

probably especially Christianity—to apply new ways of propaganda, which may lead to astonishing results. The more the new government claims the name of Muslim, the greater the expectations for new opportunities for heterodox minorities. A government consisting mainly of Muslim ministers will be controlled with critical attention both by foreign countries and by Indonesian minorities. It will attempt to show its ability to satisfy the modern demands of justice. No one will suspect it of not giving full weight to its Muslim subjects. Therefore it will be freer towards the Muslim mass than the Western ruler was; or even freer than would be the case if the number of Christian Indonesians in the new government should be disproportionately great. This case seems quite possible, judging from the first cabinet council of East Indonesia and from the number of Christian Indonesians in the ministries of the Republic, which is out of proportion to the number of Christians in the Republic.

The above-mentioned problem is urgent now that important Christian groups (The Toba-Batak in North Sumatra and the Christian Javanese churches in Central and East Java) are caught between the surrounding hostile Muslims, who proved to them that freedom is not yet theirs and that danger to their lives still exists.

As soon as safety and freedom for expression of opinion are established for the Indonesian Christians in the territory of the Republic, this small but relatively more educated and self-conscious group will manifest itself strongly in public affairs. In both possibilities we see new opportunities for Christianity. But also we expect a new effect on Islam as a world power.

Here is not the place to consider the crisis in Islam as a religious, social and political institution. I only indicate that the symptoms of crisis began to show themselves in the Central Muslim countries, weakening them and crippling them so that they could not absorb the stream of new Western ideas. The countries of the periphery were the youngest, the strongest Muslim ones, the least affected by the sec-

ularizing Western influences which entered with Western expansion. As long as the Muslim countries of the periphery stood under the stern government, Islam was relatively safe. Islam was the fortress the ruler respected, the holy realm which was tabu to him and therefore gave him an abnormally high regard for it. In this connection I mention the pilgrimage to the Holy Land of Islam. It was guaranteed in Islamic countries under Western government. There this cherished privilege was respected, disregarding economic consequences.

In the prosperous years after World War I the pilgrimage from Indonesia to the Holy Land of Islam meant a loss of 50,000,000 Netherlands Indies guilders. Djeddah, Mecca and Medina gratefully wondered at the fact that this was permitted without restriction. The Djawi, i.e., the pilgrim from the Netherlands East Indies was meaningfully called "The bread of the Hedjaz." Also the Wahabi government, led by their King Ibn Sa'ud, expressed repeatedly its appreciation of the Netherlands' government in the Indies, which seemed to have attained to such prosperity and order that tens of thousands of its subjects—well dressed, with large food supplies, transported on beautiful clean ships—could join the pilgrimages as the best-paying "guests of Allah." Once my Turkish colleague in Djeddah asked me why on earth our government allowed this yearly drainage of national capital. Even if Java were very rich, to the Turkish embassy this seemed an unjustified policy in the long run. The government of modern Turkey was wiser. It did not prohibit participation in the pilgrimage, but it asked so much money for a visa to the Muslim Holy Land that only the rich could afford it. In consequence only some dozens of Turks went on pilgrimage. My colleague seemed to be quite satisfied with his government. I replied that only a Muslim government could take this liberty. A Western Christian government in Oriental Muslim countries has to maintain 100 percent. the principle of freedom of religion, especially for its Muslim subjects; if not for moral then for political motives.

In Mecca one had the bitter experience that emancipation of a Muslim country led to declining participation in the pilgrimage. An indigenous Muslim government cannot be deceived as to necessary or non-necessary duties for believers. Moreover in fixing its attitude towards Islam it has to take into account religious motives only, not primarily political ones, as is the case with Western governments.

It is well known that the pilgrimage is one of the five pillars in Islam which is greatly observed in Indonesia. It is less known that from these countries thousands used to go for whom pilgrimage was not a duty (women, and those who could not leave their family behind in good financial circumstances) or who could not fulfil this duty legally (for instance under-aged). No one is obliged to go more than once, nor when the roads are unsafe—which frequently occurred.

Our government never used these religious arguments to restrict the participation in the pilgrimage. An independent Muslim government can do this and obviously does for economic reasons. Because of their experience officials and private people in the Holy Land of Islam anxiously regard the development towards independence of the country which used to have the greatest share in the pilgrimage.

The Muslims who have a sweeping majority in the political building of the new Indonesia will soon perceive that they cannot carry through a classical Islamic government. Whether the experiment of building the greatest homogeneous Muslim state in the world will be successful depends on the separation of Church and State, which is in flagrant opposition to the orthodox expression of their faith.

The contribution of Muslims to the building of the new Indonesia has still to manifest itself. They made a weak effort when the "Republic" was formed. They tried to have Islam declared as the state religion and to stipulate that the President ought to be a Muslim. The orthodox believers were poorly organized and had too few politically trained leaders, causing them to be pushed aside by leaders of the

left wing democratic tendency, well trained by Western education and thinking.

Afterwards this injustice was compensated to some extent by taking into the Ministry some orthodox Muslims, members of the greatest political people's party, "The Masjumi," but they do not officially represent this party in the government.

If these millions are not incorporated into the government in due time and made active in the construction of the political, social and economic organization of the society, accepting their part in the responsibility entailed, they might become a handicap which might give a different development from the one now expected.

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