a greater freedom over against the requirements of the modern world. However, by the nature of the case, the "religious" problem remains to them a legal problem, a problem of the application of divinely-sanctioned commandments and interdictions, not a problem of religious truth.

A step further was made by the *Ahl-i-Quran*, a movement initiated by Maulvi Abdallah Sakralawi of Lahore. They go back to the Koran and strive after freedom by stating as their objective: the Koran as the only authority for religious thought and practice, *interpreted by itself*. Viewed on the background of orthodox Islam this is a very revolutionary position, because it discards the entire historical evolution of Islam. As an organized group the *Ahl-i-Quran* seem to be extinct, but everywhere one comes in contact with educated Moslems who show the same stamp of thought. It has become the fashion in educated circles to go back to the "matchless" Koran and the "peerless" prophet, as a widely prevailing tendency among different types of men. This is indeed very natural. In the first place, because the contact with Christianity with its emphasis on the Bible and Christ tends to develop this attitude as a natural reaction of defence. In the second place, because Islam, as being a book-religion *par excellence*, once put to the test, finds its only basis in the Koran. To a great extent the eager activity in the field of Koran-translation is due to this newly-awakened consciousness. However, here again we do not come to a really religious issue. All is done in a spirit of propaganda, not in a spirit of research. The fundamental problem, that lurks behind this, is that of the character of religious revelation, its place in the scheme of life, its reality and its quality. When, however, it is stated, it is always distorted and the issues are evaded. Why? Because one is occupied with the *intellectual* problem of reconciling Islam to modern ideas and ideals, defending, even appraising Islam as the only religion which inspires the highest moral, cultural and social achievements and ideals of the world. This is actuated by *communal loyalty*, by pride in Islam as a set of cultural and social rules and achievements. One hears no proclamation of deep and newly-attained God-experience of the soul, no defence or enunciation of personal faith that manifests itself to the soul with the force of a universal solution of the ultimate problems of life. As I said, it is mainly an intellectual reconciliation of Islam to modern ideals and ideas, in which process one forgets that real religion, in the sense of the opening up of divine life and reality in human life, is not in need of being justified and reconciled to the standard of prevailing ideas and ideals, but is itself the standard by which all ideas and ideals are criticized. I am aware that I am applying a very high standard, in the existing circumstances for Islam too high a standard, but I do this only to have a better opportunity of expressing my opinion that there is not yet a really *religious* defence and restatement of Islam. On account of its consciousness of weakness and of its need to justify itself before a world that has subjected it to much deserved and undeserved criticism, the modern exponents of Islam are naturally applying themselves to the task of vindicating their religion as being a high or the highest specimen of human culture.

Now I will try to give some interesting instances of this situation.

I pass by such instances as Sayyid Ameer Ali, with his book: "The

Spirit of Islam," or the apologetical essays of Khuda Bakhsh, generally known in Europe as the last stage in Moslem apologetics. Their significance lies, in my opinion, in the fact that they give a rationalistic idealization of Islam in the way described above, and that they at the same time, despite their many deficiencies, have the merit of reminding many relentless critics of their immoderate and unjust zeal in their criticism of Islam. They try to rehabilitate Islam, and, although many contentions especially of Sayyid Ameer Ali are very questionable, or altogether unfounded, they are to a certain extent justified in doing so, because Islam needed a rehabilitation.

I will take the most recent instances of vindication of Islam that have come to my knowledge in traveling over the country. I do not pretend to say that these instances have a wide influence or represent the thinking of a fairly large or representative group of people. As far as I know, they do not. But that does not matter for our purpose, because it is only my intention to show that the inspiration of the most progressive and daring thinkers of modern Indian Islam is not *religious*, but cultural, intellectual or even sociological.

Sir Muhammad Iqbal, living in Lahore, is unquestionably one of the most gifted Moslems in India. He is a great poet in Urdu and Persian, and at the same time a man with strong philosophical inclinations. The poem that has made the most widespread impression in India has been his "*Shiqwa*" (Complaint). It is a complaint against God, that He has forsaken His people, the Moslems. They are the only people in the world who rightly honor Him and through whom He has His existence. He has promised them the rule of the world and a glorious life, and yet He suffers them to be the most subjected race on the face of the earth. This poem, which shows clearly how preëminently Iqbal is occupied with the position of Islam in the world, seems to have caused great emotion and stir. It was followed by another "*Djawab i Shiqwa*" (Answer to the Complaint), in which the poet represents God as speaking to the Moslems. God has not forsaken them, they have forsaken Him, being disobedient to His Book and Law. More of his poems, which I could not read, but the tendency and spirit of which was explained to me by some of his admirers, appear to show an interesting mingling of a glowing love for Islam and its loftiest traditions and a Nietzschean urge to exult in an autonomous, glorious life.

In the course of the last year, Iqbal has given in some places, e. g., Madras, Haiderabad and Aligarh, lectures under the heading: "Reconstruction of Religious Philosophy in Islam," now in the press. I had the benefit of reading them. The first two lectures on "Knowledge and Religious Experience," and "The Philosophical Test of the Revelations of Religious Experience" are a very acute and interesting discussion of the personal, theistic conception of God as the most valid in the light of modern philosophical thinking. It would be extremely interesting to discuss these lectures at length, but that would occupy too much space. What interests us most here is Iqbal's theory of revelation, which demonstrates that he, notwithstanding his love for Islam and his great philosophical ability, is not a religious thinker in the right sense of the word, but a secularized mind, who adjusts his thinking to some great principles of Islam. This appears most clearly in his fifth lecture on "The Spirit of Muslim Culture." He starts by defining the difference be-

tween mystic and prophetic consciousness. The mystic dislikes to return from the repose of unitary experience. The prophet returns from it, but his return is creative. The desire to see religious experience transformed into a living world-force is supreme in him. His is a type of mystic consciousness, in which unitary experience tends to overflow its boundaries and seeks opportunities of redirecting or refashioning the forces of collective life. Iqbal then develops a highly interesting theory why Mohammed is the final prophet. He defines "*wahy*" (revelation) as contact with the root of one's own being. Every being is capable of that. In the infant stage of mankind psychic energy now and then produced prophetic consciousness, i. e., to fashion new experience in forms that change the world. However, in its adult stage, mankind acquired the faculties of reason and critical thinking, a new form of psychic energy. Mohammed stands between the old and the new world. He is the incarnation of the old world as to the *source* of his revelation, he points to the new world as to the *spirit* of his revelation. In him life discovers other sources of knowledge, suitable to its new direction. The birth of Islam is the birth of inductive intellect. In Islam prophetism reaches its perfection in discovering the need of its own abolition. Prophetism in the common use of the word is biologically antiquated and therefore unnecessary. Inductive reasoning and critical thinking are the modern and higher substitutes of prophetic inspiration and divination in gaining access to the secret springs of life and reality. The constant appeal of the Koran to reason and experience and the Moslem doctrine of the finality of prophethood in Mohammed proclaims the highest attainable attitude for reaching ultimate truth, viz., that all personal authority claiming a supernatural origin has come to an end in the history of men, as being biologically superseded by the attitude of independent critical thinking.

The originality, brilliance and wide knowledge, displayed in these lectures by Sir Iqbal, cannot conceal the fact that the idea of God is wholly submerged in that of the stream of creative life (Iqbal is a very diligent student of Bergson), and that Islam as a *religion* is killed in the attempt to save and glorify it by presenting it as the herald of modern approach to the world as an object of human knowledge and investigation.

Another noteworthy example of recent intellectual vindication of Islam in the battle of world-religions is to be found in the book of Inayat Ullah Khan, Professor of Mathematics in Islamia College in Peshawar. He has written a book, partly in Arabic, partly in Urdu, entitled: "*Tadhkira*." Ten volumes have been planned, but so far only one has been published. It is announced as being a new explanation of the Koran. My attention was drawn to it by some highly-educated Moslems, who characterized it as being the most daring and best exposition of the essential message of Islam. Taking this estimate into account, it is highly instructive for getting an insight into the present confusion of issues in the minds of educated Moslems to study the main lines of thought of this author. His fundamental thesis is that religion is the revelation of the eternal Law that governs the rise and decay of nations. Religion must be as infallible as science in its methods and results. This challenge is only met by Islam and by the Koran, because the Koran is the most perfect revelation, as being the only book whose text is not

affected by corruption. Mohammed is the final and the greatest prophet, because he has proclaimed the eternal Law of the rise and decline of nations in the clearest manner, and has demonstrated by the marvelous ascent of the Arabs as the conquerors of an empire that divine revelation, *in casu* the Koran, is the Law that rules the life of nations. All doctrinal and ritual parts of Islam are of a secondary nature, only means to an end. Their significance is moral, they are instruments one ought to possess in order to survive in the struggle for existence. The doctrine of the oneness of God has to be taken pragmatically, i. e., the resolve to do what is good, and to be thereby identical with the divine Law and God Himself. The realizing of this Law to foster the prosperity of nations is what matters. The metaphysical independent reality of God is a problem of no importance. Metaphysics are a creation of whimsical minds. Religion is a code of laws, given to man for guidance in this physical world. The anxiety of the soul, the reality of God vanishes out of the picture. Islam becomes under his hands the most successful and universal principle of nation-building, and all religious and moral injunctions become means serving that end. It becomes, so to speak, the infallible and divine sociology. The religious problem is evaded, not solved; Islam is vindicated, but not related to and confronted with the ultimate problems of life. The time has yet to come when we will approach this stage. Islam is still waiting for its modern Ghazali, who will penetrate to the personal problem of religious *truth* and *salvation*. The opportunity for this will only come when self-defence has relaxed and the religious *quest* begins.

This leads us to a discussion of the Ahmadiyya, the Moslem counterpart of the Hindu Arya Samaj. Both have a special bearing on Christianity, because they are aggressive against missionary activity. The Ahmadiyya are an interesting exception to the generally prevailing communal spirit of Islam. They concentrate on religious propaganda and abstain from all politics, preaching loyalty to British and all foreign rulers, because the only thing that interests them is whether and in how far certain situations enable them to convey the message. They are not concerned with Islam as a religious and political body, but with the spreading of the universal truth. In this respect they are a very remarkable group in modern Islam, the only group that has purely missionary aims. They are marked by a devotion, zeal and self-sacrifice that call for genuine admiration, notwithstanding their harassing and bitterly aggressive tactics. Their founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, must have been a powerful personality. When I visited Qadian, where the group is situated that still considers him a prophet (a *nabi*, not a *rasul*, a bringer of revelation, not a bringer of a Book, because the Koran is final and cannot be superseded), I was struck by the buoyant spirit of great enthusiasm for Islam. They are not humble bearers of a message, but the proud and self-conscious proclaimers of truth. They have all the blindness and fanaticism of this attitude of the human mind. The Qadiani group tends to become a distinct sect, and may therefore become in the future an isolated phenomenon. Their main tenets are built on mere fictions, but their present significance lies in their fierce self-sacrificing and self-assertive spirit.

The Lahore group, who have seceded from the original community on the ground that they venerate the founder as a *mujaddid* (renewer)

of religion and not as a *nabi*, are therefore more acceptable to public opinion in Islam. They have the same spirit of opposition against Christianity as the Qadianis, but their activity is more exclusively concentrated on the proclamation of Islam as the only religion that is in conformity with reason and nature. The crisis of Christianity in Europe gives them much material to expose this religion and extol Islam. Their tactics are very elusive. Although actually living in a spirit of great contempt for other religions, they are never tired of expounding Islam as the religion of tolerance, peace and universal brotherhood. Still I believe that they are intellectually honest in this, because all their mental energy is concentrated on painting Islam as the upholder of broad social and moral ideals. In their bitter aggressiveness they mete out the same treatment to Christianity that has often been meted out by Christianity to Islam, viz., condemning it on account of its practice, and not judging it after its principles and ideals. Their influence is far wider than the number of their adherents would suggest. Their vindication and defence of Islam is accepted by many educated Moslems as the form in which they can remain intellectually loyal to Islam. Here again one does not find religious craving, but defence of a given position. They are not servants of the cause of religion, but advocates, who are prepared to sacrifice much for their cause. In my opinion, their existence teaches an important lesson to Christian missions. The Ahmadiyya consider the meeting of different religions as that of warring sects. Missionary work, that unfortunately also from time to time has yielded to this spirit, must be entirely purged from this spirit, and the only thing that has to be manifested is that of a powerful testimony to a divinely-received message, and an appeal to a common quest of truth.

These remarks may suffice as an exposition of the reaction of Indian Islam to modern thought, its curious mixture of defence, conservatism and eventually wholesale identification with modern ideas, all lying in the cultural sphere. As I have already remarked, in my opinion it all follows from an overpowering and often unconscious sense of self-preservation, the ideological shape in which loyalty to the community as a whole is fashioned.

In quite another field, there are instances that point even to a temporarily growing strength of a conservative and unenlightened attitude. I mean the agitation over the Sarda-Act and the proposal of Mr. Abdul Hayy in the Legislative Assembly to abolish the legal possibility for Moslem groups and individuals, who so wish, to be tried in court on the basis of customary law instead of on that of religious law (*shari'at*). As far as I understand, the strained relations of Hindus and Moslems and the existence of modern legislative institutions are responsible for that, whereas the great conservative body of *Ulamas* and *mullahs*, who sway the masses, seize their opportunity to strengthen their position.

The antagonism of the different religious groups creates a tendency to reflect on the essential principles of their respective systems. This reflection has in many respects a conservative result. In the case of the Moslems it manifests itself in this way, that they take a greater and more conscious pride in the theocratical character of their religious law. I do not believe that this feeling, at least amongst educated Moslems, is primary, but it is adduced as the theoretical foundation of their opposition against legislative measures that affect institutions of Moslem per-

sonal law. Antagonism to the Hindus is the primary cause. After a long debate, the Child Marriage Act, proposed by Sir Harbilas Sarda, a Hindu, has been accepted by the Legislative Assembly, notwithstanding the opposition of many Moslems and conservative Hindus. By this Act the age of consent for the marriage of girls is raised to fourteen years and for that of boys to eighteen years. All protagonists of social reform in India have received this legislative achievement with great enthusiasm.

Under the leadership of Maulana Muhammad Ali, especially known from the days of the Khilafat agitation and of the *Djami'at-i-Ulema-i-Hind*, the organization of the old orthodox forces, there has been set on foot an agitation against this Act as far as the Moslems are concerned, on the general ground that nobody has a right to meddle with the rules of Moslem religious law, because in definite cases the *shari'a* allows the giving in marriage of children for the sake of protection, although it is asserted that it practically never occurs that Moslem girls below the age of fourteen are given in marriage. This assertion is not borne out by the data of the Census of 1921. The special reason that is given expression to, is the result of suspicion of the Hindus. It is said that this Child Marriage Act affords a precedent for the Hindu majority to try to undermine in the future by legislative measures the structure of Moslem religious law. The object of the organized opposition is to obtain exemption for the Moslem community from the Sarda Act, that began to operate in April, 1930. In December of last year a conference of *Ulemas* was held in Cawnpore to demonstrate "the inviolability of Islamic law."

The above-mentioned proposal of Mr. Abdul Hayy is another indication of this determined championship of Moslem religious law. The opinions of modern educated Moslems are very conflicting. Many of them are frankly in favor of the Act, because they consider it a necessary measure of social reform, and esteem the opposition an endeavor on the part of the conservative forces to strengthen their influence. Especially the women, in so far as they are vocal, are very outspoken in their praise of this Act. Many however hesitate, especially those who under the pressure of the communal tension have awakened to the feeling that they have been in the past too indifferent to "religious" interests. To them the *shari'a* has become the symbol of religio-social unity, the means whereby they can offer a united front to the forces of the more powerful Hindus. The watchword "close the ranks" is, for the time being, a very influential factor in the situation of Indian Islam.

However, there are other consequences of the political and communal situation that make for other possibilities in the future. It has very considerably deepened the consciousness of the backwardness of the Moslem community, creating in many Moslems a keen spirit of impatience with this condition, and acting as an eye-opener to the many drawbacks inherent in the Moslem community itself. This is especially conspicuous in respect to three points. In the first place the growing desire for education, in the second place the increasing awakening for the importance of the *pardah* problem, in the third place a greater open-mindedness.

Finally, as a special and important feature, ought to be discussed the diminishing grip Islam has on the younger generation.

The long-lived aversion to secular education and the fear of losing Islam through its influence, is rapidly breaking down in all parts of

India. In the Interim Report of the Indian Statutory Commission on the growth of education in India, the so-called Hartog report, we find the following data as regards the growth of education amongst the Moslems. Between 1917 and 1927 the increase of enrollment of Moslems was both rapid and general. In ten years, the number of pupils increased by sixty-two and one-half per cent. or almost a million. The proportion of Moslems to the total population is only a little over twenty-four per cent., but the ratio of increase of Moslem pupils to the total increase was over thirty-one per cent. Thus, Moslem pupils are attending school in proportionately higher numbers than the pupils of all communities taken together. In the matter of enrollment the Moslems are no longer behind the rest of the country, and are steadily forging ahead. The great majority, however, of Moslem pupils are in the primary stage, and wastage among Moslems is appreciably greater than the general wastage in schools. In Class I, for instance, the Moslem pupils form about twenty-eight and one-half per cent. of the total, in Class V they form only seventeen per cent. of the total. In the secondary or middle schools only sixteen per cent. of the total number were Moslems, in the high schools only thirteen and one-half per cent., and in the colleges and universities only thirteen per cent. While, therefore, at the bottom of the educational ladder Moslems are to be found in numbers more than proportionate to their population, they quickly lose their advantage, and at every higher stage more and more drop out.

There is, however, a strong determination to ameliorate this condition, and the Indian Government affords many facilities to Moslems in order to enable them better to take part in the educational race. The important point is that they have awakened to the inevitability of the race, and that this is breaking through many conservative influences. The pioneer Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan finds at last his reward.

In the case of the girls the difference of the percentages in the different stages is still more marked. In the primary stage Moslem girls constituted twenty-nine per cent., but in the middle only five per cent., and in the high stage only two per cent. of the total number of pupils. In 1917 there were only six Mohammedan girls in arts colleges, in 1922 there were twenty-five, and in 1927, in women's colleges alone, there were thirty. Conservatism and *pardah* are the strong opposing forces, but there is arising a keen desire for education and knowledge on the part of the women, even in the provinces where *pardah* is strongest. Lady missionaries, who have worked in the last twenty years in the field of Moslem girls' education, told me that the difference between then and now is very striking. Fathers, even those belonging to the conservative circles, are now eager to get education for their girls.

The discussion of *pardah* and its abolition is the order of the day. By *pardah* is meant here the life of radical seclusion that is led by the women, shut out from regular and natural intercourse in the society of men (except of course those relatives with whom marriage is legally forbidden) and from any real participation in public life.

The wearing of the *burqa* (a body-enveloping garb) outside the house, and the going out in the impenetrable *dhulis* (palanquin) are only the consequence of this institution of *pardah*.

Another sign of the conservative character of Indian Islam is that *pardah* has always been very severe in Indian Islam. It is not so easy to

get a fair view of it. The wholesale misery which a European is inclined to deduce from this condition, is not always and everywhere to be found. Observations in the past (cf. for instance, Mrs. Ameer Hasan's book on the life of women in Lucknow society a hundred years ago) and in the present, give the impression, as to happiness, that in the refined and wealthy classes the life of such secluded women was of a childish and, in some respects, charming happiness. Nowadays such instances are not absent. Haiderabad, for instance, is a place well-known for its strict observance of *pardah*. On the other hand, there is comparatively much done in Haiderabad for the education of the girls of the best families. They go to school in strict *pardah*, they live at home in strict *pardah*, they have their tennis courts and their clubs of mental and physical recreation in *pardah*, a life in *pardah*, but with its bright colors, modernized *pardah*. Of course, these examples of happy and charming guardedness of life are not the rule. The rule is a seclusion in deep ignorance, filth and degrading idleness, an appalling waste of life. The brighter side of *pardah*, however, ought to be remembered in order to understand the comparatively pleasing possibilities to which the peculiarly Oriental conception of woman as the "guarded" being can develop.

The crucial point of the whole conception of *pardah* turns of course on the deep-rooted suspicion of sexual appetites in both sexes, which, notwithstanding all apparent possibilities, poisons the atmosphere in a violent or in a subtle way; and on the suppression of woman as a participant in social life. It is this last point on which attention at present is particularly concentrated. It seems to me to be one of the hopeful signs in Indian life that women begin to organize themselves and voice their views. It is very significant of the urgency of the woman-problem and for the removal of common misery for which they stand that the All India Women's League is one of the few organizations in which Hindus and Moslems meet and cooperate. Their problem is not political and economical, but social and moral. They are pressing on the attention of public opinion their demands for rapid extension of female education. They clamor even for compulsory education. They support all measures that protect women and girls from the disabilities that follow from old customs. They press even in some quarters the abolition of polygamy. Much of what is said in such meetings and conferences is of course the initial outcry of awakened self-consciousness rather than the indication of well-organized activity. Still I think the new activity of the women is a very hopeful fact.

It was a striking fact that in the National Social Conference, held in the Congress week at Lahore, out of twelve resolutions presented for discussion and adoption, eight were devoted to reform in the life of women and girls. The opinion generally prevails that *pardah*, just as caste, must and will vanish. *Pardah* and caste are ancient, deep-rooted and extremely tenacious institutions. They are in a crisis now, and undergo many minor changes. In my opinion the strongest factor that works for their radical reform is just this growing feeling, a curious sort of expectant and dynamic fatalism, that they are bound to change or disappear.

To confine myself to *pardah* only, the difficulties in the way of bringing the women out of *pardah* and putting them in their right place in society are appalling. It means rather more an education of men than

of women. Indian Islam is, true to its nature, inclined to a prudent course of gradual changes. The radical ways of Turkey are not attractive to it. I doubt whether such few examples of complete freedom of moving in public and participating in public life as in the case of the daughters of Sir Muhammad Shafi'i in Lahore have for the time being such a significance as is often allotted to them. The general tendency among men as well as women reformers is to be very moderate in demands as regards the *burqa* or other safeguards with which women appear in public. The sentiment of modesty of even progressive women has become, by dint of age-long tradition and education, so intimately connected with all these safeguards that time is required for mental revolutions. The value of the example of Sir Shafi'i's daughters is more that it reminds people of coming inevitabilities. However, the demands on which men and women interested in and devoted to the woman problem insist are: education, participation in public life by opening the same possibilities to women as to men, removal of the many degrading drawbacks in women's life, etc. A constantly more intense preoccupation with the problem of *pardah*, the new spirit that is slowly but irresistibly creeping into the zenanas, are forces which make for a widening, quickening and stirring of life that will have in the future important consequences.

As a third point I mentioned greater open-mindedness. After the many pages that have been devoted to the elucidation of the natural attitude of self-defence and self-preservation of Indian Islam, it is necessary to try to get the right perspective of this open-mindedness. In those circles of the Moslem world that know that they are living in a modern world with heavy demands, there is a strong feeling that Moslems need help and advice from every quarter, from wheresoever they can get it. That causes a readiness to listen, which did not exist formerly to such an extent. The ground on which Moslem educational institutions ask lectures of manifold type is voiced in this way: "We need advice, widening of outlook and contact with every one who can give something to us." I know it is a general custom in Indian colleges to avail themselves of every traveler who is not disinclined to deliver a lecture; but still the note that rang in the voices seemed to me to come from a genuine desire for help and guidance. It was particularly strong in the nationalist-minded Moslem institutions, in which the pulse of life is undoubtedly beating more vigorously than in other institutions.

It is the universal testimony of missionaries and educated Moslem converts to Christianity as well as of college professors that, along with the natural Moslem aloofness and resistance to other religious influences, there is a growing mildness and open-mindedness of spirit, a readiness to listen, a more frequent demand for religious enlightenment and advice. Old suspicions against missionary work and against what embracing Christianity implies, are waning. Moslem students are in a special situation. Most of them are entirely concentrated on the problem of getting degrees and bread and butter. If the Moslem student is religious, he is zealous, but many of them are indifferent and listless. Amidst the clash of conflicting opinions and currents, Islam has no appeal to them, because its content is rather poor. It does not give real spiritual nourishment. In Christian colleges there is more religious interest than in Government colleges, because in the latter the religious fibre is starved, in the first it is more or less kept alive. Aligarh had my special attention, but as to the religious condition I have become disappointed.

As already described above, it was the high intention of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan to build modern education on the foundation of Islamic culture and belief. This synthetic ideal was formulated in his adage: "Philosophy will be in our right hand, natural science in our left hand and the crown of the monotheistic creed will be on our head." His idealism has not been fulfilled. Islam, religion, is not a life-giving and character-building element in the life of Aligarh. Since Sir Sayyid's time it has lacked the men who could at least have tried the experiment. Perhaps this failure is due also to the fact that after all Sir Sayyid was more inspired by cultural and educational than by purely religious idealism, a common weakness of nearly all modern-educated Moslems in respect to religion. Just as in the beginning, instruction in religious subjects is part of the curriculum in Aligarh. Prayers (*maghrib* and Friday-prayers) are compulsory. But interest in the religious subjects is very meagre, and the attendance at prayer is largely neglected. This is not only the case in Aligarh, but in all private Islamiyya colleges. Everywhere I heard the tale of the tendency to evade by all possible excuses the attendance at theological classes and religious services. It is melancholy, but it is natural. The relation between modern science and religion is entirely artificial and external. The religious teachers are mainly men of a rather old type, or of a moderate and sterile liberalism, which has no inspiration. Therefore, one hears not infrequently testimonies of parents whose confidence in Aligarh has been shaken. They saw in it the guarantee that there modern secular education would not lead to destruction of faith, but they see how often graduates return thence bereft of all interest in religion.

Of course, all this is not said in the sense of sweeping generalization. My chances of contact have been far too incidental. I only reproduce my impressions and coordinate the opinions of those who have had years of contact with this class of people. This statement of mine must be seen on the background of what is said before of the apologetic self-consciousness of Indian Islam, which springs mainly from enthusiasm for Islamic culture and the feeling of belonging to a world-wide community with a glorious history and many precious elements. One meets everywhere enlightened individuals who frankly criticize the degrading and antiquated forces in the Moslem system and community, and plead for new spiritual freedom. The Congress number of the *Hindustani Times* brought a very interesting article in this respect by Mr. Asaf Ali. The reason, however, that I feel obliged to draw attention to much indifference, however well concealed, especially in private Moslem institutions, is that one is always apt to be misled by statements intended for propaganda. Only contact with real life affords the means to a right estimate. My contact has been too transitory to attach much authority to statements on the intangible currents of the human mind.

In closing, I would state that Indian Islam finds itself in a state of confusion and transition.

Solo, Java.

H. KRAEMER.

ORIGIN OF CHRISTIANITY IN SOUTH ARABIA

Dr. D. S. Margoliouth in his article on "South Arabia and Islam" in the *MOSLEM WORLD* for January, 1929, opened a question which needs a great deal of further study. It is more and more recognized that Mohammed was influenced by the religious situation in Yemen. The extent of this influence is largely a matter of speculation, but Dr. Margoliouth and others have pointed out a number of items which can best be explained by the theory that South Arabian monotheism had a considerable part in the formation of Mohammed's religious ideas.

This leads to a second important question. How much of the religious developments in South Arabia was due to Christianity? That both Judaism and Christianity played an important part is quite evident. But to determine exactly what was the part of each is one of the most baffling questions in the study of Pre-Islamic Arabian history. That there were a number of strong Christian churches in South Arabia in the period immediately preceding Mohammed's birth is a historical fact. But the nature of this Christianity, how great an influence it had upon the life of the people, and how long it had existed, are questions not easily answered. There are indications that Christianity was a comparatively recent introduction, while on the other hand, there are traditions which trace its introduction back to a very early date.

Dr. Margoliouth, in the article already referred to, mentions two inscriptions on the dam of Marib, one dated A. D. 450 and the other 543. The second document begins with an invocation of the Trinity, while the other

seems to be non-Christian, though monotheistic. Does this mean that Christianity was adopted in South Arabia between those two dates, or is this merely a matter of local significance?

The scope of this article will not permit a full discussion of the entire history of Christianity in South Arabia, nor its influence at the time of Mohammed. It is intended merely to review the various accounts of the introduction of Christianity into South Arabia, in the hope that it may shed some light as to the length of the period during which Christian influences had been working.

It is impossible to understand ancient Arabia without knowing something of the part it played in world politics. The situation in South Arabia was different from that in the North. But even in that distant region we find at work the same bitter rivalry between Byzantium and Persia, and back-eddies of the theological conflicts within Christianity. But there is a new influence, which we do not find in the north,—Abyssinia.

At about the time of the migration from Yemen to the north, which was responsible for South Arabian settlements at Yathrib and other places, or possibly somewhat earlier, there was an infiltration of Arabs into Abyssinia, to the southwest. It probably sprang from the same causes as the northward movement, the desiccation of the land, a reminiscence of which is preserved in the legend of the bursting of the Marib dam. The result of this emigration was that in the country to the west of the Red Sea, the old Cushite inhabitants had given place to Semites, and a Semitic kingdom was set up with Axum as its capital. Inscriptions show that the kingdom of Axum was in existence in the first century. At the same time there was a kingdom of the Himyarites, or Homerites, on the Arabian side of the sea, which later came under the rule of the kings of Axum.

There are traditions to the effect that Christianity was introduced into Himyar during apostolic times, and Matthew, Thomas and Bartholomew are all mentioned

as having a part in it. There is also a supposition¹ that the three Magi came from Yemen, and died as martyrs in Sana'a after being baptized by Thomas before he left Aden for India. Interesting as these stories are, they are certainly not historically reliable.

More careful consideration must be given to the story told by Eusebius and Jerome about the learned Alexandrian of the second half of the second century, Pantaenus. About 183 Pantaenus is said to have gone to India to preach the Christian religion. Now there was considerable confusion among early writers about India. The term sometimes includes Yemen, and this is understood by many to be its meaning here, but the whole question is full of obscurities. Eusebius continues: "It is reported that among persons there who knew of Christ, he found the Gospel according to Matthew, which had anticipated his own arrival. For Bartholomew, one of the apostles, had preached to them, and left with them the writing of Matthew in the Hebrew language, which they had preserved till that time" (Hist. Eccl. V. 10). Eusebius gives this as a report which had come to him, and he does not definitely vouch for its truth, and as the other writers who mention it base it upon Eusebius, we should be slow in accepting it. It is possible that Christianity was known in South Arabia in the time of Pantaenus, but extremely improbable that there was any noteworthy Christianization.

Since there was such close relationship between Yemen and Abyssinia, it is reasonable to suppose that when Christianity was introduced into the one it soon became known in the other. The account usually accepted of the origin of Christianity in Abyssinia is that given by Rufinus. (Cf. Theodoret, Hist. Eccl. I, 23, and Socrates, L, 19.) Briefly, the story is that Meropius of Tyre, a philosopher, made a voyage to these regions, accompanied by two boys whom he had as pupils, Frumentius and Aedesius. At some place on the route, probably Adulis,

¹ According to Cheikho (*Le Christianisme et la Littérature Chrétienne en Arabie avant l'Islam*), who refers to Migne, P. L., XXI, 230.

the port of Axum, the party was attacked by natives, and all were massacred except the two boys. The lads were taken to the king, Ella Amida, and became members of his court. After the death of the king, they were retained by the queen to educate her son, Ezana, the heir to the throne. Later they were permitted to return to Syria. Frumentius, however, went to Alexandria, and discussed with Athanasius the matter of sending a bishop to Abyssinia, with the result that Frumentius was himself consecrated and sent as the first Abyssinian bishop. This was about the year 340, or 356, according to Abyssinian chronicles.

Though we may accept Frumentius as a historical character, we cannot place great reliance on the details of his history. All versions of the story go back to Rufinus, who is not noted for reliability. An effort to trace back the Abyssinian legend of Frumentius (under the name Abba Salama) has led to the conclusion that its source was a Syriac version of Rufinus, which was translated into Arabic, and adopted by the Abyssinians about the end of the 14th century.² Abyssinian inscriptions give us some details, such as the names of the kings. Guidi (*l'Arabie Ante-Islamique*, p. 70) maintains, with considerable reason, that although Abyssinian Christianity was established by Frumentius, and ecclesiastically connected with Alexandria, it was largely propagated by Syrians. He gives examples, for instance, of religious words which have Aramean form.

Abyssinian inscriptions agree with Greek writers that the history of organized Christianity in Abyssinia begins in the reign of Ezana, that is at the time of Frumentius. But this does not mean that Christianity did not exist there before that time. Rufinus, as a matter of fact, speaks of the Christian merchants who were in Abyssinia when Frumentius was there as a youth, and for whom churches were built. This would seem to give us an indication as to how Christianity first became known in both Abys-

² Kemmerer: *Essai sur l'Histoire Antique d'Abyssinie*. Paris, 1925, p. 99.

sinia and Yemen. The Red Sea was one of the great trade routes, and Yemen was an important trading center. Some knowledge of Christianity would be expected in a place which was frequented by merchants and other travelers.

As a matter of fact, we have an account of a Christian mission to Yemen at about the time when Frumentius was in Abyssinia. The account of it is given by Philostorgius, an Arian historian of the latter part of the fourth century and the beginning of the fifth. His history is lost, except what is quoted by Photius, patriarch of Constantinople. The story (Migne, P. G., LXV: 482-485) is that the emperor Constantius, who was an Arian, sent an embassy to the Himyarites, headed by Theophilus "the Indian," of the island of Dibou, or Sarandib (Ceylon?). Theophilus was received with honor, and preached Christianity. He disputed with the Jews whom he found there, finally persuading the king to a favorable view of Christianity. He built churches in Zopher, or Sapher (another reading is Tapher), the capital, in Aden, and in Hormuz, and left after appointing a successor to head the Himyar church.

Like Frumentius, Theophilus seems to have been interested not only in the conversion of the natives of the country, but also in securing freedom of worship for the Christian merchants residing there. It has also been suggested that Constantius wished to establish an Arian Christianity in Yemen, as opposed to the Athanasian form which was being built up in Abyssinia, and that he had in addition a political motive, that of extending Byzantine influence in the south. When we remember that it was also important to Greek commerce to have a sea route to India by way of Yemen, it is easy to see that Constantius would have several cogent reasons for sending such an embassy.

It would seem from the narrative of Philostorgius that at this time there was rivalry, if not bitterness, between the Christians and Jews in Yemen, a foretaste of

the bloody struggle which was to take place about two centuries later. That Christianity and Judaism fell into contention very early is also gathered from Arabic historians such as Tabari, Ibn Hisham, and Mas'oudi, who give examples of such strife as early as the third century. For instance, As'ad Abu Karih, a *tubba'*, or chief, is said to have been converted to Judaism by rabbis from Yathrib, and his people with him. His sons adopted his religion; Christianity won out again in the time of Abdu Kulal Ibn Muthawwab (c. 273-297), but his successors relapsed into Judaism. Of course we cannot be sure of the reliability of these historians who wrote so long after the events, and the tendency today is to discredit Arabic historians of this period. In so far as they are reliable, they usually take their material from Greek or Syriac sources. But when we find such a well authenticated outbreak of hatred as is exhibited in Nejran in 525, we may conclude that there was a long period of preparation leading up to it.

In Nejran, one of the most important centers of Yemen, Christianity had a long and interesting history, but we are now concerned with Christian origins. The beginning of Christianity in Nejran, as in other centres in Arabia, is obscure. Legendary stories come to us from Arabic sources of a man called Phemion, who traveled from place to place working miracles. (Tabari, Yakut, 7: 782; Ibn Khaldoun; Ibn Hisham, etc.) He was captured by a caravan and sold as a slave in Nejran, where he found a people who worshipped al-Uzza in the form of a palm tree. As a result of Phemion's preaching, they were converted to Christianity. The various accounts of Phemion's life are so conflicting that one cannot trust any of the details, but it is not impossible that Christianity first became known in Nejran in some such way. It seems that the area became a center of monophysitism. There was also a Jewish colony there.

Another reference to the origin of Christianity in Nejran is found in the "Book of the Himyarites." This

document, discovered in 1920 by Axel Moberg of the University of Lund, and later edited and translated by him, gives a graphic description of the persecution of the Christians of Nejran in the year 525. Moberg gives arguments for believing that the "Book of the Himyarites" is the oldest source that we have of the events it records, except possibly the letter of Simeon of Beth Arsham, and that it is the source used by later writers on the subject. If this is true, anything found in the "Book of the Himyarites" about the origin of Christianity in the country would be of importance. From the table of contents we know that the third chapter contained an account of "How Christianity began to be sown in the land." But unfortunately this chapter is missing from the manuscript, and we have left only a reference to the subject in chapter XXI. There Habsa, one of the Christians of Nejran, is reported to have said, "I am the daughter of Hayyan of the family of Hayyan, the teacher, him by whom our Lord sowed Christianity in our land." To give us an inkling as to the identity of this Hayyan, Moberg quotes from the Nestorian Chronicle of Saard, which possibly used the "Book of the Himyarites" as its source. According to this document, Hayyan was a tradesman of Nejran, who went to Constantinople on business. On his return journey he adopted Christianity in al-Hira. After remaining there some time he returned to Nejran, where his own family and then a number of others were persuaded to become Christians. From a reference in the narrative to the Persian King Yazdegerd, we draw the conclusion that this took place early in the fifth century.

This summary of our sources for the study of the origin of Christianity in South Arabia suggests the following as the probable order of events. There may have been occasional contacts with Christianity in the second and third centuries, but there is no real evidence that there then existed any organized Christian churches in Yemen. The first churches were probably established in

the more accessible places in the latter part of the fourth century. This was brought about partly through intercourse with Abyssinia and partly through an independent mission. We cannot entirely reject the account which Philosorgius gives of such a mission in the reign of Constantius, but it is difficult to believe that there was any widespread conversion of the country, or any adequate training in Christian teaching. It was probably not until the fifth century that there existed any strong indigenous churches. In that century Christianity reached Nejran, which took a place of leadership among the churches of Yemen because of the large number of its converts and their loyalty to the new religion. The unusual strength of the Nejran church may be partly due to the fact that the place was a refuge to which numbers of Christians fled from persecution during the theological struggles of that time. While Christianity was gaining a foothold in South Arabia there was growing friction with the Jews, which greatly influenced the later religious developments of the country. In the latter part of the fifth century and the early sixth century, Christianity spread from Nejran and other centres where it had gained a foothold. Abyssinian influence also became stronger, and a number of churches are known to have existed. In the Marib inscription of 543 the God Rahman has given place to "Rahman and his Christ and his Holy Spirit." But this takes us well beyond the time of the religious war of 525, which may be considered as roughly marking the end of the original missionary movement in the country.

The nature of South Arabian Christianity, its influence upon the religious life of the country, its variegated history down to the time of the Islamic conquest, and its possible influence upon Mohammed, are interesting and important questions which lie beyond the scope of this article.

Beirut, Syria.

W. G. GREENSLADE.

IS THE CALIPH A POPE?

For centuries the Caliphate has been a powerful and mysterious factor in the political and religious life of the Near East. A number of circumstances have conspired to draw attention to this office in recent years.

The Dardanelles disaster, the landing of the Greeks in Smyrna in May of 1919, followed three years later by the Hellenic *débauché* in Anatolia, and the subsequent Turkish victory at Lausanne, the plight of Protestant missions, colleges and hospitals in Turkey and the menace of the Turkish Nationalist Government to native churches of minority peoples have caused increased consideration of the Caliphate.

Finally the abolition of the Caliphate by Mustafa Kemal Pasha caused queries as to the nature and power of that office which, to the western mind, has symbolized the unity and authority of the Moslem religion.

Mr. Lathrop Stoddard's publications, "The Rising Tide of Color" and "The New World of Islam," vivid, arresting and valuable as they are, have exaggerated any self-conscious unity of Mohammedanism that may exist, and have created the idea in some quarters that Moslem peoples are held together by an unbreakable spiritual cohesion. Sir Thomas W. Arnold's recent volume, "The Caliphate," presents a far more adequate treatment, showing clearly that at no time did any Caliph rule over a united Islam.

The Caliphate arose from a series of circumstances vastly different from those which gave rise to the Holy Roman Empire and its institutions. Charlemagne assumed a title held by non-Christian emperors before him, but gave its function a Christian character. In those

actions, he was largely influenced by his study of St. Augustine's dream of a Christian commonwealth—*De Civitate Dei*.

The office of the Caliphate came into being not from deliberate plan or foresight, but almost from accident. Due to the prostration of the two great rival empires, Persia and Rome, the Arabs—through no spiritual or intellectual renaissance, or military genius—fell heir to vast sections of these former empires, whose military and naval defenses had decayed. Unlike Charlemagne, who copied his Christian Empire from the earlier forms of Roman legal and administrative genius, the Caliphate was moulded by the turbulent accidents of the age that gave it birth.

Later Mohammedan theologians and jurists, *nunc pro tunc*, accredited its rise and power to a theory which had not existed in the beginning, a postulation after the fact.

The theory of the Caliphate was expressed first in the Traditions, which are claimed as the utterances of the Prophet or his immediate associates. These, as is the case of Christian Scriptures, were first oral traditions, and were gradually reduced to writings. The Traditions were rapidly surrounded with a theory of literal infallibility, and are held to be supreme when a question is in dispute concerning the Koran itself.

A second difference exists between the Caliphate and the Holy Roman Empire, in addition to that of origin, and that is in the matter of the spiritual function of the Caliph. Among the Sunni Mohammedans, represented to the western mind principally by Turks and Arabs, divine revelation is held to have ceased with the Koran and the Traditions, the interpretation of which is given to the *‘Ulama*, or learned men, and in no respect does interpretation appertain to the Caliph. The Caliph has no spiritual functions and in no sense corresponds to the Pope of the Roman Church, or to the Patriarch, Exarch or Metropolitan of the Eastern Orthodox Church.

It is true that acting in the capacity of an Imam he

may stand before Moslems and lead them in worship, but so may a slave or a camel driver or even the son of a prostitute. No special consecration or ordination is necessary for this office, and Islam has no body of men especially trained and set aside as a priesthood. The authority for interpretation in spiritual matters resides in those laymen who choose to devote themselves to the study of theology, the '*Ulama*, or the learned. This learning, however, does not raise them in rank above the general body of the faithful. But it ought to be stated that among the Eastern Moslems, represented by the Persians, the Imam has great authority as an expounder of sacred writ, this increased prestige of the Imam constituting a radical difference in practice between the Shiah and the Sunnis.

Islam has no sacraments—no body of specially trained or consecrated men set aside for sacerdotal functions. There is no œcumenical head of Islam, there are no holy orders, no intermediaries. The sole semblance of a priestly group corresponding to clergy that may be found among Moslems is a certain group of small religious fraternities which sprang up six centuries after Mohammed. In these, however, the spiritual bond is between the masters and those who seek their wisdom. Ritual and doctrine are not touched upon, and the fraternities have no formative influence upon theology such as that now exercised by the great writers in the monasteries of the west.

A third distinction exists between the Holy Roman Empire and Islam, and that is, that the former ceased to exist even before Napoleon, in 1806, declared it extinct, while the Caliphate has persisted into post-war times.

Reviewing the history, one pauses to wonder how the Caliphate came into being. Mohammed left no will; he nominated no one to follow in his steps, he delegated no spiritual power, and he did not deliver the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven to an apostle. While he lived, he was the ruler of both a state and a religion, each of which

he founded. When he died, his follower succeeded to the worldly power, but not to the spiritual. Islam, placing its faith in Allah and in its sacred writings, has never regarded the Caliph as its spiritual head, but as a symbol of a united worldly Moslem power that has, in fact, never existed. Whatever theory arose regarding the Caliphate was an invention of other minds than that of Mohammed. Upon the Prophet's death, Abu Bakr, Umar, and Abu Ubaydah formulated plans to elect the former as Chief of the Faithful. Word being received by them that the chiefs of the most powerful tribe of Medina, the Banu Khazraj, were about to choose a chief, they hurried to the place of meeting, and succeeded in having their candidate elected by acclamation. The next day, therefore, Abu Bakr took his place on the *mimbar* where Mohammed was accustomed to speak to the people, and upon the call of Umar the people swore allegiance to the new chief.

Abu Bakr held office for two years when, according to tradition, he nominated Umar to follow him, a tribal custom pursued by the desert peoples. With regard to the Caliphate, the theory was clear, that it was this subsequent election by the tribe that constituted the actual investiture of power.

Tradition holds that Umar, who was stabbed by an assassin ten years later, appointed six electors to choose his successor; but this may be an invention of a later period to explain a procedure arising in other ways. At any rate, a theory of election came into being which has persisted into modern times under the Ottoman Sultanate. The Caliph made his nomination first to a small gathering of powerful men who swore allegiance at that time, and it was this procedure that was followed by public proclamation and the assent of the populace.

The hereditary principle appeared first when Mu'awiyah, the founder of the Umayyad dynasty in 676, four years previous to his death, nominated his son as the future Caliph. This precedent was followed generally

in theory during the period of the Abbasid Caliphs. The ablest son was nominated, but, in reality, during the first twenty-four Caliphs holding office from 754 to 974, only six were actually succeeded by a son. The theory of election, however, was not lost during this period.

The equality of all believers was a theory easily maintained while the government remained at Medina, surrounded with associations of the Prophet, but when, in 661, Mu'awiyah removed the seat of government to Damascus, the pride of the Arabs caused them to regard themselves as rulers over subject nations. Little groups of devotees in Mecca and Medina regarded this transformation of the Caliphate, accompanied by a luxurious temporal leadership, with alarm, and protested against it. But before the Umayyad dynasty closed, the Damascus Caliph ruled over an empire that stretched from India and China across Arabia and North Africa, through Spain, and even into modern France. The successors of Mohammed had become powerful secular rulers.

During the Abbasid dynasty, the Caliphs assumed the rôle of patron of religion in a greater degree than had their less pretentious predecessors, the Umayyads. The latter were easy to approach, and assumed few regal airs; the former surrounded themselves with ceremonious splendor and retained their executioners constantly at hand. Sagacious subjects frequently carried their funeral shrouds with them upon a summons to the palace.

The theory of the Caliphate was elaborated during this period of Arab aggrandizement under the Abbasids, the theorizing process continuing even during the later days of their extreme humiliation. Abu Bakr, successor of Mohammed, took the modest title of Khalifah Rasul Allah—Successor of the Apostle of God. This humble title grew to be a magnificent symbol of power as the result of the overrunning of the broken empires of Persia and Rome by the hungry and vigorous Moslem Arabs.

Umar, in the era of great conquest and expansion, as-

sumed the title of Amir ul-Mu'minin, Commander of the Faithful, and it was by this term—the title Saladin used—that the Caliphs were known to the Christians during the Middle Ages. A third title, Imam, had special reference to the religious functions of leading the faithful in prayer. The earlier Caliphs might be described by either one of the three titles.

In 750 the Abbasids wrested the Caliphate from the Umayyads in the battle of Zab, and for five centuries they held the Caliphate within their immediate family. This family drew the Shiah Mohammedans to their support, pretending a common devotion to the Prophet's family in matters of descent. But the Abbasids claimed allegiance to al-Abbas, the uncle of the Prophet, and not—as the Shiahs held—to the son-in-law of Mohammed. When the Abbasids obtained all they desired from the Shiahs, they deserted them and pursued their own selfish path. The Umayyads preserved the old Arab culture, tribal customs and loyalties during their reign, but the entrance of the Abbasids marked the shifting of the Arab kingdom with a Moslem religion to a strict, theocratic Moslem rule.

The highest point of power reached by the Abbasids may be set about the year 800 A. D., the year Charlemagne was crowned in Rome as the first Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. Dissolution of the Abbasids' power set in quickly, however. An Umayyad prince fled to Spain and declared it a separate kingdom, in 756, while North Africa—for all practicable purposes—became an independent kingdom under the hereditary Aghlabid dynasty from the year 800. Egypt and Syria separated, and Persia came soon to be ruled by a separate dynasty. By the end of the ninth century, Abbasid power had shrunk until its influence was confined almost exclusively to the city of Baghdad. The weakness and licentiousness marking the Caliphate at this time invited aggression, and Caliph Muqtadir (908-932), a drunken and dissolute ruler, first at the mercy of his lawless Turkish merce-

naries, after being twice deposed, was slain and his head impaled upon a spear. The Baghdad Caliphate became the victim of one powerful prince after another. At one period there lived three Abbasid princes each of whom in his time had held the office of the Caliphate, and each of whom had been blinded by a powerful ruler and robbed of everything of value. For two centuries, cruel masters, the Buwayhids, were served. These were a Persian dynasty who expanded, and seized Baghdad in 945, under whom the monarch's name was put in the *Khutbah*, or Friday sermon, the symbol of sovereignty, an occurrence which dramatized the lowest depth to which the Caliphate fell under the Abbasids.

It is a fact singularly striking that the greatest treatise on the theory of the Caliphate was written at the time of its utter humiliation, by Mawardi, a jurist who died in 1058 at the age of eighty-six. The jurists have held generally that the following characteristics must be present in order to qualify a candidate for election to the high office of Caliph: he must be a member of the tribe of Quraysh, a male of mature age, of spotless character, without physical or mental infirmity, a man of sound judgment; he must, in addition, possess knowledge sufficient to adjudicate cases at law and must possess courage and energy in the defense of Moslem lands; he must be, at one and the same time, administrator, judge and general.

With the declination of the power of the Abbasids, the Caliphate became a name only, to which non-Arab rulers gave an indifferent respect for political reasons. Nevertheless, from the founding of the Abbasid dynasty, in the middle of the eighth century, to the death of Musta'sim, the last Abbasid Caliph in 1258, the holder of the office was considered the Commander of the Faithful by all orthodox Sunni Mohammedans. Independent princes, who cared little or nothing for religion, saw to it that the reigning Caliph sent to them a diploma of investiture or a title, in order to satisfy pious Moslems.

The Buwayhid princes, who entered Mesopotamia from Persia and completely dominated the Caliphate from 945 to 1055, gave way to the Seljuk Turks who entered Baghdad in the latter year. These people were a visiting power from Persia who had assumed proportions in Mohammedan history and had built rapidly an immense empire. The Abbasid Caliphate improved under the Seljuks for a time, and, during a period of dynastic warfare among the Turks, a Caliph even ventured to take the field, but was defeated and put to death. The crowning humiliation of the Abbasid dynasty, however, was received when the Mongols, under Hulagu, invaded Baghdad in 1258 and trampled the Caliph to death. Following this for a time the office ceased to exist, to the consternation of the Moslem jurists.

The Abbasids for two centuries during their régime were confronted with rival Caliphates. The Almoravid dynasty, among the Berbers of North Africa, founded a considerable empire, Morocco being the result of their conquests. Finally, in 1086, defeating the Christian armies at the battle of Zallaka, they added the Moslem provinces of Spain to their lands. The Almoravids, however, recognized the Abbasid Caliph and this compensated him somewhat for his feeble position at Baghdad. In 1171, the rival Caliphate of the Fatimids in Egypt came to an end. Saladin, defeating the Franks, displaced the rival Shiah Caliph, who had reigned in Egypt and was a Fatimid, and gave his allegiance to the Abbasid Caliph. Moslem India, represented by the conquest of the Slave kings—so called because they were former Turkish slaves who achieved their office by reason of military prowess—also gave homage to the Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad. These, as other conquerors, found in the diplomas and mantles of the Baghdad Caliph a convenient way to legitimize their conquests.

The Abbasid Caliphate at Baghdad was now revived in Egypt through the exigencies of the Mamluk rulers who needed sanction for their rule. Consequently, the

fourth Mamluk ruler procured an uncle of the last Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad, and set him up in Cairo as Caliph with great pomp and ceremony, although the Caliph remained practically a prisoner in the citadel at Cairo. Thus for two hundred and fifty years, weak and almost helpless Abbasid Caliphs gave a semblance of legitimacy to Mamluk rule in Egypt.

During this period other Moslem princes looked to the almost impotent Caliph for sanction of their rule. The founder of the Muzaffarid dynasty in Persia and the Turkish Sultans of Delhi both found his *imprimatur* a convenient political device. In Transoxiana, Timurlane nominated his grandson to follow him. After the great conqueror's death, the throne was contested, and the grandson advised to apply to the Abbasid Caliph in Cairo for a diploma of investiture, a counsel which he rejected. The Ottoman Sultan, Bayazid I, in 1394, applied to the Caliph for permission to use the title of Sultan. Thus the fiction of a powerful Caliphate was perpetuated through the needs of turbulent princes.

Several Moslem potentates, despising the pretensions of the Abbasids, set themselves up as Caliphs during the period of the Abbasids at Cairo. Abu Abdallah Muhammed (1249-1277) of the Hafsid dynasty in Tunis was one of the first rivals to claim the title. The same occurred in Asia Minor, India, Mesopotamia and Transoxiana, until the description of Caliph became fairly frequent among Moslem historians. The Mogul emperors of India commonly employed the title for themselves.

Several Ottoman Sultans arrogated the title thus connoting so great an authority. However, the title had been claimed by so many puny rulers that the mighty Ottoman, Sultan Salim, did not employ the term for himself, even after conquering Egypt. A few years before, in 1508, when the Shah of Persia, his rival, had captured Baghdad from the Turkomans, he appointed a eunuch governor, and dubbed him "Caliph of the Caliphs." Salim achieved his power by his sharp sword, and chose

to ascribe it to that instrument rather than to the shadowy authority which the last Abbasid Caliph in Cairo is alleged to have handed on to him when he overran Egypt. Neither did his son, Sulayman, employ the title.¹

Although the earlier Ottomans took pride in the strength of their arms and used the term Caliph only infrequently for themselves, following 1700, when the powers of western Europe came more and more into contact with the Moslem world, the Turks were astute enough not to overlook the value of such a claim in diplomatic negotiations. Therefore, the false idea arose among Christians that the Caliph was a sort of Pope—a spiritual ruler over a united Islam—an idea that was exploited to the full.

The Ottoman Turk found his first opportunity to make capital of the Caliphate in the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, in 1774, between Abdul Hamid I and Catherine II of Russia, under which treaty the Sultan surrendered all claim to the Tatars in southern Russia, that is to say in the Crimea and in the Kuban Steppes. Following the analogy of Catherine II, who claimed to be protectress of Orthodox Christians in Turkish territory, the Sultan's diplomats made a similar claim in regard to Moslems in Christian Russia. The Russians quickly recognized that such a clause would divide the loyalty of the Tatars and in 1783 struck the clause from the Treaty.

An error once set going is difficult to eradicate from popular opinion and belief and from the publications of historians. Jacques de Vitry, Bishop of Acre from 1216 to 1226, was one of the earliest to mislead Christendom, in saying that the Caliph was Pope of the Saracens. He was followed in this view by Matthew Paris, Marco Polo and many Moslem writers. In fact, the view which came to be held thus in Christendom had a distinct reaction upon Turkish ideas and claims, with no foundation in Moslem writ or tradition, now maintained as *bona fide*

¹ This paragraph seems to misrepresent the Ottoman use of the title of Caliph. See Encycl. of Islam—articles Khalifa and Selim I, which both state that Selim used the title before his conquest of Egypt.—*Editor*.

by Turkish writers. Sultan Abdul Hamid II inserted in the Constitution set forth on December 24, 1876, Article 3: "The Sublime Ottoman Sultanate, which possesses the Supreme Islamic Caliphate, will appertain to the eldest of the descendants of the house." Article 4: "H. M. the Sultan, as Caliph, is protector of the Moslem religion."

Consequent upon the disastrous wars in which Serbia, Rumania and Montenegro gained complete independence, and as a result of which Bulgaria became a separate state under Turkish suzerainty, with Bosnia and Herzegovina ceded to Austria by the Treaty of Berlin, Abdul Hamid made a bid for sympathy on the strength of the claim of the Caliphate to such Asiatic Moslem governments as India, Afghanistan, Java, China, Egypt and Tunis. The response was not forthcoming. His plea was met by the orthodox Sunni doctrine that the Caliph must be from the tribe of the Quraysh, from which no Turkish Sultan ever came. Even in Turkey there was opposition, and in 1890 Abdul Hamid ordered the tablets defining the qualifications of the Caliphate removed from the mosques.

In post-war Turkey, the idea took root that the Caliphate and its associations were not compatible with modern constitutional government, and on November 1, 1922, the Grand National Assembly declared the Sultanate at an end, and the republic established. Sultan Wahid-ud-Din was deposed and Abdul Majid was elected Caliph of all Moslems by the Grand National Assembly at Angora. He held an anomalous position until the Caliphate was finally abolished by the Angora government in March, 1924, when Abdul Majid was taken into exile by a British war vessel bound for Malta, whence he later joined King Hussein at Mecca.

The ex-Sultan, Wahid-ud-Din, has not been inactive, but has busied himself with various plots against the Nationalist régime. Secret service men of the Angora government recently accused him of being implicated in the late uprising in Kurdistan, with four aims in mind:

his own restoration as Sultan, the re-establishment of the Ottoman Caliphate, the autonomy of Kurdistan, and the return of the seat of government to Constantinople.

But even today there are several claimants for the Caliphate. The late King of the Hijaz, Hussein, can well claim that he is a descendant of the tribe of Quraysh, an ancestry which would go a long way toward satisfying the Moslem legitimist. The Sharif of Morocco is considered the Caliph by his people; several potentates in the Malay Archipelago put forward the claim; a Javanese Sultan, three chieftains of Borneo, the Sultan of Tidore in the Molucca Islands, a chief in Sumatra—all claim to be the Caliph of Islam.

The Moslem ideal of a single Caliph who shall rule an ideal state, in which Mohammedan law shall govern every concern of life, will remain alive and will continue to be a rallying cry for faithful enthusiasts and Moslem or anti-Moslem propagandists. The idea of Pan-Islam appeals to Moslems as a reaction against foreign domination. But one œcumenical Caliph to rule over a unified Mohammedan culture and religion has never been a reality.

Stamford, Conn.

GEORGE STEWART.

CURRENT TOPICS

Teaching the Moros to Read

The Rev. Frank C. Laubach, D.D., writes as follows:

"It was clear to me as soon as I reached this country that the only approach we could have to all the Moros would be through the periodicals and books which we might publish. We have the problem of teaching them to read. There are only three thousand of them who know how to read in Arabic letters, so we started a literacy campaign. This has been greatly helped, of course, by the public schools. We only began the campaign about eight months ago, but have already taught about three thousand people to read their own language *with Roman letters*. I am so enthusiastic about this literacy movement and the splendid response that it has received, that I feel like urging it upon all who are working in Mohammedan lands. The Moros, at least, are extremely grateful and feel that our *madrasas*, as they call them, are of great value to their people. I have just received a naïve but sincere letter of appreciation signed by two pages of *sultans* and *datos*. A little over a month ago, I received another such document, signed by thirteen hundred people of Lanao."

Parsis help Persian Education

We learn from the *Moslem Outlook*, published in India, that "the Parsi philanthropists of Bombay have collected large sums in subscriptions, and sent them to the Persian Government for their distribution among the various philanthropic institutions and asylums. Out of the amount a sum of one *lakh* of rupees has been given to the Zoroastrian Orphanage and Children's School, and a like amount for the Girls' School. A sum of Rs. 15,000/- has been apportioned for the encouragement of the study of the ancient Persian literature; a sum of one *lakh* has been given to one of the Girls' Schools in Teheran; Rs. 35,000/- for the erection of a medical institution for the poor, and Rs. 25,000/- for the dispensary of the said institution; and a sum of Rs. 10,000/- to one of the Boys' Schools in Teheran. A Zoroastrian philanthropist has donated in favor of the Zoroastrian Library Academy in Teheran two thousand volumes of books, among which there is a large number of works dealing with Persian history and learning before Islam. The Persian papers have hailed with satisfaction these munificent donations made by the Parsis of India for their original home."

Another Step toward Religious Liberty

Last year Sheikh Kamil Mansur, a distinguished Egyptian evangelist working for the American Mission and a scholarly convert from Islam, was arrested for alleged attacks upon the religion in Egypt. This took

place on April 14, 1930, at Cairo, and the charges made against him were of such a character, although wholly baseless, that he was for a time in prison. On December 4th a cablegram was received that he had been acquitted of all charges. This acquittal, in view of the fact that the Government and the court were predominantly Moslem, means a great deal for the cause of religious liberty.

A Recruit to Islam

Mr. H. St. John Philby has made a statement to the British press to the effect that he has become a Moslem. He is one of the leading authorities on Arabia of this generation. Giving his reason for turning Moslem he says:

"I am convinced that the present greatness of England is largely based on the Cromwell Puritan period which laid the firm moral foundations of the subsequent intellectual and spiritual development.

"Similarly, I believe that the present Arabian Puritan movement harbingers an epoch of future political greatness based on strong moral and spiritual foundations.

"Also I regard the Islamic ethical system as a real democratic fraternity and the general conduct of life, including marriage, divorce and the absence of the unjust stigma of bastardy, resulting in a high standard of Arabian public morality, as definitely superior to the European ethical code based on Christianity."

Mr. Philby also states, "Further, I am encouraged by the striking tribute to Islam contained in Shaw's *Methuselah*."

We agree with the comment made on this news-item by one who knows and loves the Near East: "Perhaps it would be a great service to Christianity for many thousands of those who bear the name of Christian to take their religious allegiance to a camp whose ethical tenets are congenial."

A Question of Method

John H. Brocklesby is a young English Friend working at Banani in East Africa. He writes in *Quaker World Service* on the Impact of Christianity and Islam and his words are thought-provoking.

"The problem of approaching one of another religion in the right way looms large before a young missionary on his first tour, especially in view of modernist trends of thought. One must respect the other man's religion as one must respect his personality, and the two are inextricably interwoven. Many people are so extremely sensitive in matters of religion that they get terribly afraid of anything that threatens to injure the authority of their creed. I saw one missionary giving pamphlets of the Scripture Gift Mission to some Moslems, which at once aroused keen animosity. They found something referring to the Divinity and Sonship of Christ which grossly offended their Unitarian belief. Considering this incident I concluded that to arouse opposition at the first step is to lose touch permanently, before one has even started to make a contact.

"When I pointed this out, my friend replied that he wasn't going to modify his religion one jot for anyone. I wondered if that was the reason why Christian Missions have made such little headway against the religions of the East—Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucian-

ism. I felt that I must confine myself, when approaching a man, to the common ground of his religion and mine, at any rate till I had won his confidence, or better still, his friendship.

"Then I was led to ask myself, 'Does it matter what label we put on a man? Are we here to stick labels on people? Are not labels most misleading when dealing with complex human personalities?' So I concluded that I must, in so far as I can, bring what new light of God I may have received; I must seek to lead my neighbor to the higher life of the spirit; I must show him that the higher life is a happy, joyful life because one feels that he is making the best of life. After that, labels are of little or no significance.

"I ought to say that, as far as my own observations go, I don't find all Mohammedans such purists as those mentioned above. Probably the Arabs are the greatest purists and the least tolerant. The African Mohammedans often seem to be but slightly instructed in the tenets of Islam, while their beliefs still have a large admixture of native fatalism and animism with lingering notions of witchcraft. The Indian Mohammedans often show much progressive thinking, while one sect, the Ismailis, bear almost the same relation to Islam that the Theosophists bear to Orthodox Christianity. They claim that Ismailism is the essence of all religions and take as their motto, 'Truth, Tolerance, Benevolence.' All these forms of Mohammedanism are to be seen here in East Africa.

"Every man has his own method; he must of necessity evolve his own method, and no method can be laid down as suitable for all peoples and circumstances."

Ruanda-Urundi

En Terre d'Islam, published by the Roman Catholics in Morocco, gives the following account of Islam in Central Africa in the territories under the Belgium Mandate:

"La propagande islamique se manifeste peu et ne paraît pas, d'ailleurs, systématiquement organisée. Le nombre des adeptes ne s'accroît guère. A la fin de 1928 on pouvait évaluer à 6,248 le nombre de Mahométans comprenant d'une part 5,907 Waswahili (Noirs islamisés) dont 4,952 habitent l'Urundi et 955 le Ruanda et d'autre part 340 Arabes, Indiens et autres Asiatiques (213 Arabes dont 47 au Ruanda et 166 dans l'Urundi et 129 Indiens : 43 pour le Ruanda et 86 pour l'Urundi . . . La plupart des Asiatiques s'installent à demeure.

"Sans doute le nombre des sectateurs du Coran s'est accru de 168 unités. Mais cette augmentation provient bien moins de la conversion d'indigènes que de l'immigration de quelques artisans et chauffeurs d'automobiles, venus des contrées du sud-est ou de la côte, et du développement normal de la population par les naissances. Il n'est pas d'ailleurs sans intérêt de noter que les mosquées ne sont fréquentées que par les Waswahili : jamais un Arabe n'y pénètre et rarement un Indien en passe le seuil."

How Can We Best Present the Subject of the Trinity?

A group of Christian workers after discussing the subject came to the following conclusions:

"The only source of our knowledge of the Trinity is the Bible. In

the Old Testament there are passages that indicate not only the Unity of God, but also that God is more than one Person. But it is in the New Testament alone that we find clear teaching implying both the Unity of God and the Trinity.

"For this reason it is generally better to induce a Moslem to read the New Testament, so that the fact of the Trinity will gradually dawn upon his consciousness rather than to attempt at the outset to argue about the subject. Jesus Himself did not establish the proofs of His Divinity by argument. His life was His challenge to Jewish thought.

"We must also bear in mind that arguments and analogies have proved useful with certain people. It is possible to point out:—that Islam, like Christianity, admits that the human finite mind cannot grasp the nature of an Infinite God; that Islam, like Christianity, holds that what we really know about God has come by way of revelation; that Islamic theology has experienced much difficulty in deciding firstly, as to the relationship between the Divine essence and the Divine attributes; secondly, as to the relationship between these attributes and the created Universe; that God, Who is Love, must have loved from eternity and this implies the eternal existence of Someone who is loved, and of a relationship of loving; that there are passages in the Koran which point the way towards the Trinity, more particularly those referring to the Divine Word and Command; that 'Nature' has many 'Secrets,' which we only partially understand, so that we need not be surprised to find similar secrets in the realm of the Spirit; that the act of creating seems to some to postulate more than one Person in the Godhead; that there are many analogies in nature and in human life to the fact of the Trinity.

"We must carefully make it clear that we believe not in three gods, but in Three Persons in One God. Many of our arguments are often tritheistic."

New Education in Turkey Today

The following is a report of the schools and reading rooms established in Turkey in order to teach all citizens to read in the new script.

"It is reported that at the present time 569,000 persons are attending the popular schools in 62 provinces. In many places people themselves have opened such popular schools at their own expense. This year 12,692 such schools have been opened; 11,073 teachers have served in these schools. Of the students 199,156 are women and 350,702 are men. This means that 65% were men and 35% women. The average expense to carry each school has amounted to 79 Liras.

"Reading Rooms also are being opened continually. There are today 1,250 such rooms. This year many more will be added to this number. Besides these reading rooms moving libraries also will be organized, so that they may serve in different places. The Ministry of Education has spent 11,500 Liras in buying 5,691 books and has presented these books to these Reading Rooms. The Government is planning to open schools in all villages where there are no schools yet.

"At the Congress of Teachers held at Angora, one of the problems was the teaching of Turkish Literature in the schools. With the change in the script and the simplification of the Turkish language, the question

arose as to whether the old Literature should be taught in schools or not. Three views were brought forward for discussion:

- (a) The old Divan Literature should not be taught at all;
- (b) It should be taught very briefly and in one course only;
- (c) It should be taught in detail and with ample time.

After long discussion, the second of these views was accepted by the vote of the majority. Hence the old Divan Literature will be taught in the second class of Lycées and briefly too.

"At the same time it was decided that the course in the first class of the Lycée in the instruction of the old literature, its Rhetoric and verse, should be cancelled, and that time should be given to the study of fine examples of Western literature. In the second and third classes of the Lycées this course should be followed by a full course in Western classics. In the fourth class the history of Western literature will be studied."

Youth in Turkey

Hasan Refik writes in *Uyanis* (May 15, 1930):

"In these days there is a problem which is even discussed in the daily papers. It is the problem of our youth. It is said, 'The new generation is pessimistic, without perseverance, and prefers imagination to reality.' Others say that 'The new generation was shocked by the new life; consequently the new Truths which they learn have not been useful to them.' With such a confused mind we can do nothing; we can produce nothing.

"It is a fact that our new generation is showing a pessimistic face. This can be proved by the new literature in circulation. It is a pity also that the new generation lacks other qualities, such as perseverance, to make up this deficiency. Our youth need this quality more than anything else. This is illustrated by the large number of students who graduate from the department of Law and seek positions in the State department of finance.

"It is very desirable that a young man should choose an aim and follow it in his studies. Our nation and country can make progress only with men of this mind. But it is meaningless to be pessimistic if one does not find the expected happiness at the end. Of course, if a person has only seen the bright side of life since his childhood, he will naturally be pessimistic. We must not prefer imagination to reality; we must learn to face facts, and the darker aspects of life. This is the reason why we are all so pessimistic. Do you want a proof of this? Let me ask how many persons you can find in our society who feel satisfied with their present position?

"What shall we say? Should we not expect anything from the new generation? I believe we can expect much, because I do not believe that these deficiencies in our youth are permanent. Our generation is passing through a crisis, and these things are the natural results of this crisis. The reason of this crisis is the fact that the new life has come upon us like a heavy shock instead of by a gradual process. The present panic is simply the result of this shock. As soon as this panic passes and we get rid of the intellectual confusion caused by this crisis, I feel confident that these deficiencies will disappear, and our generation will be able to produce and to create new things."

France's Hostility to Islam

The recent action of the French government in North Africa changing certain laws among the Berbers has given rise to the rumor that thousands, yea millions of these people have been forced to accept Christianity as their religion. The press of Egypt has been filled with long protests from numerous sources throughout the month of Sept., 1930. For much of this time *al-Wadi* has devoted columns daily to the subject under the heading, "France's hostility to Islam." Letters of complaint in many papers accuse France of attempting to change the religion of devoted Moslems by means of schools and preaching.

Al-Ahram published a declaration from the French Legation which stated that the change in laws did not touch religious tenets, but was a recognition that certain Berber traditions were to be considered as law.

This statement in turn was answered by 'Abd al-Hamid Said, the President of the Young Muslim Men's Association in a letter which appeared in *al-Muayyad*, *al-Wadi* and *al-Siyasa* on Sept. 16th, 1930. He objected that matters regarding inheritance and personal status are most special features of Islam as far as the social factors of the believer's faith are concerned. The secretary of this Association had already made a statement (see *al-Muqattam*, Sept. 2, 1930) that France was Christianizing the Berber nation in North Africa.

In *al-Muayyad* of Sept. 3d, Mahmud 'Abd al-Karim, a former editor of the magazine, *Nur al-Islam*, suggested that there be an active committee formed to call upon the Moslems of the East and West to organize central and branch committees to collect subscriptions from the hundreds of Moslems everywhere—even if only a piastre is collected from each one. This money after being forwarded to the central office in Egypt is to be used for sending delegates appointed by the different Moslem countries to Europe beseeching aid against France in her efforts to destroy civilization and the spirit of humanity.

The Veil in Islam

In the numbers for May, June and July, 1930, of *al-Taqwa*, a religious monthly published in Cairo by the Society for Preaching Islam, there is an interesting discussion of the veil as an essential of Islam today. The matter is presented in the form of a conversation between a husband and his wife concerning the trend of the times towards European customs. In the course of the argument the husband says, "Suppose you went on the street dressed as you do in your house, wouldn't the men say, 'She's a beauty! Isn't she sweet?'" "Only the ignorant ruffians say such things," replied the wife. "Not at all," answered the husband, "the people who will say this are the educated people, the wise philosophers, the modern writers who take great pride in themselves. If you hear such words you are really to blame, for your appearance led them to say what they said."

The final argument that convinces the wife and induces her to remain at home consists in the statement of numerous traditions. Among these the following is significant, since it is not at all authoritative for the hundreds of women who now attend public lectures and gatherings. "The Prophet of Allah came upon two of his wives and found with them the blind Ibn Umm Maktum, to whom they were reading the

Qur'an. The Prophet became angry and reproved them. They replied, 'He is blind and doesn't see us, O Prophet of Allah, while we are learning from him.' The Prophet said, 'Are you blind, you see him, don't you?' " The husband goes on to comment, "The Prophet became angry at a very little thing, should we not then become angry when a Muslim queen (the Queen of Afghanistan) undertakes to kiss young men in the presence of her husband, whose feelings were not at all moved at such a scene."

Societies for the Defense of Islam

The activities of the many newly organized Islamic societies command considerable space in the Egyptian press. *Al-Siyasa* of January 1, 1930, published a notice of the formation at Assiut of a Society for the Defence of Islam. Its purposes are given as follows:

(1) To confront atheists and infidels with clear arguments and proofs from Islam which will absolutely humiliate them.

(2) To banish innovators and dissemblers in matters of religion, who although they have no religion, beguile the minds of the common Moslem people with an empty form of religion.

(3) To give attention to disseminating the excellencies of Islam and its profound mysteries, and that it is the solid foundation for the elevation of nations.

Kawkab al-Sharq in its issues of June 6 and June 14, 1930, has notices of the formation of branches of the Society for the Preservation of the Koran in different cities of Egypt.

The Young Muslim Men's Association held a meeting in Assiut, which is reported in *al-Ahram* of May 26, 1930. At this meeting a speaker from the central association in Cairo spoke on "Societies for Evangelization and Unbelief, and what has come to Egypt through them." After showing statistics derived from the Edinburgh Conference, he spoke of the Association for the Advancement of Atheism in America.

Al-Ahram for July 13 and 18, 1930, gives extended reports of the Conference of the governing councils of the Y. M. M. A. in Cairo.

Marriage Today in Moslem Lands

The Cairo daily, *al-Wadi*, has given considerable space in a number of late issues to the problem of marriage, to a study of the reasons why young men are not marrying, and to the remedy for the present crisis. Ahmad Hanafi al-Qusi of Bank Misr in an article on September 9, 1930, states that the causes are, women's love of display, the excessive expenses of family life, and the enormous dowries demanded by the bride's father. A teacher writing in the issue of September 22, names as the reasons for non-marriage that unreasonable dowries are demanded, weddings involve enormous expense because of vanity, and young men are now more free to become engaged to whomsoever they wish.

An article by the lady who edits "Fatat Misr" in *al-Wadi* of September 20, draws a comparison between the solution of the marriage problem in the Hejaz under the rule of Ibn Sa'ud and Egypt's failure to solve it. In Arabia the government has instituted compulsory marriage for every young man of eighteen years, and has made a law limiting the doweries and the expenditures at wedding feasts.

BOOK REVIEWS

Halidé Edib: Turkey Faces West—A Turkish View of Recent Changes and their Origin. With a Preface by Edward Mead Earle. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1930. \$3.

This book offers to a wider audience an interpretation of Turkish history, already presented at the Williamstown Conference and in the *Yale Review*. Its value lies in the fact that the author is a Turk, whose wide experience in her own country and abroad has carried her beyond the prevalent embittered selfishness of Balkan nationalism to an attitude of broad tolerance. She sketches the origins of the Turkish people and mentality, distinguishing between what is Turkish or Anatolian and what is Ottoman. This Ottoman heritage she describes as a composite of religion, culture, and government, partly inherited from Arabs and Byzantine Greeks, but strongly infused with Turkish elements. In its day of power the empire provided strong and relatively just government for the peoples of the Nearer East, but by the Nineteenth Century had become utterly corrupt, and preyed indiscriminately on its Christian and Moslem subjects. For nearly a hundred years Ottoman statesmen were trying to westernize and democratize this anachronistic structure, that it might hold its own against the rising tide of nationalism within and European imperialism from without. To this end the Anatolian peasantry was exploited as a reservoir of soldiers, and Moslem was incited to massacre Christian, who in turn was urged by foreign powers to hopeless revolt. Meanwhile a Turkish renaissance developed, and provided leaders for a national revolt of the last people to free itself from Ottoman rule—the Turks of Anatolia. Events since 1908 the author describes as witness, and often as active participant, giving a most valuable insight into the minds and motives of those who have made the new Turkish Republic, and discussing both reforms and present trends of policy with a rare good judgment and discrimination. In a work so full of opinion there could not fail to be many opportunities for criticism and dissent, but to emphasize this would be finical. Such a book deserves to be welcomed as an honest and able attempt to present to the Western world the history and mind of the people of the Turkish Republic as seen through the eyes of one of its most distinguished citizens.

Princeton University.

W. L. WRIGHT.

La Syrie Contemporaine, by Commandant Noël Maestracci. 2nd edition, Paris, 1930. pp. 228 + 3 sketch maps, table of contents, but no index.

A popular treatise, drawn mainly from secondary sources, by one who does not seem to have special qualifications for the work. Within the compass of a couple of hundred pages an attempt is made to cover the geography and history of Syria in addition to its economic, political

and social conditions and its status under the mandate. Even the life of Mohammed comes up for treatment. The sections dealing with contemporaneous Syria, particularly those relating to public works, jurisdiction, and the organization of the states under the mandate are pretty good. The historical data, however, are not always reliable. On p. 48 Sayf al-Dawlah, the patron of al-Mutanabbi (spelled "Montanabbi") is made a Seljûq! "Salah-Eddine," p. 49 l. 7, becomes "Salaheddine" 18 lines below. "Feyçal," p. 55, is "Fayçal" p. 56. The name of the president of the Syrian state in 1925 was Barakât, not "Baraka" (p. 58). Among other typographical errors the following are noted: "Habab," p. 33, for Ḥalab; "Djounich," p. 56, for Djounieh, etc.

Princeton University.

PHILIP K. HITTI.

Nûr ul Hudâ, or Mystery Religions and Christianity. 2 vols. By Rev. Barakat Ullah, M.A.; of Church Missionary Society, Lahore, India. Published by St. Andrew's Brotherhood, Sândhâ Road, Lahore, India. pp. 131 + 174. Price As. 14 or 1s. 4d.

This book is an answer to Khwaja Kamal ud Din's book, "The Sources of Christianity." Some thirty years ago, the late Dr. Tisdall wrote his now famous book, "The Sources of Islam," which was translated into many languages, including Urdu, and shook the faith of hundreds of Indian Moslems. When the Khwaja, who is the Imam of Woking Mosque, found that Moslem controversialists were unable to refute Dr. Tisdall's book, he eagerly seized upon and devoured Robertson's "Pagan Christs," "Our Sun-god," "Pagan and Christian Creeds," "Bible Myths" and cooked up the stuff of the R.P.A. and wrote a book in Urdu called "Sirâj i Hidâyat," which he afterwards translated into English and called "The Sources of Christianity." Thanks to Qadianis, the Urdu version had a very wide sale and was in the hands of all their propagandists.

In the course of his book Kamal ud Din alleges that St. Paul was the real founder of Christianity. Mr. Barakat Ullah makes a detailed examination of Paulinism, and by comparing distinctively Pauline teachings with those of the Synoptics refutes the Khwaja's position, and proceeds to show that the word "Mystery" is used by St. Paul and by Jesus in a sense totally different from that which was current in Mystery religions; but is used in the Koran in a sense absolutely identical with those of the pagan religions.

At the end of each volume references to English books are appended. A glance at these lists shows the painstaking care with which the author has read standard books on subjects discussed in his book. The book under review is a scholarly production and is written in a charmingly simple style. It is an excellent piece of work, and on the whole what the author has to say is unanswerable. Missionaries and ministers would do well to buy and distribute this book among Urdu speaking Moslems.

Lahore, Panjab, India.

ABDUL MASIH.

Zwischen Nil und Kaukasus. By Paul Schütz. Chr. Kaiser Verlag, München, 1930. pp. 236. R.M.5.80.

"The dissolution of the Church in 'religion,' the dissolution of religion in secularism, the dissolution of secularism in the chaos of worldli-

ness which recognizes no law except its own—these are the signs of the times.”

Such is the conclusion of Paul Schütz's account of his eventful journey from the Nile to the Caucasus and from the heights of Persia to Smyrna. A journey in more senses than one: A journey in the good old sense of adventure and rich experience, but also a journey in the spiritual realm. Both lead the author and the reader from the cosiness of the fireplace to the lonely peaks of ultimate reality. The two stories, of outward happenings and of inner vision, are perfectly interwoven. And this is one of the reasons why the book is nothing short of fascinating.

Wherever the author goes, be it to the Mohammedans or the Devil-worshippers (who, by the way, celebrate Christmas more faithfully than most of us in the “Christian” nations) he finds the long arm of the Christian West, the most disruptive force in the world because it has become untrue to its God-given mission. To be sure, the West carries a civilization with it, the benefits of which are universally greeted with joy. It carries humanitarianism, it carries even missions. But all of these are finally aspects of its deep-rooted secularism, its lust after power, its political dynamics. And the East knows it.

But if this is so, the real question is no longer the one asked from the East as to whether it will accept Western Christianity. The real question, returning like a boomerang, is whether that West worships Christ or Mammon.

Schütz tried to enter Turkey. No admittance for a Christian pastor. He tried the Russian frontier twice. Another closed door. But this very closed door symbolizes our real situation. The children of Western culture, be they called communism or rationalism, Russia or Turkey, force us to turn back. Turning back means “*metanoia*,” that is repentance. Thus the closed door becomes our divine warning. Turn back to the West, turn in upon yourselves, turn to your “Christian” Church and ask yourselves whether there is a light burning in the candlestick, whether there is salt in the Church, or whether the Church has become enslaved by the Prince of this world.

Thus Schütz's experience becomes an inescapable question to all of us. We may discount his often too symbolic interpretations of Eastern affairs or his somewhat too sweeping political views. These do not matter. The only important thing is whether he is essentially right as to the signs of the times. If he is, God help us to confess our hypocrisy and to see ourselves as we are.

Geneva.

W. A. VISSER 'T HOOFT.

The Romance of the Black River. By F. Deaville Walker. Church Missionary Society, 1930. pp. 267. 5s.

In a former book Mr. Deaville Walker drew a fascinating picture of Thomas Birch Freeman, the American-born negro, apostle of the Niger Coastlands, sent there by the Methodist Church. Here he delineates the yet wider sweep of evangelization which accompanied and promoted the final exploration of the great river Niger, and is still building up the church of Christ among a population of twenty million, both Pagan and Moslem. It is the preponderating share of his work, as taken by the Church Missionary Society, which Mr. Walker, as a

Wesleyan comrade, most sympathetically describes. That work is linked with the name of Samuel Adjai Crowther, rescued slave boy at Sierra-Leone, first Bishop of the Niger in the Episcopate, followed by three other Africans. Townshend, Gollmer, Schön and Hinderer remind us what manner of men and women the C. M. S. from the first sent out to this work. English and German, side by side, they gave themselves to the people, their language and their life. No wonder that the African Secretary of the C. M. S., on a recent visit to Nigeria, was deeply touched by the affection with which the West African Church regards the Society whose members have brought them into new light and life.

The peoples of Nigeria have shown a remarkable aptitude for building large cities, and the territories controlled by these have remained, after the British occupation, as units of government, which is carried on by native chiefs under general supervision of the British authority. It was in Abeokuta, the largest of these, that Christianity first took root inland. Gradually the trade and administration of the Royal Niger Company extended, till in 1900 the British Government took over the whole of its responsibilities. This brought the great Hausa and Fulani races, with their Emirates centered at Sokoto, Katsena, Kano and Zaria, under the rule of a Christian nation; but at the time of annexation, special pledges were given that the Moslem religion of the Hausa princes and peoples should not be interfered with; for their idea was that the conqueror would force his religion on the conquered. These pledges became a source of friction between government and missionaries, when they were interpreted to mean that no Christian mission could be carried on in the territory of a Moslem *emir*, though substantial portions of the population might still be pagan. Gradually this policy of exclusion is breaking down, partly through the Gospel of healing embodied in the medical missionary; partly through the penetration of Christians from the south, coming to Northern Nigeria by the new railways, roads, and waterways. This development is treated rather fragmentarily; but with so wide a subject, it was difficult to give a complete view. The contact of the Gospel and Islam in Nigeria is a task that calls for wide vision, ceaseless vigilance, and persistent effort in the strength of God. Mr. Walker's narrative is a suggestive introduction to the subject, and those who take it up will find their knowledge illuminated and their purpose strengthened by this captivating record of God's doings through His messengers.

H. U. WEITBRECHT STANTON.

The Handbook of Palestine and Trans-Jordan. Edited by Harry Charles Luke, C.M.G. and Edward Keith-Roach, O.B.E., with introductions by Sir John Chancellor, G.C.M.G. and The Right Hon. Sir Herbert Samuel, P.C. Second Edition. Macmillan Co., London. pp. 505. 16s.

We are glad to call attention to the second edition of this handbook which, for its literary merits, accuracy of contents, and the wide field of its information, is without a rival. The authors are experts in their subject, and have brought the information up-to-date, adding a new section on Trans-Jordan. Following a sketch on the geography and history of Palestine, there are sections on the peoples and religions, the archæology and places of special interest; on communications and information for tourists, on the government of the country, its commerce,

industry, geology, and natural history. In an appendix we have the text of the mandate and other documents of historic interest. An excellent railway map is contained in the pocket of the book, and the index is complete. The information given regarding Islam in Palestine is accurate. "With the exception of small Shiah colonies, the Moslems of Palestine are Sunnis (Traditionalists), divided among the four rites (*mazhab*, plural *mazaheb*) approximately in the following proportions: *Shafi* 70%; *Hanbali* 19%; *Hanafi* 10%; *Maliki* 1%. Under the Ottoman Government the *Hanafi* was the established rite, it being to this school that the majority of Turks belong. Jerusalem, chronologically the first *qibleh* (point of adoration) of Islam, is almost as sacred in the eyes of Moslems as are Mecca and Medina; and from the early ages of Islam, Quds al-Sherif, to give the city its Moslem name, has been a place of pilgrimage for the entire Mohammedan world. According to Moslem belief, it was from Jerusalem that Mohammed was translated to heaven." Z.

Usamah's Memoirs entitled *KITAB AL-I'TIBAR* by Usamah Ibn-Munqidh. By Philip K. Hitti. Princeton University Press, 1930. pp. 240. \$5.00.

This book is issued as volume I of the Princeton Oriental Texts, and we trust that many other volumes will follow in the series. An English translation by Dr. Hitti appeared earlier and was reviewed in our Quarterly, October, 1930. Usamah (1095-1188) was a warrior, a hunter, a gentleman and a poet. He sojourned in the courts of the Fatimid caliph in Cairo, of Saladin in Damascus and of Zanki in Mosul, and had personal contacts with Baldwin, Bohemond, Roger and other leaders of the first two Crusades. When not engaged in repelling Frankish, Byzantine, or Assassin attacks on his picturesque castle, Shayzar, on the Orontes, he was hunting lions, hawking, or writing poetry. His life was an epitome of Arab civilization as it flourished during the early Crusading period on Syrian soil.

The importance of the translation and of the text is, therefore, obvious. In the present work the editor has collated and critically edited the material with the help of earlier translations, to which clearer references might have been made. Brockelmann (volume II, page 320) refers to an earlier edition as follows: "*K. al i'tibar*, Autobiographie, hsg. und weitschweifig paraphrasiert v. H. Derenbourg, Ousama ibn Mounkidh, Paris 1886-93; Publ. de l'école d. lang. or. viv. II^e serie, vol. XII; Traduction in *Revue de l'or. lat.* II 357-565."

The Department of Oriental Languages and Literature, as well as Dr. Hitti, deserve high praise for the care and accuracy shown in the printing of the text. Z.

Novyi Vostok. Journal of the Scientific Oriental Association of the U.S.S.R. Vol. 28. Moscow, 1930. XXIV—302 pp., 5 illustrations.

Novyi Vostok, i.e., *New Orient* is published by the Soviet Oriental Association, sporadically. The "biography" of this magazine is very interesting. When the Faculty of Oriental Languages of the University of Petrograd and the Oriental Section of the Russian Archeological Society were abolished by the Soviet Government, the well known old Russian Orientalists established in 1922 in Petrograd two Oriental journals: one, purely scientific, *Memoirs of the Committee of Orientalists*, and

another, more popular,—*The Orient*. Immediately the Government founded in Moscow the magazine *New Orient*, the staff and collaborators of which were almost exclusively the members of the Communist party and the officers of the Foreign Office. The aim of this magazine was the propaganda of the Soviet ideas and the concurrence with *The Orient* of Petrograd. The last journal was suppressed by the Soviets in 1924 and since this date the *New Orient* has no more concurrents.

Usually the *New Orient* includes political articles and the contents of the volume under discussion are the best example of this. The volume is divided into six sections: the introduction which describes the position of Stalin in the policy of the Communist party; political section; historico-ethnological; documents; political review; and bibliography. Among twenty-two articles, eighteen deal with the revolutions in various countries of the world and the Marxist theory. Two articles only are written by scholars: the late Professor Barthold, who died last summer, wrote about the feudalism in Iran, and Professor Derjavine about the new history of Dobroudja. But the work of Barthold is severely criticized in the next article by Mr. Iransky and a special reproach of the critic is that the author is non-Marxist. All other articles are written by non-authoritative people with unknown names, mostly pseudonyms.

N. MARTINOVITCH.

Women in Modern India. Edited by Evelyn C. Gedge and Mithan Choksi with a Foreword by Sarojini Naidu. Kegan, Paul Trench, 1929. pp. 161. Rs. 4.

Although there is little concerning Moslem women in India in particular in the fifteen papers that compose this book, it will deeply interest our readers. All the papers are written by Indian women themselves, and treat of work in which they are either personally active or acquainted with at first hand. Two of the writers are in prison at the present time, and the fathers of two more, all on account of the strength, even vehemence of the opinions they have expressed about Mr. Gandhi. It is in fact a unique symposium from the pens of the more advanced women thinkers and social reformers in Modern India, especially of the Bombay and Madras Presidencies.

After "a general conspectus" on "the Status of Women in India," one of the most striking contributions, there are biographical sketches of Pandita Ramabai and Ramabai Ranade by their personal friends and fellow-workers, Mrs. Nikambe and Miss S. Sorabji. Five papers record achievements in Social Work, Medical Work, the Women's Colleges and Literature, the last being contributed by Mrs. Hansa Mekta, President for 1930 of the Congress of Women Workers in Bombay.

The third section is perhaps the most interesting, although not all the papers are of equal literary merit. They concern "Some avenues for further advance" in painting, music, law, medico-social work. One lays down the book, unpretentious in appearance, but packed with information which will be new to many, with a feeling of surprised thankfulness. If only all those who discussed and were so much interested in Miss Mayo's "Mother India" could read this book, their opinions on Modern India would be more balanced. At all events here is knowledge at first hand from within.

E. I. M. BOYD.

W.H.T.G. to His Friends. Some Letters and Informal Writings of Canon W. H. Temple Gairdner of Cairo, 1873-1928. S.P.C.K., London. pp. 173.

This fascinating book, compiled by Mrs. Gairdner and her children, is truly one of her husband's "greatest legacies." Mrs. Gairdner writes, "this thought of sharing is the keynote of the book, just as it was also of the life of Temple Gairdner. In his letters to an individual, when no particular event occurred, he shared with them his latest and best thoughts on all manner of things, both in heaven and on earth. But when the great events happened—those thrills, whether of travel, music, books of art, beauties of nature (and who so readily thrilled as he!)—his happiness was never complete until he had shared the experience of joy with them. I write (he said) because it is the only way to share those glories with you all, and so redeem me from utter selfishness!"

Throughout the letters one is impressed by two of Temple Gairdner's most endearing characteristics—utter unconscious humility, and abandoned joyousness. Two of the most delightful chapters are his charming letters to his children, and the paper on Elgar's Second Symphony. The keynote of the whole book seems to be summed up in advice to his son,—“Live richly—in digs. It reminds one of a piece of rich embroidery worked on coarse commonplace canvas. The embroidery's the thing.”

ELIZABETH Z. PICKENS.

Oriental Hymn Tunes, Egyptian and Syrian, collected and noted by W. H. T. Gairdner. S.P.C.K., London. pp. 87. 5s.

This collection of Oriental hymn tunes represents research and study during a period of twenty years, for the Egyptian tunes were first printed alone in 1910. The Syrian tunes were collected later, but not until Canon Gairdner's last illness was there a respite which gave an opportunity for completing this work. Mrs. Gairdner, who did the final work of editing and revision, writes that “this may be considered his last legacy to his beloved Church in the Near East.”

Canon Gairdner's task was colossal, as some tunes have such variations in different localities that they are totally transmogrified, and one hundred and eighty tunes have been noted, some of which are variations. They are listed according to metre, and are not harmonized, as Oriental Tunes seldom admit of harmony. In the Appendix there are interesting examples of secular tunes. This book should be an inspiration to compilers of hymnals for the Oriental Churches, both in the Near and the Far East.

ELIZABETH Z. PICKENS.

The Riddle of the Jew's Success. Translated from the German of F. Roderich-Stoltheim. By Capel Pownall. Hammer-Verlag, Leipzig. pp. 288.

This book is one of a series published by a firm which seems to specialize in Anti-Semitic propaganda. There are chapters on Jewish methods of business, their peculiar morality and their economic life, as well as on the origin and character of the race, their attitude toward womanhood, and, the Jews and the World War. Intolerance and special pleading, with a minimum of documentary evidence, mar every chapter. Yet the book represents a viewpoint that challenges attention. Z.

Italien im Oestlichen Mittelmeer. By Ibrahim Seyfullah. Kurt Vowinkel Verlag, Berlin. pp. 91.

This reprint from the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* deals with the political problems of the Mediterranean in relation to the islands on the Anatolian Coast now occupied by Italy. It contains maps, statistics and a bibliography, but also many misprints.

Turkey in the World War. By Ahmed Emin, Ph.D. Yale University Press, New Haven. pp. 310. \$3.25.

Of making many books on the World War there is no end. This volume is one of a series, published for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, on the economic and social history of the World War. The monumental survey, we are told, when completed will include two hundred volumes in a half-dozen different languages. The authors were selected for each volume because they were "men of judicial temper and adequate training." Dr. Emin has intimate knowledge of the events portrayed, and deals with them without too much national bias. The effects of the World War upon Turkey were exceptionally deep and far-reaching.

The first part of the book sketches the Turkey that existed, before the conflict, under the old régime. The second part deals with the actual War period, and necessarily contains many chapters that are controversial, e. g., How Turkey Entered the War, War and Religion, and Racial Problems. The third part tells the after effects of the War. This part of the story is brief. Turkey's enemies were her salvation. In a country with nothing left to lose, Mustafa Kemal had his opportunity. The last chapter tells of the economic effects of the Nationalist Movement, and the conclusion is perhaps too optimistic:—"The unexpected setting up in Turkey of a régime peace-loving, self-confident, self-reliant, and energetic, capable of seeing facts very clearly and acting according to them promptly and efficiently, unquestionably constitutes a great gain for international tranquillity. One of the worst breeding grounds of war was drained dry when the Turkish people assumed complete control of their own destinies. The internal stabilization in Turkey brought to a natural end the traditional activities of those Powers which had formerly been preparing the ground for their own intervention by playing one diverse and discontented part of the population against another. The new Turkey, with her stable and uniform domestic situation, and her sincere hatred of intrigue and adventure abroad, surely constitutes a new and solid factor in a region geographically very important, when once, feeble and without a goal, she had been rightly looked upon as the greatest possible danger to peace." Z.

Siegel und Charaktere in der Muhammedanischen Zauberei. By Dr. H. A. Winkler, Tübingen. Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin und Leipzig. pp. 187.

The excellent book of Dr. Winkler, originating in a doctor's dissertation at the University of Tübingen, throws new light upon this dark matter. The writer justly goes back to the Primitives. Primitive magic extends its influence, to a very great extent, into the lives of converts from primitive religion to Islam. Magic is the bridge between heathenism and Islam. The magician likes all that is strange;—strange sayings,

often absurdly deformed, as well as strange, e. g., Hebrew characters are not uncommon. It is, in most cases, difficult to make out their meanings. Dr. Winkler has, in several instances, been able to trace the wanderings of certain magic formulas, e. g., from the Old Testament, which explains the meaning of Islamic charms and talismans. The last part of the book is a historic investigation of the Seven Seals and the "*Brillenbuchstaben*" (spectacle letters). The writer's attempt to expound the wholly unintelligible "*Brillenbuchstaben*" as a deformed way of Babylonian arrow-head writing is very interesting. However it may be, the book invites anyone who works as a missionary among Mohammedans to follow up the extremely mysterious ways of Arabian magic. SIMON.

Arabia. By H. St. J. B. Philby, C.I.E., B.A. (Cantab.), F.R.G.S., M.R.A.S., Late of the Indian Civil Service; Formerly Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, Iraq, and Chief British Representative in Trans-Jordan; Founder's Medalist of the Royal Asiatic Society; Author of "*The Heart of Arabia*" and "*Arabia of the Wahhabis*," pp. xi—384, with Appendix: Genealogy of the House of Sa'ud, Index and Map. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1930. \$5.

"Philby's Arabia," as it will have to be called to distinguish it from Hogarth's, is the story of the last two centuries of Central Arabia. It records the rise and fall of the first Wahhabi empire, the interval of Shammar supremacy and the establishment and expansion of the second empire of the Wahhabis.

Philby derives his material from Arabic sources used also by Rihani in the latter's Arabic and English works on the Arabian kings and countries, and from an intimate acquaintance with recent events and negotiations.

The book plainly shows the religious basis of both the first and second Sa'udian empires. In the first, the extreme expression of that characteristic caused opposition from outside Arabia and led to its overthrow. Similar zeal was used to build up the present empire, but, with difficulty, was moderated to make way for more modern means of government and growth.

Mr. Philby is a strong and confident advocate of an Arabia united, under Wahhabi rule, willingly or "by other paths." From the history of the last quarter century he argues that British sanction only is needed for the early consummation of an all-Arabian Empire that is ultimately inevitable. The public press announces what this book indicates, that Mr. Philby has joined the Wahhabis. Future generations will know the value of his prophecy, which reverses the lesson of immemorial Arabian history and psychology and builds upon the achievements of a single, albeit forceful, sagacious and generous, personality. In any case, although individual disappointment might be involved, does it not accord more with world needs and tendencies to advocate and work for a United States of Arabia, federated by agreement and acknowledgment of the rights, liberties and opinions of all the rulers, religions and groups in the land?

Hartford, Conn.

EDWIN E. CALVERLEY.

The Muhammadan Emirates of Nigeria. By S. J. Hogben. Oxford University Press, London. pp. 204.

This monograph is in every sense worthy of a place in the excellent series of books that have recently appeared from the Oxford Press on

Nigeria. It fills a gap in the history of this part of the world most admirably. The first part gives a preliminary summary of the earliest references to the Sudan, the origins and development of Arab civilization, and traces Mediterranean influences, until the decline of the Moors in Spain. The author tells of the development of the Western Sudan, of Kanem and the Bornu Empire, the Songhay Empire, and the three centuries of chaos in the Western Sudan, until the time of the European discoveries.

Part Two contains the local history in detail of the various provinces, (pp. 68-196). There are nine sketch-maps and one colored map of Nigeria. The book contains a good bibliography and index. Z.

Through Central Africa. By W. J. W. Roome, F.R.G.S. Fleming H. Revell Co., London. pp. 208. \$1.50.

The readers of our Quarterly will remember an article by Mr. Roome, with its illuminating map, showing the border-marches of Islam in North Central Africa. The volume before us is of a popular character, and contains the narrative of a four-thousand mile motor tour on behalf of the British and Foreign Bible Society in Central and West Africa. The area visited, according to the sketch map, and the descriptions given do not specially touch Islam. Only in chapter six is there a brief account of its penetration inland. Z.

Our Birthright and the Mess of Meat. By Jan Karel Van Baalen. W. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Grand Rapids, Michigan. pp. 287.

Under this fanciful title the author gives a comparative study of present-day cults in their relation to orthodox Christianity, viz., Spiritism, Theosophy, Christian Science, Lodgeism, Mormonism, Russellism, Unitarianism, Modernism and Bahaism. The first part of the book describes these systems, not always with sympathy; and the second part gives quotations from representative authors regarding the character of their peculiar teachings in distinction to that of the Reformed Church, of which the author is a member.

The Rubā'iyāt of Omar Khayyam. Translated from the French of J. B. Nicolas by Francis Dyson. William Brooks, Sydney. pp. 138.

This version has all the weakness of being a translation of a translation. The text of the French translation is described in the Encyclopædia Britannica as "very incorrect and misleading." However, the translation is *complete*, and there are valuable notes and an interesting preface on the life of the poet-astronomer. Z.

Under Five Sultans. By Mary Mills Patrick. The Century Co., New York. pp. 357. \$4.

The author of this book has lived and worked in the Turkish Empire while most of its modern and picturesque history was in the making. She has seen despotic rule give place to a constitutional government, and she says: "From the point of view of the historian, the whole movement of the Young Turks was a great triumph, and formed an epoch in the evolution of national progress." Dr. Patrick was also in the country when the empire ceased to be and became a Republic.

One critic says, "This is in no way an autobiography, but is a gentle and kindly narrative—and is in no way the book we have a right

to expect from the author." The Constantinople Women's College is a monument to her devotion—of fifty-three years of wise and unselfish work. A.

L'Islam. By Henri Masse. Librairie Armand Colin, Paris. pp. 221. 12 fr. 50.

There is no dearth of manuals on Islam in English, German or French. The occasion for issuing this excellent handbook in the Collection of Armand Colin is the centennial celebration of the French occupation of Algeria. The author has done excellent work, and has crowded his material into an astonishingly brief compass. The rise of Islam, its early spread, its sources, evolution, history and present-day extent are treated in six chapters, each with a bibliography, which is almost entirely limited to works in the French language. Z.

Muslim Calligraphy in the Ghosh Collection, Calcutta. By M. Mahfuz-ul-Haq, M. A. *Muslim Review*, Calcutta. pp. 21. Re. 1/4 and **The Kharijites Under the First Omayyads**, Translated from the German of Dr. Rudolf Ernst Brunnow. By S. Khuda Bukhsh, M.A. *The Muslim Review*, Calcutta. pp. 19. Re. 1/8-.

These two pamphlets are reprinted from the *Muslim Review* and are excellent examples of the contents of this important magazine. The account of the Muslim Calligraphy is beautifully illustrated in colors. The historical paper is a translation, but none the less interesting on that account. Both pamphlets do credit to the authors and the Press. Z.

Races of Africa. By C. G. Seligman. Thornton Butterworth, Ltd., London. pp. 256. 2/6 net.

This is No. 144 in the Home University Library. The value of the volume lies in the fact that it gives the reader in condensed form a wealth of scientific information. The author describes the negritos, the true negro, the Hamites, both Eastern and Northern, the dwellers on the Nile, the Bantu races of the South, and in a concluding chapter the Semites. In view of the importance of the Arab race in Africa, this final chapter is unsatisfactory. Z.

Treasure of Ophir. By Commander C. E. V. Craufurd. Skeffington & Son, Ltd. London. pp. 288. 18s.

The story of the travel adventures of a British Naval Officer along the coasts of Arabia and in search for the land of Ophir. The first part has some rollicking good stories of experiences with the Arabs before and during the War. The latter part is a proposed vindication of one of the old theories that Solomon's land of Ophir lay in South Arabia. The spelling of Arabic words and the references to Arab customs betray the superficial character of this otherwise attractively written and beautifully illustrated volume. Z.

This Believing World, A Simple Account of the Great Religions of Mankind, by Lewis Browne. The Macmillan Company, New York. 347 pp.

A cheap edition of this book, selling for \$1, has recently been published, in which it is stated that it has been printed sixteen times since it was first published in 1926. We understand that it is used as a text

book in some schools and colleges. Turning to the eighth section, which deals with Islam, we find abundant evidence that the writer knows little or nothing at first hand about Islam, and that he has misunderstood much of what he has read on the subject. He also uses in regard to the prophet of Islam many expressions which are sure to give serious offense to any Moslem who might happen to come across this book. We regret that publishers in a nominally Christian land should give publicity to such violent and unnecessary denunciation, which will only embitter those who are already convinced that Christians are their natural enemies; this will not help towards that sympathetic understanding between the various races of the world which all reasonable men desire in these days. Why should our educators make use of these so-called "popular" works on religion, when there are standard works on the religions of the world which have been written by men thoroughly conversant with the subjects on which they write?

W. G. SHELLABEAR.

Statement exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India During the Year 1928-29. His Majesty's Stationery Office, London. pp. 416. 5s.

This is the sixty-fourth number of this annual publication, replete with information on the politics, the economic conditions, the medical and health service, the railway communications, trade, commerce and finance of India. A special section deals with Moslem communal claims and the Moslem league. The maps, diagrams and photographs are excellent as usual. Z.

On "The Book of Religion and Empire" of 'Ali B. Rabban Al-Tabari, by D. S. Margoliouth. Humphrey Milford, London. pp. 20. 1s. 6d. net.

In 1924 Father Peeters and Father Morris Bouyges assailed the genuineness of this Arabic manuscript published by Dr. Mingana with English translation. In this pamphlet Professor Margoliouth gives conclusive evidence to the contrary. The book is not "a literary fraud," but a genuine document. The original work was reviewed in our Quarterly. Z.

Eighty Mosques and Other Islamic Monuments in Cairo. By Mrs. R. L. Devonshire. Maisonneuve Frères, Paris, 1930. pp. 64. 12fr.

This is the English edition of the original French, revised and enlarged. No better guide exists to the leading Mosques of Cairo, and the information given is reliable. There are eight photographic illustrations and an excellent map of Mediæval Cairo.

Red Star in Samarkand. By Anna Louise Strong. Williams and Norgate, Ltd., London, W. C. 1. pp. 329. 15s.

The Red Star referred to in the title of this fascinating account of Turkestan and the heart of Central Asia is the symbol of Bolshevism. Aeroplanes, cinemas, factories and schools are now found in the city once ruled by Tamerlane. The author describes this Bolshevik outpost in Central Asia after a personal visit. She tells of the struggle between the new law and ancient customs; the fight for women's emancipation, and the march of Westernization under the lash of Communism. Fifty years of Czarist control in Central Asia left ninety-seven per cent. of

the population illiterate. The old Moslem education was not worthy of the name. "Today, nearly one hundred thousand boys and girls of the Uzbek Republic are in modern primary schools. The number is not large in a population of five million, but it is eighteen times as many as before the Revolution. It is a remarkable achievement in a land so ruined by war, and so lacking of teachers or school buildings. Teachers are being rapidly trained; in fact, the most noticeable new structures in Samarkand and Tashkent are the Normal Schools." The illustrations are excellent, but it is unfortunate that a book so full of facts has no index. Nearly every page bears witness that Communism has captured the cities of Central Asia, and is making Bolsheviks of erstwhile Mohammedans. Z.

L'Algerie Chrétienne Esquisse Historique. By Chanoine P. Repeticci. Librairie A Notre Dame, Alger. pp. 265. 15 fr.

La Conquête religieuse de l'Algérie. By Le Chanoine Jules Tournier. Librairie Plon, Paris. pp. 260. 16 fr.

These two books, although by different publishers, deal with the same theme, and together form a compact and reliable history of Roman Catholic missionaries' efforts in North Africa from 1830 to the present. The volume by Canon Jules Tournier has a valuable introductory chapter on Early Christianity in North Africa and its disappearance because of Moslem Conquest. One is astonished to note the boldness with which the Christian cause is presented, and the extent of Roman Catholic influence through missions and colonial churches in Algiers. Both authors repudiate the statement often used in the press that France is a "grande puissance musulmane."

"Si la France républicaine n'a pas la haute sagesse de patronner ouvertement et pleinement le christianisme dans l'Afrique du Nord afin de permettre aux missionnaires d'amener, avec l'appui officiel, les populations musulmanes à l'Évangile, il n'est pas nécessaire d'être de la lignée des Prophètes pour annoncer que, malgré la somme impressionnante de capitaux qu'elle a versée depuis un siècle sur ces terres et les immenses travaux qu'elle a accomplis; malgré l'instruction qu'elle a distribuée largement aux tribus berbères et arabes; malgré même un peuplement français plus étendu, elle n'est pas certaine de conserver définitivement les empires chérifien, algérien et tunisien." Z.

Vita Beati Raimundi Lulli. By B. de Gaiffier. Société des Bollandistes, Bruxelles. pp. 178.

The Belgian Jesuits, who publish the *Acta Sanctorum* or collection of hagiography under the title *Analecta Bollandiana*, have just issued a brief life of Raymund Lull in Latin (a reprint from Tome XLVIII fasc. 1-2). It is based on the life by an anonymous writer found in a Parisian Codex of the fourteenth century, and on two other manuscripts. The story breaks off before his martyrdom. There is a brief introduction, and the text is accompanied by critical notes. Z.

SURVEY OF PERIODICALS

BY MISS HOLLIS W. HERING
Missionary Research Library, New York

I. GENERAL.

ALAMUT. W. Ivanow. (In the *Geographical Journal*, London. January, 1931. pp. 38-45.)

A description of the district and its inhabitants, with brief notes on the ruined fortress.

THE ASSASSINS' VALLEY AND THE SALAMBAR PASS. Freya Stark. (In the *Geographical Journal*, London. January, 1931. pp. 48-60.)

The description of a journey from Shutur Khan, across the Pass to the Caspian shore at Shahsewar.

CARTES DE REPARTITION DES KABYLES DANS LA RÉGION PARISIENNE. L. Massignon. (In *Revue des Études Islamiques*, Paris. 1930, cahier II. pp. 161-169.)

Three sketch maps, to which are added a list of Algerian communal sources of Kabyle immigration, a list of Paris factories employing these workmen, and some general notes on their habits and problems.

EARTHQUAKES IN PERSIA. Sir Arnold T. Wilson. (In *The Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, London Institution, London. Vol. VI., pt. 1. pp. 103-131.)

An analysis of existing records of shocks, records which are very meagre despite the fact that the country is liable to catastrophic quakes.

PALESTINE AND THE STABILITY OF CLIMATE IN HISTORIC TIMES. Professor J. W. Gregory. (In the *Geographical Journal*, London. December, 1930. pp. 487-494.)

Geologic evidence goes to show that the present dry climate of Palestine was established in the early ages; but the difference in the productivity of the country as shown in the early records and at the present day is due to the fact that modern times have made less careful use of the available resources.

THE PERSIAN ART NUMBER. Special supplement of the *Times*, London. January 5, 1931. 24 pp.

Numerous excellent articles on the art, literature, history, politics, and social and religious conditions of the country.

PROVERBES ET DICTONS MAURITANIENS. J. Beyries. (In *Revue des Études Islamiques*, Paris. 1930, cahier I. pp. 1-51.)

One hundred and ninety-eight proverbs, with translations.

II. ARABIA.

THE HABITABILITY OF THE ARABIAN DESERT. Eldon Rutter. (In the *Geographical Journal*, London. December, 1930. pp. 512-515.)

Shows the life of the desert Bedawin, with its impossibility of comfort as conceived by the West, and its inadaptability to changing conditions, together with its suitability for the life of camel-breeders.

A JOURNEY INTO RUB 'AL KHALI—THE SOUTHERN ARABIAN DESERT. Bertram Thomas. (In the *Geographical Journal*, London. January, 1931. pp. 1-37.)

Good geographical details, with brief notes on the tribes encountered.

III. HISTORY OF ISLAM.

IV. KORAN, TRADITIONS, THEOLOGY.

THE IDEA OF MAN AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE CONCEPTION OF PERSIAN MYSTICS. Translated from the Russian of V. Zhukovski by L. Bogdanov. (In the *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, London Institution, London. Vol. VI. pt. 1, 1930. pp. 151-177.)

Discusses and analyzes the development of this idea in Persian Sufism; indicates the sources used in compiling the sketch.

THE TEACHING OF THE GREAT PROPHET: ITS APPEAL TO YOUTH TO-DAY. R. D. B. Blakeney. (In *The Islamic Review*, Woking. November, 1930. pp. 394-400.)

Under the post-war questioning of all authority, what are the vital elements in the creed of Islam which will enable it successfully to answer the challenge of youth?

V. RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL LIFE.

CREATIVE NATIONALISM IN TURKEY. Jagadisan M. Kumaraappa. (In *The Modern Review*, Calcutta. November, 1930. pp. 502-505.)

While limiting its discussion to internal affairs, notes the changes which have followed "the Americanization of Turkish mentality," in which process "Orientalism is being abandoned altogether."

A GLANCE AT TURKEY, ARMENIA, AND EGYPT. Donald C. Blaisdell. (In *The World Tomorrow*, New York. February, 1931. pp. 44-46.)

Traces the similarities and dissimilarities in the rebuilding of the social wreckage caused by the War in these sections of the Near East.

MAGIE ET EXORCISME CHEZ LES KAZAK-KIRGHIZS ET AUTRES PEUPLES TURKS ORIENTAUX. J. Castagné. (In *Revue des Études Islamiques*, Paris. 1930, cahier I. pp. 53-156.)

Includes some of the sacred hymns and chants; part of the article was published in Russian in 1910, but has been revised and greatly enlarged.

RECUEIL DE DÉLIBÉRATIONS DES DJEMÂ'A DU MZÂB. Louis Milliot et A. Giacobetti. (In *Revue des Études Islamiques*, Paris. 1930, cahier II. pp. 171-230.)

The minutes of old-time legal actions taken by the General Assembly of the five sacred cities of the Mzâb, analyzed chiefly from the point of view of law rather than of ethnography.

TURKEY HAS CHANGED! Herbert L. Willett, Jr. (In *The Christian Century*, Chicago. January 7, 1931. pp. 14-16.)

A kaleidoscopic view of the upheaval in Turkey during the last few years.

LA VIE FÉMININE AU MZÂB. A. M. Goichon. (In *Revue des Études Islamiques*, Paris. 1930, cahier II. pp. 231-287.)

To serve as supplementary notes to the author's book of this same title, which was published in 1927.

VI. POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS.

CONSTITUTIONALISM IN EGYPT. Arthur Marton. (In *The Contemporary Review*, London. January, 1931. pp. 32-40.)

An analysis of the new electoral law and the amendments in the Constitution.

EGYPT. E. W. Polson Newman. (In *The Contemporary Review*, London. November, 1930. pp. 570-577.)

Outlines the situation by considering respectively the actual facts in the development of the constitutional crisis, the history and evolution of Egyptian parliamentary life, and the relationship between Egyptian politics and Anglo-Egyptian relations.

EGYPT: A DECADE OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT. Elizabeth P. MacCallum. (In *Foreign Policy Association Information Service*, New York. January 7, 1931. pp. 403-420.)

Part I. is devoted to Anglo-Egyptian negotiations; part II. to domestic constitutional issues; with an appendix summarizing the Constitution and Electoral Law of 1930.

POLICY IN PALESTINE. Freda White. (In *The Nineteenth Century*, London. December, 1930. pp. 703-714.)

A dispassionate survey of Great Britain's pronouncements as to policy, showing that what is new in her plans is not a changed view of her obligations, but an economic program which marks the beginning of an active land policy for the Arab cultivators.

TEN YEARS OF BOLSHEVIST RULE IN AZERBAIJAN. Jeyhoun Bey Hajibeyli. (In *The Asiatic Review*, London. January, 1931. pp. 122-130.)

A brief résumé, indicating the special points where the rule is resented by the Turko-Azeris.

TURKISH POLITICS: PERSONS AND PARTIES. Julian Palmer. (In *The Nineteenth Century*, London. November, 1930. pp. 591-599.)

Attempts to trace the currents at work in political circles in Turkey, especially those which have been driven underground by the harsh measures of the Ghazi.

VII. MISSIONS TO MOHAMMEDANS.

CHRISTIAN PROPAGANDA AGAINST MUSLIMS. Sheikh S. M. S. Faruque. (In *The Islamic Review*, Woking. December, 1930. pp. 447-452.)

Written to awaken and to warn the Muslim reading public concerning the vehement propaganda being carried on against Islam, especially by American missionaries, and largely through Dr. Zwemer and his periodical, *The Moslem World*.

EVANGELISM IN PERSIA. J. H. Linton. (In *The International Review of Missions*, London. January, 1931. pp. 84-91.)

The change and upheaval in Persia are opening wide doors to the Gospel; and Bible distribution, public preaching services, and personal work for individuals are resulting in a noticeable current of thought favorable to Christianity.

PROGRESSIVE PERSIA. H. A. Lichtwardt. (In *World Dominion*, London. January, 1931. pp. 47-50.)

Indicates some of the forward steps taken during the last decade, notes the greater religious freedom, and comments on the problems facing the growing Church in Persia.

THE RELIGION OF THE MALAYS. R. A. Blasdel. (In *World Dominion*, London. January, 1931. pp. 74-80.)

An analysis of the various elements which underlie the predominant Mohammedanism, and a glance at the opportunities for Christian influence in the peninsula.

THE TURKISH SITUATION. Frank L. MacCallum. (In *World Dominion*, London. January, 1931. pp. 83-88.)

Indicates some of the difficulties the government has faced in putting through its drastic reforms, mentions the limitations under which Christian missionaries may work, and shows how the missionaries in Turkey are carrying on.