his capital at Sāmarra where he built enormous barracks for his Turkish troops. After that date Turkish soldiers became a common feature, as fresh accessions to their number continually flowed in from the East.

The fundamental objectives underlying the Islamic theory of war as revealed at the outset of Islam had changed considerably during the fierce struggle between the 'Abbāsids, relying upon their Khurāsān troops, and the Umayyads of Syria.

A new turning point is found, not in the life-and-death rivalry between two houses bidding for the leadership of the Moslem peoples, but in a relentless attempt to challenge the idea of Islamic sovereignty as represented in the person of the caliph, and the caliph's feverish effort to uphold the prerogatives of his high office despite the host of opponents pitted against him. In this he sought personal security through reliance upon bodyguards bearing no tie to the rest of the population. Security, however, is not so cheaply bought. Al-Muqtadir (908-32) in his disillusionment with the Turkish bodyguard promoted a rival slave army of some four thousand men. White slaves in thousands were brought in from various tribes in Central Asia, as well as from Mediterranean ports, especially from Spain and Italy. In the rise to political power of certain slaves favored by the rulers of their day we have not only a key to the continually shifting theory of war in the particular age but a means to the understanding of the origin of several important Islamic dynasties, including the emergence of the Mamlūks, whose power was not eclipsed in Egypt until the victory of the Ottoman Turks brought the Nile Valley under their control in 1517.

*The Religious Motive Subordinated.* Having dealt, though cursorily, with Islamic war from the universal, juristic and military angles, we shall now turn to two specific cases, the one drawn from modern history, the other from medieval times. Both of these attest the existence in Islamic wars of the religious motive, but show that it is normally over-shadowed by other considerations.

The Ottoman Empire, which united under its scepter most of the former 'Abbāsid provinces as well as new areas reaching as far as Vienna, was difficult to control, and disintegrated rapidly during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Organized ecclesiastical union was thwarted by political circumstances, as well as by the cultural level of Moslem peoples. In 1914 the final collapse of the *jihād* as a significant force was made clear. Ottoman Turkey acting in alliance with infidel countries served notice on the believers to fight the Entente powers, but the only Moslem rulers to respond were the Great Sanūsi of Libya and the Imām of Ṣan'ā'. The enemy side endeavored to disprove scientifically the dubious claim of Turkey to the caliphate. In point of fact the pan-Islamic propaganda of the years preceding the First World War bore little fruit, and it was probably the growing strength of nationalism among Moslem peoples which as much as any other factor played havoc with the Turks' appeal for Islamic unity, and made possible the anomaly of Indians and Arabs fighting with Christian powers against their Turkish co-religionists. We have seen how the *jihād* never denoted a purely religious sentiment sustaining the armies of Islam in their spectacular and epoch-making onslaughts. Since the downfall of the Turkish Caliph-Sultan the last practical significance of this conception was lost. Certain movements in Islam, such as Wahhābism in Sa'ūdi Arabia, still retain the holy war in their program, but modern Moslem theologians tend in general to dismiss it.

Returning to medieval times, it is noticeable that, long before the theologians disavowed the validity of *jihād,* it had already lost any religious connotation it might ever have had even in the minds of the pious and orthodox Moslems. Consider, for example, the bloody conflict under al-Mu'taṣim produced by the appearance of the dangerous Khurrami sect headed by Bābak[18] against whom the Caliph dispatched his Turkish general Bugha the Elder,

[18] Arabicized from Persian Pāpak. He began to stir up the population of the district of al-Badhdh in Arrān about 201/816-17 in the reign of al-Ma'mūn. In 204/819-20 Yaḥya ibn-Mu'ādh attacked him without success. Ṭabari, III, 2, p. 1015.

who met defeat.[19] Therefore al-Afshīn[20] prepared at the order of al-Mu'taṣim to crush the revolt. As a precaution against disaster al-Afshīn saved his troops by placing Kuhbānīyah (mountaineers) furnished with signals on the tops of hills. After an unsuccessful attack by the troops of al-Baṣrah and an assault by those of Farghānah, he had the town of al-Badhdh demolished by his corps of engineers (*kilghārīyah*).[21] Bābak took to flight, falling into the hands of Ṣāliḥ ibn-Sunbāṭ, an Armenian patriarch, who delivered him to the hand of al-Afshīn. Disregarding the pardon promised him by al-Afshīn, al-Mu'taṣim caused Bābak to be paraded on an elephant and executed with refined cruelty; his body was left hanging and gave its name to a quarter of Sāmarra. Significant about this civil war is the fact that it was a major conflict in which the theory of Islamic war as defense of sovereignty comes to the forefront. As a grandee of colossal influence in the Oriental power politics of his day, al-Afshīn was at first loaded with honor and reward, but later overthrown and cruelly executed in 226/840-41 on the grounds of apostacy, but in reality as a safeguard to caliphal sovereignty.

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[19] Ṭabari, III, 2, p. 1186.
[20] Title of the native princes, in pre-Islamic times, of the country of Usrūshana in Asia Minor.
[21] Ṭabari, III, 2, pp. 1196 *seq.*